write an argumentative essay about exercising your right to vote

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Exercising the right to vote is essential to being a good citizen

More Voting Rights :

• Four important responsibilities of voters
• Reasons why you should vote
• The right to vote should not be taken for granted
• Voting rights you might not know about

Generally speaking, most Americans tend to take their hard-won voting rights as guaranteed givens that go with the territory of U.S. citizenship. Such a lackadaisical attitude is extremely dangerous and may backfire with permanent loss of a false sense of political security, however. The primary reason why that’s true is due to proverbial mice’s bent to begin playing whenever their space is free of human inhabitants. In practical real-world terms, such a scenario invariably leads to progressive devolution of life circumstances beyond the point of no return that could have been completely avoided by electing the right candidate for the job. This is precisely what non-voting citizens do by effectively surrendering to defeat by default.

True Democracy vs. total hypocrisy

There are many reasons why you should vote , but the first and most important thing that non-voting eligible U.S. citizens must fully comprehend and keep firmly in mind at all times is the basic purpose of casting a ballot in any election: Tacit expression of personal preference in a public representative. That basic rule holds true for U.S. Presidential campaigns and local court administrators alike: Selecting the best candidate to represent constituents’ special interests.

Therefore, failure to vote constitutes implied consent to governance by incumbent public officeholders. It further equates to forfeiture of any right to voice any complaint about current governmental officials – despite how inept or corrupt they may be. The combined truths of all foresaid facts of American political life amount to a singular conclusion: failure to vote equals inexcusable neglect of public and private affairs.

Voting rights are mandatory responsibilities for naturalized and native citizens alike

A popular school of thought exists that holds voting as a mandatory obligation for naturalized U.S. citizens. The official Guide to Naturalization contains the following verbatim passage:

“Citizens have a responsibility to participate in the political process by registering and voting in elections.”

As such, the standard naturalization oath requires pledgees to solemnly swear or affirm to support the U.S. Constitution, which entails voting as an integral part of that affirmation.

While native U.S. citizens currently have no legal compulsion to vote, many knowledgeable observers urge the passage of legislation to mandate that every eligible citizen participate in all popular elections.

Many benefits vs. major detriments of voting

Despite a lack of notoriety or fame, political activism by casting a ballot in all elections can impart many subtle indirect advantages to citizens that include but are not limited to:

1. Having the relatively rare opportunity to exercise one of the primary privileges of membership in a democratic society.

Public officials in the U.S. are handpicked by a majority vote of governed populists. Such a momentous privilege must never be taken lightly and always exercised rightly. Numerous wars have been fought and many lives were lost to build and preserve democratic governance. Anyone who doubts the gravity of that point merely need to ask a fresh foreign immigrant whose homeland is ruled by leaders that weren’t chosen by the people. Indeed, such social catastrophes are precisely what many immigrants seek to escape by taking up residence in the U. S. of A. Even more startling is the dawning realization that failure to vote by all eligible citizens would result in an identical situation for America. After all, if no one bothers to express their desired pick for public representation, the U.S. federal government will install somebody to fill open seats in Congress and elsewhere throughout Washington.

2. Enhanced political clout and personal credibility

Even the least informed people can readily appreciate and respect potential gains to be made via consistently high levels of political activism. Thus, voting on a regular basis garners greater respect and admiration of others who become inspired to do likewise on their own behalf. This positive trickle-down effect ultimately culminates as increased voter participation on a much larger scale that is more representative of the entire electorate.

3. Nobody wants, needs or appreciates taxation without representation

As taxpayers, most citizens want some say so in where and how their hard-earned money goes and the manner in which the nation is run. The only way to ensure having some say to hold major sway with delegated responsible decision makers is voting for those in whom you repose complete trust and confidence.

In the final analysis, voting offers a means of speaking your mind without ever talking loud enough to let your voice be heard! Your vote is your voice. When you vote, you actually tell elected reps what you want and where you stand on important issues pertaining to public safety, retirement benefits, affordable healthcare and other matters of vital import. If you don’t vote for your personal beliefs, others will and you probably won’t like the end outcome. Not to dare mention betraying children by tossing their futures to the whimsical Fates.

A prime example of proof that one man, one vote really works was the 1960s Civil Rights Movement whereby sweeping, far-reaching positive changes occurred solely due to political activism of African Americans fed up with generations of extreme deprivation and second-class citizenship to such an extent that even precluded entry into public places via the front door. A peculiar aspect of those major victories was having to fight for the right to vote before being able to vote for positive change. However, take heart! If those forbears of color did it while facing huge hurdles that had to be overcome, so can you!

Why Voting Is Important

“Voting is your civic duty.” This is a pretty common sentiment, especially each November as Election Day approaches. But what does it really mean? And what does it mean for Americans in particular?

Social Studies, Civics, U.S. History

Americans Voting

Typically in the United States, national elections draw large numbers of voters compared to local elections.

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A History of Voting in the United States Today, most American citizens over the age of 18 are entitled to vote in federal and state elections , but voting was not always a default right for all Americans. The United States Constitution, as originally written, did not define specifically who could or could not vote—but it did establish how the new country would vote. Article 1 of the Constitution determined that members of the Senate and House of Representatives would both be elected directly by popular vote . The president, however, would be elected not by direct vote, but rather by the Electoral College . The Electoral College assigns a number of representative votes per state, typically based on the state’s population. This indirect election method was seen as a balance between the popular vote and using a state’s representatives in Congress to elect a president. Because the Constitution did not specifically say who could vote, this question was largely left to the states into the 1800s. In most cases, landowning white men were eligible to vote, while white women, black people, and other disadvantaged groups of the time were excluded from voting (known as disenfranchisement ).

While no longer explicitly excluded, voter suppression is a problem in many parts of the country. Some politicians try to win re election by making it harder for certain populations and demographics to vote. These politicians may use strategies such as reducing polling locations in predominantly African American or Lantinx neighborhoods, or only having polling stations open during business hours, when many disenfranchised populations are working and unable to take time off. It was not until the 15th Amendment was passed in 1869 that black men were allowed to vote. But even so, many would-be voters faced artificial hurdles like poll taxes , literacy tests, and other measures meant to discourage them from exercising their voting right. This would continue until the 24th Amendment in 1964, which eliminated the poll tax , and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which ended Jim Crow laws. Women were denied the right to vote until 1920, when the long efforts of the women’s suffrage movement resulted in the 19th Amendment. With these amendments removing the previous barriers to voting (particularly sex and race), theoretically all American citizens over the age of 21 could vote by the mid 1960s. Later, in 1971, the American voting age was lowered to 18, building on the idea that if a person was old enough to serve their country in the military, they should be allowed to vote. With these constitutional amendments and legislation like the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the struggle for widespread voting rights evolved from the Founding Fathers’ era to the late 20th century. Why Your Vote Matters If you ever think that just one vote in a sea of millions cannot make much of a difference, consider some of the closest elections in U.S. history. In 2000, Al Gore narrowly lost the Electoral College vote to George W. Bush. The election came down to a recount in Florida, where Bush had won the popular vote by such a small margin that it triggered an automatic recount and a Supreme Court case ( Bush v. Gore ). In the end, Bush won Florida by 0.009 percent of the votes cast in the state, or 537 votes. Had 600 more pro-Gore voters gone to the polls in Florida that November, there may have been an entirely different president from 2000–2008. More recently, Donald Trump defeated Hillary Clinton in 2016 by securing a close Electoral College win. Although the election did not come down to a handful of votes in one state, Trump’s votes in the Electoral College decided a tight race. Clinton had won the national popular vote by nearly three million votes, but the concentration of Trump voters in key districts in “swing” states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan helped seal enough electoral votes to win the presidency. Your vote may not directly elect the president, but if your vote joins enough others in your voting district or county, your vote undoubtedly matters when it comes to electoral results. Most states have a “winner take all” system where the popular vote winner gets the state’s electoral votes. There are also local and state elections to consider. While presidential or other national elections usually get a significant voter turnout, local elections are typically decided by a much smaller group of voters. A Portland State University study found that fewer than 15 percent of eligible voters were turning out to vote for mayors, council members, and other local offices. Low turnout means that important local issues are determined by a limited group of voters, making a single vote even more statistically meaningful. How You Can Make Your Voice Heard If you are not yet 18, or are not a U.S. citizen, you can still participate in the election process. You may not be able to walk into a voting booth, but there are things you can do to get involved:

• Be informed! Read up on political issues (both local and national) and figure out where you stand.
• Get out and talk to people. Even if you cannot vote, you can still voice opinions on social media, in your school or local newspaper, or other public forums. You never know who might be listening.
• Volunteer. If you support a particular candidate, you can work on their campaign by participating in phone banks, doing door-to-door outreach, writing postcards, or volunteering at campaign headquarters. Your work can help get candidates elected, even if you are not able to vote yourself.

Participating in elections is one of the key freedoms of American life. Many people in countries around the world do not have the same freedom, nor did many Americans in centuries past. No matter what you believe or whom you support, it is important to exercise your rights.

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Symposium - 2022 - Safeguarding the Fundamental Right to Vote

The right to vote, baselines and defaults, yasmin dawood *.

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Abstract. It is axiomatic in democratic theory that all citizens should have the right to vote. Voting should be easy and accessible, the theory goes. But easy compared to what? In practice, the right to vote is subject to an array of rules controlling the eligibility and opportunity to vote. An election undoubtedly requires some rules to ensure that it is ‘free and fair,’ but at what point do these rules diminish the equal opportunity of minority voters to cast a ballot?

This Essay addresses these questions by examining the baselines that undergird the right to vote. I identify three kinds of baselines—legal, contextual, and normative—and explore the implications of each for voting rights protection. Part I focuses on the legal baselines and defaults at play in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee . It finds that Justice Alito’s five “guideposts,” while seriously undercutting the reach and scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in vote-denial claims, do not provide a unified approach to the baseline question. This suggests that, in practice, Brnovich could be interpreted relatively broadly or narrowly, within its admittedly limited compass, in future vote-denial cases.

Part II focuses on a number of contextual baselines, including the Brnovich majority’s treatment of the history of the Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA, the relevance of socioeconomic circumstances for the right to vote, and the interaction of race and partisanship in vote-denial cases. Finally, Part III identifies two kinds of normative baselines—first, racial-equality and universalist principles of voting; and second, institutional best practices—and underscores their relevance for assessing electoral laws, voting processes, and court decisions. The conclusion highlights the importance of legal, contextual, and normative baselines for safeguarding the fundamental right to vote.

Introduction

It is axiomatic in democratic theory that all citizens should have the right to vote. 1 Open this footnote Close this footnote 1 See Dennis F. Thompson, Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States 4 (2002). … Open this footnote Close Voting should be easy and accessible, the theory goes. But easy compared to what? In practice, the right to vote is subject to an array of rules controlling the eligibility and opportunity to cast a ballot. An election undoubtedly requires some rules to ensure that it is ‘free and fair,’ but at what point do the rules governing the eligibility and opportunity to cast a ballot diminish the equal opportunity to vote?

This Essay addresses these questions by examining the baselines that undergird the right to vote. I identify three kinds of baselines—legal, contextual, and normative—and explore the implications of each for voting rights protection. Part I focuses on the legal baselines and defaults at play in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee . 2 Open this footnote Close this footnote 2 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021). … Open this footnote Close Legal baselines can be thought of as reference points, often explicitly articulated as an element of a legal test, which are indispensable to the analogic reasoning that undergirds legal interpretation. Defaults are best understood as “legal settings,” which are evident in such things as the burden of proof, evidentiary thresholds, or in the likelihood that a particular legal test will be successfully met.

Part I argues that there are multiple baselines and defaults at play in the majority opinion in Brnovich . I suggest that Justice Alito’s five “guideposts,” while seriously undercutting the reach and scope of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in vote-denial claims, do not provide a unified approach to the baseline question. This suggests that, in practice, Brnovich could be interpreted relatively broadly or narrowly, within its admittedly limited compass in future vote-denial cases. Part I contrasts the Brnovich best-case scenario with the Brnovich worst-case scenario to illustrate the possibilities and limits of this interpretive flexibility.

Part II focuses on the contextual baselines at work in the majority opinion. Contextual baselines consist of an assessment of background circumstances such as political, historical, or socioeconomic conditions. While often drawn obliquely, contextual baselines provide important points of reference for how a legal test is interpreted and applied. In Part II, I consider a number of contextual baselines, including the majority’s treatment of the history of the Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA, the relevance of socioeconomic circumstances for the right to vote, and the interaction of partisanship and race in vote-denial cases. Although contextual baselines are more abstract than legal baselines, they play a role in protecting or undermining the right to vote.

Part III considers normative baselines, which provide an external vantage point from which to assess cases, statutes, and policies. I first consider universalist and racial-equality normative principles, which I apply to the Supreme Court’s approach in Brnovich to demonstrate the majority’s departure from democratic principles. I then turn to another kind of normative baseline—institutional best practices—which are helpful for both the protection and the provision of the right to vote. The conclusion highlights the importance of legal, contextual, and normative baselines for safeguarding the fundamental right to vote.

II. Legal Baselines and Defaults

After the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder , 3 Open this footnote Close this footnote 3 570 U.S. 529 (2013). … Open this footnote Close which dismantled the preclearance process under Section 5 of the VRA, states enacted a wave of regulations restricting the opportunity and eligibility to vote. 4 Open this footnote Close this footnote 4 See The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Aug. 6, 2018), http://perma.cc/R7JP-3HXE . … Open this footnote Close These restrictions have amounted to a new form of vote denial. 5 Open this footnote Close this footnote 5 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act , 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 691-92 (2006). … Open this footnote Close To the extent that these voting restrictions have a disproportionate impact on minority voters, they can still be challenged under Section 2 of the VRA. 6 Open this footnote Close this footnote 6 For a discussion of vote denial claims under Section 2, as distinguished from vote dilution claims under Section 2, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial , 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 439, 442 (2015); and Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 2143, 2175-85 (2015). … Open this footnote Close

A. Vote-Denial Claims and the Brnovich Factors

The Court’s ruling in Brnovich was the first time it had addressed a Section 2 vote-denial claim. 7 Open this footnote Close this footnote 7 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2330. … Open this footnote Close At issue in the case were two Arizona voting rules: The first rule disenfranchised voters for casting a ballot in the wrong precinct, while the second rule prevented most third parties from delivering a voter’s ballot. 8 Open this footnote Close this footnote 8 Id. at 2334. … Open this footnote Close In Brnovich , a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, held that neither voting rule ran afoul of Section 2 of the VRA. 9 Open this footnote Close this footnote 9 Id. at 2343-44, 2350. The Court also rejected the claim that the ballot-delivery restriction was enacted with discriminatory intent in contravention of both Section 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 2350. … Open this footnote Close

More consequentially, the Court announced a new approach to vote-denial claims under Section 2. Relying on the “totality of the circumstances” language in Section 2, the Court identified five factors—or “guideposts”—that could be used to determine whether a Section 2 violation has been established; that is, whether the electoral process was not “equally open” to minority voters in that it did not provide an “equal opportunity” to participate in the political process. 10 Open this footnote Close this footnote 10 Id. at 2338-40. … Open this footnote Close According to the majority, this list of five factors does not amount to a formal “test,” nor is the list exhaustive. 11 Open this footnote Close this footnote 11 Id. at 2338. … Open this footnote Close The majority declined to follow its approach to Section 2 vote-dilution claims 12 Open this footnote Close this footnote 12 For the majority’s approach to Section 2 vote-dilution claims, see Thornburg v. Gingles , 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and its progeny. … Open this footnote Close on the grounds that Brnovich concerned an issue of first impression—the time, place or manner for casting ballots. 13 Open this footnote Close this footnote 13 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2337. … Open this footnote Close

The first guidepost is the “size of the burden imposed by a challenged voting rule.” 14 Open this footnote Close this footnote 14 Id. at 2338. … Open this footnote Close Because every voting regulation imposes a burden, whether it be travelling to a polling station or following directions to complete a ballot, the Court explained that Section 2 must allow for the “usual burdens of voting.” 15 Open this footnote Close this footnote 15 Id. … Open this footnote Close A “[m]ere inconvenience” would not pass muster. 16 Open this footnote Close this footnote 16 Id. at 2338. … Open this footnote Close The usual-burdens baseline establishes an additional threshold, not evident in the language of Section 2, that must be satisfied to demonstrate a violation. The second factor is the “degree to which a voting rule departs from what was standard practice when Section 2 was amended in 1982.” 17 Open this footnote Close this footnote 17 Id. at 2338. … Open this footnote Close The rationale for this baseline, according to the Court, is that the existing practice at the time—namely, voting in-person on election day with limited exceptions for absentee ballots—was presumptively supported by Congress. This baseline is puzzling given that Congress explicitly revised Section 2 to provide enhanced protection to minority voters.

The third factor is the “size of any disparities in a rule’s impact on members of different racial or ethnic groups.” 18 Open this footnote Close this footnote 18 Id. at 2339. … Open this footnote Close As the Court explained, race-based differences in “employment, wealth, and education,” mean that even neutral regulations may result in disparities. 19 Open this footnote Close this footnote 19 See id. … Open this footnote Close Hence, the majority established a baseline that small disparities are less likely to show that a voting system is not equally open. 20 Open this footnote Close this footnote 20 Id. … Open this footnote Close This factor also establishes a default that voters must provide statistical evidence demonstrating a sufficiently large disparity. 21 Open this footnote Close this footnote 21 See id. at 2346-47. … Open this footnote Close

The fourth factor is the set of “opportunities provided by a State’s entire system of voting.” 22 Open this footnote Close this footnote 22 Id. at 2339. … Open this footnote Close This entire-system baseline means that burdens imposed on voters by any one method of voting must be evaluated in light of all the avenues to vote in the state. This factor also establishes a default by which states are inoculated against the discriminatory impact of any one voting method as long as they can demonstrate that other methods exist. It also seems to establish a default that voters have to select an option that does not disenfranchise them.

The fifth factor is the “strength of the state interests served by a challenged voting rule.” 23 Open this footnote Close this footnote 23 Id. … Open this footnote Close According to the majority, the prevention of fraud and the prevention of undue influence in voting are strong state interests. 24 Open this footnote Close this footnote 24 Id. at 2340. … Open this footnote Close This factor establishes two defaults which are beneficial for the states. First, the states do not have to show evidence of electoral fraud; that is, they may take steps to prevent fraud without having to first detect it. 25 Open this footnote Close this footnote 25 Id. at 2348. … Open this footnote Close Second, the majority held that the state does not have to provide evidence that a less-restrictive alternative was not available or that the regulation was necessary to meet the state’s objectives. 26 Open this footnote Close this footnote 26 Id. at 2345-46. … Open this footnote Close

In addition, the Brnovich majority cautioned that the Gingles or Senate factors were designed for vote dilution cases; indeed, some of the Senate factors were clearly inapplicable to vote-denial claims. 27 Open this footnote Close this footnote 27 Id. at 2340 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 37 (1986)). … Open this footnote Close The Court appeared to say, however, in a rather ambiguous passage, that a consideration of some of the other Senate factors, such as historical and ongoing discrimination, was not impermissible. 28 Open this footnote Close this footnote 28 The majority stated that “the only relevance of . . . [Senate factors two, six and seven] and the remaining factors is to show that minority group members suffered discrimination in the past (factor one) and that effects of that discrimination persist (factor five).” Id. at 2340. … Open this footnote Close While these Senate factors should not be disregarded given Section 2(b)’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, their “relevance is much less direct.” 29 Open this footnote Close this footnote 29 Id. … Open this footnote Close The Court also stated that the disparate-impact model used in employment and housing cases was not useful in the voting context. In particular, the majority declined to read into Section 2 a strict necessity test whereby the states would have to show that the regulation in question provided the only means to achieve their interests. 30 Open this footnote Close this footnote 30 Id. at 2340-41. Nicholas Stephanopoulos proposes that Section 2 be treated as a standard disparate impact claim (similar to disparate impact claims in housing and employment), which would require a two-part test that asks, first, if a particular practice causes a significant racial disparity, and second, if the practice is necessary to achieve a substantial state interest. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law , 128 Yale L.J. 1566, 1595 (2019). … Open this footnote Close

In a notable dissent, Justice Kagan argued that the Court had “undermine[d] Section 2 and the right it provides.” 31 Open this footnote Close this footnote 31 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2351 (Kagan, J., dissenting). … Open this footnote Close Instead of reading Section 2 as Congress intended, the majority gave “a cramped reading to broad language” and then used that “reading to uphold two election laws from Arizona that discriminate against minority voters.” 32 Open this footnote Close this footnote 32 Id. … Open this footnote Close Furthermore, the guideposts announced by the Court serve as “extra-textual restrictions” on Section 2 that “all cut in one direction—toward limiting liability for race-based voting inequalities.” 33 Open this footnote Close this footnote 33 Id. at 2362. … Open this footnote Close

B. The Best-Case Scenario and the Worst Case Scenario After Brnovich

Predictions about the likely impact of Brnovich will be inevitably influenced by the pre-existing treatment of vote-denial claims by lower courts prior to the Court’s decision. While a detailed appraisal of these cases is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth noting that, prior to Brnovich , several appellate courts had coalesced around a two-part inquiry for vote-denial claims. 34 Open this footnote Close this footnote 34 See Dale E. Ho, Building an Umbrella in a Rainstorm: The New Vote Denial Litigation Since Shelby County, 127 Yale L.J.F. 799, 806-08 (2018); see also Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 1578-80 (analyzing the “emerging judicial consensus” for adjudicating vote-denial claims). … Open this footnote Close It asks, first, whether the challenged rule imposes a disparate burden on minority voters; and second, whether that burden is caused by or linked to the social and historical conditions of past and ongoing discrimination. 35 Open this footnote Close this footnote 35 See Ho, supra note 34, at 806. In a 2014 article, Daniel Tokaji proposed a three-part test for vote-denial claims (which was based in part on his earlier 2006 proposal). The first two steps are similar to the approach adopted by the lower courts, while the third step requires that the state “show by clear and convincing evidence that the burden on voting is outweighed by the state interests in the challenged standard.” Tokaji, supra note 6, at 473-74; see also Tokaji, supra note 5, at 724 (proposing his earlier 2006 version of the test). … Open this footnote Close But despite this apparent consensus, there were, as Nicholas Stephanopoulos argues, several unresolved issues with respect to the application of this two-part test in vote-denial cases pre- Brnovich . 36 Open this footnote Close this footnote 36 See Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 1582-89; see also Ho, supra note 34, at 809 (discussing differences among the circuit courts as to the evidentiary showing required to satisfy the two-part test); Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims , 17 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 675, 680, 689-90 (2014) (describing various factors used by courts to decide claims under Section 2). … Open this footnote Close Case outcomes had also been mixed, with some voting restrictions upheld and others struck down. 37 Open this footnote Close this footnote 37 See Ho, supra note 34, at 808. … Open this footnote Close While the impact of Brnovich will become clearer as lower courts apply the guideposts to actual cases, the decision may be less consequential than one might expect, in part because lower courts have always been more or less receptive to Section 2 vote-denial claims. 38 Open this footnote Close this footnote 38 See generally Michael S. Kang, Election Law Under the Post-Trump Supreme Court , Stan. L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 2022) (analyzing the impact of hyperpartisanship on election law). Another factor that may affect the overall impact of Brnovich is the decline in Section 2 claims. See Richard Hasen, Updated Katz Study: Substantial Decline in the Number of Cases Brought Under Section 2 of The Voting Rights Act and Plaintiffs’ Success in Winning Them , Election L. Blog (Mar. 1, 2022, 7:02 AM), http://perma.cc/KR2V-Q2GT . … Open this footnote Close

With this in mind, it is helpful to contrast the best-case scenario and the worst-case scenario post- Brnovich . While Brnovich erects significant barriers to a successful Section 2 vote-denial claim, it is worth observing that the Court has not established a unified approach to the baseline question.

