religious extremism in pakistan css essay

The Politics of Religious Extremism in Pakistan: An Analysis

Sidra Karamat PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science and International Relations, GC University, Faisalabad, Pakistan
Muhammad Muzaffar Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, GC Women University, Sialkot, Pakistan
Ali Shan Shah Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, GC University, Faisalabad, Pakistan

In this study, the connection between Islamic values and country policies has been carefully connected to the foundations that create political legitimating and the basic nature of a country. Islam performs a crucial part in the social fabric of Pakistan and has been integrated as the guiding concept for the constitutional procedure and governmental systems of the country but at the same time produced implicit stress for their future improvements. Various government authorities have used religious beliefs for their quest for governmental authenticity and power. This has consequently brought about politicization of spiritual explanation in Pakistan demonstrated in the form of sectarian disputes, persecution of spiritual unprivileged or disempowerment of certain spiritual organizations and management. Whereas controversy about interpreting religious identity continues pervading the Pakistani community, it is observed that large parts of the Pakistani inhabitants follow pluralistic types of Islam based on heterogeneous spiritual and devotional methods. Islamic political parties should cooperate on federal or provincial levels with national and local political parties to eliminate the religious extremism in Pakistan.

Abbas, H. (2015). Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Afzal, M. (2018). Pakistan Under Siege: Extremism, Society, and the State. ?Washington, D.C.,: Brookings Institution Press.

Cheema, P. I. (2008). Political Role of Religious Communities in Pakistan. Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

Day, A. J., &Degenhardt, H. W. (1984). Political Parties of the World (2nd ed.). London: Longman Group Limited.

Misra, A. (2003). Rise of religious parties in Pakistan: Causes and prospects. Strategic Analysis, 27(2), 186-215.

Murphy, E. (2013). The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and Social Roots of Extremism. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Ullah, H. K. (2013). Vying for Allah's Vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan. Washington, D.C., United States: Georgetown University Press.

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Terrorism in Pakistan: A Critical Overview

Nimra Fawad
December 21, 2022
CSS , CSS Essays , CSS Solved Essays , Current Affairs , Pakistan's Domestic Affairs , PMS , PMS Essays , Terrorism & Extremism
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Nimra Fawa d has attempted this essay on the given pattern, which Sir Syed Kazim Ali teaches his students, who have consistently been qualifying their CSS and PMS essays. The essay is uploaded to help other competitive aspirants learn and practice how to write a comprehensive outline; how to write bullets in an outline; how to write the introductory paragraph; how to connect sentences and paragraphs; how to write a topic sentence; how to put evidence within the paragraphs.

1- Introduction

2- a bird’s eye view of terrorism in pakistan.

✓ Currently, terrorism has become a matter of great concern for the country’s survival.
✓ Pakistan ranks 10 out of 163 countries in terrorism-affecting countries, The Global Terrorism Index (2021)

3- What are the alarming impacts of terrorism experienced by the country?

Social Impacts

✓ Restriction on social mobility

Terrorism served as an impediment in the way of the country’s social mobility
The recent attack at a Shia mosque in Peshawar on 4th March 2022

✓ Reduction in school enrolment

Education institutions remained no more secure from the heinous acts of terrorist organizations
Appalling attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar (2014)

Economic impacts

✓ Tourism industry in loss

Terrorism is an alarming challenge for the fostering of the country’s tourism industry
In 2017, national tourism faced a decline of almost 80% in all tourist activities, The World Travel & Tourism Council

✓ Declivity in Foreign Direct Investment(FDI)

Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) touched its lowest ebb in the presence of terrorism
The FDI in Pakistan declined from $41.9bn to $35.6bn in five years from 2016 to 2020, The State Bank of Pakistan

Political impacts

✓ Threat to national security

Terrorism fettered the country’s political advancement by making it vulnerable to the security threats
Abbottabad operation of the Americans regarding the sheltering of Osama bin Laden

✓ Defamation of the country worldwide

Terrorism left no stone unturned to defame the country.
A soft image like a cash-able commodity, existing in its worst condition in Pakistan, the analysts of international economics

4- What are the grim culprits behind the menace of terrorism in the country?

✓ Prevailing poverty

Poverty is a significant cause of exacerbating the terrorist activities
60% of the population living below the poverty line, Pakistan Economic Survey (2021)
In his book, A Handbook of Labor Economics, Freeman stated that criminal behaviour is closely related to poverty.

✓ Wrong and rigid policies of the previous dictators’ regimes

Last, through their inappropriate policies, dictators’ governments sowed the seed of terrorism in the land of the pure.
Pakistan- American alliance in the Soviet-Afghan War

✓ Religious manipulation

Conservative-minded mullahs become the significant driver of further intensifying terrorism.
The International Crisis Group’s report reports that around 10-15 per cent of the schools become a breeding ground for radical Islamic militants.
At least 299 madrasahs were found to be involved in terrorism in Punjab alone.

✓ The exploitation of local persons during the launching of drone attacks

Mistreatment with inter displaced persons become another major reason of raising terrorist attacks
Massive internally displaced person (IDP) movement in FATA in 2007 as a result of frequent U.S. drone strikes

✓ Foreign involvement

Foreign interference in raising the misery of terrorism in Pakistan is no more hidden.
Pakistan’s Sunni Muslim sectarian militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is an example of where Saudi Arabian donors are channeling funds, the statement of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

5- What practical measures can address the monster of terrorism in the country?

✓ To improve the education system and employment rate
✓ To review the anti-terrorism policies and implement them strictly
✓ To register the religious seminaries and disclose the conspiracies of conservative-minded mullahs
✓ To rehabilitate the terrorism-related affected people
✓ To make anti-terrorism diplomacy a priority in the country’s political approaches

6- CRITICAL ANALYSIS 7- CONCLUSION

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Terrorism is one of the most pervasive challenges ranking high on the agenda of all international organizations. It has disrupted the peace and stability of the whole world to a great extent through violence to achieve political objectives. Similarly, according to the claim of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), during the last fifteen years, more than 61,000 terrorist incidents have occurred, which have claimed over 140,000 lives worldwide. However, it has affected Pakistan much more severely than other countries because the country has played a role as a front-line state against the war on terror. As a result, terrorism has shaken the country’s social fabric, hampered its economic progress, and shackled its political system. Moreover, worsening the state’s foundation, it has blown several other issues. Some of them are restrictions on social mobility, loss in the tourism industry, slope in the Foreign Direct Investment(FDI), and rise of national security issues. Nonetheless, all these dreadful challenges have not emerged in isolation. Many alarming factors are rooted behind terrorism, including poverty, delay in implementing anti-terrorism policies, religious maltreatment, and foreign involvement. Therefore, it is high time for Pakistan to take fundamental measures to win the war against the monster of terrorism. Improving literacy and employment rate, reviewing the anti-terrorism policies, registering the religious seminaries, and prioritizing the counter-terrorism approach in the country’s foreign policy may help the country come out of this misery. The following essay highlights the consequences and ills of terrorism in Pakistan and the measures needed to alleviate it in the country.

Before exploring the dreadful impacts of terrorism in Pakistan, it is imperative to explain the current profile of terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism has become a matter of great concern for the country’s survival. It manifests in many ways, including augmenting chaos and anarchy, loss in Foreign Direct Investment, and a volatile national security environment resulting from rising terrorist attacks. Ironically, all these socioeconomic and political hurdles in the way of the country’s prosperity push the country toward collapse. Therefore, as per the report of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2021, Pakistan ranks 10 out of 163 countries owing to the bleak consequences of terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan still cannot achieve its anti-terrorism objectives despite making multiple anti-terrorism policies and agencies and launching counter-terrorism operations. Notwithstanding, if the government sticks to its goal of fizzling out of this problem and reviewing its strategies, it will yield fruitful results shortly.

As every action manifests its impacts afterwards, terrorism also has inevitable and dire influences on Pakistan’s society. Here, light has been thrown on some of its severe footprints. Terrorism has served as an impediment in the way of the country’s social mobility. Jeopardizing the country’s peace and security undermines the enjoyment of the civilian rights of life and liberty. Owing to the rising threats of terrorist attacks in the last two decades, people remain stressed and feel insecure about visiting their places of worship outside. For instance, the attack at a Shia mosque in Peshawar on 4th March 2022 is a reminder that Pakistani mosques and other public places are unsafe and vulnerable to periodic terrorism. Correspondingly, prevailing social rigidity among the people plays a crucial role in dividing society and, ultimately, shrinks their role in marching the country forward. To sum up, terrorism has inculcated a sense of social isolation in the nation to hamper the country’s social progress.

Furthermore, educational institutions have remained no more secure from the heinous acts of terrorist organizations. To enhance the climate of fear among the public, terrorists have brutally blown up several renowned educational institutions in the country. For example, the inevitable and horrific massacre in Army Public School in Peshawar (2014) has taken the lives of 132 innocent children. In addition to it, the proponents of education have also been targeted in the country. The case of Malala Yousafzai, who was shot in the face and head by a Taliban activist, can also be quoted in this regard . Sadly, these incidents of terrorism have become a reason for depriving the youth of securing their bright future as the fear of terror has forced the provincial governments to adjourn the educational activities in schools and colleges. So, the peril of terrorism has proved to be devastating for the education practices enabling the youth as productive members of society.

Apart from other consequences, terrorism has become an alarming challenge for fostering the country’s tourism industry. As the attacks have distorted the image profile of the country’s tourism destinations, many local and foreign tourists avoid visiting the country’s public places due to their security concerns. They consider the law and order system of the country most crucial for their visit, which is in the worst condition in Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has to bear the huge loss in income generating tourism industry. According to the World Travel & Tourism Council report in 2017, tourism in Pakistan has faced a decline of almost 80% in all tourist activities owing to the prevailing threat of violence. Due to this slope, persons affiliated with the tourism industry have also been involved in anti-state activities to meet their needs. Thus, terrorism has severely impacted the state’s economic plight by reducing the revenue generation from its tourism industry.

Moreover, the country’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has touched its lowest ebb in the presence of terrorism. The frequent bomb blasting has pushed foreign investors away from investing in the insecure country, which makes the country economically unstable. It is not denied in the fact that Pakistan has to face the loss of billions of dollars due to reducing the business-friendly environment. Therefore, as per the statistics of the State Bank of Pakistan, the FDI in Pakistan has declined from $41.9bn to $35.6bn in five years from 2016 to 2020. Moreover, several industries running on the FDI have now been shut down in the country. Similarly, the country’s poverty and unemployment rate have also been miserably augmented due to the rising issue of the balance of payment. In short, terrorism has hit the country’s economic fabric hard by adversely declining the FDI.

Further, terrorism has fettered the political advancement of the country by making it vulnerable to security threats. As Pakistan’s dictators’ governments have adopted the inappropriate policies of feeding the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan war to secure the region from invaders after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, America considers it suspicious and funding the country to terrorist organizations. By benefitting from its vulnerability to Pakistan, America has started interfering in the state’s matters. Moreover, without the consent of Pakistan’s government, America has launched many operations against terrorism on the pure of land, which has become a threat to the country’s autonomy. Specifically, the Abbottabad operation of the Americans regarding the sheltering of Osama bin Laden in the country by the CIA is a prominent illustration of the breaching of the state’s sovereignty. Due to these incidents, the government could not work autonomously to protect its citizens from dangers. As a result, people started to lose their confidence in the government and become out of control, eventually making the country’s law and order system fragile. To conclude, Pakistan has to confront several security threats in the existence of terrorism.

Along with other impacts, terrorism has left no stone unturned to defame the country in the global society. Frequent terrorist attacks in the country have presented it as a safe haven for terrorist organizations in front of the international community. Due to this fact, other countries have lost their confidence in Pakistan and considered it an insecure country to invest and trust in its nationals. Contrarily, following the analysts of international economics, the soft image is like a cashable commodity for the country’s well-being. However, the frequent incidents of terrorism have given a bad name to Pakistan in the international markets, causing damage to its economy, polity, and society on multiple levels. Besides reducing the FDI in the country, Pakistani locals have to face many difficulties abroad because foreigners picture them as mistrustful. Hence, terrorism has become a dreadful factor in tarnishing the country’s soft image.

Above discussed, impacts do not grow automatically. Nevertheless, many reasons exist behind this worst situation in the country. Here, it is important to discuss some of the major issues which have motivated the production of terrorist activities in Pakistan.