Because these guideposts are neither a test nor an exhaustive list, courts would have some, albeit limited, discretion about which factors are most relevant. The ultimate stringency of the analysis will turn, to some degree, on the particular combination of baselines and defaults that a court selects. The non-exhaustive nature of the guideposts means not only that a court could select among the five Brnovich factors, but also that it could presumably consider other factors, including some of the Senate factors as indicated by the Court, under a totality of the circumstances analysis. Not only do courts have some (limited) flexibility in selecting a combination of baselines and defaults, they also have some discretion about how stringently these baselines and defaults are interpreted. The best-case scenario is that Brnovich could be interpreted relatively broadly or narrowly by courts, within this admittedly constrained compass.

That being said, Brnovich has added new considerations to the mix, which may, even under a best-case scenario, exert a chilling effect on the likelihood of success. The 1982 baseline, for example, has significant implications for future cases: Challenges to post-1982 developments like early voting, voting by mail, and automatic registration are unlikely to succeed. 39 Open this footnote Close this footnote 39 See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Strong and Weak Claims After Brnovich , Election L. Blog (July 1, 2021, 6:58 PM), http://perma.cc/XS3E-DR6A . … Open this footnote Close In addition, this baseline sends a signal to the states that “they can roll back voting restrictions to a time when registration was onerous, and early and absentee voting rare.” 40 Open this footnote Close this footnote 40 Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Latest Voting Rights Opinion Is Even Worse Than It Seems , Slate (July 8, 2021, 10:16 AM), http://perma.cc/2WQE-LDMJ . … Open this footnote Close The two-part test used by most lower courts in vote-denial cases did not employ this 1982 baseline, nor did it rely on some of the other Brnovich factors, such as the usual-burdens baseline and the entire-system baseline. 41 Open this footnote Close this footnote 41 See supra text accompanying notes 14-17, 22. … Open this footnote Close The Brnovich guideposts also establish defaults that benefit the states: The third factor, for instance, requires plaintiff voters to provide statistical evidence of a sufficiently large racial disparity, while the fifth factor makes it easier for states to demonstrate the strength of the state interests behind the challenged rule. 42 Open this footnote Close this footnote 42 See supra text accompanying notes 18-21, 23-26. … Open this footnote Close Taken together, these additional considerations will make it more difficult for plaintiff voters to demonstrate a violation of Section 2 as compared to the requirements of the lower courts’ two-part test.

While there remains some possibility of redressing vote denial under the best-case scenario, the worst-case scenario post- Brnovich would be very bad indeed. To be sure, given the partisan pattern of voting restrictions (and for that matter, courts), much turned, even prior to Brnovich , on whether or not the court in question was hostile to the VRA. What Brnovich has done, however, is to furnish lower courts not only with a green light to reject challenges to voting rules but also with enhanced jurisprudential tools to do so.

Under the worst case scenario, a court could select the most stringent combination and interpretation of the baselines and defaults from the five Brnovich factors. Under such an approach, plaintiff voters would be required to provide the following: a statistical demonstration of a sufficiently large racial disparity resulting from an unusual burden placed on minority voters by a voting rule which was not a standard practice in 1982 and which provides the only avenue to cast a ballot.

Meanwhile, a state would be inoculated from Section 2 liability if it provided multiple avenues for voting and had a sufficiently strong state interest. This is a low bar to meet because, first, almost any state interest (fraud prevention; electoral integrity; orderly administration) is acceptable and second, the state is not required to provide evidence justifying this state interest. Nor, for that matter, is the state required to show that there are any less-restrictive alternatives to the measure. Indeed, as demonstrated by the Court majority’s analysis of the Arizona voting rules, the Brnovich factors can be easily used to find no violation of Section 2. 43 Open this footnote Close this footnote 43 To be sure, it would have been far more instructive if the Court had applied the factors to a strict photo-identification requirement than the two Arizona voting rules. … Open this footnote Close For the first factor, the majority found that voting in the correct polling place was a “quintessential” example of a usual burden, as was the requirement to submit early ballots by mail. 44 Open this footnote Close this footnote 44 Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2344-46 (2021). … Open this footnote Close With respect to the third factor, the 0.5% difference in out-of-precinct ballots as between minority voters and non-minority voters was, according to the majority, too small a disparity, particularly in view of the overall rates of voting. 45 Open this footnote Close this footnote 45 Id. at 2344-45. … Open this footnote Close As for the ballot-delivery restriction, the majority first noted the lack of statistical evidence, and then proceeded to reject the witness testimony regarding the disadvantages faced by Native American voters on the grounds that this testimony was insufficient to establish that the restriction resulted in less opportunity to participate in the political process. 46 Open this footnote Close this footnote 46 See id. at 2346-47, 2347 n.19. … Open this footnote Close For the fourth factor, the Court found that even if

Arizona had the highest rate of discarded out-of-precinct votes in the country, the state offered several ways to vote, including early voting. 47 Open this footnote Close this footnote 47 See id. at 2344. … Open this footnote Close With respect to the fifth factor, the Court found that the state interests behind the two rules—orderly administration and electoral integrity, respectively—were sufficiently weighty to satisfy Section 2.

In sum, while it is certainly the case that lower courts prior to Brnovich were able to reject vote-denial challenges, the Brnovich decision has given a stamp of approval—and greater jurisprudential means—to lower courts that are determined to make Section 2 a dead letter. If a court is open to Section 2 claims, there is some, albeit limited, scope to find that a voting restriction has run afoul of Section 2. In this sense, the Brnovich decision has shifted the goalposts—making it even easier for courts to reject challenges to vote-denial practices and even harder for voters to prevail.

II. Contextual Baselines

In addition to the explicit baselines and defaults which form the “legal machinery” of tests, judicial decisions also deploy contextual baselines which provide background reference points for how a legal test is constructed, interpreted, and applied. These baselines are rooted in an assessment of political, historical, or socioeconomic conditions, and may augment or diminish the relevance of these background conditions. Although contextual baselines are often expressed obliquely (if at all), they can have a significant impact on the ultimate decision.

A. The Historical Context of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act

In Brnovich , the most notable example of a contextual baseline is the Court majority’s treatment of the history of the Fifteenth Amendment and the VRA. Justice Alito painted an appropriately bleak picture of this historical context, observing that the right to vote for African Americans was “heavily suppressed” by frequently “blatant efforts” of disenfranchisement—in particular the use of “notorious methods,” such as literacy tests and ‘white primaries,’ which led to “appallingly low” rates of voting in some states. 48 Open this footnote Close this footnote 48 See id. at 2330-31. … Open this footnote Close

The point of this contextual baseline, however, is not to indicate a protective stance toward the right to vote but rather the opposite: to imply, first, that the two Arizona laws are trivial in comparison, and second, that the kind of race-based voter discrimination that requires a legal response is an artifact of the past and/or that current vote denial must rise to the same level of past egregiousness to warrant a response. Reminiscent of Shelby County v. Holder , 49 Open this footnote Close this footnote 49 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet”). … Open this footnote Close Justice Alito under-emphasized the crucial role played by the VRA in protecting minority voting rights. Despite his reassurance that “no one [is] suggest[ing] that discrimination in voting has been extirpated,” 50 Open this footnote Close this footnote 50 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2343. … Open this footnote Close he failed to mention the political reality that numerous states passed voter suppression laws after the Court dismantled the preclearance process in Shelby County . 51 Open this footnote Close this footnote 51 See The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 4 (“The decision in Shelby County opened the floodgates to laws restricting voting throughout the United States.”). … Open this footnote Close

B. Social and Economic Circumstances

The Brnovich majority displayed considerable ambiguity about the legal relevance of background socioeconomic conditions, making it difficult to discern a clear baseline. The Court did acknowledge that race-based “differences in employment, wealth, and education may make it virtually impossible for a State to devise rules that do not have some disparate impact.” 52 Open this footnote Close this footnote 52 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2343. … Open this footnote Close Hence, guidepost three requires a showing of a large racial disparity. 53 Open this footnote Close this footnote 53 See id. at 2339. … Open this footnote Close While there are good reasons for this requirement, in particular the concern that it would be unmanageable if every minor disparate impact could trigger a Section 2 claim, 54 Open this footnote Close this footnote 54 See, e.g ., Stephanopoulos, supra note 30, at 1612 (arguing that “[d]isparate impacts are ubiquitous, alas, so if they were all actionable, many institutions might be paralyzed by litigation and more severe discrepancies could be overshadowed by relatively trivial ones”). … Open this footnote Close the addition of this requirement does not resolve the underlying ambiguity.

For instance, none of the guideposts explicitly invite plaintiffs to demonstrate the impact of these background conditions on voting. 55 Open this footnote Close this footnote 55 For a contrasting approach, see Ho, supra note 34, at 821 (describing how racial disparities in factors such as the possession of photo identification or a reliance on early voting are caused by socioeconomic factors linked to historic racism). … Open this footnote Close That being said, the Brnovich majority did allude to some of the Senate factors, including historic and ongoing discrimination, but here too there is a certain amount of hedging, with the Court stating that while these Senate factors should not be ignored, they are also not directly relevant. 56 Open this footnote Close this footnote 56 See supra text accompanying notes 27-29. … Open this footnote Close The Brnovich majority’s ambiguous stance on the legal relevance of background socioeconomic conditions is particularly evident when contrasted with Justice Kagan’s straightforward assertion that Section 2’s totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry requires the consideration of contextual circumstances: Equal voting opportunity is a function of both the voting rule and how it operates “against the backdrop of historical, social, and economic conditions.” 57 Open this footnote Close this footnote 57 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2359-60 (Kagan, J. dissenting); see also Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial , 54 B.C. L. Rev . 579, 586 (2013) (arguing that the VRA is a disparate impact statute and that vote-denial claims under § 2 should focus on the racial context as a cause of disparate vote denial). … Open this footnote Close

C. The Meaning of “Equally Open” and “Equal Opportunity”

The Court’s ambiguous stance is also evident its interpretation of the statutory language of Section 2. While, according to the majority, the term “equal opportunity” helps to explain the meaning of “equally open,” the “touchstone” of Section 2 is that the voting process must be “equally open” for minority voters. 58 Open this footnote Close this footnote 58 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2337-38. … Open this footnote Close But the wording of Section 2 does not even mention “ equal opportunity;” instead, Section 2 refers to minority voters having “ less opportunity” than other voters. 59 Open this footnote Close this footnote 59 52 U.S.C. § 10301. … Open this footnote Close The purpose of the majority’s analysis, it seems, is to focus attention on the equal openness of the voting rule (which requires a formalist assessment of the means) rather than on the diminished opportunity experienced by the minority voter (which requires a contextual assessment of the voter’s ability to use the means).

Furthermore, given that “opportunity” means, according to the majority’s own definition, a “combination of circumstances, time, and place” favorable for a particular outcome, 60 Open this footnote Close this footnote 60 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct at 2338. … Open this footnote Close it seems logical that such background circumstances would be relevant to assessing whether or not a minority voter had “less opportunity” to participate. 61 Open this footnote Close this footnote 61 Id. at 2337. … Open this footnote Close The Court’s ambiguous stance is amplified by its fleeting concession at the conclusion of its textual analysis that Section 2’s reference to equal “opportunity” may “stretch” the concept of equal openness “to some degree to include consideration of a person’s ability to use the means that are equally open.” 62 Open this footnote Close this footnote 62 Id. at 2338. … Open this footnote Close The Court appears to acknowledge that the background circumstances affecting a voter’s ability to vote may be relevant but, at the same time, the majority does not explicitly embrace a consideration of these background conditions.

D. Race, Partisanship, and Voting Restrictions

Justice Kagan stated that there is “a Section 2 problem when an election rule, operating against the backdrop of historical, social, and economic conditions, makes it harder for minority citizens than for others to cast ballots.” 63 Open this footnote Close this footnote 63 Id. at 2360 (Kagan, J., dissenting). … Open this footnote Close Why does this not seem to be a Section 2 problem for the Brnovich majority? One possible reason is that these voting restrictions are viewed as partisan barriers rather than as racial ones—that is, states are passing these restrictions to suppress the vote of their political opponents (Democrats) rather than to suppress the votes of minority voters per se.

On this account, the wave of voting restrictions passed in the wake of Shelby County is just another example of partisan politics. 64 Open this footnote Close this footnote 64 For an analysis of the race/party divide, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party? How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere , 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 58 (2014) (arguing that, given the overlap of considerations of race and consi Dawood-74-Stan.-L.-Rev-37 derations of party, a restriction on voting is often viewed as either a law about race or as a law about party politics). … Open this footnote Close For instance, the Brnovich majority stated that “partisan motives are not the same as racial motives” when it discussed the intentional discrimination claim with respect to the ballot-delivery restriction (which it described as a reaction to a “Democratic get-out-the-vote strategy”). 65 Open this footnote Close this footnote 65 Brnovich , 141 S. Ct at 2349 (citing Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1473-74 (2017)). … Open this footnote Close Since partisan competition is inevitable, the theory would go, the VRA should only kick in when a certain threshold of race-based vote denial has been reached. Even putting aside the problem that this approach wrongfully minimizes the harm of race-based voting restrictions, the fact that it is fair game for states to exploit these socioeconomic differences for partisan gain is itself deeply problematic.

III. Normative Baselines

Normative baselines provide an external vantage point by which current laws, policies, and judicial decisions can be judged. These baselines refer not only to the ideals, principles and values underlying the right to vote, but also to the institutional best practices that help to provide and protect voting rights.

A. The Principle of Racial Equality

An important normative baseline is the vision of racial equality that animates the VRA. The Brnovich decision departs in significant measure from this normative baseline. As Justice Kagan observed, the Court “has (yet again) rewritten—in order to weaken—a statute that stands as a monument to America’s greatness, and protects against its basest impulses.” 66 Open this footnote Close this footnote 66 Id. at 2351 (Kagan, J., dissenting). … Open this footnote Close Rather than ensuring the equal opportunity of minority voters to cast a ballot, the Brnovich approach “stacks the deck against minority citizens’ voting rights.” 67 Open this footnote Close this footnote 67 Id. at 2362. … Open this footnote Close There is no question that the Brnovich guideposts, which place the onus on minority voters, are in some considerable tension with a statute designed by Congress to place the onus on the states. 68 Open this footnote Close this footnote 68 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, The Court’s Voting-Rights Decision Was Worse Than People Think , Atlantic (July 8, 2021), http://perma.cc/SY3A-EHSS ; Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Brnovich and the Conflation of Disparities and Burdens , Election L. Blog (July 6, 2021), http://perma.cc/RQA2-37RR (arguing that the Bnrovich decision is simply “inventing additional hoops” and “stacking the deck against plaintiffs so they’ll lose more often,” and that it therefore amounts to “ideological opposition to Section 2, not statutory interpretation”). … Open this footnote Close

B. Universalist Principles of Voting

Universalist principles of voting, which apply to all citizens irrespective of race, have attracted increasing attention, 69 Open this footnote Close this footnote 69 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The Death of a Superstatute , 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1389, 1433 (2015); Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights Law , 92 Ind. L.J. 299, 300-01 (2016). … Open this footnote Close perhaps in part due to the skepticism displayed in recent Supreme Court decisions about the need to protect minority voting rights. 70 Open this footnote Close this footnote 70 See, e.g. , Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 69, at 1439 (arguing that “the consensus about racial discrimination that supported the VRA has dissolved”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Slouching Toward Universality: A Brief History of Race, Voting, and Political Participation , 62 Howard L.J. 809, 814-15 (2019) (arguing that barriers to voting, whether based on race or not, are increasingly viewed as unacceptable, and that this shift to universality is ironically due to the nation’s experience with race and voting); Jowei Chen & Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Race-Blind Future of Voting Rights , 130 Yale L.J. 862, 864-66, 872-76 (2021) (describing the Supreme Court majority’s skepticism of race-based electoral policies and exploring the implications of a race-blind baseline for vote dilution cases); Ekow N. Yankah, Compulsory Voting and Black Citizenship , 90 Fordham L. Rev. 639, 652, 675 (2021) (arguing for the adoption of compulsory voting as a remedy for various democratic ills, including the fact that “universal access to voting has been insufficient to secure the Black vote”). … Open this footnote Close These universalist principles can provide a useful vantage point from which to assess judicial decisions, such as Brnovich , even when these decisions are concerned with barriers faced by minority voters.

Although a full-blown analysis is not possible in this Essay, I provide a provisional account of two universalist normative principles. 71 Open this footnote Close this footnote 71 For a discussion of these principles, see Yasmin Dawood, Constructing the Demos: Voter Qualification Laws in Comparative Perspective , in Comparative Election Law 270, 270-84 (James A. Gardner ed., forthcoming 2022). … Open this footnote Close The first is that voter-qualification and voting-access rules should be structured to optimize the ability of voters to cast a ballot. The underlying assumption is that greater participation is preferable to less participation in a democracy. This means that the opportunity to vote should be as expansive as possible while still ensuring a fair and efficacious electoral process. To put it another way, the baseline should be set to enable the greatest possible level of voting by all citizens, while nonetheless ensuring that the administration of the election abides by genuine (and not pretextual) requirements of accuracy, efficacy, transparency, and trustworthiness.

The second normative principle is that a voting law that creates barriers because of the anticipated choice of the voter violates the basic premise of free and fair elections, namely that all citizens are equal and should have the equal opportunity to participate freely in elections. In a democracy, individuals should not face barriers to voting because of how they are expected to vote. This principle would bar partisan rules that are designed to create barriers to vote for supporters of an opposing political party. 72 Open this footnote Close this footnote 72 For an argument against partisanship, see generally Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship , 116 Mich. L. Rev. 351 (2017) (arguing that partisanship is not a constitutional government purpose). … Open this footnote Close

With respect to the first normative principle, the Supreme Court could have furnished a set of factors (and accompanying baselines and defaults) in Brnovich that optimized the equal ability of minority voters to cast a ballot by allowing for a (better) balance between protecting voting rights and protecting the state’s interests in an orderly election. This would mean, for example, that the requirement that voters demonstrate a sufficiently large racial disparity be balanced by comparable burdens imposed on the states. That is, that states would be required to furnish evidence about the harms they were seeking to prevent. The second normative principle, whereby states would be required to ensure widespread voting irrespective of how particular voters are expected to vote, likewise highlights the deficiencies of the Brnovich decision. On this view, rules that make it harder for certain voters to vote—whether because of their racial identity or assumed partisan affiliation—would be impermissible.

C. Institutional Best Practices

Voting rights also benefit from attention to institutional best practices. The right to vote, as I suggest elsewhere, amounts to a “structural right” because its existence depends upon an entire array of institutions, such as political parties, electoral districts, and legislative bodies. 73 Open this footnote Close this footnote 73 See Yasmin Dawood, Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights Approach to Judicial Review , 62 U. Toronto L.J. 499, 503 (2012). … Open this footnote Close This means that the right to vote cannot be protected without attention to the institutional infrastructure that renders such a right intelligible and meaningful. 74 Open this footnote Close this footnote 74 See Yasmin Dawood, Democracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights Under the Charter , 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251, 255 (2013). … Open this footnote Close Indeed, I claim that the provision of the right to vote in free and fair elections is a basic requirement of effective democratic government. 75 Open this footnote Close this footnote 75 See Yasmin Dawood, Effective Government and the Two Faces of Constitutionalism , in Constitutionalism and a Right to Effective Government? 47, 48 (Vicki C. Jackson & Yasmin Dawood eds., forthcoming 2022). … Open this footnote Close

Thus, the development of best practices to support and strengthen this institutional infrastructure is crucial for voting rights protection. These institutional best practices may focus on innovations such as automatic voter registration and election day registration. 76 Open this footnote Close this footnote 76 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform , 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 453, 498-501 (2008). … Open this footnote Close Alternatively, these baselines may concern best practices of electoral administration as developed during the pandemic. 77 Open this footnote Close this footnote 77 See Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, The Miracle and Tragedy of the 2020 U.S. Election , 32 J. Democracy 159, 160, 174-75 (2021). … Open this footnote Close Normative baselines with respect to electoral management bodies are likewise helpful. 78 Open this footnote Close this footnote 78 See Mark Tushnet, The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy 123-57 (2021). … Open this footnote Close Comparative examples and international standards of electoral integrity may also be a source of institutional best practices. 79 Open this footnote Close this footnote 79 See Pippa Norris, Why Elections Fail 4-11, 19-21, 170-78 (2015). … Open this footnote Close

D. The Democratic Value of Normative Baselines

What is the democratic value of these normative principles and institutional best practices? They may seem trivial or even irrelevant in the face of the multiple challenges facing democracy. Not only have the Supreme Court’s decisions on preclearance, partisan gerrymandering, campaign finance, and now, vote denial, undermined the fairness of the electoral process, but certain states are actively engaged in restricting voting rights. 80 Open this footnote Close this footnote 80 See Yasmin Dawood, Election Law Originalism: The Supreme Court’s Elitist Conception of Democracy , 64 St. Louis U. L.J. 609, 611-17 (2020); The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, supra note 4. … Open this footnote Close The post-election insurrection has revealed the fragility of democratic norms. The political blockades against the For The People Act and the Freedom to Vote Act (not to mention the anticipated judicial reaction to such statutes if enacted) raise serious doubts about the capacity of the political branches to protect voting rights. 81 Open this footnote Close this footnote 81 See Andrew Prokop, Democrats’ Doomed Voting Bill Is Too Broad to Pass–and Not Broad Enough to Work , Vox (June 8, 2021, 8:00 AM EDT), http://perma.cc/UR2G-KXKV . … Open this footnote Close These anxieties about the resilience of democracy are magnified given current events on the world stage. 82 Open this footnote Close this footnote 82 See generally, e.g. , Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018); Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Z. Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (2019); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts (2015). … Open this footnote Close

Despite these significant challenges, it is, in my view, more important than ever to develop and foster normative principles and institutional best practices to protect the right to vote. Normative principles provide us with the benchmarks by which we can assess and judge policies, laws, and judicial decisions. These principles matter not only for the protection of voting, but they also serve as a crucial foundation for citizens’ continued commitment to the values and ideals of the right to vote. Institutional best practices are likewise indispensable for strengthening the right to vote and for establishing benchmarks for future reforms.