Amongst the major culprits of terrorism, poverty is a leading reason for exacerbating terrorist activities in Pakistan. Due to the prevailing hunger in 60 per cent population of the country, as per the Pakistan Economic Survey (2021), people have become helpless to meet their needs at any cost. Moreover, it is estimated that a 1 per cent increase in poverty is associated with a 0.064 per cent increase in the total crime rate . In his book, A Handbook of Labor Economics, Freeman also stated that criminal behaviour is closely related to poverty. The poor in the country have remained unable to feed and educate their children properly. These deprivations have created frustration and insecurity among them. As a result, terrorist organizations easily exploit their plight and make them harmful and violent against society’s peace. Poverty has played a role as a catalyst in fostering the menace of terrorism in Pakistan.

Next to it, previous dictators’ regimes, through their inappropriate policies, have sowed the seed of terrorism in the land of the pure. As an illustration, the regime of Zia ul Haq in Pakistan fed and trained the Mujahedeen with the support of America against Russia during the Soviet-Afghan war, fought in the land of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, after the war, when the government could not further assist the mujahedeen and left them in the lurch, they became violent against the country and joined hands with terrorist organizations. They, with other terrorist groups, have spread chaos and anarchy in the country through bomb blasting. Thus, former inefficient governments have sowed the seed of terrorism in the land of the pure.

Additionally, conservative-minded mullahs have become the significant driver of further intensifying terrorism in Pakistan. They have been interpreting the Quranic teachings as per their desires. Instead of spreading Islam’s message of peace, they impart a sense of intolerance among the nation and, ultimately, force them to take swords in their hands. The icing on the cake is that the government does not bother to take action against these extremist mullahs and scrutinize the institutions from where they are inculcating the element of radicalism in youth. It is because, as per the report of the International Crisis Group, around 10-15 per cent of the schools in Pakistan are affiliated with extremist religious groups, which have become a breeding ground for radical Islamic militants. Similarly, Punjab has become a significant hub of these fake mullahs among the other provinces. At least 299 madrasahs are involved in terrorism and sectarian activities in Punjab alone. Paradoxically, all these strategies of mullahs against Pakistan have badly repelled the country’s youth from participating in making the country a peaceful, stable, and prosperous society. Without a doubt, it is the domain of the country’s security forces to secure the country from internal and external threats, not the responsibility of citizens to take weapons into their hands without the government’s approval. On the whole, narrow-minded mullahs have hindered maintaining a peaceful environment in Pakistan.

Similarly, the mistreatment of Internally Displaced Persons has become another leading reason for raising terrorist attacks in the country. Many nationals have become victims of the drone attacks launched by the government or other states in their areas to stop the activities of terrorists. For instance, FATA has consistently been targeted by U.S. drone strikes to uproot terrorist groups, resulting in human collateral damage and a massive internally displaced person (IDP) movement in 2007. However, instead of revitalizing the condition of the IDPs by providing them food, shelter, and education, the government has also left them high and dry. In turn, terrorist agencies take benefit from their grieving situation and use them to exploit the government. Therefore, the unfair attitude of the government toward the IDPs has promoted the peril of terrorism in the country.

Likewise, foreign interference in raising the misery of terrorism in Pakistan is no more hidden. For example, the exploitation of Pakistan’s land by Saudi Arabia and Iran for their interest clearly shows this reality. As per the statement of the U.S. secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Saudi Arabian donors are one the most significant funding source to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide, and Pakistan’s Sunni Muslim sectarian militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is an example of where funds are being channelled. Miserably, where on the one hand, Saudi Arabia maintains a law and order system in its country. Contrarily, the country has lost its stability due to their conspiracies of funding to own version of Islam to flourish in Pakistan. Now, people do not bother with the country’s rule of law; instead, they brutally kill their Muslim brothers and do not feel shame over their baleful acts for pleasure. To summarize, foreign involvement in matters of state cements the foundation of terrorism in the country.

Although terrorism has jolted Pakistan’s foundation by badly impacting each segment, it is not a problem that cannot be solved. Every ailment has its remedies. As past mistakes instigate to ponder its reasons and ways to bring down these reasons, Pakistan must pick up the gauntlet of terrorism and devise some practical measures to crunch it at the gross root level. Here is some effective way forwards which may help reverse the country’s peaceful situation.

First, Pakistan can counter the menace of terrorism by increasing its literacy and employment rate. It is because the higher the literacy and employment rate exist in the country, the lower the chances of poverty in that country. By enhancing the employment rate in the country, people would become self-efficient to meet their needs and overpower their insecurities and frustrations, which are the reason for participating in terrorist activities. Similarly, literate people are well- aware of the dangers of terrorism and what is better for their society. Accordingly, they do not easily exploit through terrorist agencies. To cut short, the rise in literacy and employment rate enables the country to deal with terrorism.

Second, the government can curb the peril of terrorism in the country after reviewing its anti-terrorism policies. For this objective, instead of following the policies of previous governments, which were not in favour of the state, but in favour of terrorism, the government has to change its attitude in making counter-terrorism policies and prefer the safety of the nation over its interests. In addition, the country should focus on devising proactive policies rather than reactionary ones to prevent terrorism in the future before it would have engulfed the country’s sovereignty. Moreover, these counter-terrorism policies are to strengthen the capacities and coordination mechanisms of federal, provincial, counter-terrorism, and criminal justice institutions. Hence, after reviewing and strictly implementing the counter-terrorism policies, the government may become capable of mitigating the danger of terrorism in the country.

Third, the rehabilitation of terrorism regarding affected people is the need of the hour. The reason is that their miserable condition has made them dangerous to the state. Nevertheless, it is high time for the government to allocate a few portions of the fund to recover their losses and give them food, shelter, and education opportunities to revitalize their good old days. Consequently, no option would remain for them to engage in terrorist activities. However, they may help the country preserve society’s peace for its socioeconomic development. So, restoring the terrorism-affected people may assist the country in buckling out of the bleak challenge of terrorism.

Next to it, registering the seminaries of mullahs is compulsory to control terrorism in the country. Through these seminaries, fake mullahs have found a way to brain wash innocent people against the country. Conversely, to curtail the hazard of terrorism, the government should take action against these mullahs and register their institutions. True scholars can also participate in this aim to reveal the false teachings of mullahs and inculcate a sense of tolerance and peace in the nation. Accordingly, these actions against the mullahs may help the country to restrict the rising chaos and conflicts in society. To conclude, having records of mullahs’ institutions is one solution to alleviating terrorism in the country.