This Essay has highlighted the significance of three kinds of baselines—legal, contextual, and normative—for safeguarding the fundamental right to vote. I have suggested that the protection of the right to vote is, at least in part, a function of the legal baselines and defaults used to assess the rules that govern the eligibility and opportunity to vote. While contextual baselines are more abstract, often relating to understandings of background political, historical, and socioeconomic circumstances, they too are vital for defending voting rights. Finally, this Essay has considered normative baselines for the conceptual and institutional dimensions of voting. I have suggested that, notwithstanding the significant challenges facing the polity, an important way to bolster voting rights is to continue to shine a light on the normative principles, ideals, and institutional best practices of free and fair elections.

* Canada Resear c h Chair in Democracy, Constitutionalism, and Electoral Law and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Department of Political Science, University of Toronto. I would like to thank Jessie Amunson, Mi c hael Carvin, Guy Charles, Mi c hael Kang, Allison Riggs, Nick Stephanopoulos, anonymous reviewers, and the participants at the Stanford Law Review Symposium on Safeguarding the Fundamental Right to Vote for very helpful comments and conversations. Special thanks to Azeezat Adeleke for superb editorial work on this Essay, and to Donovan Hicks, S c huyler Atkins, and the staff of the Stanford Law Review for their excellent editorial assistance and for organizing a truly exceptional symposium.

The featured image “Election Day 2020” by Phil Roeder is licensed under CC BY 2.0 .

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The Ethics and Rationality of Voting

This entry focuses on six major questions concerning the rationality and morality of voting:

• Is it rational for an individual citizen to vote?
• Is there a moral duty to vote?
• Are there moral obligations regarding how citizens vote?
• Is it justifiable for governments to compel citizens to vote?
• Is it permissible to buy, trade, and sell votes?
• Who ought to have the right to vote, and should every citizen have an equal vote?

Question 6 concerns the broader question of whether democratic forms of government are preferable to the alternatives; see Christiano (2006) on the justification of democracy for a longer discussion. See also Pacuit (2011) for a discussion of which voting method is best suited to reflect the “will of the group”. See Gosseries (2005) for a discussion of arguments for and against the secret ballot.

1.1 Voting to Change the Outcome

1.2 voting to change the “mandate”, 1.3 other reasons to vote, 2.1 a general moral obligation not to vote, 3.1 the expressivist ethics of voting, 3.2 the epistemic ethics of voting, 4. the justice of compulsory voting, 5. the ethics of vote buying, 6.1 democratic challenges to one person, one vote, 6.2 non-democratic challenges to one person, one vote, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the rationality of voting.

The act of voting has an opportunity cost. It takes time and effort that could be used for other valuable things, such as working for pay, volunteering at a soup kitchen, or playing video games. Further, identifying issues, gathering political information, thinking or deliberating about that information, and so on, also take time and effort which could be spent doing other valuable things. Economics, in its simplest form, predicts that rational people will perform an activity only if doing so maximizes expected utility. However, economists have long worried that, that for nearly every individual citizen, voting does not maximize expected utility. This leads to the “paradox of voting”(Downs 1957): Since the expected costs (including opportunity costs) of voting appear to exceed the expected benefits, and since voters could always instead perform some action with positive overall utility, it’s surprising that anyone votes.

However, whether voting is rational or not depends on just what voters are trying to do. Instrumental theories of the rationality of voting hold that it can be rational to vote when the voter’s goal is to influence or change the outcome of an election, including the “mandate” the winning candidate receives. (The mandate theory of elections holds that a candidate’s effectiveness in office, i.e., her ability to get things done, is in part a function of how large or small a lead she had over her competing candidates during the election.) In contrast, the expressive theory of voting holds that voters vote in order to express themselves and their fidelity to certain groups or ideas. Alternatively, one might hold that voting is rational because it is has consumption value; many people enjoy political participation for its own sake or for being able to show others that they voted. Finally, if one believes, as most democratic citizens say they do (Mackie 2010), that voting is a substantial moral obligation, then voting could be rational because it is necessary to discharge one’s obligation.

One reason a person might vote is to influence, or attempt to change, the outcome of an election. Suppose there are two candidates, D and R . Suppose Sally prefers D to R . Suppose she correctly believes that D would do a trillion dollars more overall good than R would do. If her beliefs were correct, then by hypothesis, it would be best if D won.

Here, casting the expected value difference between the two candidates in monetary terms is a simplifying assumption. Whether political outcomes can be described in monetary terms as such is not without controversy. To illustrate, suppose the difference between two candidates came down entirely to how many lives would be lost in the way they would conduct a current war. Whether we can translate “lives lost” into dollar terms is controversial. Further, whether we can commensurate all the distinct goods and harms a candidate might cause onto a common scale is also controversial.

Even if the expected value difference between two candidates could be expressed on some common value scale, such as in monetary terms, this leaves open whether the typical voter is aware of or can generally estimate that difference. Empirical work generally finds that most voters are badly informed, and further, that many of them are not voting for the purpose of promoting certain policies or platforms over others (Achen and Bartels 2016; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Mason 2017). Beyond that, estimating the value difference between candidates requires evaluating complex counterfactuals, estimating what various candidates are likely to achieve, and determining what the outcomes of these actions would be (Freiman 2020).

These worries aside, even if Sally is correct that D will do a trillion dollars more good than R , this does not yet show it is rational for Sally to vote for D . Instead, this depends on how likely it is that her vote will make a difference. In much the same way, it might be worth $200 million to win the lottery, but that does not imply it is rational to buy a lottery ticket.

Suppose Sally’s only goal, in voting, is to change the outcome of the election between two major candidates. In that case, the expected value of her vote (\(U_v\)) is:

where p represents the probability that Sally’s vote is decisive, \([V(D) - V(R)]\) represents (in monetary terms) the difference in the expected value of the two candidates, and C represents the opportunity cost of voting. In short, the value of her vote is the value of the difference between the two candidates discounted by her chance of being decisive, minus the opportunity cost of voting. In this way, voting is indeed like buying a lottery ticket. Unless \(p[V(D) - V(R)] > C\), then it is (given Sally’s stated goals) irrational for her to vote.

The equation above models the rationality of Sally’s choice to vote under the assumption that she is simply trying to change the outcome of the election, and gets no further benefit from voting. Further, the equation assumes her vote confers no other benefit to others than having some chance of changing which candidate wins. However, these are controversial simplifying assumptions. It is possible that the choice to cast a vote may induce others to vote, might improve the quality of the ground decision by adding cognitive diversity, might have some marginal influence on which candidates or platforms parties run, or might have some other effect not modeled in the equation above.

Again, it is controversial among some philosophers whether the difference in value between two candidates can be expressed, in principle, in monetary terms. Nevertheless, the point generalizes in some way. If we are discussing the instrumental value of a vote, then the general point is that the vote depends on the expected difference in value between the chosen candidate and the next best alternative, discounted by the probability of the vote breaking a tie, and we must then take into account the opportunity cost of voting. For instance, if two candidates were identical except that one would save one more life than another, but one had a 1 in 1 billion chance of being decisive, and instead of voting one could save a drowning toddler, then it seems voting is not worthwhile, even if we cannot assign an exact monetary value to thee consequences.

There is some debate among economists, political scientists, and philosophers over the precise way to calculate the probability that a vote will be decisive. Nevertheless, they generally agree that the probability that the modal individual voter in a typical election will break a tie is small. Binomial models of voting estimate the probability of a vote being decisive by modeling voters as if they were weighted coins and then asking what the probability is that a weighted coin will come up heads exactly 50% of the time. These models generally imply that the probability of being decisive, if any candidate has a lead, is vanishingly small, which in turn implies that the expected benefit of voting (i.e., \(p[V(D) - V(R)]\)) for a good candidate is worth far less than a millionth of a penny (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993: 56–7, 119). A more optimistic estimate in the literature, which uses statistical estimate techniques based on past elections, claims that in a typical presidential election, American voters have widely varying chances of being decisive depending on which state they vote in. This model still predicts that a typical vote in a “safe” states, like California, has a vanishingly small chance of making a difference, but suggests that that a vote in very close states could have on the order of a 1 in 10 million chance of breaking a tie (Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007). Thus, on both of these popular models, whether voting for the purpose of changing the outcome is rational depends upon the facts on the ground, including how close the election is and how significant the value difference is between the candidates. The binomial model suggests it will almost never be rational to vote, while the statistical model suggests it will be rational for voters to vote in sufficiently close elections or in swing states.

However, some claim even these assessments are optimistic. One worry is that if a major election in most places came down to a single vote, the issue might be decided in the courts after extensive lawsuits (Somin 2013). Further, in making such estimates, we have assumed that voters can reliably identify which candidate is better and reliably estimate how much better that candidate is. But perhaps voters cannot. After all, showing that individual votes matter is a double-edged sword; the more expected good an individual vote can do, the more expected harm it can do (J. Brennan 2011a; Freiman 2020).

One popular response to the paradox of voting is to posit that voters are not trying to determine who wins, but instead trying to change the “mandate” the elected candidate receives. The assumption here is that an elected official’s efficacy—i.e., her ability to get things done in office—depends in part on how large of a majority vote she received. If that were true, I might vote for what I expect to be the winning candidate in order to increase her mandate, or vote against the expected winner to reduce her mandate. The virtue of the mandate hypothesis, if it were true, is that it could explain why it would be rational to vote even in elections where one candidate enjoys a massive lead coming into the election.

However, the mandate argument faces two major problems. First, even if we assume that such mandates exist, to know whether voting is rational, we would need to know how much the nth voter’s vote increases the marginal effectiveness of her preferred candidate, or reduces the marginal effectiveness of her dispreferred candidate. Suppose voting for the expected winning candidate costs me $15 worth of my time. It would be rational for me to vote only if I believed my individual vote would give the winning candidate at least $15 worth of electoral efficacy (and I care about the increased efficiency as much or more than my opportunity costs). In principle, whether individual votes change the “mandate” this much is something that political scientists could measure, and indeed, they have tried to do so.

But this brings us to the second, deeper problem: Political scientists have done extensive empirical work trying to test whether electoral mandates exist, and they now roundly reject the mandate hypothesis (Dahl 1990b; Noel 2010). A winning candidate’s ability to get things done is generally not affected by how small or large of a margin she wins by.

Perhaps voting is rational not as a way of trying to change how effective the elected politician will be, but instead as a way of trying to change the kind of mandate the winning politician enjoys (Guerrero 2010). Perhaps a vote could transform a candidate from a delegate to a trustee. A delegate tries to do what she believes her constituents want, but a trustee has the normative legitimacy to do what she believes is best.

Suppose for the sake of argument that trustee representatives are significantly more valuable than delegates, and that what makes a representative a trustee rather than a delegate is her large margin of victory. Unfortunately, this does not yet show that the expected benefits of voting exceed the expected costs. Suppose (as in Guerrero 2010: 289) that the distinction between a delegate and trustee lies on a continuum, like difference between bald and hairy. To show voting is rational, one would need to show that the marginal impact of an individual vote, as it moves a candidate a marginal degree from delegate to trustee, is higher than the opportunity cost of voting. If voting costs me $15 worth of time, then, on this theory, it would be rational to vote only if my vote is expected to move my favorite candidate from delegate to trustee by an increment worth at least $15 (Guerrero 2010: 295–297).

Alternatively, suppose that there were a determinate threshold (either known or unknown) of votes at which a winning candidate is suddenly transformed from being a delegate to a trustee. By casting a vote, the voter has some chance of decisively pushing her favored candidate over this threshold. However, just as the probability that her vote will decide the election is vanishingly small, so the probability that her vote will decisively transform a representative from a delegate into a trustee would be vanishingly small. Indeed, the formula for determining decisiveness in transforming a candidate into a trustee would be roughly the same as determining whether the voter would break a tie. Thus, suppose it’s a billion or even a trillion dollars better for a representative to be a trustee rather than a candidate. Even if so, the expected benefit of an individual vote is still less than a penny, which is lower than the opportunity cost of voting. Again, it’s wonderful to win the lottery, but that doesn’t mean it’s rational to buy a ticket.

Other philosophers have attempted to shift the focus on other ways individual votes might be said to “make a difference”. Perhaps by voting, a voter has a significant chance of being among the “causally efficacious set” of votes, or is in some way causally responsible for the outcome (Tuck 2008; Goldman 1999).

On these theories, what voters value is not changing the outcome, but being agents who have participated in causing various outcomes. These causal theories of voting claim that voting is rational provided the voter sufficiently cares about being a cause or among the joint causes of the outcome. Voters vote because they wish to bear the right kind of causal responsibility for outcomes, even if their individual influence is small.

What these alternative theories make clear is that whether voting is rational depends in part upon what the voters’ goals are. If their goal is to in some way change the outcome of the election, or to change which policies are implemented, then voting is indeed irrational, or rational only in unusual circumstances or for a small subset of voters. However, perhaps voters have other goals.

The expressive theory of voting (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993) holds that voters vote in order to express themselves. On the expressive theory, voting is a consumption activity rather than a productive activity; it is more like reading a book for pleasure than it is like reading a book to develop a new skill. On this theory, though the act of voting is private, voters regard voting as an apt way to demonstrate and express their commitment to their political team. Voting is like wearing a Metallica T-shirt at a concert or doing the wave at a sports game. Sports fans who paint their faces the team colors do not generally believe that they, as individuals, will change the outcome of the game, but instead wish to demonstrate their commitment to their team. Even when watching games alone, sports fans cheer and clap for their teams. Perhaps voting is like this.

This “expressive theory of voting” is untroubled by and indeed partly supported by the empirical findings that most voters are ignorant about basic political facts (Somin 2013; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The expressive theory is also untroubled by and indeed partly supported by work in political psychology showing that most citizens suffer from significant “intergroup bias”: we tend to automatically form groups, and to be irrationally loyal to and forgiving of our own group while irrationally hateful of other groups (Lodge and Taber 2013; Haidt 2012; Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, and Hamann 2006; Westen 2008). Voters might adopt ideologies in order to signal to themselves and others that they are certain kinds of people. For example, suppose Bob wants to express that he is a patriot and a tough guy. He thus endorses hawkish military actions, e.g., that the United States nuke Russia for interfering with Ukraine. It would be disastrous for Bob were the US to do what he wants. However, since Bob’s individual vote for a militaristic candidate has little hope of being decisive, Bob can afford to indulge irrational and misinformed beliefs about public policy and express those beliefs at the polls.

Another simple and plausible argument is that it can be rational to vote in order to discharge a perceived duty to vote (Mackie 2010). Surveys indicate that most citizens in fact believe there is a duty to vote or to “do their share” (Mackie 2010: 8–9). If there are such duties, and these duties are sufficiently weighty, then it would be rational for most voters to vote.

2. The Moral Obligation to Vote

Surveys show that most citizens in contemporary democracies believe there is some sort of moral obligation to vote (Mackie 2010: 8–9). Other surveys show most moral and political philosophers agree (Schwitzgebel and Rust 2010). They tend to believe that citizens have a duty to vote even when these citizens rightly believe their favored party or candidate has no serious chance of winning (Campbell, Gurin, and Mill 1954: 195). Further, most people seem to think that the duty to vote specifically means a duty to turn out to vote (perhaps only to cast a blank ballot), rather than a duty to vote a particular way. On this view, citizens have a duty simply to cast a vote, but nearly any good-faith vote is morally acceptable.

Many popular arguments for a duty to vote rely upon the idea that individual votes make a significant difference. For instance, one might argue that that there is a duty to vote because there is a duty to protect oneself, a duty to help others, or to produce good government, or the like. However, these arguments face the problem, as discussed in section 1, that individual votes have vanishingly small instrumental value (or disvalue)

For instance, one early hypothesis was that voting might be a form of insurance, meant to to prevent democracy from collapsing (Downs 1957: 257). Following this suggestion, suppose one hypothesizes that citizens have a duty to vote in order to help prevent democracy from collapsing. Suppose there is some determinate threshold of votes under which a democracy becomes unstable and collapses. The problem here is that just as there is a vanishingly small probability that any individual’s vote would decide the election, so there is a vanishingly small chance that any vote would decisively put the number of votes above that threshold. Alternatively, suppose that as fewer and fewer citizens vote, the probability of democracy collapsing becomes incrementally higher. If so, to show there is a duty to vote, one would first need to show that the marginal expected benefits of the nth vote, in reducing the chance of democratic collapse, exceed the expected costs (including opportunity costs).

A plausible argument for a duty to vote would thus not depend on individual votes having significant expected value or impact on government or civic culture. Instead, a plausible argument for a duty to vote should presume that individual votes make little difference in changing the outcome of election, but then identify a reason why citizens should vote anyway.

One suggestion (Beerbohm 2012) is that citizens have a duty to vote to avoid complicity with injustice. On this view, representatives act in the name of the citizens. Citizens count as partial authors of the law, even when the citizens do not vote or participate in government. Citizens who refuse to vote are thus complicit in allowing their representatives to commit injustice. Perhaps failure to resist injustice counts as kind of sponsorship. (This theory thus implies that citizens do not merely have a duty to vote rather than abstain, but specifically have a duty to vote for candidates and policies that will reduce injustice.)

Another popular argument, which does not turn on the efficacy of individual votes, is the “Generalization Argument”:

What if everyone were to stay home and not vote? The results would be disastrous! Therefore, I (you/she) should vote. (Lomasky and G. Brennan 2000: 75)

This popular argument can be parodied in a way that exposes its weakness. Consider:

What if everyone were to stay home and not farm? Then we would all starve to death! Therefore, I (you/she) should each become farmers. (Lomasky and G. Brennan 2000: 76)

The problem with this argument, as stated, is that even if it would be disastrous if no one or too few performed some activity, it does not follow that everyone ought to perform it. Instead, one conclude that it matters that sufficient number of people perform the activity. In the case of farming, we think it’s permissible for people to decide for themselves whether to farm or not, because market incentives suffice to ensure that enough people farm.

However, even if the Generalization Argument, as stated, is unsound, perhaps it is on to something. There are certain classes of actions in which we tend to presume everyone ought to participate (or ought not to participate). For instance, suppose a university places a sign saying, “Keep off the newly planted grass.” It’s not as though the grass will die if one person walks on it once. If I were allowed to walk on it at will while the rest of you refrained from doing so, the grass would probably be fine. Still, it would seem unfair if the university allowed me to walk on the grass at will but forbade everyone else from doing so. It seems more appropriate to impose the duty to keep off the lawn equally on everyone. Similarly, if the government wants to raise money to provide a public good, it could just tax a randomly chosen minority of the citizens. However, it seems more fair or just for everyone (at least above a certain income threshold) to pay some taxes, to share in the burden of providing police protection.

We should thus ask: is voting more like the first kind of activity, in which it is only imperative that enough people do it, or the second kind, in which it’s imperative that everyone do it? One difference between the two kinds of activities is what abstention does to others. If I abstain from farming, I don’t thereby take advantage of or free ride on farmers’ efforts. Rather, I compensate them for whatever food I eat by buying that food on the market. In the second set of cases, if I freely walk across the lawn while everyone else walks around it, or if I enjoy police protection but don’t pay taxes, it appears I free ride on others’ efforts. They bear an uncompensated differential burden in maintaining the grass or providing police protection, and I seem to be taking advantage of them.

A defender of a duty to vote might thus argue that non-voters free ride on voters. Non-voters benefit from the government that voters provide, but do not themselves help to provide government.

There are at least a few arguments for a duty to vote that do not depend on the controversial assumption that individual votes make a difference:

• The Generalization/Public Goods/Debt to Society Argument : Claims that citizens who abstain from voting thereby free ride on the provision of good government, or fail to pay their “debts to society”.
• The Civic Virtue Argument : Claims that citizens have a duty to exercise civic virtue, and thus to vote.
• The Complicity Argument : Claims that citizens have a duty to vote (for just outcomes) in order to avoid being complicit in the injustice their governments commit.

However, there is a general challenge to these arguments in support of a duty to vote. Call this the particularity problem : To show that there is a duty to vote, it is not enough to appeal to some goal G that citizens plausibly have a duty to support, and then to argue that voting is one way they can support or help achieve G . Instead, proponents of a duty to vote need to show specifically that voting is the only way, or the required way, to support G (J. Brennan 2011a). The worry is that the three arguments above might only show that voting is one way among many to discharge the duty in question. Indeed, it might not be even be an especially good way, let alone the only or obligatory way to discharge the duty.

For instance, suppose one argues that citizens should vote because they ought to exercise civic virtue. One must explain why a duty to exercise civic virtue specifically implies a duty to vote, rather than a duty just to perform one of thousands of possible acts of civic virtue. Or, if a citizen has a duty to to be an agent who helps promote other citizens’ well-being, it seems this duty could be discharged by volunteering, making art, or working at a productive job that adds to the social surplus. If a citizen has a duty to to avoid complicity in injustice, it seems that rather than voting, she could engage in civil disobedience; write letters to newspaper editors, pamphlets, or political theory books; donate money; engage in conscientious abstention; protest; assassinate criminal political leaders; or do any number of other activities. It’s unclear why voting is special or required.

Note that the particularity problem need not be framed in consequentialist terms, i.e., both defenders and critics of the duty to vote need not say that what determines whether voting is morally required depends on whether voting has the highest expected consequences. Rather, the issue is whether voting is simply one of many ways to discharge an underlying duty or respond to underlying reasons, or whether voting is in some way special and unique, such that these reasons select voting in particular as an obligatory means of responding to these underlying reasons.

Maskivker (2019) responds partly to this objection by saying, in effect, “Why not both?” J. Brennan (2011a) and Freiman (2020) say that the underlying grounds for any duty to vote can be discharged (and discharged better) through actions other than voting. Maskivker takes this to suggest not that voting is optional, but that one should vote (if one is already sufficiently well-informed and publicly-spirited) and also performs these other actions. Maskivker grounds her argument on a deontological duty of easy aid: if one can provide aid to others at very low cost to oneself, then one should do so. For already well-informed citizens, voting is an instance of easy aid.

While many hold that it is obligatory to vote, a few have argued that many people have an obligation not to vote under special circumstances. For instance, Sheehy (2002) argues that voting when one is indifferent to the election is unfair. He argues that if one’s vote makes a difference, it could be to disappoint what otherwise would be have been the majority coalition, whose position is now thwarted by those who, by hypothesis, have no preference.

Another argument holds that voting might be wrong because it is an ineffective form of altruism. Freiman (2020) argues that when people discharge their obligations to help and aid others, they are obligated to pursue effective rather than ineffective forms of altruism (see also MacAskill 2015). For instance, suppose one has an obligation to give a certain amount to charity each year. This obligation is not fundamentally about spending a certain percentage of one’s money. If a person gave 10% of their income to a charity that did no good at all, or which made the world worse, one would not have discharged the obligation to act beneficently. Similarly, Freiman argues, if a person is voting for the purpose of aiding and helping others, then they would at the very least need to be sufficiently well-informed to vote for the better candidate, a condition few voters meet (see section 3.2 below). In part because most voters are in no position to judge whether they are voting for the better or worse candidates, and in part simply because individual votes make little difference, votes and most other forms of political action (such as donating to political campaigns, canvassing, volunteering, and the like) are highly ineffective forms of altruism. Freiman claims that we are instead obligated to pursue effective forms of altruism, such as collecting and making donations to the Against Malaria Foundation.

3. Moral Obligations Regarding How One Votes

Most people appear to believe that there is a duty to cast a vote (perhaps including a blank ballot) rather than abstain (Mackie 2010: 8–9), but this leaves open whether they believe there is a duty to vote in any particular way. Some philosophers and political theorists have argued there are ethical obligations attached to how one chooses to vote. For instance, many deliberative democrats (see Christiano 2006) believe not only that every citizen has a duty to vote, but also that they must vote in publicly-spirited ways, after engaging in various forms of democratic deliberation. In contrast, some (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993; J. Brennan 2009, 2011a) argue that while there is no general duty to vote (abstention is permissible), those citizens who do choose to vote have duties affecting how they vote. They argue that while it is not wrong to abstain, it is wrong to vote badly , in some theory-specified sense of “badly”.

Note that the question of how one ought to vote is distinct from the question of whether one ought to have the right to vote. The right to vote licenses a citizen to cast a vote. It requires the state to permit the citizen to vote and then requires the state to count that vote. This leaves open whether some ways a voter could vote could be morally wrong, or whether other ways of voting might be morally obligatory. In parallel, my right of free association arguably includes the right to join the Ku Klux Klan, while my right of free speech arguably includes the right to advocate an unjust war. Still, it would be morally wrong for me to do either of these things, though doing so is within my rights. Thus, just as someone can, without contradiction, say, “You have the right to have racist attitudes, but you should not,” so a person can, without contradiction, say, “You have the right to vote for that candidate, but you should not.”

A theory of voting ethics might include answers to any of the following questions:

• The Intended Beneficiary of the Vote : Whose interests should the voter take into account when casting a vote? May the voter vote selfishly, or should she vote sociotropically? If the latter, on behalf of which group ought she vote: her demographic group(s), her local jurisdiction, the nation, or the entire world? Is it permissible to vote when one has no stake in the election, or is otherwise indifferent to the outcome?
• The Substance of the Vote : Are there particular candidates or policies that the voter is obligated to support, or not to support? For instance, is a voter obligated to vote for whatever would best produce the most just outcomes, according to the correct theory of justice? Must the voter vote for candidates with good character? May the voter vote strategically, or must she vote in accordance with her sincere preferences?
• Epistemic Duties Regarding Voting : Are voters required to have a particular degree of knowledge, or exhibit a particular kind of epistemic rationality, in forming their voting preferences? Is it permissible to vote in ignorance, on the basis of beliefs about social scientific matters that are formed without sufficient evidence?

Recall that one important theory of voting behavior holds that most citizens vote not in order to influence the outcome of the election or influence government policies, but in order to express themselves (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993). They vote to signal to themselves and to others that they are loyal to certain ideas, ideals, or groups. For instance, I might vote Democrat to signal that I’m compassionate and fair, or Republican to signal I’m responsible, moral, and tough. If voting is primarily an expressive act, then perhaps the ethics of voting is an ethics of expression (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993: 167–198). We can assess the morality of voting by asking what it says about a voter that she voted like that:

To cast a Klan ballot is to identify oneself in a morally significant way with the racist policies that the organization espouses. One thereby lays oneself open to associated moral liability whether the candidate has a small, large, or zero probability of gaining victory, and whether or not one’s own vote has an appreciable likelihood of affecting the election result. (G. Brennan and Lomasky 1993: 186)

The idea here is that if it’s wrong (even if it’s within my rights) in general for me to express sincere racist attitudes, and so it’s wrong for me to express sincere racist commitments at the polls. Similar remarks apply to other wrongful attitudes. To the extent it is wrong for me to express sincere support for illiberal, reckless, or bad ideas, it would also be wrong for me to vote for candidates who support those ideas.

Of course, the question of just what counts as wrongful and permissible expression is complicated. There is also a complicated question of just what voting expresses. What I think my vote expresses might be different from what it expresses to others, or it might be that it expresses different things to different people. The expressivist theory of voting ethics acknowledges these difficulties, and replies that whatever we would say about the ethics of expression in general should presumably apply to expressive voting.

Consider the question: What do doctors owe patients, parents owe children, or jurors owe defendants (or, perhaps, society)? Doctors owe patients proper care, and to discharge their duties, they must 1) aim to promote their patients’ interests, and 2) reason about how to do so in a sufficiently informed and rational way. Parents similarly owe such duties to their children. Jurors similarly owe society at large, or perhaps more specifically the defendant, duties to 1) try to determine the truth, and 2) do so in an informed and rational way. The doctors, parents, and jurors are fiduciaries of others. They owe a duty of care, and this duty of care brings with it certain epistemic responsibilities .

One might try to argue that voters owe similar duties of care to the governed. Perhaps voters should vote 1) for what they perceive to be the best outcomes (consistent with strategic voting) and 2) make such decisions in a sufficiently informed and rational way. How voters vote has significant impact on political outcomes, and can help determine matters of peace and war, life and death, prosperity and poverty. Majority voters do not just choose for themselves, but for everyone, including dissenting minorities, children, non-voters, resident aliens, and people in other countries affected by their decisions. For this reason, voting seems to be a morally charged activity (Christiano 2006; J. Brennan 2011a; Beerbohm 2012).

That said, one clear disanalogy between the relationship doctors have with patients and voters have with the governed is that individual voters have only a vanishingly small chance of making a difference. The expected harm of an incompetent individual vote is vanishingly small, while the expected harm of incompetent individual medical decisions is high.

However, perhaps the point holds anyway. Define a “collectively harmful activity” as an activity in which a group is imposing or threatening to impose harm, or unjust risk of harm, upon other innocent people, but the harm will be imposed regardless of whether individual members of that group drop out. It’s plausible that one might have an obligation to refrain from participating in such activities, i.e., a duty to keep one’s hands clean.

To illustrate, suppose a 100-member firing squad is about to shoot an innocent child. Each bullet will hit the child at the same time, and each shot would, on its own, be sufficient to kill her. You cannot stop them, so the child will die regardless of what you do. Now, suppose they offer you the opportunity to join in and shoot the child with them. You can make the 101st shot. Again, the child will die regardless of what you do. Is it permissible for you join the firing squad? Most people have a strong intuition that it is wrong to join the squad and shoot the child. One plausible explanation of why it is wrong is that there may be a general moral prohibition against participating in these kinds of activities. In these kinds of cases, we should try to keep our hands clean.

Perhaps this “clean-hands principle” can be generalized to explain why individual acts of ignorant, irrational, or malicious voting are wrong. The firing-squad example is somewhat analogous to voting in an election. Adding or subtracting a shooter to the firing squad makes no difference—the girl will die anyway. Similarly, with elections, individual votes make no difference. In both cases, the outcome is causally overdetermined. Still, the irresponsible voter is much like a person who volunteers to shoot in the firing squad. Her individual bad vote is of no consequence—just as an individual shot is of no consequence—but she is participating in a collectively harmful activity when she could easily keep her hands clean (J. Brennan 2011a, 68–94).

Voting rates in many contemporary democracies are (according to many observers) low, and seem in general to be falling. The United States, for instance, barely manages about 60% in presidential elections and 45% in other elections (Brennan and Hill 2014: 3). Many other countries have similarly low rates. Some democratic theorists, politicians, and others think this is problematic, and advocate compulsory voting as a solution. In a compulsory voting regime, citizens are required to vote by law; if they fail to vote without a valid excuse, they incur some sort of penalty.

One major argument for compulsory voting is what we might call the Demographic or Representativeness Argument (Lijphart 1997; Engelen 2007; Galston 2011; Hill in J. Brennan and Hill 2014: 154–173; Singh 2015). The argument begins by noting that in voluntary voting regimes, citizens who choose to vote are systematically different from those who choose to abstain. The rich are more likely to vote than the poor. The old are more likely to vote than the young. Men are more likely to vote than women. In many countries, ethnic minorities are less likely to vote than ethnic majorities. More highly educated people are more likely to vote than less highly educated people. Married people are more likely to vote than non-married people. Political partisans are more likely to vote than true independents (Leighley and Nagler 1992; Evans 2003: 152–6). In short, under voluntary voting, the electorate—the citizens who actually choose to vote—are not fully representative of the public at large. The Demographic Argument holds that since politicians tend to give voters what they want, in a voluntary voting regime, politicians will tend to advance the interests of advantaged citizens (who vote disproportionately) over the disadvantaged (who tend not to vote). Compulsory voting would tend to ensure that the disadvantaged vote in higher numbers, and would thus tend to ensure that everyone’s interests are properly represented.

Relatedly, one might argue compulsory voting helps citizens overcome an “assurance problem” (Hill 2006). The thought here is that an individual voter realizes her individual vote has little significance. What’s important is that enough other voters like her vote. However, she cannot easily coordinate with other voters and ensure they will vote with her. Compulsory voting solves this problem. For this reason, Lisa Hill (2006: 214–15) concludes, “Rather than perceiving the compulsion as yet another unwelcome form of state coercion, compulsory voting may be better understood as a coordination necessity in mass societies of individual strangers unable to communicate and coordinate their preferences.”

Whether the Demographic Argument succeeds or not depends on a few assumptions about voter and politician behavior. First, political scientists overwhelmingly find that voters do not vote their self-interest, but instead vote for what they perceive to be the national interest. (See the dozens of papers cited at Brennan and Hill 2014: 38–9n28.) Second, it might turn out that disadvantaged citizens are not informed enough to vote in ways that promote their interests—they might not have sufficient social scientific knowledge to know which candidates or political parties will help them (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Caplan 2007; Somin 2013). Third, it may be that even in a compulsory voting regime, politicians can get away with ignoring the policy preferences of most voters (Gilens 2012; Bartels 2010).

In fact, contrary to many theorists’ expectations, it appears that compulsory voting has no significant effect on individual political knowledge (that is, it does not induce ignorant voters to become better informed), individual political conversation and persuasion, individual propensity to contact politicians, the propensity to work with others to address concerns, participation in campaign activities, the likelihood of being contacted by a party or politician, the quality of representation, electoral integrity, the proportion of female members of parliament, support for small or third parties, support for the left, or support for the far right (Birch 2009; Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Political scientists have also been unable to demonstrate that compulsory voting leads to more egalitarian or left-leaning policy outcomes. The empirical literature so far shows that compulsory voting gets citizens to vote, but it’s not clear it does much else.

Many citizens of modern democracies believe that vote buying and selling are immoral (Tetlock 2000). Many philosophers agree; they argue it is wrong to buy, trade, or sell votes (Satz 2010: 102; Sandel 2012: 104–5). Richard Hasen reviews the literature on vote buying and concludes that people have offered three main arguments against it. He says,

Despite the almost universal condemnation of core vote buying, commentators disagree on the underlying rationales for its prohibition. Some offer an equality argument against vote buying: the poor are more likely to sell their votes than are the wealthy, leading to political outcomes favoring the wealthy. Others offer an efficiency argument against vote buying: vote buying allows buyers to engage in rent-seeking that diminishes overall social wealth. Finally, some commentators offer an inalienability argument against vote buying: votes belong to the community as a whole and should not be alienable by individual voters. This alienability argument may support an anti-commodification norm that causes voters to make public-regarding voting decisions. (Hasen 2000: 1325)

Two of the concerns here are consequentialist: the worry is that in a regime where vote-buying is legal, votes will be bought and sold in socially destructive ways. However, whether vote buying is destructive is a subject of serious social scientific debate; some economists think markets in votes would in fact produce greater efficiency (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Haefele 1971; Mueller 1973; Philipson and Snyder 1996; Hasen 2000: 1332). The third concern is deontological: it holds that votes are just not the kind of thing that ought be for sale, even if it turned out that vote-buying and selling did not lead to bad consequences.

Many people think vote selling is wrong because it would lead to bad or corrupt voting. But, if that is the problem, then perhaps the permissibility of vote buying and selling should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps the rightness or wrongness of individual acts of vote buying and selling depends entirely on how the vote seller votes (J. Brennan 2011a: 135–160; Brennan and Jaworski 2015: 183–194). Suppose I pay a person to vote in a good way. For instance, suppose I pay indifferent people to vote on behalf of women’s rights, or for the Correct Theory of Justice, whatever that might be. Or, suppose I think turnout is too low, and so I pay a well-informed person to vote her conscience. It is unclear why we should conclude in either case that I have done something wrong, rather than conclude that I have done everyone a small public service.

Certain objections to vote buying and selling appear to prove too much; these objections lead to conclusions that the objectors are not willing to support. For instance, one common argument against voting selling is that paying a person to vote imposes an externality on third parties. However, so does persuading others to vote or to vote in certain ways (Freiman 2014: 762). If paying you to vote for X is wrong because it imposes a third party cost, then for the sake of consistency, I should also conclude that persuading you to vote for X , say, on the basis of a good argument, is equally problematic.

As another example, some object to voting markets on the grounds that votes should be for the common good, rather than for narrow self-interest (Satz 2010: 103; Sandel 2012: 10). Others say that voting should “be an act undertaken only after collectively deliberating about what it is in the common good” (Satz 2010: 103). Some claim that vote markets should be illegal for this reason. Perhaps it’s permissible to forbid vote selling because commodified votes are likely to be cast against the common good. However, if that is sufficient reason to forbid markets in votes, then it is unclear why we should not, e.g., forbid highly ignorant, irrational, or selfish voters from voting, as their votes are also unusually likely to undermine the common good (Freiman 2014: 771–772). Further these arguments appear to leave open that a person could permissibly sell her vote, provided she does so after deliberating and provided she votes for the common good. It might be that if vote selling were legal, most or even all vote sellers would vote in destructive ways, but that does not show that vote selling is inherently wrong.

One pressing issue, though, is whether vote buying is compatible with the secret ballot (Maloberti 2018). Regardless of whether vote buying is enforced through legal means (such as through enforceable contracts) or social means (such as through the reputation mechanism in eBay or through simply social disapproval), to enforce vote buying seems to require that voters in some way actively prove they voted in various ways. But, if so, then this will partly eliminate the secret ballot and possibly lead to increased clientelism, in which politicians make targeted promises to particular bands of voters rather than serve the common good (Maloberti 2018).

Not all objections to vote-buying have this consequentialist flavor. Some argue that vote buying is wrong for deontological grounds, for instance, on the grounds that vote buying in some way is incompatible with the social meaning of voting (e.g. Walzer 1984). Some view voting is an expressive act, and the meaning of that expression is socially-determined. To buy and sell votes may signal disrespect to others in light of this social meaning.

6. Who Should Be Allowed to Vote? Should Everyone Receive Equal Voting Rights?

The dominant view among political philosophers is that we ought to have some sort of representative democracy, and that each adult ought to have one vote, of equal weight to every other adult’s, in any election in her jurisdiction. This view has recently come under criticism, though, both from friends and foes of democracy.

Before one even asks whether “one person, one vote” is the right policy, one needs to determine just who counts as part of the demos. Call this the boundary problem or the problem of constituting the demos (Goodin 2007: 40; Ron 2017). Democracy is the rule of the people. But one fundamental question is just who constitutes “the people”. This is no small problem. Before one can judge that a democracy is fair, or adequately responds to citizens’ interests, one needs to know who “counts” and who does not.

One might be inclined to say that everyone living under a particular government’s jurisdiction is part of the demos and is thus entitled to a vote. However, in fact, most democracies exclude children and teenagers, felons, the mentally infirm, and non-citizens living in a government’s territory from being able to vote, but at the same time allow their citizens living in foreign countries to vote (López-Guerra 2014: 1).

There are a number of competing theories here. The “all affected interests” theory (Dahl 1990a: 64) holds that anyone who is affected by a political decision or a political institution is part of the demos. The basic argument is that anyone who is affected by a political decision-making process should have some say over that process. However, this principle suffers from multiple problems. It may be incoherent or useless, as we might not know or be able to know who is affected by a decision until after the decision is made (Goodin 2007: 52). For example (taken from Goodin 2007: 53), suppose the UK votes on whether to transfer 5% of its GDP to its former African colonies. We cannot assess whether the members of the former African colonies are among the affected interests until we know what the outcome of the vote is. If the vote is yay, then they are affected; if the vote is nay, then they are not. (See Owen 2012 for a response.) Further, the “all affected interests” theory would often include non-citizens and exclude citizens. Sometimes political decisions made in one country have a significant effect on citizens of another country; sometimes political decisions made in one country have little or no effect on some of the citizens of that country.

One solution (Goodin 2007: 55) to this problem (of who counts as an affected party) is to hold that all people with possibly or potentially affected interests constitute part of the polity. This principle implies, however, that for many decisions, the demos is smaller than the nation-state, and for others, it is larger. For instance, when the United States decides whether to elect a warmongering or pacifist candidate, this affects not only Americans, but a large percentage of people worldwide.

Other major theories offered as solutions to the boundary problem face similar problems. For example, the coercion theory holds that anyone subject to coercion from a political body ought to have a say (López-Guerra 2005). But this principle might be also be seen as over-inclusive (Song 2009), as it would require that resident aliens, tourists, or even enemy combatants be granted a right to vote, as they are also subject to a state’s coercive power. Further, who will be coerced depends on the outcome of a decision. If a state decides to impose some laws, it will coerce certain people, and if the state declines to impose those laws, then it will not. If we try to overcome this by saying anyone potentially subject to a given state’s coercive power ought to have a say, then this seems to imply that almost everyone worldwide should have a say in most states’ major decisions.

The commonsense view of the demos, i.e., that the demos includes all and only adult members of a nation-state, may be hard to defend. Goodin (2007: 49) proposes that what makes citizens special is that their interests are interlinked. This may be an accidental feature of arbitrarily-decided national borders, but once these borders are in place, citizens will find that their interests tend to more linked together than with citizens of other polities. But whether this is true is also highly contingent.

The idea of “One person, one vote” is supposedly grounded on a commitment to egalitarianism. Some philosophers believe that democracy with equal voting rights is necessary to ensure that government gives equal consideration to everyone’s interests (Christiano 1996, 2008). However, it is not clear that giving every citizen an equal right to vote reliably results in decisions that give equal consideration to everyone’s interests. In many decisions, many citizens have little to nothing at stake, while other citizens have a great deal at stake. Thus, one alternative proposal is that citizens’ votes should be weighted by how much they have a stake in the decision. This preserves equality not by giving everyone an equal chance of being decisive in every decision, but by giving everyone’s interests equal weight. Otherwise, in a system of one person, one vote, issues that are deeply important to the few might continually lose out to issues of only minor interest to the many (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010).

There are a number of other independent arguments for this conclusion. Perhaps proportional voting enhances citizens’ autonomy, by giving them greater control over those issues in which they have greater stakes, while few would regard it as significant loss of autonomy were they to have reduced control over issues that do not concern them. Further, though the argument for this conclusion is too technical to cover here in depth (Brighouse and Fleurbaey 2010; List 2013), it may be that apportioning political power according to one’s stake in the outcome can overcome some of the well-known paradoxes of democracy, such as the Condorcet Paradox (which show that democracies might have intransitive preferences, i.e., the majority might prefer A to B, B to C, and yet also prefer C to A).

However, even if this proposal seems plausible in theory, it is unclear how a democracy might reliably instantiate this in practice. Before allowing a vote, a democratic polity would need to determine to what extent different citizens have a stake in the decision, and then somehow weight their votes accordingly. In real life, special-interests groups and others would likely try to use vote weighting for their own ends. Citizens might regard unequal voting rights as evidence of corruption or electoral manipulation (Christiano 2008: 34–45).

Early defenders of democracy were concerned to show democracy is superior to aristocracy, monarchy, or oligarchy. However, in recent years, epistocracy has emerged as a major contender to democracy (Estlund 2003, 2007; Landemore 2012). A system is said to be epistocratic to the extent that the system formally allocates political power on the basis of knowledge or political competence. For instance, an epistocracy might give university-educated citizens additional votes (Mill 1861), exclude citizens from voting unless they can pass a voter qualification exam, weigh votes by each voter’s degree of political knowledge while correcting for the influence of demographic factors, or create panels of experts who have the right to veto democratic legislation (Caplan 2007; J. Brennan 2011b; López-Guerra 2014; Mulligan 2015).

Arguments for epistocracy generally center on concerns about democratic incompetence. Epistocrats hold that democracy imbues citizens with the right to vote in a promiscuous way. Ample empirical research has shown that the mean, median, and modal levels of basic political knowledge (let alone social scientific knowledge) among citizens is extremely low (Somin 2013; Caplan 2007; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Further, political knowledge makes a significant difference in how citizens vote and what policies they support (Althaus 1998, 2003; Caplan 2007; Gilens 2012). Epistocrats believe that restricting or weighting votes would protect against some of the downsides of democratic incompetence.

One argument for epistocracy is that the legitimacy of political decisions depends upon them being made competently and in good faith. Consider, as an analogy: In a criminal trial, the jury’s decision is high stakes; their decision can remove a person’s rights or greatly harm their life, liberty, welfare, or property. If a jury made its decision out of ignorance, malice, whimsy, or on the basis of irrational and biased thought processes, we arguably should not and probably would not regard the jury’s decision as authoritative or legitimate. Instead, we think the criminal has a right to a trial conducted by competent people in good faith. In many respects, electoral decisions are similar to jury decisions: they also are high stakes, and can result in innocent people losing their lives, liberty, welfare, or property. If the legitimacy and authority of a jury decision depends upon the jury making a competent decision in good faith, then perhaps so should the legitimacy and authority of most other governmental decisions, including the decisions that electorates and their representatives make. Now, suppose, in light of widespread voter ignorance and irrationality, it turns out that democratic electorates tend to make incompetent decisions. If so, then this seems to provide at least presumptive grounds for favoring epistocracy over democracy (J. Brennan 2011b).

Some dispute whether epistocracy would in fact perform better than democracy, even in principle. Epistocracy generally attempts to generate better political outcomes by in some way raising the average reliability of political decision-makers. Political scientists Lu Hong and Scott Page (2004) adduced a mathematical theorem showing that under the right conditions, cognitive diversity among the participants in a collective decision more strongly contributes to the group making a smart decision than does increasing the individual participants’ reliability. On the Hong-Page theorem, it is possible that having a large number of diverse but unreliable decision-makers in a collective decision will outperform having a smaller number of less diverse but more reliable decision-makers. There is some debate over whether the Hong-Page theorem has any mathematical substance (Thompson 2014 claims it does not), whether real-world political decisions meet the conditions of the theorem, and if so, to what extent that justifies universal suffrage, or merely shows that having widespread but restricted suffrage is superior to having highly restricted suffrage (Landemore 2012; Somin 2013: 113–5).

Relatedly, Condorcet’s Jury Theorem holds that under the right conditions, provided the average voter is reliable, as more and more voters are added to a collective decision, the probability that the democracy will make the right choice approaches 1 (List and Goodin 2001). However, assuming the theorem applies to real-life democratic decisions, whether the theorem supports or condemns democracy depends on how reliable voters are. If voters do systematically worse than chance (e.g., Althaus 2003; Caplan 2007), then the theorem instead implies that large democracies almost always make the wrong choice.