Lastly, another panacea to grip the monster of terrorism is to give importance to discussing this issue on international platforms. The reason behind adopting this action is that despite taking various pragmatic approaches to overcome this challenge at the national level, the challenge of terrorism would not be solved until Pakistani diplomats would raise their voices on the international platforms against it and request the great powers to stand with the country to cope with this global issue. If Pakistan can successfully persuade the global powers to counter this issue collectively, it would be straightforward for the government to reduce the prevailing terrorism in the country. To summarize, Pakistan can crumble the jeopardy of terrorism by making it a priority in its diplomatic agenda.

Terrorism has emerged as an existential threat to the country’s survival. It has given birth to multiple socioeconomic and political challenges, such as social immobility, loss in the tourism industry, and threat to national security by challenging the country’s governance. Disturbing the state’s socioeconomic fabric and political might, it has repelled the FDI and tarnished the country’s soft profile in the global community. As a result, socioeconomic inequalities have prevailed in Pakistan’s society, causing chaos and anarchy. This overpowering mayhem in society eventually makes the state’s autonomy insecure. Hence, terrorism serves as a bottleneck to Pakistan’s existence.

In a nutshell, Pakistan’s peace and sovereignty are in jeopardy due to the burning challenge of terrorism. It has enhanced the miseries of the state. From social distractions to political instability, the country is at a loss. Moreover, poverty, misinterpretation of religion by mullahs, and foreign interference nourish this threat in the state. Nonetheless, Pakistan needs to tackle this issue timely and sagaciously before it would have engulfed the country’s integrity. For this motive, the whole nation should play its effective role, along with the government, to implement counter-terrorism policies rigorously. Besides, reducing poverty would help the country a lot against the prevailing threat of terrorism. Last but not least, the country should take the initiative at the international forums to counter the global misery of terrorism with the help of the global society to secure the future of the next generations.

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About the author

Nimra Fawad is a student of Syed Kazim Ali . She adds that one of those enthusiastic people who, their whole life, remain in search of how they can facilitate their society through their actions and polishing their own skills. She is multitalented as she has done her bachelor’s in Biochemistry and has mastery over social sciences. Moreover, as a talented writer, she loves to write on current domestic and international issues in which the whole global society, particularly Pakistan, has been entangled. In her writing, she presents social evils with research-based analysis. The motive behind this is to tell others about their role in building and the miseries of society from the past till now. Notwithstanding, at the same time, she gives her readers the best remedial measures to reverse the rising problems of society. In a word, her articles guide others in how to secure their own society from contemporary challenges. So, if you want to know about updated social issues, their foresighted panaceas, and fact-based logical analysis, follow Nimra Fawad on her social media accounts.

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Pakistani analysis on extremism, its causes and solutions

Yesterday, I attended a conference on counter radicalisation strategies organised by the Pak Institute of Peace Studeis (PIPS) and the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). I'm pasting my notes here because I think many readers working on the region and Pakistan in particular will find them useful. But at the same time, for the general reader, it provides a rare opportunity to see what professional analysts with an intimate knowledge of context and history as well as the advantage of local language knowledge make of current situation.

PIPS is a fantastic organistation. Unfortunately, I don't think the Pakistani government has the capacity to take on what they have to say. Counter Radicalisation Strategies conference

Hosted by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) and US Institute for Peace (USIP)

Amir Rana, director of PIPS: Radicalising factors in Pakistan are: 1. Inequality - contributing 2. Religion - catalyst 3. Politics - major factor 4. State of mind - contributing factor 5. Socio-cultural - transformational

Radicalisation amongst Pakistan's societal groups: 1. Lower income - poor governance, religious networks = Talibanisation 2. Middle Income - political and ideological radical tendencies, informal educational institutions = sympathy for Talibanisation, sectarianism etc. 3. Upper income - isolation from rest of society (also common in Muslim/Pakistani diaspora) results in identity crisis. This is shared with diaspora communities. The catalyst is the religious-extremist environment. This manifestation is very different form the other two groups.

The general manifestations of growing extremism and radicalisation are: 1. The Islamisation of Pakistan 2. Militancy in AfPak.

Catalysts: Globally networked organisations eg. Hizb ut Tahrir and al Huda.

It's clear from opinion polls such as Pew etc, the common man is against manifestations of militancy. Support for al Qaeda's methods is very low. In Pakistan it support for al-Qaeda and/or suicide bombing comes in at about 10%-15%. In the rest of the Islamic world you'll find up to 85% support for such measures.

Support for terror is low, so why is there much extremism in Pakistan? Because extremist networks are a major driver. There are literally hundreds of groups that are sectarian, anti democracy etc. If you include large and small groups, we are talking about 600 distinct entities. This is transforming small level of support into a high level of actual violence.

Saba Nur, PIPS researcher: Topic: women

Gradually, the role of women in extremism is growing. There have been cases of women trained for suicide bombings.

Women have very limited access to religious knowledge (mostly parents)

When asked about religion; most women said scholars had an important role to play in public life.

A high percentage of women though that sectarianism was important to "keep Islam pure".

Wahjat Ali, PIPS researcher and journalist: Topic: Emerging trends in Radicalisation in Pakistan

There is a need for counter narratives to take on the extremism narrative. "The fight against extremism will be fought in the craggy mountains of Waziristan but it will be won in the newsrooms."

Dr Shabana Feyaz, asst. Professor of Defence Studies at Quaid e Azam university.

Extremism in Pakistan is a mixed bag. It's anti US, anti Jewish, anti capaitalist, ethnic, sectarian etc.

There needs to be a state societal partnership. The ideology of extremism needs to be challenged educationally and socially.

Military force is necessary but it can't lead. We need a more wholeistic approach.

The state should be an engine of transformation. The government needs to work on the rule of law and governance.

We need a new societal contract between the rulers and the ruled.

We have to engage the youth. We have a huge youth bulge. A huge percentage of the population is between 15 and 35 years of age. There needs to be a qualitative shift in education from primary to university level.

Women need to be engaged to wean brothers, sons etc away from extremist ideas. Women are often on the receiving end of extremist practice because they are often seen as the symbols of collective religiosity.

Moeed Yusuf: United States Institute for Peace

We tend to believe Pakistan's problems are external. Why is there this inclination to refuse to do anything until outside problems are dealt with.