One worry about certain forms of epistocracy, such as a system in which voters must earn the right to vote by passing an examination, is that such systems might make decisions that are biased toward members of certain demographic groups. After all, political knowledge is not evenly dispersed among all demographic groups. (At the very least, the kinds of knowledge political scientists have been studying are not evenly distributed. Whether other kinds of knowledge are better distributed is an open question.) On average, in the United States, on measures of basic political knowledge, whites know more than blacks, people in the Northeast know more than people in the South, men know more than women, middle-aged people know more than the young or old, and high-income people know more than the poor (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 137–177). If such a voter examination system were implemented, the resulting electorate would be whiter, maler, richer, more middle-aged, and better employed than the population at large. Democrats might reasonably worry that for this very reason an epistocracy would not take the interests of non-whites, women, the poor, or the unemployed into proper consideration.

However, at least one form of epistocracy may be able to avoid this objection. Consider, for instance, the “enfranchisement lottery”:

The enfranchisement lottery consists of two devices. First, there would be a sortition to disenfranchise the vast majority of the population. Prior to every election, all but a random sample of the public would be excluded. I call this device the exclusionary sortition because it merely tells us who will not be entitled to vote in a given contest. Indeed, those who survive the sortition (the pre-voters) would not be automatically enfranchised. Like everyone in the larger group from which they are drawn, pre-voters would be assumed to be insufficiently competent to vote. This is where the second device comes in. To finally become enfranchised and vote, pre-voters would gather in relatively small groups to participate in a competence-building process carefully designed to optimize their knowledge about the alternatives on the ballot. (López-Guerra 2014: 4; cf. Ackerman and Fishkin 2005)

Under this scheme, no one has any presumptive right to vote. Instead, everyone has, by default, equal eligibility to be selected to become a voter. Before the enfranchisement lottery takes place, candidates would proceed with their campaigns as they do in democracy. However, they campaign without knowing which citizens in particular will eventually acquire the right to vote. Immediately before the election, a random but representative subset of citizens is then selected by lottery. These citizens are not automatically granted the right to vote. Instead, the chosen citizens merely acquire permission to earn the right to vote. To earn this right, they must then participate in some sort of competence-building exercise, such as studying party platforms or meeting in a deliberative forum with one another. In practice this system might suffer corruption or abuse, but, epistocrats respond, so does democracy in practice. For epistocrats, the question is which system works better, i.e., produces the best or most substantively just outcomes, all things considered.

One important deontological objection to epistocracy is that it may be incompatible with public reason liberalism (Estlund 2007). Public reason liberals hold that distribution of coercive political power is legitimate and authoritative only if all reasonable people subject to that power have strong enough grounds to endorse a justification for that power (Vallier and D’Agostino 2013). By definition, epistocracy imbues some citizens with greater power than others on the grounds that these citizens have greater social scientific knowledge. However, the objection goes, reasonable people could disagree about just what counts as expertise and just who the experts are. If reasonable people disagree about what counts as expertise and who the experts are, then epistocracy distributes political power on terms not all reasonable people have conclusive grounds to endorse. Epistocracy thus distributes political power on terms not all reasonable people have conclusive grounds to endorse. (See, however, Mulligan 2015.)

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How to Actually Guarantee the Right to Vote

A six-point checklist

As election season begins and Americans head to the polls, many would be shocked to learn that the United States Constitution does not guarantee them the right to vote. It instead leaves the question of voter qualifications mainly to the states, and bars voting discrimination only on the basis of certain protected categories, such as race and gender. What’s worse, courts for the past 50 years have repeatedly failed to protect Americans who have been denied the franchise or who face unnecessary hurdles exercising it.

The Supreme Court in 1973 refused to recognize that disenfranchisement of felons who had completed their sentences violated the Constitution. The Court in 2000 rejected the claim of residents of Washington, D.C., that they had the right to vote for members of Congress. Lower courts similarly rejected voting-rights claims brought by U.S. citizens living in U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico. The Supreme Court also upheld an Arizona law barring the third-party collection of mail-in ballots, a prohibition that made voting harder for Native Americans living on reservations.

Adam Serwer: The decision that could end voting rights

In the case of Bush v. Gore , which ended the disputed presidential election of 2000, the Court affirmed that the Constitution does not guarantee anyone the right to vote for president, confirming that states can take away that right at any time for future elections. Similarly, in 2008, the Court in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board allowed states to pass more onerous voting rules, such as strict voter-identification laws, without proof that such laws serve any state interests in preventing fraud or promoting voter confidence.

Perhaps worst of all was Shelby County v. Holder , in 2013, when the Court held that Congress no longer had the power to force states with a history of discrimination to get federal approval before making changes to their voting rules. Shelby County marked a new era in the Court’s approach to voting rights. The Constitution’s Fifteenth Amendment, barring discrimination on the basis of race, expressly recognizes Congress’s power to prevent such discrimination by passing appropriate legislation. Yet far from recognizing “the special role assigned to Congress in protecting the integrity of the democratic process in federal elections,” as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent suggested, the Court in Shelby County did not treat Congress as a coequal branch of government entitled to exercise its own judgment as to what laws are constitutionally required to prevent race discrimination in voting. Shelby County revealed how difficult it would be to get bold voting-rights legislation upheld by the Supreme Court even if Congress could get its act together to pass it.

With a Court that not only fails to protect voting rights on its own but that could also well stymie congressional efforts to provide that protection via ordinary legislation, Americans need a more direct path toward full enfranchisement: The time has come to add an amendment to the U.S. Constitution affirmatively protecting the right to vote. Voters in the United States can no longer depend on the negative protections of voting rights in the Constitution itself, or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of those rights, or Congress’s attempts to protect those rights when it is subject to what is essentially a Supreme Court veto.

Since the 1860s, voting-rights proponents have periodically suggested adding an affirmative right to vote to the Constitution, but these efforts have gone nowhere. More recently, some have thought such an amendment unnecessary. For a brief period in the 1960s, during the heyday of the Warren Court, the Supreme Court more boldly protected voting rights through a generous interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection clause. But that was decades ago, and efforts to expand voting rights in this direction have hit a brick wall at the conservative Supreme Court; indeed, some of the Warren Court voting-rights protections could soon be in danger. For this reason, it’s time to renew suggestions for a popular movement to protect the right to vote in the Constitution.

One might fairly ask how, if Congress cannot even pass ordinary voting-rights legislation with Republicans opposing Democrats on virtually all voting issues, we could expect it to pass a constitutional amendment with its much more difficult thresholds: An amendment requires support of two-thirds of each house of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the states. Given intense political polarization, passage of this amendment is not happening anytime soon, even if Democrats take back both houses of Congress in 2024. But now is the time to begin the work.

The key is to think in the longer term and to build a political movement around passage of the amendment. That’s what happened in earlier times, as with passage of the Nineteenth Amendment ensuring gender equality in voting. Decades elapsed between 1874, when the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote, and 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified. Along the way, women’s-rights activists built support for gender equality in voting state by state.

An amendment affirmatively protecting the right to vote could be structured in many ways. I have developed what I term a “basic” version of the constitutional right to vote, one that would continue to let states exclude noncitizens, nonresidents, children, and former or current felons, and which would not change voting rights for U.S. territories or abolish the Electoral College or change the Senate. In my new book , I also suggest how to expand the right to vote to make these more capacious changes, leaving the full scope of the amendment to those who would lead a 21st-century voting-rights movement.

By using the term “basic,” I do not mean to suggest that such a right embodied in the Constitution would be small, or inconsequential, or easily evaded. To the contrary, passage and ratification of the basic version of the amendment would be a monumental accomplishment that would profoundly change the nature of voting rights and elections in the United States.

A basic constitutional right to vote should have these six elements:

1. A Positive Right to Vote

The first provision of my proposed amendment is the most fundamental. It would guarantee the right of citizen, adult, resident non-felons to vote and to have that vote fairly and accurately counted. This provision would apply to all elections, federal, state, and local, including those for president and vice president. No longer could state legislatures threaten to take away the people’s right to vote for president.

This would be the first time an explicit, positive right to vote would be part of the Constitution. As we have seen, the Constitution generally frames voting rights in the negative and prohibits discrimination in voting on the basis of such prohibited categories as race. This new amendment, in essence, would codify the Warren Court–era rulings recognizing the right to vote as fundamental for this class of voters and would lock it in so that a hostile Supreme Court cannot continue to water down voting rights.

2. Equal Weighting of Votes

This provision would explicitly embed in the Constitution the Warren Court’s one-person, one-vote principle. It is necessary, despite rulings such as Reynolds v. Sims , because a future Supreme Court could overrule those cases and determine that the original public meaning of the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (or Article I as applied to congressional elections) does not require the drawing of districts with roughly equal populations.

Wilfred Codrington III: The electoral college’s racist origins

States and local governments would not have the power to create systems of their own, analogous to the Senate, in which each state is entitled to two senators regardless of population. Nor could states design other means of dividing voting power that give more voting power to some voters over others.

The provision would carve out voting for president and vice president, which the Constitution has always required to be conducted on a state-by-state basis through the Electoral College. That system weights the votes of voters in states with smaller populations as greater than those of voters in states with large populations. However, within each state, the votes for president must be equally weighted. The provision does not require an explicit carve-out for Senate elections, because Senate elections are conducted statewide, not in districts.

3. Automatic Voter Registration and Unique Voter-Identification Numbers

This provision helps implement the right to an equal vote. Voter registration and identification requirements are among the biggest sources of dispute in current election litigation. By making the government bear the burden and costs of registering all eligible voters and requiring the government to provide all eligible citizens with unique voter-identification numbers that would be used to help voters register across states and prevent double voting, elections may be run more securely with less litigation and greater voter confidence. And, of course, easing the path to voter registration promotes political equality by removing a hurdle for voters.

Some states may not want to set up the procedures for automatic voter registration and may prefer to leave the registration question to the federal government. States would have the option to set up their own system or leave it to the federal government. This means that the provision would not require a “federal takeover” of elections, as some conservatives fear.

David A. Graham: Actually good news about voting, for a change

Democrats and those on the left have reflexively opposed all voter-identification provisions. But such laws are ubiquitous in most other democracies because they are coupled with voter registration conducted by the government (and often using national identity cards, which the United States does not produce).

The real objection to these provisions as they have been implemented in the states is that they have put the onus on voters to get the right form of identification, which places an undue burden on certain people, such as students, poor voters, and others. Under the amendment, the government would take on all of those costs and burdens as part of the system of setting up automatic voter-registration systems. This will make the system work better across states (as people would have a single voter-identification number for their entire life, just as they have a single Social Security number) and ensure not only eased voter registration but also a more efficient and more secure voting system overall.

4. Ensuring Equal Voting Opportunities and Limiting Burdens on Voting Rights

This provision addresses two substantive points and gives a set of instructions to the courts.

First, voters in a state must have roughly equal voting opportunities. This provision does not require states to have a certain number of days of early voting (or even require early voting at all). It does mean, for example, that if a state decides to have an early-voting period, the opportunity for voters must be roughly the same. Any burdens on voting are measured on a per capita, not a per county, basis. This means that people in urban and rural voting areas should have similar wait times to vote. That might lead to more hours for early-polling places in areas with higher populations compared with sparsely populated areas. The provision does not allow a state to assign just one early-voting place per county, which would put a bigger burden on voters in larger counties and give only the illusion of equality or uniformity.

Second, the provision requires that voting not be unduly burdensome on voters and that impediments to voting be reasonably necessary. This requirement should again be measured not by a specific number of early-voting days but by the overall ease with which voters may vote. These standards are unavoidably general, but they should be applied by courts using reasonableness and common sense in a way that favors the enfranchisement of and easy voting opportunities for eligible voters.

5. Constitutionalizing Protection of Minority Voting Rights

This provision would transform what currently appears as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act into a constitutional guarantee of equal treatment. This provision is necessary because the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have not been properly interpreted by the Supreme Court to adequately protect voting rights, and because a very conservative Court could one day determine that the section in question, because it is race conscious, itself now violates the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite strides toward greater political equality, too much discrimination in voting remains, especially against African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian voters, to leave the issue to a congressional statute that can be neutered by the Supreme Court.

Read: Voter suppression is warping democracy

This constitutional provision would enshrine the original intent of Section 2 to provide meaningful protection for minority voters, rather than the watered-down version of the section that the Supreme Court has recently embraced.

6. Congress’s Broad Enforcement Powers

This provision clarifies that when Congress acts under its powers to enforce voting rights, it is fully equal with the Supreme Court. Rather than treating Congress as an ordinary litigant that has to produce enough evidence to satisfy the Supreme Court, the Court must accept congressional legislation protecting voting rights so long as it is rationally related to Congress’s purposes.

Looking across American history, the people, not the Supreme Court, have been the main protectors of voting rights. After the Supreme Court refused to recognize enslaved African Americans as citizens, and after the Civil War freed them, Congress passed and states ratified a series of amendments ending slavery, guaranteeing citizenship for those born in the United States, and barring discrimination in voting on the basis of race. After the Supreme Court refused to recognize equal voting rights for women, Congress passed and the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment. So, too, with voting rights for 18-to-21-year-olds, and for the right of residents of Washington, D.C., to vote for president.

We can do it again, providing the American people with a real right to vote. It won’t solve all the problems with our election system, and it won’t happen tomorrow, but passing a right-to-vote amendment would go a long way toward ensuring greater enfranchisement, less litigation and uncertainty over voting rules, and a stronger democracy for all.

This essay has been adapted from Richard L. Hasen’s new book, A Real Right To Vote: How A Constitutional Amendment Can Safeguard American Democracy .

​When you buy a book using a link on this page, we receive a commission. Thank you for supporting The Atlantic.

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• How to write an argumentative essay | Examples & tips

How to Write an Argumentative Essay | Examples & Tips

Published on July 24, 2020 by Jack Caulfield . Revised on July 23, 2023.

An argumentative essay expresses an extended argument for a particular thesis statement . The author takes a clearly defined stance on their subject and builds up an evidence-based case for it.

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Table of contents

When do you write an argumentative essay, approaches to argumentative essays, introducing your argument, the body: developing your argument, concluding your argument, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about argumentative essays.

You might be assigned an argumentative essay as a writing exercise in high school or in a composition class. The prompt will often ask you to argue for one of two positions, and may include terms like “argue” or “argument.” It will frequently take the form of a question.

The prompt may also be more open-ended in terms of the possible arguments you could make.

Argumentative writing at college level

At university, the vast majority of essays or papers you write will involve some form of argumentation. For example, both rhetorical analysis and literary analysis essays involve making arguments about texts.

In this context, you won’t necessarily be told to write an argumentative essay—but making an evidence-based argument is an essential goal of most academic writing, and this should be your default approach unless you’re told otherwise.

Examples of argumentative essay prompts

At a university level, all the prompts below imply an argumentative essay as the appropriate response.

Your research should lead you to develop a specific position on the topic. The essay then argues for that position and aims to convince the reader by presenting your evidence, evaluation and analysis.

• Don’t just list all the effects you can think of.
• Do develop a focused argument about the overall effect and why it matters, backed up by evidence from sources.
• Don’t just provide a selection of data on the measures’ effectiveness.
• Do build up your own argument about which kinds of measures have been most or least effective, and why.
• Don’t just analyze a random selection of doppelgänger characters.
• Do form an argument about specific texts, comparing and contrasting how they express their thematic concerns through doppelgänger characters.

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An argumentative essay should be objective in its approach; your arguments should rely on logic and evidence, not on exaggeration or appeals to emotion.

There are many possible approaches to argumentative essays, but there are two common models that can help you start outlining your arguments: The Toulmin model and the Rogerian model.

Toulmin arguments

The Toulmin model consists of four steps, which may be repeated as many times as necessary for the argument:

• Make a claim
• Provide the grounds (evidence) for the claim
• Explain the warrant (how the grounds support the claim)
• Discuss possible rebuttals to the claim, identifying the limits of the argument and showing that you have considered alternative perspectives

The Toulmin model is a common approach in academic essays. You don’t have to use these specific terms (grounds, warrants, rebuttals), but establishing a clear connection between your claims and the evidence supporting them is crucial in an argumentative essay.

Say you’re making an argument about the effectiveness of workplace anti-discrimination measures. You might:

• Claim that unconscious bias training does not have the desired results, and resources would be better spent on other approaches
• Cite data to support your claim
• Explain how the data indicates that the method is ineffective
• Anticipate objections to your claim based on other data, indicating whether these objections are valid, and if not, why not.

Rogerian arguments

The Rogerian model also consists of four steps you might repeat throughout your essay:

• Discuss what the opposing position gets right and why people might hold this position
• Highlight the problems with this position
• Present your own position , showing how it addresses these problems
• Suggest a possible compromise —what elements of your position would proponents of the opposing position benefit from adopting?

This model builds up a clear picture of both sides of an argument and seeks a compromise. It is particularly useful when people tend to disagree strongly on the issue discussed, allowing you to approach opposing arguments in good faith.

Say you want to argue that the internet has had a positive impact on education. You might:

• Acknowledge that students rely too much on websites like Wikipedia
• Argue that teachers view Wikipedia as more unreliable than it really is
• Suggest that Wikipedia’s system of citations can actually teach students about referencing
• Suggest critical engagement with Wikipedia as a possible assignment for teachers who are skeptical of its usefulness.

You don’t necessarily have to pick one of these models—you may even use elements of both in different parts of your essay—but it’s worth considering them if you struggle to structure your arguments.

Regardless of which approach you take, your essay should always be structured using an introduction , a body , and a conclusion .

Like other academic essays, an argumentative essay begins with an introduction . The introduction serves to capture the reader’s interest, provide background information, present your thesis statement , and (in longer essays) to summarize the structure of the body.

Hover over different parts of the example below to see how a typical introduction works.

The spread of the internet has had a world-changing effect, not least on the world of education. The use of the internet in academic contexts is on the rise, and its role in learning is hotly debated. For many teachers who did not grow up with this technology, its effects seem alarming and potentially harmful. This concern, while understandable, is misguided. The negatives of internet use are outweighed by its critical benefits for students and educators—as a uniquely comprehensive and accessible information source; a means of exposure to and engagement with different perspectives; and a highly flexible learning environment.

The body of an argumentative essay is where you develop your arguments in detail. Here you’ll present evidence, analysis, and reasoning to convince the reader that your thesis statement is true.

In the standard five-paragraph format for short essays, the body takes up three of your five paragraphs. In longer essays, it will be more paragraphs, and might be divided into sections with headings.

Each paragraph covers its own topic, introduced with a topic sentence . Each of these topics must contribute to your overall argument; don’t include irrelevant information.

This example paragraph takes a Rogerian approach: It first acknowledges the merits of the opposing position and then highlights problems with that position.

Hover over different parts of the example to see how a body paragraph is constructed.

A common frustration for teachers is students’ use of Wikipedia as a source in their writing. Its prevalence among students is not exaggerated; a survey found that the vast majority of the students surveyed used Wikipedia (Head & Eisenberg, 2010). An article in The Guardian stresses a common objection to its use: “a reliance on Wikipedia can discourage students from engaging with genuine academic writing” (Coomer, 2013). Teachers are clearly not mistaken in viewing Wikipedia usage as ubiquitous among their students; but the claim that it discourages engagement with academic sources requires further investigation. This point is treated as self-evident by many teachers, but Wikipedia itself explicitly encourages students to look into other sources. Its articles often provide references to academic publications and include warning notes where citations are missing; the site’s own guidelines for research make clear that it should be used as a starting point, emphasizing that users should always “read the references and check whether they really do support what the article says” (“Wikipedia:Researching with Wikipedia,” 2020). Indeed, for many students, Wikipedia is their first encounter with the concepts of citation and referencing. The use of Wikipedia therefore has a positive side that merits deeper consideration than it often receives.

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An argumentative essay ends with a conclusion that summarizes and reflects on the arguments made in the body.

No new arguments or evidence appear here, but in longer essays you may discuss the strengths and weaknesses of your argument and suggest topics for future research. In all conclusions, you should stress the relevance and importance of your argument.

Hover over the following example to see the typical elements of a conclusion.

The internet has had a major positive impact on the world of education; occasional pitfalls aside, its value is evident in numerous applications. The future of teaching lies in the possibilities the internet opens up for communication, research, and interactivity. As the popularity of distance learning shows, students value the flexibility and accessibility offered by digital education, and educators should fully embrace these advantages. The internet’s dangers, real and imaginary, have been documented exhaustively by skeptics, but the internet is here to stay; it is time to focus seriously on its potential for good.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

• Ad hominem fallacy
• Post hoc fallacy
• Appeal to authority fallacy
• False cause fallacy
• Sunk cost fallacy

College essays

• Choosing Essay Topic
• Write a College Essay
• Write a Diversity Essay
• College Essay Format & Structure
• Comparing and Contrasting in an Essay

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An argumentative essay tends to be a longer essay involving independent research, and aims to make an original argument about a topic. Its thesis statement makes a contentious claim that must be supported in an objective, evidence-based way.

An expository essay also aims to be objective, but it doesn’t have to make an original argument. Rather, it aims to explain something (e.g., a process or idea) in a clear, concise way. Expository essays are often shorter assignments and rely less on research.

At college level, you must properly cite your sources in all essays , research papers , and other academic texts (except exams and in-class exercises).

Add a citation whenever you quote , paraphrase , or summarize information or ideas from a source. You should also give full source details in a bibliography or reference list at the end of your text.

The exact format of your citations depends on which citation style you are instructed to use. The most common styles are APA , MLA , and Chicago .

The majority of the essays written at university are some sort of argumentative essay . Unless otherwise specified, you can assume that the goal of any essay you’re asked to write is argumentative: To convince the reader of your position using evidence and reasoning.

In composition classes you might be given assignments that specifically test your ability to write an argumentative essay. Look out for prompts including instructions like “argue,” “assess,” or “discuss” to see if this is the goal.

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Chapter 11: The Right to Vote

We cannot imagine a modern democracy without adult citizens having the right to vote freely. It is a basic right of citizenship in a democratic society. Yet nowhere in the Constitution is the right to vote granted explicitly. At a time when even dictatorial governments formally (and fraudulently) hold elections, it seems remarkable that the world’s leading democracy does not mention the right to vote in the main body of its most important document.

The creation of a federal system that divided power between state and central governments explains this strange omission. The framers left it to states to determine qualifications of voters in state and national elections, which at the time meant that only white men who owned property could vote. This limitation proved unacceptable, and beginning in the nineteenth century, states gradually opened the door to widespread participation in elections. By the 1970s, changes in voter qualifications opened the ballot to nearly all adult citizens.

Today, we tend to think of new rights as results of Supreme Court decisions. We often forget that rights also stem from political action and constitutional amendment. The extension of the right to vote to all adult citizens falls into this latter category. Property restrictions disappeared in the 1820s and 1830s when, under political pressure, new state constitutions extended the right to vote—also called suffrage and the franchise—to free white males older than twenty-one. Changes to the federal constitution occurred after the Civil War. The Fifteenth Amendment (1870) prohibited states from denying the right to vote on account of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” The Nineteenth Amendment (1920) enfranchised women. The Twenty-fourth Amendment (1964) banned poll taxes meant to discourage blacks from voting in federal elections. The Twenty sixth Amendment (1971) lowered the voting age to eighteen. Collectively, the voting amendments represent the greatest addition of rights to the Constitution since the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.

Few of these changes came easily. Opponents were fearful that new voters would threaten their political power or challenge the values they prized. In each instance a shift in social attitudes preceded the adoption of the amendment and made it possible. Many of the major expansions of the franchise have also occurred during or in the aftermath of wars because it was difficult to ask people to bear the demands of war while denying them the vote. But even when most people agreed the time had come to extend the franchise, stiff opposition remained, making it difficult to claim victory, as illustrated by the final act—the so-called War of the Roses—in the long battle to enact the Nineteenth Amendment.

August 1920 was hot and muggy in Nashville, Tennessee. Normally, it was a month when residents left the capital city for the highlands of Kentucky or the Smoky Mountains to the east. But this August was not typical. The Tennessee legislature was in session to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment and extend the vote to women. Thirty-five states had passed it, one short of the three-fourths of states required for its adoption. Yet suffragists, supporters of the amendment, were uneasy. Connecticut, the state they had counted on for victory, suddenly appeared unlikely to ratify the amendment. Now they had to fight the battle in the conservative, unsympathetic South. A defeat in Tennessee, they feared, might kill the amendment.

The town was thick with celebrities and reporters from around the nation. Carrie Chapman Catt, head of the National Woman Suffrage Association, had arrived from New York two months earlier to team with prominent Tennessee women to organize rallies and letter-writing campaigns, enlisting support from women of urban and rural backgrounds, different social classes, and different races. To demonstrate their unity, the pro-amendment forces adopted the yellow rose as a symbol. In response, opponents chose the red rose. The ensuing campaign became known, naturally, as the War of the Roses, recalling the fifteenth century civil war among the nobility in England.

Initially, legislators appeared to favor passage, but they soon began to waver under relentless pressure from opponents of the amendment. Suffragists feared the worst, even after the Tennessee senate voted overwhelmingly to ratify. The state’s lower house appeared to be leaning the other way. Legislators wore either yellow roses or red roses to signal their position on the vote, and a simple count of roses, 49 red and 47 yellow, forecast defeat for the amendment. “We are up to the last half of the last state,” Catt wrote, “[and] opposition of every sort is fighting with no scruple… [They] are appealing to Negrophobia and every other cave man’s prejudice… It’s hot, muggy, nasty, and this last battle is desperate… We are low in our minds… Even if we win, we who are here will never remember it but with a shudder.”

The road to ratification that was reaching its climactic moment in Tennessee had begun in 1848 in New York State at the Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention. The Declaration of Rights of Women, the document produced by the convention, contained the first serious proposal that women be allowed to vote. Twenty years later, in 1868, a woman suffrage amendment was first introduced, unsuccessfully, in Congress. In the 1870s, suffragists tried again, this time proposing the so-called Anthony amendment, named for Susan B. Anthony, the century’s leading campaigner for women’s rights, and modeled after the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade states from denying the right to vote based on race or color. (Even though that amendment does not refer to gender, in effect it applied to men only.) The Anthony amendment provided that “the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex,” words that became the language of the Nineteenth Amendment forty-two years later.

But to have drunkards, idiots, horse-racing, rum-selling rowdies, ignorant foreigners, and silly boys fully recognized, while we ourselves are thrust out from all the rights that belong to citizens, it is too grossly insulting to the dignity of woman to be longer quietly submitted to. The right is ours. Have it, we must. Use it, we will. The pens, the tongues, the fortunes, the indomitable wills of many women are already pledged to secure this right.

Stymied in their attempts to get a constitutional amendment passed by Congress in the 1860s and 1870s, suffragists resorted to the courts, with no success. In what was termed the “new departure,” they looked to the Fourteenth Amendment’s language that all persons born in the United States are citizens who enjoy the privileges and immunities of citizenship. Voting was one of those privileges, they argued. But the Supreme Court did not agree, rejecting the attempt of a reformer, Virginia Minor, to register to vote in Missouri. Advocates of women’s right to vote were more successful in persuading some states, especially western states, to grant the franchise to women. Other suffragists, tired of the slow progress, began using more radical tactics: picketing the White House, staging large marches and demonstrations, and going to jail. During World War I, women played important roles in the war effort, and they used their new influence to pressure the President and Congress for a reward of political equality. Their tactics paid off. In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to submit the Nineteenth Amendment to the states, which it did in 1919.

All the arguments advanced in Tennessee for and against the amendment had been part of the national debate for decades. Supporters focused on two themes—equality and responsibility. Women were citizens, and the American ideals of citizenship, as expressed in the Declaration of Independence and reinforced in the Fourteenth Amendment, required equal treatment under law. The Fifteenth Amendment had extended the vote to previously excluded African Americans, so women, too, were due this right. Unfortunately, this argument sometimes was accompanied by the ugly claim of white women’s superiority over black men as potential voters. Women also pointed to their contributions to the nation’s economy; increasingly they worked in factories and had begun to enter the professions. Even so, women were denied opportunities to fulfill their civic obligation. They could not serve on juries, for instance, because jurors were chosen from voting rolls, an exclusion that denied women defendants the right to be tried by their peers.

Opponents of female suffrage focused attention on what they claimed would threaten the family. A woman’s place was in the home; it was her separate sphere, a world of motherhood and domesticity where she exerted a naturally superior moral influence. Placing women in the nasty arena of partisan politics would sully them, dragging them to the level of the men who were less refined morally and ethically. Ironically, many feminists accepted the notion that women played a superior domestic role, but they argued in rebuttal that by voting women would uplift the nation’s political and moral tone.

The critical Tennessee vote on the amendment came in the state’s house of representatives on August 18. Supporters were two votes shy of passage, but a legislator abandoned his hospital bed to close the gap to one vote. Then, unexpectedly, an opponent switched sides, leaving the legislature deadlocked. A second vote on the amendment produced another tie. Tensions mounted as each side lobbied furiously to change legislators’ minds. Suddenly, on the third roll call, the youngest member of the legislature, twenty-four-year-old Harry Burns, whose district opposed the amendment, dramatically announced his support. In his pocket was a telegram from his mother, a staunch suffragist, who urged him to vote yes, writing, “I have been watching to see how you stood, but have noticed nothing yet. Be a good boy and help Mrs. Catt put ‘Rat’ in Ratification.” Joined by another member who also changed his vote, the amendment passed, 49 to 47.

The vote. . . is the most powerful instrument ever devised by man for breaking down injustice and destroying the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different from other men.

With the certification of Tennessee’s decision, the Nineteenth Amendment—and a new right—became part of the Constitution. Only one delegate from the Seneca Falls convention was still alive when the amendment passed. Charlotte Woodward had been nineteen years old in 1848. When finally eligible to cast her first ballot, she was ninety-one. It had taken a lifetime for women to achieve the right to vote.

The Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments contain clear directives and have required little or no judicial interpretation. The Fifteenth Amendment is in a class by itself, even though it, too, contained a similar directive extending the vote to black citizens. This new constitutional protection did not guarantee access to the polls as many states, especially in the South, found other ways to discourage black men, and then women, from exercising their rights. Literacy tests, poll taxes, and intimidation were just some of the obstacles African Americans had to overcome. White voting registrars, for instance, required potential black voters to read and explain complex constitutional texts and then denied the vote even when the applicant demonstrated his knowledge. White men were given a pass under so-called “grandfather” clauses that allowed them to register if their ancestors had voted. Not until the 1960s were most of these barriers removed by law.

Today, the franchise is nearly universal in the United States. Only juveniles, aliens (foreign-born residents who are not yet citizens), convicted felons, and insane persons cannot vote in most states. Not all questions related to voting are settled, however. In Georgia, for example, all counties, regardless of size, had a single representative in the legislature. A series of cases in the 1960s addressed these problems when the Supreme Court adopted what is known as the “one man, one vote” principle to judge how fairly state legislatures created voting districts, based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal protection of the laws for different groups of people. These decisions corrected some gross inequities, but they raised other questions. In redrawing districts, for example, could legislatures create predominately black or Latino districts for the purpose of ensuring the election of minority officeholders? The underlying question was an important one—is voting an individual right or a group right? These issues are still being debated, although Americans remain true to the tradition that legislators represent individual voters, not groups. Also unsettled is how far political parties may go to redraw voting districts to make it more likely their candidates will win—and whether these districts can be redrawn at times other than the years immediately following a census conducted every decade.

A more significant modern problem is the number of eligible voters who choose not to exercise their right. Many people fail to register, even though recent laws allow registration by mail or when applying for governmental services, including a driver’s license. Only about half of all registered voters participate in the national election for President, and even fewer people vote in other elections. This low turnout places the United States near the bottom of all Western democracies. The group that votes least is eighteen- to twenty-four year-olds, thereby giving young adults less influence over government policy even though, as the largest group in the military, they are the citizens whose lives are most at risk from political decisions.

What difference does voting make—and more important, what is its relationship to other individual rights? Each vote counts, sometimes in ways unimagined when they are cast. The Presidential election of 2000, for example, was one of the closest contests in U.S. history. Less than three hundred votes separated winner from loser in Florida, the state whose electoral votes tipped the election to George W. Bush. But what difference does voting make to our individual rights under the Constitution? The most direct relationship comes in the laws passed by Congress and the various state legislatures. We elect the senators and representatives who pass measures that may extend or limit our rights. We also vote for the President and governors who administer and enforce these statutes. The selection of federal and state judges has a less direct but equally important relationship with voting. The U.S. Senate, elected by popular vote, approves the President’s appointments for federal judgeships. These judges interpret our constitutional guarantees, which is why the confirmation of Supreme Court nominees attracts such attention.

Voting is a fundamental right—and a responsibility—of citizens in a democracy. It is, in fact, a right that gives special meaning to the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly that we deem essential for our liberty. These rights and the right to vote are required for a government “of the people, by the people, for the people,” in Abraham Lincoln’s words. One of the original contributions made by the founding generation, a generation raised in a world of monarchies, was the theory of popular sovereignty, where power resides in the people and not the government. Our constitution expresses this concept in its opening phrase, “We the People.” When we exercise our right to vote, we affirm the value of this revolutionary ideal and, in the process, revitalize our democracy.

Are All Citizens Necessarily Voters?

Virginia Minor of Missouri was the first person to take the cause of women’s right to vote to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1869, she developed an argument called the “New Departure” in which she claimed that women already had the right to vote as a consequence of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and its citizenship clause. Women were citizens of the United States, she claimed, and were entitled to all the “privileges and immunities” of citizens, as protected by the amendment. One of these privileges was the right to vote. When she tried to register to vote in Missouri, however, the county election judge, Reese Happersett, refused to enroll her on the list of eligible voters. In 1875, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court rejected her appeal. It reasoned that because a person could be a citizen without being a voter, therefore voting was not a privilege or right of citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Morrison R.Waite wrote the opinion in Minor v. Happersett.

The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the constitutional and laws of that State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. . . .

The direct question is. . . whether all citizens are necessarily voters.

The [fourteenth] amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had. . . .It is clear. . . that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption. If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.

[A]ll the citizens of the States were not invested with the right of suffrage. In all, save perhaps New Jersey, this right was only bestowed upon men and not upon all of them. . . .

Women were excluded from suffrage in nearly all States by the express provision of their constitutions and laws. . . .

But we need not particularize further. No new State has ever been admitted to the Union which has conferred the right of suffrage upon women, and this have never been considered a valid objection to her admission. On the contrary. . . the right of suffrage was withdrawn from women as early as 1807 in the State of New Jersey, without any attempt to obtain the interference of the United States to prevent it. Since then the governments of the insurgent States have been reorganized under a requirement that be fore their representatives could be admitted to seats in Congress they must have adopted new constitutions, republican in form. In no one of these constitutions was suffrage conferred upon women, and yet the States have all been restored to their original position as States in the Union.

Certainly, if the courts can consider any question settled, this is one. For nearly ninety years the people have acted upon the idea that the Constitution, when it conferred citizenship, did not necessarily confer the right of suffrage . . . Our province here is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be.

We have given this case the careful consideration its importance demands. If the law is wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not with us.

“No Person Shall Be Kept from Voting Because of His Race”

Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, the federal government responded to claims of racial discrimination in voting in the South on a case-by-case basis. The civil rights march from Selma to Birmingham, Alabama, in March 1965 dramatized the injustices and brutality inflicted on blacks who sought to vote. The use of police dogs and fire hoses to stop the marchers and the murders of several civil rights workers led to public outrage and a decision by Lyndon Johnson’s administration to seek a national voting rights act. President Johnson outlined his reasons for the request in a nationally televised speech (below) to a joint session of Congress while the Selma march was still in progress. The act passed quickly. In 2006, the act was extended for another twenty-five years.

Our fathers believed that if this noble view of the rights of man was to flourish, it must be rooted in democracy. The most basic right of all was the right to choose your own leaders. The history of this country, in large measure, is the history of the expansion of that right to all of our people.

Many of the issues of civil rights are very complex and most difficult. But about this there can and should be no argument. Every American citizen must have an equal right to vote. There is no reason which can excuse the denial of that right. There is no duty which weighs more heavily on us than the duty we have to ensure that right.

Yet the harsh fact is that in many places in this country men and women are kept from voting simply because they are Negroes.

Every device of which human ingenuity is capable has been used to deny this right. The Negro citizen may go to register only to be told that the day is wrong, or the hour is late, or the official in charge is absent. And if he persists, and if he manages to present himself to the registrar, he may be disqualified because he did not spell out his middle name or because he abbreviated a word on the application.

And if he manages to fill out an application he is given a test. The registrar is the sole judge of whether he passes this test. He may be asked to recite the entire Constitution, or explain the most complex provisions of State law. And even a college degree cannot be used to prove that he can read and write. For the fact is that the only way to pass these barriers is to show a white skin.

Experience has clearly shown that the existing process of law cannot overcome systematic and ingenious discrimination. No law that we now have on the books—and I have helped to put three of them there—can ensure the right to vote when local officials are determined to deny it.

In such a case our duty must be clear to all of us. The Constitution says that no person shall be kept from voting because of his race or his color.We have all sworn an oath before God to support and to defend that Constitution. We must now act in obedience to that oath.

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Argumentative Essay: All Citizens Should be Required by Law to Vote

Every citizen has the right to vote, yet so many people don’t vote, with the turnout at just 64% for the 2008 presidential election, and voter turnout rates decreasing steadily in most established democracies. There are a number of reasons why people may not vote: a lack of understanding of politics, people being busier, a lack of trust in the government, laziness, not caring or even contentment with how things are.

But when people fought so hard to get fair and equal voting rights for all, it should be a legal requirement that every US citizen turns out on election day and votes.

For a start, not voting when you have the right to is disrespectful to a lot of people. It disrespects those that fought and struggled for the right to vote and not be discriminated against, because to not vote is to not value the contribution and sacrifice that they made for all of us. However, it is possible that many people do not value the movements because they are ignored from our own history. The school system should value important suffragettes just as much as presidents so people are more aware of the suffrage and then they would be more likely to want to vote.

It also isn’t fair to many underprivileged or oppressed people all over the world who would give anything for the right to vote, but are denied the important opportunity that we so readily throw away. These people may feel that we are ungrateful what they have, and they would be right, because they would love the chance to have a say in the way their country runs and potentially improve their lives through it, while we don’t bother to vote but then moan if things don’t go the way that we want.

This is another reason that we should have to vote: because otherwise you shouldn’t have the right to complain. If you don’t even try to influence policy in the ways that you can, you can’t then moan about how rubbish everything is. If you’ve done all that you can but it hasn’t worked, however, you and everyone else being critical of the government is perfectly reasonable because things are going wrong despite every citizen’s best efforts.

The main argument against making voting compulsory is that the people that aren’t voting currently don’t care, and will just pick randomly and could make bad choices and undermine the votes of those that thought carefully. However, although people may not actively vote to improve their country, they wouldn’t actively vote to make it worse, so if they had to vote they would put some effort in. If we all had to vote, we would all understand more and the country would be better off.

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Blog > She Should Run Tips

How to Exercise Your Right to Vote This Election

October 8, 2020 | Kathleen Kiernan

Writer and meditation teacher Sharon Salzberg once said, “Voting is the expression of our commitment to ourselves, one another, this country, and this world.” As we count-down to Election Day, people across the country are exercising their right to vote, whether that’s by mail or in person. As you consider what voting means to you, She Should Run teamed up with Rock the Vote and Ballot Ready to help you understand what will be on your ballot, how to make your voting plan, and how to recognize barriers to voting and protect your ballot.

(Image Sourced by Bustle)

Understanding Your Ballot

Let’s start with the basics. Your ballot is a sheet of paper on which you make your vote for candidates running for office and depending on where you live, a law that will impact your community. When you are preparing to vote, you will want to take a look at who and what will be on your ballot so you can make an informed decision on what to vote for. Luckily, Ballot Ready has made this easier than ever to do . When you type in the address that you are registered to vote in, it will show you your sample ballot. This will include the Presidential candidates, candidates running at the state and local level if your state is hosting elections for those levels, and any ballot measures. Here are some tips to help you once you’ve viewed your ballot:

• Compare and contrast the candidates. How are they different? How are they similar? What are their accomplishments? What are their values?

• Check their responses to issues. What issues are they focusing on and what are their solutions?

• View endorsements. Endorsements from right-leaning or left-leaning organizations or issue-based organizations like the NRA or Planned Parenthood can give you an insight into how the candidate feels about policies and tell you whether your values and beliefs line up with theirs.

Tip: A ballot measure is a law, issue, or question that appears on a state or local ballot for voters to decide. Ballot Ready can help you understand the language of the measure, what you’re voting for or against, and help you determine how you want to vote.

Making Your Voting Plan

So you’ve researched your ballot and you know which candidates and ballot measures you’re going to vote on. Now’s the time to make your voting plan. First, check your voter registration status and make sure you’re registered. Next, figure out how you’re going to vote. Will you vote by mail or in-person this year? If you’re voting by mail, make sure you request your ballot today . No, really: request it right now. Some states like Colorado and Washington, D.C. are mailing every registered voter a ballot, and in other states, like Georgia, you have to request your mail-in ballot. Once you’ve completed your ballot ( make sure you follow the instructions carefully !), you can either mail it back or drop it off at a ballot box. 

• If you plan on voting in person, here are a few questions to consider:

• Where is your voting center? 

• What time will you arrive? 

• How are you getting there? Do you need a ride?

• Who else can you bring with you?

• Do you need to take off work or secure childcare?

• In states with voter I.D. laws: Do you have all the necessary documents to vote?

Answering these questions a few weeks before Election Day will make voting easier and more enjoyable for you. Also, you might want to consider voting early where the lines are typically shorter.

(Image Sourced by Hope Ann Flores | The State News)

Barriers to Voting

Now that you have figured out who you’re voting for and how you’re voting, let’s talk about barriers to voting. Anything that keeps you from voting is considered a barrier. These include:

• Voter ID requirements

• Inaccessibility: ability, age, language

• Voter role purges 

• Polling place closures/consolidations

• Voter intimidation tactics 

• Reduced early voting

• Reduced voting hours

Call (866) OUR-VOTE if you feel your rights have been violated. There will be lawyers on hand to answer Election Day questions and concerns about voting procedures.

Election Protection

This brings us to protecting our elections and your ballot. Because there are real barriers to voting and voting this year looks different than it ever has due to COVID-19, you’ll want to ensure that your ballot is counted and your voice is heard. We’ve said it once, but we’ll say it again: make sure you are registered to vote. If you plan on voting by mail, make sure you read, understand, and follow all of the instructions for mail-in voting. For example, if you vote absentee in Alabama, your ballot must be witnessed by two people or notarized and if hand-delivered, your ballot must be received by the close of business, but no later than 5 pm, on the day prior to Election Day.

If necessary, you may need to cast a provisional ballot on Election Day. A provisional ballot is cast by a voter whose eligibility to vote cannot be proven at the polls on Election Day. If, after the election, administrators determine that the voter who cast the provisional ballot was eligible to vote, the ballot will be counted as a regular ballot. 

Lastly, check the results! Since many people are voting by mail this year and many states are operating differently with rules on when they are accepting mail-in ballots, we may not know the results until a week after Election Day so be patient as voter officials work to make sure every ballot is counted. 

(Image Sourced by Sébastien Thibault) 

ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

For more information on exercising your right to vote, we invite you to join our community where you can join with more than 21,000 women and discuss tips and tricks for voting and understanding the ballot, and you can watch a full webinar about what a ballot is and who’s on it, including guest speakers Ballot Ready Electoral Fellow Taylor Raymond and Rock the Vote Director of Civic Partnerships and Campaigns Allie Aguilera DiMuzio. 

Resources from Rock the Vote: 

State by state How-to-Vote center which tells you deadlines, vote-by-mail requirements, ballot tracking where it’s available, and more!

Absentee ballot request tool .

The Empower App , Rock the Vote’s relational organizing tool that lets you connect with your community directly.

Civic Tech Tools in case you want to put a voter registration or election reminder widget on your website. 

Resources from Ballot Ready:

Election Center : your new best friend, all in one planning tool for everything Election Day.

Ballot Parties : Get involved! Set up an information session with family and friends to share your ballot knowledge.

Super Voter : Amplify your voice and activate your network.

Become A Partner : Use the power of BallotReady, the nation’s largest electoral database to help your community vote this year.

Enjoying our blog content? Help pay it forward so more women are able to wake up to their political potential. Donate to support She Should Run.

Voting Rights

Learn more about how to exercise your voting rights, resist voter intimidation efforts, and access disability-related accommodations and language assistance at the polls. For help at the polls, call the non-partisan Election Protection Hotline at 1-866-OUR-VOTE.

I need to register to vote

States have different voter registration deadlines and requirements, so check what you need to do to register in your state well in advance of Election Day. Voter registration deadlines vary and some states allow individuals to register for the first time and cast ballots on Election Day.  

• Check your registration status at Can I Vote .
• If you are not registered to vote, go to vote.gov to find your options. This link will provide information about your registration options, which may include online registration.

I need to find my polling place

Every state offers options to vote in-person on Election Day, even those that primarily conduct elections by mail.

• Find your polling place or vote center and its hours of operation.
• Make a plan for Election Day: When and where will you cast your vote, documents you may need to bring, and how will you get there?  

I’m not sure what to bring to the polls

Your state may require you to bring an ID or bring documents to show your residence, especially if you’re voting for the first time. Make sure you’re prepared.

• Learn what materials you’ll need to bring with you to the polling place on Election Day.

I want to vote before Election Day

Your rights.

• If you cannot vote in-person on Election Day, you may be able to vote early or by absentee vote-by-mail ballot.
• Some states allow any voter to vote absentee; others have stricter requirements.
• Learn about your options to exercise absentee or early voting in your state.
• Keep in mind that the deadline to request an absentee ballot may be before Election Day.