There is a core message: A Western conspiracy aimed at destroying Pakistan is radicalising the whole country.

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, when they first appeared, said they weren't against the Pakistani state, only that they were against the United States and government's role in US foreign policy.

This was picked up by the media and gained popular appeal.

If you see the problem as only US driven (Afghanistan etc) then what happens? The Taliban come to attack Pakistani cities, Pakistan does nothing. There is no talk of de radicalisation or counter extremism.

Does it matter how it started? The change has to come from within. The solutions reside in-house.

The coming issues for Pakistan are: Need to increase the economy by about 5% a year just to employ young people entering the work force. The option of sending the spare workforce abroad is no longer there (to a greater degree) Urbanisation is rising and the urban poor are the main recruiting ground for extremists There is easy access to militants.

In essence; if you believe the extremist narrative and want to get involved and fight, then you will be able to find people to facilitate you.

Imtiaz Gul, journalist and researcher:

The rule of law and governance is a major driver.

Ijaz Haider, scholar and journalist.

The government's interventions so far has only been the use of conventional force. There is no counter radicalisation or counter extremism.

Previously, the government relied on Barelvis to counter extremist thought and this led to Baraelvis being killed. Pursuing this further could lead to violence between the two groups.

An overall societal effort is needed. Not rely on coopting one group or individual.

Pakistan is a country of many communities and religions. Even if people say they are Muslim, people follow vastly different interpretations of the faith.

Sharia is like a unicorn. No one knows what it exactly entails.

The problem is beyond the specific ideology of extremism. It's about society in general. For eg, seminary students mishear a religious leader referring to Christians and think local Christians have defamed the Quran, and then lynch them. This is a societal problem.

Extremism in a wider sense is a gangrene is Pakistan.

Tariq Rehman: Former army guy and now an educationalist:

Anything from the government is not trusted. This is a trust deficit issue. When TTP said they didn't kill Benazir, people believed them rather than the government of Musharraf.

Why not use educational tools (books and processes) to instil the values of coexistance and not extremism

Sherry Rehman PPP MP and former minister of information

We are aware of what's happening. There needs to be a look at integration of the state's actions. Interagency coordination is a challenge.

We need to have a look at governance. There is a lack of governance.

Even a commitment from all political parties against terrorism is not easy. There are always ambiguities and exceptions. We need interagency coordination.

We have huge gaps in policy execution. Civil service reform hasn't happened for a long time. It's been talked about but hasn't happened.

Governments don't plan for the next 40 years, it's true. This is because they are worried about the coming year.

"You should be able to hold a government accountable without threatening he premise of democracy."

"We have to remember that we (Pakistan) was complicit in the policy that brought terrorism home."

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Extremism and Terrorism Trends in Pakistan: Changing Dynamics and New Challenges

February 2021, volume 14, issue 2.

Hassan Abbas

Abstract: Even as Pakistan has made progress in reducing the threat from terrorist sanctuaries in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal areas, an increased crime-terror nexus in urban centers and a new terrorist recruitment drive by Islamic State Khorasan province, or ISK, in Baluchistan has raised alarms. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is trying to stage a comeback, and sectarianism is also rising, creating a congenial environment for terrorist and extremist organizations, including some Kashmir-focused groups that have evaded counterterrorism scrutiny. Pakistan’s poor investment in developing a much-needed countering violent extremism strategy makes it ill-equipped to respond to these challenges.

Terrorism in Pakistan is down, but by no means out. The number of terror attacks and the number of resulting fatalities have started to tick up again; sectarianism is growing and the causes feeding into radicalization of the population not only continue to exist but, in some instances, are aggravating the problem. The revival of the Afghan Taliban since its nadir in the fall of 2001 coupled with the striking emergence and resilient footprint of the Islamic State Khorasan province, or ISK, in adjacent Afghanistan, in parallel with the rise of Hindu nationalism in neighboring India, indicate worsening extremism trends in South Asia overall. The fact that various groups continue to enjoy immunity from state clampdowns adds a further layer of complexity to the challenge. South Asia has recorded more deaths from terrorism than any other region of the world for two consecutive years now—2018 and 2019. 1 Granted, this is partly due to a noteworthy decline in fatalities in the Syria and Iraq conflict theaters, yet it shows that terrorism in South Asia remains a very serious challenge. In terms of measuring the impact of terrorism, the 2020 Global Terrorism Index prepared by Australia’s Institute for Economics and Peace ranks Pakistan seventh (for greatest impact), right after Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen (in that order) and followed by India, Congo, and the Philippines. To have Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan continue to hold a position in the top 10 in this category is not an encouraging sign for regional counterterrorism efforts. 2 The complicated relationships between these three countries are also factors at play.

In comparative terms, according to data from the Global Terrorism Index, terrorism attacks have declined since 2018 in Pakistan, as the total number of terrorist incidents dropped from 369 (causing 543 deaths) in 2018 to 279 (causing 300 deaths) in 2019, bringing the number of deaths from terrorism in Pakistan to its lowest annual number since 2006. 3 The Global Terrorism Index has not made data available yet for Pakistan in 2020. According to the South Asia Terrorism portal (SATP), there were 319 terrorism related incidents in Pakistan in 2020. 4 According to Pakistan’s National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA), terrorism attacks caused 357 deaths in Pakistan in 2020 (through December 21), a clear increase in the number of victims of terrorism from the previous year. 5

While terrorism incident data reflects a generally positive counterterrorism trend, the underlying radicalization trends and lack of evidence that elements active in terrorist organizations (such as Kashmir-focused Jaish-e-Mohammad) have been brought to justice in some shape or form continue to raise legitimate concerns. Measuring extremism is harder as it requires a broader set of data ranging from hate crimes, health of minorities’ rights, youth radicalization trends, and sectarian tendencies. Local security analysts, independent Pakistan watchers, and those with access to relevant data are mostly worried about Pakistan’s direction. The survival of ISK in Afghanistan and Pakistan, despite enhanced counterterrorism operations, is one example of the persistence of the terrorism problem in the region. As Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines insightfully conclude, this is a result of ISK’s “wide network of operational alliances in directly enhancing its lethality and geographical reach” as well as “access to a steady supply of experienced militants on both sides of the border.” 6 A new generation of extremist recruits today is enhancing this capacity.