What are my general rights on Election Day?

• If the polls close while you’re still in line, stay in line – you have the right to vote.
• If you make a mistake on your ballot, ask for a new one.
• If the machines are down at your polling place, ask for a paper ballot.
• English: 1-866-OUR-VOTE / 1-866-687-8683
• Spanish: 1-888-VE-Y-VOTA / 1-888-839-8682
• Arabic: 1-844-YALLA-US / 1-844-925-5287
• For Bengali, Cantonese, Hindi, Urdu, Korean, Mandarin, Tagalog, or Vietnamese: 1-888-274-8683

The poll worker says my name is not on the list of registered voters

• Voters are entitled to a provisional ballot, even if they aren’t in the poll book.
• After Election Day, election officials must investigate whether you are qualified to vote and registered. If you are qualified and registered, they will count your provisional ballot.
• Ask the poll worker to double check for your name on the list of registered voters. Make sure to spell your name out for the poll worker.
• If your name is not on the list, ask if there is a supplemental list of voters.
• Request that the poll workers check a statewide system (if one is available) to see if you are registered to vote at a different polling place.
• If the poll worker does not have access to a statewide system, ask them to call the main election office.
• You can also call 1-866-OUR-VOTE and ask for help verifying your proper polling place.
• If you are registered at a different location, in most instances you will have to travel to that location to cast a regular ballot.
• If the poll worker still cannot find your name or if you cannot travel to the correct polling place, ask for a provisional ballot.

Additional information

• If you are turned away or denied a provisional ballot, call the Election Protection Hotline at 1-866-OUR-VOTE or 1-888-VE-Y-VOTA (en Español).
• Report your experience to local election officials .

I am a voter with a disability

• Under federal law, all polling places for federal elections must be fully accessible to older adults and voters with disabilities. Simply allowing curbside voting is not enough to meet Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) accessibility requirements.
• In federal elections, every polling place must have at least one voting system that allows voters with disabilities to vote privately and independently. Usually, this is a machine that can read the ballot to you (for people with vision disabilities or dyslexia), and let you vote by pushing buttons (for people with mobility disabilities).
• Under federal law, voters with disabilities and voters who have difficulty reading or writing English have the right to receive in-person help at the polls from the person of their choice. This helper cannot be the voter’s employer, an agent of the voter’s employer, or an agent or officer of the voter’s union. The helper must respect the voter’s privacy, not looking at the voter’s ballot unless the voter asks them to do so.
• Election officials (including poll workers) must make reasonable accommodations as needed to help you vote.
• Election officials must provide you with help if it’s possible for them to do so.
• A voter with a mental disability cannot be turned away from the polls because a poll worker thinks they are not ‘qualified’ to vote.
• You can bring a family member, friend, or another person of your choice to assist you at the polls. Do not bring your employer, or an agent of your employer or union.
• If you bring a person to assist you, let the poll workers know that when you check in. They may ask you to swear under oath that you have a disability and that you have asked that person to help you. Your helper may also be required to sign a form swearing that they did not tell you how to vote.
• If there are long lines and you have a physical or mental health condition or disability that makes it difficult for you to stand in line, tell a poll worker.
• Tell election officials what you need. For example, if it’s hard for you to stand, they should provide you with a chair or a place to sit while you wait. If the crowds or noise are hard for you, election officials can find a quiet place for you to wait and call you when it’s your turn to vote.
• If you are not able to enter your polling place because the pathway to it is not fully accessible, ask poll workers for curbside assistance. Also call 1-866-OUR-VOTE to report the issue.
• If you have difficulty using the materials provided to make your ballot selections, review, or cast your ballot, let a poll worker know and ask for the help you need. Accessibility is the law.
• If you face any challenges in voting privately and independently or are unable to cast your vote, report the problem to the Election Protection hotline at 1-866-OUR-VOTE. Trained attorneys can assist you and make sure that other voters do not experience the same problem.

     Additional information

• Find detailed voting guides at Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law
• For a toolkit on voting with a disability, visit the Autistic Self Advocacy Network .
• Visit SABE’s GoVoter Project for accessible trainings on how to exercise your rights as a voter with a disability.
• Take a course on polling place accessibility requirements at the Rocky Mountain ADA Center .
• For voting in formation in American Sign Language, visit SignVote .

I speak English less than “very well”

• Under federal law, voters who have difficulty reading or writing English may receive in-person assistance at the polls from the person of their choice. This person cannot be the voter’s employer, an agent of the voter’s employer, or an agent or officer of the voter’s union.
• Counties covered by Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act are required to provide bilingual assistance to voters in specific languages. This means that they must provide poll workers who speak certain languages, and make all election materials and election-related information available in those languages. Check whether your county is required to provide bilingual election assistance in a language you speak.
• You can bring a family member, friend, or other person of your choice to assist you at the polls. Do not bring your employer, or an agent of your employer or union.
• If you live in a county that’s required to provide bilingual voting assistance for a language you speak, you can request oral assistance from a bilingual poll worker and ask for voting materials, such as a ballot, in that language.
• English: 1-866-OUR-VOTE / 1-866-687-8683.
• Bengali, Cantonese, Hindi, Urdu, Korean, Mandarin, Tagalog, Vietnamese): 1-888-API-VOTE / 1-888-274-8683
• For detailed guidance on bilingual voting assistance, visit Asian Americans Advancing Justice .

Someone is interfering with my right to vote

Examples of voter intimidation.

• Aggressively questioning voters about their citizenship, criminal record, or other qualifications to vote.
• Falsely representing oneself as an elections official.
• Displaying false or misleading signs about voter fraud and related criminal penalties.
• Other forms of harassment, particularly harassment targeting non-English speakers and voters of color.
• You do not need to speak English to vote, in any state.
• You do not need to pass a test to vote, in any state.
• Some states do not require voters to present photo identification.
• It’s illegal to intimidate voters and a federal crime to “intimidate, threaten, [or] coerce … any other person for the purpose of interfering with the right of [that] other person to vote or to vote as he may choose.”

What to do if you experience voter intimidation

• In many states, you can give a sworn statement to the poll worker that you satisfy the qualifications to vote in your state, and then proceed to cast a ballot.
• Report intimidation to the Election Protection Hotline at 1-866-OUR-VOTE or 1-888-VE-Y-VOTA (en Español).
• Report intimidation to your local election officials . Their offices will be open on Election Day.

Other Know Your Rights Issues

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Sat / act prep online guides and tips, how to write an a+ argumentative essay.

Miscellaneous

You'll no doubt have to write a number of argumentative essays in both high school and college, but what, exactly, is an argumentative essay and how do you write the best one possible? Let's take a look.

A great argumentative essay always combines the same basic elements: approaching an argument from a rational perspective, researching sources, supporting your claims using facts rather than opinion, and articulating your reasoning into the most cogent and reasoned points. Argumentative essays are great building blocks for all sorts of research and rhetoric, so your teachers will expect you to master the technique before long.

But if this sounds daunting, never fear! We'll show how an argumentative essay differs from other kinds of papers, how to research and write them, how to pick an argumentative essay topic, and where to find example essays. So let's get started.

What Is an Argumentative Essay? How Is it Different from Other Kinds of Essays?

There are two basic requirements for any and all essays: to state a claim (a thesis statement) and to support that claim with evidence.

Though every essay is founded on these two ideas, there are several different types of essays, differentiated by the style of the writing, how the writer presents the thesis, and the types of evidence used to support the thesis statement.

Essays can be roughly divided into four different types:

#1: Argumentative #2: Persuasive #3: Expository #4: Analytical

So let's look at each type and what the differences are between them before we focus the rest of our time to argumentative essays.

Argumentative Essay

Argumentative essays are what this article is all about, so let's talk about them first.

An argumentative essay attempts to convince a reader to agree with a particular argument (the writer's thesis statement). The writer takes a firm stand one way or another on a topic and then uses hard evidence to support that stance.

An argumentative essay seeks to prove to the reader that one argument —the writer's argument— is the factually and logically correct one. This means that an argumentative essay must use only evidence-based support to back up a claim , rather than emotional or philosophical reasoning (which is often allowed in other types of essays). Thus, an argumentative essay has a burden of substantiated proof and sources , whereas some other types of essays (namely persuasive essays) do not.

You can write an argumentative essay on any topic, so long as there's room for argument. Generally, you can use the same topics for both a persuasive essay or an argumentative one, so long as you support the argumentative essay with hard evidence.

Example topics of an argumentative essay:

• "Should farmers be allowed to shoot wolves if those wolves injure or kill farm animals?"
• "Should the drinking age be lowered in the United States?"
• "Are alternatives to democracy effective and/or feasible to implement?"

The next three types of essays are not argumentative essays, but you may have written them in school. We're going to cover them so you know what not to do for your argumentative essay.

Persuasive Essay

Persuasive essays are similar to argumentative essays, so it can be easy to get them confused. But knowing what makes an argumentative essay different than a persuasive essay can often mean the difference between an excellent grade and an average one.

Persuasive essays seek to persuade a reader to agree with the point of view of the writer, whether that point of view is based on factual evidence or not. The writer has much more flexibility in the evidence they can use, with the ability to use moral, cultural, or opinion-based reasoning as well as factual reasoning to persuade the reader to agree the writer's side of a given issue.

Instead of being forced to use "pure" reason as one would in an argumentative essay, the writer of a persuasive essay can manipulate or appeal to the reader's emotions. So long as the writer attempts to steer the readers into agreeing with the thesis statement, the writer doesn't necessarily need hard evidence in favor of the argument.

Often, you can use the same topics for both a persuasive essay or an argumentative one—the difference is all in the approach and the evidence you present.

Example topics of a persuasive essay:

• "Should children be responsible for their parents' debts?"
• "Should cheating on a test be automatic grounds for expulsion?"
• "How much should sports leagues be held accountable for player injuries and the long-term consequences of those injuries?"

Expository Essay

An expository essay is typically a short essay in which the writer explains an idea, issue, or theme , or discusses the history of a person, place, or idea.

This is typically a fact-forward essay with little argument or opinion one way or the other.

Example topics of an expository essay:

• "The History of the Philadelphia Liberty Bell"
• "The Reasons I Always Wanted to be a Doctor"
• "The Meaning Behind the Colloquialism ‘People in Glass Houses Shouldn't Throw Stones'"

Analytical Essay

An analytical essay seeks to delve into the deeper meaning of a text or work of art, or unpack a complicated idea . These kinds of essays closely interpret a source and look into its meaning by analyzing it at both a macro and micro level.

This type of analysis can be augmented by historical context or other expert or widely-regarded opinions on the subject, but is mainly supported directly through the original source (the piece or art or text being analyzed) .

Example topics of an analytical essay:

• "Victory Gin in Place of Water: The Symbolism Behind Gin as the Only Potable Substance in George Orwell's 1984"
• "Amarna Period Art: The Meaning Behind the Shift from Rigid to Fluid Poses"
• "Adultery During WWII, as Told Through a Series of Letters to and from Soldiers"

There are many different types of essay and, over time, you'll be able to master them all.

A Typical Argumentative Essay Assignment

The average argumentative essay is between three to five pages, and will require at least three or four separate sources with which to back your claims . As for the essay topic , you'll most often be asked to write an argumentative essay in an English class on a "general" topic of your choice, ranging the gamut from science, to history, to literature.

But while the topics of an argumentative essay can span several different fields, the structure of an argumentative essay is always the same: you must support a claim—a claim that can reasonably have multiple sides—using multiple sources and using a standard essay format (which we'll talk about later on).

This is why many argumentative essay topics begin with the word "should," as in:

• "Should all students be required to learn chemistry in high school?"
• "Should children be required to learn a second language?"
• "Should schools or governments be allowed to ban books?"

These topics all have at least two sides of the argument: Yes or no. And you must support the side you choose with evidence as to why your side is the correct one.

But there are also plenty of other ways to frame an argumentative essay as well:

• "Does using social media do more to benefit or harm people?"
• "Does the legal status of artwork or its creators—graffiti and vandalism, pirated media, a creator who's in jail—have an impact on the art itself?"
• "Is or should anyone ever be ‘above the law?'"

Though these are worded differently than the first three, you're still essentially forced to pick between two sides of an issue: yes or no, for or against, benefit or detriment. Though your argument might not fall entirely into one side of the divide or another—for instance, you could claim that social media has positively impacted some aspects of modern life while being a detriment to others—your essay should still support one side of the argument above all. Your final stance would be that overall , social media is beneficial or overall , social media is harmful.

If your argument is one that is mostly text-based or backed by a single source (e.g., "How does Salinger show that Holden Caulfield is an unreliable narrator?" or "Does Gatsby personify the American Dream?"), then it's an analytical essay, rather than an argumentative essay. An argumentative essay will always be focused on more general topics so that you can use multiple sources to back up your claims.

Good Argumentative Essay Topics

So you know the basic idea behind an argumentative essay, but what topic should you write about?

Again, almost always, you'll be asked to write an argumentative essay on a free topic of your choice, or you'll be asked to select between a few given topics . If you're given complete free reign of topics, then it'll be up to you to find an essay topic that no only appeals to you, but that you can turn into an A+ argumentative essay.

What makes a "good" argumentative essay topic depends on both the subject matter and your personal interest —it can be hard to give your best effort on something that bores you to tears! But it can also be near impossible to write an argumentative essay on a topic that has no room for debate.

As we said earlier, a good argumentative essay topic will be one that has the potential to reasonably go in at least two directions—for or against, yes or no, and why . For example, it's pretty hard to write an argumentative essay on whether or not people should be allowed to murder one another—not a whole lot of debate there for most people!—but writing an essay for or against the death penalty has a lot more wiggle room for evidence and argument.

A good topic is also one that can be substantiated through hard evidence and relevant sources . So be sure to pick a topic that other people have studied (or at least studied elements of) so that you can use their data in your argument. For example, if you're arguing that it should be mandatory for all middle school children to play a sport, you might have to apply smaller scientific data points to the larger picture you're trying to justify. There are probably several studies you could cite on the benefits of physical activity and the positive effect structure and teamwork has on young minds, but there's probably no study you could use where a group of scientists put all middle-schoolers in one jurisdiction into a mandatory sports program (since that's probably never happened). So long as your evidence is relevant to your point and you can extrapolate from it to form a larger whole, you can use it as a part of your resource material.

And if you need ideas on where to get started, or just want to see sample argumentative essay topics, then check out these links for hundreds of potential argumentative essay topics.

101 Persuasive (or Argumentative) Essay and Speech Topics

301 Prompts for Argumentative Writing

Top 50 Ideas for Argumentative/Persuasive Essay Writing

[Note: some of these say "persuasive essay topics," but just remember that the same topic can often be used for both a persuasive essay and an argumentative essay; the difference is in your writing style and the evidence you use to support your claims.]

KO! Find that one argumentative essay topic you can absolutely conquer.

Argumentative Essay Format

Argumentative Essays are composed of four main elements:

• A position (your argument)
• Your reasons
• Supporting evidence for those reasons (from reliable sources)
• Counterargument(s) (possible opposing arguments and reasons why those arguments are incorrect)

If you're familiar with essay writing in general, then you're also probably familiar with the five paragraph essay structure . This structure is a simple tool to show how one outlines an essay and breaks it down into its component parts, although it can be expanded into as many paragraphs as you want beyond the core five.

The standard argumentative essay is often 3-5 pages, which will usually mean a lot more than five paragraphs, but your overall structure will look the same as a much shorter essay.

An argumentative essay at its simplest structure will look like:

Paragraph 1: Intro

• Set up the story/problem/issue
• Thesis/claim

Paragraph 2: Support

• Reason #1 claim is correct
• Supporting evidence with sources

Paragraph 3: Support

• Reason #2 claim is correct

Paragraph 4: Counterargument

• Explanation of argument for the other side
• Refutation of opposing argument with supporting evidence

Paragraph 5: Conclusion

• Re-state claim
• Sum up reasons and support of claim from the essay to prove claim is correct

Now let's unpack each of these paragraph types to see how they work (with examples!), what goes into them, and why.

Paragraph 1—Set Up and Claim

Your first task is to introduce the reader to the topic at hand so they'll be prepared for your claim. Give a little background information, set the scene, and give the reader some stakes so that they care about the issue you're going to discuss.

Next, you absolutely must have a position on an argument and make that position clear to the readers. It's not an argumentative essay unless you're arguing for a specific claim, and this claim will be your thesis statement.

Your thesis CANNOT be a mere statement of fact (e.g., "Washington DC is the capital of the United States"). Your thesis must instead be an opinion which can be backed up with evidence and has the potential to be argued against (e.g., "New York should be the capital of the United States").

Paragraphs 2 and 3—Your Evidence

These are your body paragraphs in which you give the reasons why your argument is the best one and back up this reasoning with concrete evidence .

The argument supporting the thesis of an argumentative essay should be one that can be supported by facts and evidence, rather than personal opinion or cultural or religious mores.

For example, if you're arguing that New York should be the new capital of the US, you would have to back up that fact by discussing the factual contrasts between New York and DC in terms of location, population, revenue, and laws. You would then have to talk about the precedents for what makes for a good capital city and why New York fits the bill more than DC does.

Your argument can't simply be that a lot of people think New York is the best city ever and that you agree.

In addition to using concrete evidence, you always want to keep the tone of your essay passionate, but impersonal . Even though you're writing your argument from a single opinion, don't use first person language—"I think," "I feel," "I believe,"—to present your claims. Doing so is repetitive, since by writing the essay you're already telling the audience what you feel, and using first person language weakens your writing voice.

For example,

"I think that Washington DC is no longer suited to be the capital city of the United States."

"Washington DC is no longer suited to be the capital city of the United States."

The second statement sounds far stronger and more analytical.

Paragraph 4—Argument for the Other Side and Refutation

Even without a counter argument, you can make a pretty persuasive claim, but a counterargument will round out your essay into one that is much more persuasive and substantial.

By anticipating an argument against your claim and taking the initiative to counter it, you're allowing yourself to get ahead of the game. This way, you show that you've given great thought to all sides of the issue before choosing your position, and you demonstrate in multiple ways how yours is the more reasoned and supported side.

Paragraph 5—Conclusion

This paragraph is where you re-state your argument and summarize why it's the best claim.

Briefly touch on your supporting evidence and voila! A finished argumentative essay.

Your essay should have just as awesome a skeleton as this plesiosaur does. (In other words: a ridiculously awesome skeleton)

Argumentative Essay Example: 5-Paragraph Style

It always helps to have an example to learn from. I've written a full 5-paragraph argumentative essay here. Look at how I state my thesis in paragraph 1, give supporting evidence in paragraphs 2 and 3, address a counterargument in paragraph 4, and conclude in paragraph 5.

Topic: Is it possible to maintain conflicting loyalties?

Paragraph 1

It is almost impossible to go through life without encountering a situation where your loyalties to different people or causes come into conflict with each other. Maybe you have a loving relationship with your sister, but she disagrees with your decision to join the army, or you find yourself torn between your cultural beliefs and your scientific ones. These conflicting loyalties can often be maintained for a time, but as examples from both history and psychological theory illustrate, sooner or later, people have to make a choice between competing loyalties, as no one can maintain a conflicting loyalty or belief system forever.

The first two sentences set the scene and give some hypothetical examples and stakes for the reader to care about.

The third sentence finishes off the intro with the thesis statement, making very clear how the author stands on the issue ("people have to make a choice between competing loyalties, as no one can maintain a conflicting loyalty or belief system forever." )

Paragraphs 2 and 3

Psychological theory states that human beings are not equipped to maintain conflicting loyalties indefinitely and that attempting to do so leads to a state called "cognitive dissonance." Cognitive dissonance theory is the psychological idea that people undergo tremendous mental stress or anxiety when holding contradictory beliefs, values, or loyalties (Festinger, 1957). Even if human beings initially hold a conflicting loyalty, they will do their best to find a mental equilibrium by making a choice between those loyalties—stay stalwart to a belief system or change their beliefs. One of the earliest formal examples of cognitive dissonance theory comes from Leon Festinger's When Prophesy Fails . Members of an apocalyptic cult are told that the end of the world will occur on a specific date and that they alone will be spared the Earth's destruction. When that day comes and goes with no apocalypse, the cult members face a cognitive dissonance between what they see and what they've been led to believe (Festinger, 1956). Some choose to believe that the cult's beliefs are still correct, but that the Earth was simply spared from destruction by mercy, while others choose to believe that they were lied to and that the cult was fraudulent all along. Both beliefs cannot be correct at the same time, and so the cult members are forced to make their choice.

But even when conflicting loyalties can lead to potentially physical, rather than just mental, consequences, people will always make a choice to fall on one side or other of a dividing line. Take, for instance, Nicolaus Copernicus, a man born and raised in Catholic Poland (and educated in Catholic Italy). Though the Catholic church dictated specific scientific teachings, Copernicus' loyalty to his own observations and scientific evidence won out over his loyalty to his country's government and belief system. When he published his heliocentric model of the solar system--in opposition to the geocentric model that had been widely accepted for hundreds of years (Hannam, 2011)-- Copernicus was making a choice between his loyalties. In an attempt t o maintain his fealty both to the established system and to what he believed, h e sat on his findings for a number of years (Fantoli, 1994). But, ultimately, Copernicus made the choice to side with his beliefs and observations above all and published his work for the world to see (even though, in doing so, he risked both his reputation and personal freedoms).

These two paragraphs provide the reasons why the author supports the main argument and uses substantiated sources to back those reasons.

The paragraph on cognitive dissonance theory gives both broad supporting evidence and more narrow, detailed supporting evidence to show why the thesis statement is correct not just anecdotally but also scientifically and psychologically. First, we see why people in general have a difficult time accepting conflicting loyalties and desires and then how this applies to individuals through the example of the cult members from the Dr. Festinger's research.

The next paragraph continues to use more detailed examples from history to provide further evidence of why the thesis that people cannot indefinitely maintain conflicting loyalties is true.

Paragraph 4

Some will claim that it is possible to maintain conflicting beliefs or loyalties permanently, but this is often more a matter of people deluding themselves and still making a choice for one side or the other, rather than truly maintaining loyalty to both sides equally. For example, Lancelot du Lac typifies a person who claims to maintain a balanced loyalty between to two parties, but his attempt to do so fails (as all attempts to permanently maintain conflicting loyalties must). Lancelot tells himself and others that he is equally devoted to both King Arthur and his court and to being Queen Guinevere's knight (Malory, 2008). But he can neither be in two places at once to protect both the king and queen, nor can he help but let his romantic feelings for the queen to interfere with his duties to the king and the kingdom. Ultimately, he and Queen Guinevere give into their feelings for one another and Lancelot—though he denies it—chooses his loyalty to her over his loyalty to Arthur. This decision plunges the kingdom into a civil war, ages Lancelot prematurely, and ultimately leads to Camelot's ruin (Raabe, 1987). Though Lancelot claimed to have been loyal to both the king and the queen, this loyalty was ultimately in conflict, and he could not maintain it.

Here we have the acknowledgement of a potential counter-argument and the evidence as to why it isn't true.

The argument is that some people (or literary characters) have asserted that they give equal weight to their conflicting loyalties. The refutation is that, though some may claim to be able to maintain conflicting loyalties, they're either lying to others or deceiving themselves. The paragraph shows why this is true by providing an example of this in action.

Paragraph 5

Whether it be through literature or history, time and time again, people demonstrate the challenges of trying to manage conflicting loyalties and the inevitable consequences of doing so. Though belief systems are malleable and will often change over time, it is not possible to maintain two mutually exclusive loyalties or beliefs at once. In the end, people always make a choice, and loyalty for one party or one side of an issue will always trump loyalty to the other.

The concluding paragraph summarizes the essay, touches on the evidence presented, and re-states the thesis statement.

How to Write an Argumentative Essay: 8 Steps

Writing the best argumentative essay is all about the preparation, so let's talk steps:

#1: Preliminary Research

If you have the option to pick your own argumentative essay topic (which you most likely will), then choose one or two topics you find the most intriguing or that you have a vested interest in and do some preliminary research on both sides of the debate.

Do an open internet search just to see what the general chatter is on the topic and what the research trends are.

Did your preliminary reading influence you to pick a side or change your side? Without diving into all the scholarly articles at length, do you believe there's enough evidence to support your claim? Have there been scientific studies? Experiments? Does a noted scholar in the field agree with you? If not, you may need to pick another topic or side of the argument to support.

#2: Pick Your Side and Form Your Thesis

Now's the time to pick the side of the argument you feel you can support the best and summarize your main point into your thesis statement.

Your thesis will be the basis of your entire essay, so make sure you know which side you're on, that you've stated it clearly, and that you stick by your argument throughout the entire essay .

#3: Heavy-Duty Research Time

You've taken a gander at what the internet at large has to say on your argument, but now's the time to actually read those sources and take notes.

Check scholarly journals online at Google Scholar , the Directory of Open Access Journals , or JStor . You can also search individual university or school libraries and websites to see what kinds of academic articles you can access for free. Keep track of your important quotes and page numbers and put them somewhere that's easy to find later.

And don't forget to check your school or local libraries as well!

#4: Outline

Follow the five-paragraph outline structure from the previous section.

Fill in your topic, your reasons, and your supporting evidence into each of the categories.

Before you begin to flesh out the essay, take a look at what you've got. Is your thesis statement in the first paragraph? Is it clear? Is your argument logical? Does your supporting evidence support your reasoning?

By outlining your essay, you streamline your process and take care of any logic gaps before you dive headfirst into the writing. This will save you a lot of grief later on if you need to change your sources or your structure, so don't get too trigger-happy and skip this step.

Now that you've laid out exactly what you'll need for your essay and where, it's time to fill in all the gaps by writing it out.

Take it one step at a time and expand your ideas into complete sentences and substantiated claims. It may feel daunting to turn an outline into a complete draft, but just remember that you've already laid out all the groundwork; now you're just filling in the gaps.

If you have the time before deadline, give yourself a day or two (or even just an hour!) away from your essay . Looking it over with fresh eyes will allow you to see errors, both minor and major, that you likely would have missed had you tried to edit when it was still raw.

Take a first pass over the entire essay and try your best to ignore any minor spelling or grammar mistakes—you're just looking at the big picture right now. Does it make sense as a whole? Did the essay succeed in making an argument and backing that argument up logically? (Do you feel persuaded?)

If not, go back and make notes so that you can fix it for your final draft.

Once you've made your revisions to the overall structure, mark all your small errors and grammar problems so you can fix them in the next draft.

#7: Final Draft

Use the notes you made on the rough draft and go in and hack and smooth away until you're satisfied with the final result.

A checklist for your final draft:

• Formatting is correct according to your teacher's standards
• No errors in spelling, grammar, and punctuation
• Essay is the right length and size for the assignment
• The argument is present, consistent, and concise
• Each reason is supported by relevant evidence
• The essay makes sense overall

#8: Celebrate!

Once you've brought that final draft to a perfect polish and turned in your assignment, you're done! Go you!

Be prepared and ♪ you'll never go hungry again ♪, *cough*, or struggle with your argumentative essay-writing again. (Walt Disney Studios)

Good Examples of Argumentative Essays Online

Theory is all well and good, but examples are key. Just to get you started on what a fully-fleshed out argumentative essay looks like, let's see some examples in action.

Check out these two argumentative essay examples on the use of landmines and freons (and note the excellent use of concrete sources to back up their arguments!).

The Use of Landmines

A Shattered Sky

The Take-Aways: Keys to Writing an Argumentative Essay

At first, writing an argumentative essay may seem like a monstrous hurdle to overcome, but with the proper preparation and understanding, you'll be able to knock yours out of the park.

Remember the differences between a persuasive essay and an argumentative one, make sure your thesis is clear, and double-check that your supporting evidence is both relevant to your point and well-sourced . Pick your topic, do your research, make your outline, and fill in the gaps. Before you know it, you'll have yourself an A+ argumentative essay there, my friend.

What's Next?

Now you know the ins and outs of an argumentative essay, but how comfortable are you writing in other styles? Learn more about the four writing styles and when it makes sense to use each .

Understand how to make an argument, but still having trouble organizing your thoughts? Check out our guide to three popular essay formats and choose which one is right for you.

Ready to make your case, but not sure what to write about? We've created a list of 50 potential argumentative essay topics to spark your imagination.

Need more help with this topic? Check out Tutorbase!

Our vetted tutor database includes a range of experienced educators who can help you polish an essay for English or explain how derivatives work for Calculus. You can use dozens of filters and search criteria to find the perfect person for your needs.

Courtney scored in the 99th percentile on the SAT in high school and went on to graduate from Stanford University with a degree in Cultural and Social Anthropology. She is passionate about bringing education and the tools to succeed to students from all backgrounds and walks of life, as she believes open education is one of the great societal equalizers. She has years of tutoring experience and writes creative works in her free time.

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Essay on My Vote My Right

Students are often asked to write an essay on My Vote My Right in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on My Vote My Right

Introduction.

Voting is a fundamental right of every citizen. It’s our way to voice our opinions and choose our leaders.

Importance of Voting

Voting is crucial for democracy. It allows us to select competent leaders and hold them accountable.

Responsibility of Citizens

As responsible citizens, we should use our voting rights wisely. It’s our duty to vote for the betterment of our society.

In conclusion, our vote is our right. We should value it and use it responsibly to shape our country’s future.

250 Words Essay on My Vote My Right

The significance of voting.

Voting is not just a right; it is a privilege and a responsibility. It is the most potent nonviolent tool or weapon in a democratic society. We make choices about the leaders who will shape the policy and direction of our communities, our countries, and our world.

The Power of a Single Vote

Many may argue that a single vote does not make a difference. However, history is replete with instances where the destiny of nations was changed by a single vote. It is the collective power of individual votes that shapes the outcome of an election. Every vote counts in the democratic process.

The Impact of Not Voting

When we choose not to vote, we surrender our voice. We let others decide our future. The consequences can be dire, leading to the election of leaders not aligned with our values or the enactment of policies that negatively affect our lives.

My Vote, My Right

The right to vote is a fundamental aspect of civil liberties and human rights. It is a direct way for citizens to influence governmental decisions. It is our right to vote that safeguards our democracy, ensuring that power truly belongs to the people.

The act of voting is a declaration of our commitment to democracy, to one another, and to the principles of liberty and justice. It is an affirmation that we value our right to make choices about who governs us and how we are governed. My vote, indeed, is my right.

500 Words Essay on My Vote My Right

Introduction: the power of a single vote.

The right to vote is a cornerstone of any democratic society. It is through this right that citizens participate in the democratic process, choosing representatives who align with their beliefs and values. The phrase “My Vote, My Right” encapsulates this principle, emphasizing the personal power and responsibility inherent in the act of voting.

The Concept of Voting Rights

Voting rights are more than just a legal entitlement; they are a reflection of a society’s commitment to equality and justice. They ensure that all citizens, regardless of their socio-economic status, race, or gender, have a say in the political direction of their country. In essence, voting rights are a manifestation of the democratic principle that power ultimately resides with the people.

Historical Perspective and Struggle

The struggle for voting rights has been a long and arduous journey. From the suffragette movement that fought for women’s voting rights to the Civil Rights movement that sought to end racial discrimination in voting, history is replete with instances of people battling for this fundamental right. These struggles underscore the importance of voting rights and serve as a reminder that they should never be taken for granted.

The Impact of a Single Vote

The power of a single vote should not be underestimated. There have been numerous instances in history where elections have been decided by a handful of votes. Each vote contributes to the final outcome, and hence, each vote matters. It is through the collective power of individual votes that societal change is brought about.

Challenges to Voting Rights

Despite the importance of voting rights, they are often under threat. Voter suppression, disenfranchisement, and gerrymandering are some of the tactics used to undermine the democratic process. It is the responsibility of every citizen to stay vigilant against such threats and to fight for the preservation and expansion of voting rights.

The Role of Youth in Upholding Voting Rights

As the future leaders of society, college students play a crucial role in upholding voting rights. They can do this by educating themselves and others about the importance of voting, participating in peaceful protests against voter suppression, and most importantly, by exercising their right to vote. By doing so, they can ensure that the democratic process remains robust and representative of the people’s will.

Conclusion: My Vote, My Right

In conclusion, the phrase “My Vote, My Right” is not just a statement of a legal entitlement, but a declaration of personal power and responsibility. It is a call to action for every citizen to participate in the democratic process, and a reminder that the power to shape society lies in our hands. Whether we choose to exercise this power or not, the consequences will be ours to bear. Therefore, let us not take our voting rights for granted, but instead, use them to create a society that reflects our values and aspirations.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

• Essay on My Native Village
• Essay on Modern Village
• Essay on Global Village

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

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What is an Argumentative Essay? How to Write It (With Examples)

We define an argumentative essay as a type of essay that presents arguments about both sides of an issue. The purpose is to convince the reader to accept a particular viewpoint or action. In an argumentative essay, the writer takes a stance on a controversial or debatable topic and supports their position with evidence, reasoning, and examples. The essay should also address counterarguments, demonstrating a thorough understanding of the topic.

Table of Contents

• What is an argumentative essay?  
• Argumentative essay structure 
• Argumentative essay outline 
• Types of argument claims 

How to write an argumentative essay?

• Argumentative essay writing tips 
• Good argumentative essay example 

How to write a good thesis

Frequently asked questions, what is an argumentative essay.

An argumentative essay is a type of writing that presents a coherent and logical analysis of a specific topic. 1 The goal is to convince the reader to accept the writer’s point of view or opinion on a particular issue. Here are the key elements of an argumentative essay: 

• Thesis Statement : The central claim or argument that the essay aims to prove. 
• Introduction : Provides background information and introduces the thesis statement. 
• Body Paragraphs : Each paragraph addresses a specific aspect of the argument, presents evidence, and may include counterarguments. 
• Evidence : Supports the main argument with relevant facts, examples, statistics, or expert opinions. 
• Counterarguments : Anticipates and addresses opposing viewpoints to strengthen the overall argument. 
• Conclusion : Summarizes the main points, reinforces the thesis, and may suggest implications or actions. 

Argumentative essay structure

Aristotelian, Rogerian, and Toulmin are three distinct approaches to argumentative essay structures, each with its principles and methods. 2 The choice depends on the purpose and nature of the topic. Here’s an overview of each type of argumentative essay format.

Argumentative essay outline

An argumentative essay presents a specific claim or argument and supports it with evidence and reasoning. Here’s an outline for an argumentative essay, along with examples for each section: 3  

1.  Introduction : 

• Hook : Start with a compelling statement, question, or anecdote to grab the reader’s attention. 

Example: “Did you know that plastic pollution is threatening marine life at an alarming rate?” 

• Background information : Provide brief context about the issue. 

Example: “Plastic pollution has become a global environmental concern, with millions of tons of plastic waste entering our oceans yearly.” 

• Thesis statement : Clearly state your main argument or position. 

Example: “We must take immediate action to reduce plastic usage and implement more sustainable alternatives to protect our marine ecosystem.” 

2.  Body Paragraphs : 

• Topic sentence : Introduce the main idea of each paragraph. 

Example: “The first step towards addressing the plastic pollution crisis is reducing single-use plastic consumption.” 

• Evidence/Support : Provide evidence, facts, statistics, or examples that support your argument. 

Example: “Research shows that plastic straws alone contribute to millions of tons of plastic waste annually, and many marine animals suffer from ingestion or entanglement.” 

• Counterargument/Refutation : Acknowledge and refute opposing viewpoints. 

Example: “Some argue that banning plastic straws is inconvenient for consumers, but the long-term environmental benefits far outweigh the temporary inconvenience.” 

• Transition : Connect each paragraph to the next. 

Example: “Having addressed the issue of single-use plastics, the focus must now shift to promoting sustainable alternatives.” 

3.  Counterargument Paragraph : 

• Acknowledgement of opposing views : Recognize alternative perspectives on the issue. 

Example: “While some may argue that individual actions cannot significantly impact global plastic pollution, the cumulative effect of collective efforts must be considered.” 

• Counterargument and rebuttal : Present and refute the main counterargument. 

Example: “However, individual actions, when multiplied across millions of people, can substantially reduce plastic waste. Small changes in behavior, such as using reusable bags and containers, can have a significant positive impact.” 

4.  Conclusion : 

• Restatement of thesis : Summarize your main argument. 

Example: “In conclusion, adopting sustainable practices and reducing single-use plastic is crucial for preserving our oceans and marine life.” 

• Call to action : Encourage the reader to take specific steps or consider the argument’s implications. 

Example: “It is our responsibility to make environmentally conscious choices and advocate for policies that prioritize the health of our planet. By collectively embracing sustainable alternatives, we can contribute to a cleaner and healthier future.” 

Types of argument claims

A claim is a statement or proposition a writer puts forward with evidence to persuade the reader. 4 Here are some common types of argument claims, along with examples: 

• Fact Claims : These claims assert that something is true or false and can often be verified through evidence.  Example: “Water boils at 100°C at sea level.”
• Value Claims : Value claims express judgments about the worth or morality of something, often based on personal beliefs or societal values. Example: “Organic farming is more ethical than conventional farming.” 
• Policy Claims : Policy claims propose a course of action or argue for a specific policy, law, or regulation change.  Example: “Schools should adopt a year-round education system to improve student learning outcomes.” 
• Cause and Effect Claims : These claims argue that one event or condition leads to another, establishing a cause-and-effect relationship.  Example: “Excessive use of social media is a leading cause of increased feelings of loneliness among young adults.” 
• Definition Claims : Definition claims assert the meaning or classification of a concept or term.  Example: “Artificial intelligence can be defined as machines exhibiting human-like cognitive functions.” 
• Comparative Claims : Comparative claims assert that one thing is better or worse than another in certain respects.  Example: “Online education is more cost-effective than traditional classroom learning.” 
• Evaluation Claims : Evaluation claims assess the quality, significance, or effectiveness of something based on specific criteria.  Example: “The new healthcare policy is more effective in providing affordable healthcare to all citizens.” 

Understanding these argument claims can help writers construct more persuasive and well-supported arguments tailored to the specific nature of the claim.  

If you’re wondering how to start an argumentative essay, here’s a step-by-step guide to help you with the argumentative essay format and writing process.

• Choose a Topic: Select a topic that you are passionate about or interested in. Ensure that the topic is debatable and has two or more sides.
• Define Your Position: Clearly state your stance on the issue. Consider opposing viewpoints and be ready to counter them.
• Conduct Research: Gather relevant information from credible sources, such as books, articles, and academic journals. Take notes on key points and supporting evidence.
• Create a Thesis Statement: Develop a concise and clear thesis statement that outlines your main argument. Convey your position on the issue and provide a roadmap for the essay.
• Outline Your Argumentative Essay: Organize your ideas logically by creating an outline. Include an introduction, body paragraphs, and a conclusion. Each body paragraph should focus on a single point that supports your thesis.
• Write the Introduction: Start with a hook to grab the reader’s attention (a quote, a question, a surprising fact). Provide background information on the topic. Present your thesis statement at the end of the introduction.
• Develop Body Paragraphs: Begin each paragraph with a clear topic sentence that relates to the thesis. Support your points with evidence and examples. Address counterarguments and refute them to strengthen your position. Ensure smooth transitions between paragraphs.
• Address Counterarguments: Acknowledge and respond to opposing viewpoints. Anticipate objections and provide evidence to counter them.
• Write the Conclusion: Summarize the main points of your argumentative essay. Reinforce the significance of your argument. End with a call to action, a prediction, or a thought-provoking statement.
• Revise, Edit, and Share: Review your essay for clarity, coherence, and consistency. Check for grammatical and spelling errors. Share your essay with peers, friends, or instructors for constructive feedback.
• Finalize Your Argumentative Essay: Make final edits based on feedback received. Ensure that your essay follows the required formatting and citation style.

Argumentative essay writing tips

Here are eight strategies to craft a compelling argumentative essay: 

• Choose a Clear and Controversial Topic : Select a topic that sparks debate and has opposing viewpoints. A clear and controversial issue provides a solid foundation for a strong argument. 
• Conduct Thorough Research : Gather relevant information from reputable sources to support your argument. Use a variety of sources, such as academic journals, books, reputable websites, and expert opinions, to strengthen your position. 
• Create a Strong Thesis Statement : Clearly articulate your main argument in a concise thesis statement. Your thesis should convey your stance on the issue and provide a roadmap for the reader to follow your argument. 
• Develop a Logical Structure : Organize your essay with a clear introduction, body paragraphs, and conclusion. Each paragraph should focus on a specific point of evidence that contributes to your overall argument. Ensure a logical flow from one point to the next. 
• Provide Strong Evidence : Support your claims with solid evidence. Use facts, statistics, examples, and expert opinions to support your arguments. Be sure to cite your sources appropriately to maintain credibility. 
• Address Counterarguments : Acknowledge opposing viewpoints and counterarguments. Addressing and refuting alternative perspectives strengthens your essay and demonstrates a thorough understanding of the issue. Be mindful of maintaining a respectful tone even when discussing opposing views. 
• Use Persuasive Language : Employ persuasive language to make your points effectively. Avoid emotional appeals without supporting evidence and strive for a respectful and professional tone. 
• Craft a Compelling Conclusion : Summarize your main points, restate your thesis, and leave a lasting impression in your conclusion. Encourage readers to consider the implications of your argument and potentially take action. 

Good argumentative essay example

Let’s consider a sample of argumentative essay on how social media enhances connectivity:

In the digital age, social media has emerged as a powerful tool that transcends geographical boundaries, connecting individuals from diverse backgrounds and providing a platform for an array of voices to be heard. While critics argue that social media fosters division and amplifies negativity, it is essential to recognize the positive aspects of this digital revolution and how it enhances connectivity by providing a platform for diverse voices to flourish. One of the primary benefits of social media is its ability to facilitate instant communication and connection across the globe. Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram break down geographical barriers, enabling people to establish and maintain relationships regardless of physical location and fostering a sense of global community. Furthermore, social media has transformed how people stay connected with friends and family. Whether separated by miles or time zones, social media ensures that relationships remain dynamic and relevant, contributing to a more interconnected world. Moreover, social media has played a pivotal role in giving voice to social justice movements and marginalized communities. Movements such as #BlackLivesMatter, #MeToo, and #ClimateStrike have gained momentum through social media, allowing individuals to share their stories and advocate for change on a global scale. This digital activism can shape public opinion and hold institutions accountable. Social media platforms provide a dynamic space for open dialogue and discourse. Users can engage in discussions, share information, and challenge each other’s perspectives, fostering a culture of critical thinking. This open exchange of ideas contributes to a more informed and enlightened society where individuals can broaden their horizons and develop a nuanced understanding of complex issues. While criticisms of social media abound, it is crucial to recognize its positive impact on connectivity and the amplification of diverse voices. Social media transcends physical and cultural barriers, connecting people across the globe and providing a platform for marginalized voices to be heard. By fostering open dialogue and facilitating the exchange of ideas, social media contributes to a more interconnected and empowered society. Embracing the positive aspects of social media allows us to harness its potential for positive change and collective growth.

• Clearly Define Your Thesis Statement:   Your thesis statement is the core of your argumentative essay. Clearly articulate your main argument or position on the issue. Avoid vague or general statements.  
• Provide Strong Supporting Evidence:   Back up your thesis with solid evidence from reliable sources and examples. This can include facts, statistics, expert opinions, anecdotes, or real-life examples. Make sure your evidence is relevant to your argument, as it impacts the overall persuasiveness of your thesis.  
• Anticipate Counterarguments and Address Them:   Acknowledge and address opposing viewpoints to strengthen credibility. This also shows that you engage critically with the topic rather than presenting a one-sided argument. 

The length of an argumentative essay can vary, but it typically falls within the range of 1,000 to 2,500 words. However, the specific requirements may depend on the guidelines provided.

You might write an argumentative essay when:  1. You want to convince others of the validity of your position.  2. There is a controversial or debatable issue that requires discussion.  3. You need to present evidence and logical reasoning to support your claims.  4. You want to explore and critically analyze different perspectives on a topic. 

Argumentative Essay:  Purpose : An argumentative essay aims to persuade the reader to accept or agree with a specific point of view or argument.  Structure : It follows a clear structure with an introduction, thesis statement, body paragraphs presenting arguments and evidence, counterarguments and refutations, and a conclusion.  Tone : The tone is formal and relies on logical reasoning, evidence, and critical analysis.    Narrative/Descriptive Essay:  Purpose : These aim to tell a story or describe an experience, while a descriptive essay focuses on creating a vivid picture of a person, place, or thing.  Structure : They may have a more flexible structure. They often include an engaging introduction, a well-developed body that builds the story or description, and a conclusion.  Tone : The tone is more personal and expressive to evoke emotions or provide sensory details. 

• Gladd, J. (2020). Tips for Writing Academic Persuasive Essays.  Write What Matters . 
• Nimehchisalem, V. (2018). Pyramid of argumentation: Towards an integrated model for teaching and assessing ESL writing.  Language & Communication ,  5 (2), 185-200. 
• Press, B. (2022).  Argumentative Essays: A Step-by-Step Guide . Broadview Press. 
• Rieke, R. D., Sillars, M. O., & Peterson, T. R. (2005).  Argumentation and critical decision making . Pearson/Allyn & Bacon. 

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Try it for free or upgrade to  Paperpal Prime , which unlocks unlimited access to premium features like academic translation, paraphrasing, contextual synonyms, consistency checks and more. It’s like always having a professional academic editor by your side! Go beyond limitations and experience the future of academic writing.  Get Paperpal Prime now at just US$19 a month!

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• Empirical Research: A Comprehensive Guide for Academics 
• How to Write a Scientific Paper in 10 Steps 
• What is a Literature Review? How to Write It (with Examples)
• Chemistry Terms: 7 Commonly Confused Words in Chemistry Manuscripts

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Vote Persuasive Speech

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Published: Mar 20, 2024

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