This article looks specifically at terrorism and extremism trends in Pakistan with a focus on relatively new developments that are deemed worthy of deeper analysis and attention. This article examines five dimensions of the terrorism threat faced by Pakistan. It first look at TTP’s efforts to stage a comeback in Pakistan. It then looks at ISK’s new recruitment strategy. Then it examines the upsurge in targeted killings in Karachi. The next section focuses on the evolving threat posed by Kashmiri-focused militant groups. The final section outlines the challenges posed by rising violent sectarianism inside Pakistan. This study benefits from interviews and conversations the author conducted in October-December 2020 with many security and law enforcement officials in Karachi, Kabul, Lahore, and Peshawar.

Pakistani Taliban Regaining Foothold in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Areas First, credit is due to Pakistan’s security forces for terminating the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan’s (TTP) reign of terror (roughly 2007-2015) through its effective Operation Zarb-e-Azb launched in June 2014. The U.S. drone campaign’s success in decapitating TTP leadership facilitated it in no small way. 7 TTP splintered thereafter, and its surviving leaders escaped to Afghanistan. 8 Some of its splinter factions either merged into ISK or pledged allegiance to it. 9 The TTP’s most lethal splinter Jamaat ul Ahrar (JuA), in collaboration with TTP’s Tariq Gidar Group, was responsible for major terrorist attacks, including on Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014. a It survived energized Pakistani counterterrorism operations and has continued its terror operations from its new base in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar area. 10

Many of these splinter groups, including JuA and Hizb ul- Ahrar (HuA), decided to come together again in August 2020 and renewed their pledge of allegiance to current TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud, alias Abu Mansour Asim. 11 HuA, especially, has an agile terror network in and around the Peshawar region. 12 The return of a Mehsud as the TTP leader also persuaded many disgruntled Mehsud tribesmen (such as members of the Hakimullah Mehsud group, led by Mukhlis Yar) to return to the TTP fold. 13 Even Punjabi Taliban’s Amjad Farouqi group, closely aligned with al-Qa`ida, and the Usman Saifullah group, a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) splinter, also returned to the TTP platform. 14 The latest to rejoin this notorious gang of terrorists in late November 2020 was influential Ustad Aleem Khan (from the Gul Bahadur TTP faction) and Umar Azzam. 15 TTP is proudly marketing the video of this allegiance through its media outlet Umar Media. 16

According to a May 2020 UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report, the number of Pakistani militants of all stripes operating in Afghanistan may be as high as 6,000 to 6,500. 17 A great majority of them will likely drift back into Pakistan if TTP regains control in parts of the Pashtun tribal belt sandwiched between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This area was known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA), but has been legally incorporated into Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) province since 2018. A U.N. report published in February 2021 maintains that TTP was responsible for more than 100 cross-border attacks from Afghanistan into Pakistan between July and October 2020. 18

A significant increase in targeted killings in the Pakistani tribal areas during 2020 carried out by terrorist groups indicates that something is amiss. Those targeted lately are tribal elders (senior leaders), reminiscent of times when TTP emerged in 2007 and eliminated hundreds of them. 19 Analyst Daud Khattak maintains that increased targeted killings in Waziristan and Bajaur tribal districts are caused by TTP’s “involvement in resolving local disputes, forcing people to pay protection money, and targeting those believed to be their opponents.” 20 This was how they gained space in the tribal belt more than a decade ago. 21 Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) did the same in Iraq over a decade and a half ago, showing how terrorist organizations may be learning from each other and why timely comparative analysis of such campaigns can help counterterrorism efforts. According to Pakistani security analyst Amir Rana, by mid-December 2020, about 11 splinter groups had joined this reconfigured TTP, and attacks on security forces in South and North Waziristan, and in Bajaur and Mohmand areas—an old stronghold of TTP—have increased. 22 Pakistan’s speedy effort to complete fencing work on the border with Afghanistan, with a goal to discourage militant movement, smuggling, and illegal crossings, has possibly convinced some TTP elements to return to Pakistan from Afghanistan while they can. 23 Rustam Shah Mohmand argues that prospects of a negotiated deal in Afghanistan between Kabul and the Afghan Taliban may mean restricted space for TTP types in Afghanistan, and hence, they have started returning to Pakistan. 24

One of the major reasons behind TTP’s resurgence as a serious threat, however, is Islamabad’s lackluster effort toward bringing the FATA into the mainstream as envisioned by the 2018 FATA Reforms Bill, a major constitutional initiative. 25 The FATA was merged into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province through this belated but commendable legal initiative, on paper abolishing the draconian colonial-era regulations governing the frontier area. The legal, administrative, and financial measures needed to facilitate this process, however, are absent, or seriously lacking, in turn provoking a rise in public frustrations. 26 A pertinent example is the recent rise of the Pashtun Tahafuz (Protection) Movement (PTM) led by Manzoor Pashteen, a revolutionary but non-violent protest movement demanding an end to extrajudicial killings in the area by security forces and the elimination of military check posts that restrict the free movement of people. PTM pleads for Pashtun rights, maintaining that the lives of ordinary Pashtuns have been disrupted over the last two decades on a massive scale and that they are victims of both the Taliban and the security forces. 27 TTP also used similar criticism of security forces to gain public sympathy, but PTM emphasizes a non-violent approach, distinguishing it from militant organizations.

PTM’s genuine but provocative slogans condemning the role of the Pakistan Army, however, resulted in Pakistani governing authorities publicly presenting it as a threat. To the contrary, it could be argued that PTM should have been welcomed by Islamabad as an ally against the extremist and radical ideologies propagated in the tribal areas, but short-sightedness served as an obstacle to such an understanding. PTM’s popularity across Pashtun communities from Peshawar to Karachi appears to be rising despite the military’s effort to contain the group’s reach. 28 A few of the PTM’s leading lights made it into the parliament but that did not prevent them from being depicted as ‘Indian agents’ or ‘enemies of the state,’ charges that are unfortunate and unfounded. 29 In fact, Pakistani security forces hired criminal elements and extremist elements to confront PTM on the ground, as explained by Ali Wazir, currently an elected member of Pakistan’s National Assembly and one of the co-founders of the movement:

It is ironic that the institutions responsible for protecting Pakistan’s territorial integrity and protecting it from dangerous threats are bankrolling thugs to launch a Pakistan Zindabad Movement (Urdu for Long Live Pakistan Movement) … It is telling that former Taliban commanders have addressed their gatherings. We also have indications that efforts are underway to mobilize sectarian terrorists and other fanatics to ‘counter’ our peaceful campaign. 30

Popular Pakistani columnist Nadeem Paracha calls PTM “a contemporary version of classical Pashtun nationalism” that was “overshadowed by the rise of political Islam and then militancy among various Pashtun tribes.” 31 There are indeed elements of nationalist fervor in PTM’s narrative, but its primary focus is on human rights and rule of law and their leaders insist: “We have created a golden opportunity for Islamabad to shun its past as a security state and function as a normal country concerned with the welfare of its citizens.” 32 But arrests, kidnapping, and intimidation of PTM supporters and followers at the hands of state agencies continue. 33 TTP and other extremists in tribal areas must be relieved to see intelligence services and their proxies getting embroiled into confrontation with PTM rather than confronting TTP ideology and activities.

ISK Expanded Recruitment Drive Targeting Baluchistan’s Brahui Ethnic Group ISK, which had emerged around 2015 in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region as an extension of the Iraq- and Syria-based Islamic State, in its early days had greatly benefitted from a stream of defections from many regional militant organizations. 34 That process has run its course, it appears. Today, ISK is under stress due to regular elimination of its top leadership at the hands of Afghan and U.S. forces, and it is now experimenting with a model that includes a broader recruitment focus as well as the appointment of a foreigner, Shahab al-Muhajir, as its top leader. 35 b Some changes in this direction were visible in early 2020, as evident by the recruitment of militants from the Indian state of Kerala who were then used to target a Sikh place of worship in Kabul. 36 The more terrorist groups are able to recruit from a particular area, the easier it becomes for them to recruit there because of their deepening local ties, but expanding recruitment to different ethnicities requires wider network and training needs (given linguistic and cultural factors).

As part of its broader recruitment focus, ISK is now likely looking to expand its recruitment efforts in the Brahui (or Brohi) ethnic community in the Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. 37 While only a small fraction of Brahuis have any sympathy for ISK, a number have been recruited into its terror campaign. For instance, the masterminds of terrorist attacks targeting a popular Sufi Shrine in Sehwan, Sindh province (2017), a police training center in Quetta, Baluchistan, and many Islamic centers associated with Shi`a communities in the Sindh province turned out to be Brahui militants by the name of Hafeez Pandrani Brohi and Abdullah Brohi, both killed in police encounters in 2019. 38 In the case of the Sehwan attack, one of the two suicide bombers was also from Brahui background, namely Barar Brohi. 39

Pakistani officials believe that ISK cells are “predominantly present in the border areas of Baluchistan,” and the group keeps the size of these cells small as a strategy for securing their communications and target planning. 40

The primary local partner of ISK in Pakistan remains Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami (LeJA), an offshoot of the terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) known widely for its targeting of Shi`a communities across the country. 41 While LeJ terrorist operations have been focused internally in Pakistan, the LeJA has aspired to operate regionally as its extended title al-Alami, meaning ‘international,’ suggests. More specifically, LeJA has attracted the most notorious of the LeJ cadre who were also more aggressive in their approach. Their parent ideological organization, defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba—now operating as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jammat (ASWJ)—is also operating in Baluchistan, and there are strong allegations of its involvement in terrorist attacks targeting the Shi`a Hazara community in Quetta. Ramzan Mengal (ethnically Brahui), the top leader of ASWJ in Baluchistan, openly campaigned for the killing of Shi`a in the past but remains free and was even permitted to contest national elections in 2018. 42

The Brahui factor needs further explanation to get across some important nuances. c The Brahui are distinct from Baluch in the anthropological sense, but they mutually share Baluch political identity and also support the cause of Baluch nationalism. 43 Brahui tribes, however, are more conservative and tribal in terms of their network and outlook as compared to other ethnicities and are generally lagging behind in the economic and educational domains. 44 They are in the majority in Khuzdar, Kalat, and Mastung districts but also have a significant presence in the Quetta, Noshki, and Kharan districts of Baluchistan as well as in some Sindh districts including Shikarpur, Jacobabad, and Qambar Shahdatkot. An important distinguishing feature of Brahui identity is their religious inclinations. Brahui areas host most of the madrassas (Islamic seminaries), and most prayer leaders in the province consequently are from Brahui background. That in itself is not worthy of security concern, but the fact remains that extremist groups have had opportunities to recruit through madrassas in this area.

Since its inception in 2010, 45 LeJA has made strategic inroads into Brahui-dominant areas in Baluchistan as well as Sindh province. One leading indicator of this was the trajectory of the terrorist leader Hafeez Pandrani Brohi (mentioned above), hailing originally from Baluchistan’s Mastung district and trained initially by LeJ. 46 Pakistani intelligence services, or some sectarian elements within it, possibly facilitated LeJ’s move to Baluchistan to confront the Baluch nationalists, especially Baluch Liberation Army (BLA), around the 2007-2010 timeframe. Scholar Stephen Tankel in his 2013 paper on militant infrastructure in Pakistan maintained that, “Rumors persist about Pakistani military support for LeJ militants in Balochistan to degrade the separatist insurgency in that province. There is no evidence of an institutionalized policy, however, and the military has denied these charges vociferously. It is possible some officers overlook or abet LeJ activities because they are seen as targeting enemies of the state.” 47

Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani journalist known for his in-depth stories about the Taliban and other extremist groups, aptly argues, “Call it infiltration, or what you will, but the LeJ has succeeded in recruiting Baloch, once considered quite secular.” 48 According to reliable media accounts in Pakistan, LeJ training camps were run in the second half of the 2000s from Mastung and Khuzdar in Pakistan. 49

The fact that many LeJ (and LeJA) militants have been able to escape from police and even military custody in Baluchistan has reinforced the view that there is an ongoing LeJ-security forces linkage. 50 The recurrence of such escapes (and from high security zone detention facilities) has further entrenched the view that official support was involved.

Shafiq Mengal (ethnically Brahui), an LeJ militant known as a “pawn set by the intelligence agencies to counter Baloch militants in the province,” is an example of a religious extremist turned national asset of Pakistani intelligence. 51 Tariq Khosa, former Inspector General of Police of Baluchistan and a brave writer, laments state backing for private militias and aptly argues that “the decision to use Shafiq as a proxy against certain Baloch separatist organizations allowed proscribed sectarian groups to regroup in and around Quetta.” 52 Rafique Mengal, another LeJ terrorist who was found involved in many killings of Hazara Shi`a in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan province, received state protection, at least in the early 2010s, for his political work against Baluch nationalists. 53 Such state blunders continue to empower groups that widen sectarian rifts and open the doors for groups such as ISK to expand their terror networks in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies are very concerned about the recruitment drive of ISK-LeJA targeting the Brahui-dominated areas, and as discussed, this trend is also visible from publicly available data. 54 This indicates at the least that the ISK-LeJA tandem is looking for opportunities to exploit. LeJ used to get most of its recruits from south Punjab—a critical hub for many extremist organizations in Pakistan—so its move via its LeJA offshoot to Baluchistan (in alliance with ISK) is a development worth taking note of and probing further.

A likely motivating factor for ISK’s enhanced recruitment drive in Baluchistan is the high number of clashes between the Afghan Taliban (mostly Pashtun) and ISK occurring in Afghanistan’s Kunar and Nangahar provinces bordering Pakistan. This area is important for ISK as it hosts its central operational base. Given Pakistan’s past practice and presumed support for the Afghan Taliban in these campaigns, ISK’s retaliation through terror acts in Pakistan is highly probable. To pull off such a terror campaign, it is possible ISK will seek to step up the deployment of Brahui violent extremists as one way to both leverage and aggravate Baluch-Brahui versus Pashtun rivalries in the area.

The evolving nature of the Afghan Taliban-ISK war is evident from the October 27, 2020, ISK terror attack in Peshawar targeting a seminary led by Shaikh Rahim ullah Haqqani, a close ally of the Afghan Taliban, who had publicly declared followers of ISK as enemies of Islam. 55 Haqqani’s lecture was being livestreamed when the attack occurred, leading to the death of eight students while 136 were wounded. 56 Another Afghan Taliban commander, Abdul Samad Mullah Toor, was assassinated by unknown assailants in the outskirts of Peshawar, on January 24, 2021. 57

Targeted Killings in Karachi Pakistani security experts believe that a new generation of religious militants is coming of age in Pakistan, and these tech-savvy individuals are mostly based in urban centers such as Karachi and Lahore. 58 In ideological terms, this pool of individuals harbors salafi-takfiri leanings, ever ready to excommunicate Muslims who are different from them, and they have relatively little baggage in terms of inter-group rivalries as was the case with those who participated in the ‘Afghan Jihad’ of the 1980s. 59 These individuals are more global in their outlook and ambitions, and are largely radicalized through online sources. 60 d

A rise in targeted killings by extremists in Karachi during 2020 raised serious concerns within Pakistani security agencies about the increased activities of some local extremist groups, some with transnational connections, that they were not tracking closely. 61 A senior counterterrorism department officer in Islamabad shared with the author that based on data from Karachi police, they have concluded that four terrorist groups allied with local criminal gangs are quite active in Karachi and Sindh province lately: ‘Lyari gang,’ a Karachi-based criminal network; 62 elements of Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA), a designated terrorist outfit with its base in Baluchistan province; 63 Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army, a relatively new, shadowy group; 64 and criminal elements from the Altaf-led faction Muttihada Qaumi Movement (MQM-A), a political party that has splintered into many factions since its London-based leadership were declared personae non gratae by many leaders of the party as well as Pakistani security agencies for their involvement in criminal activities and alleged ties with Indian intelligence. 65 Many criminal elements from MQM-A escaped Pakistan and now reportedly hide in South Africa. 66 It is important to clarify that some of the four Karachi groups specified above have been in existence for many years, but lately they have been more active than usual according to local police assessments. The author’s conversations with police officials in Karachi indicate that many of the underground jihadis are found involved in narcotics smuggling activity and Sindh and Punjab police forces are closely monitoring this trend. 67

Cracking down on these Karachi groups will in some cases need to be an international endeavor. The United Arab Emirates remains a destination for many criminals from the Karachi area and other parts of Pakistan. 68 For instance, the prime suspect in the attack on the Chinese consulate in Karachi in November 2018, named Rashid Brohi and belonging to BLA, was arrested in July 2019 in UAE by Interpol. 69

The Evolving Threat Posed by Kashmiri-focused Groups The activities of Kashmir-focused militant groups and other organizations that aspire to be active in Indian-controlled Kashmir remain a concern. There are no indications that groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) led by the notorious Masood Azhar have been decommissioned. 70

In early 2020, a Urdu-language magazine managed by al-Qa`ida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), titled Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind (roughly Voice of the Battlefield of India), started campaigning for focus on Kashmir, raising alarm bells in India. 71 The latest edition (January 2021) of this magazine not only carries articles on Kashmir but its language and content clearly indicates that it is published by ‘battle hardened’ militants with experience in Kashmir and Afghanistan. e

While Kashmir-focused militant groups are generally keeping a low profile within Pakistan (likely due to the hanging sword of ‘Financial Action Task Force’ on Islamabad’s head), f there is a real danger that some elements that differ with this quietism strategy may join AQIS. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan warned his countrymen against any effort to “wage Jihad in Kashmir” and cautioned them by saying: “Anyone, who thinks that he will cross the border to join the Kashmiris, is a big enemy of them and Pakistan.” 72 This indicates resolve on the part of political leadership at least. There is no credible evidence that AQIS is operating in Kashmir at this time, but its publications clearly show intent and motivation to do so.

Many of these Kashmir-focused Pakistani militants, as is known from their track record, jump between groups depending on geopolitics and security vulnerabilities. The mood of intelligence agencies is also kept in view.

Deepening Sectarianism Sunni-Shi`a sectarianism, mostly anti-Shi`a platforms, has long been exploited by violent extremist groups in Pakistan, and as outlined below, it is once again on the rise. Lately, Pakistan’s Ahmadi community has also been on the receiving end as there has been a recent spike in targeted killing against them. 73 The intra-Sunni Barelvi-Deobandi rivalry also continues to simmer hazardously in the background, as Tehrike-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a radical Barelvi group, has energized its base by insisting on the strict implementation of Pakistan’s controversial blasphemy laws. In the process, it is regaining the political ground it had lost to the Deobandis “since the rise of jihadism in the 1980s.” 74

Disturbingly, recent months have seen heightened anti-Shi`a rhetoric expressed through major street protests, involving ultra conservative political forces, in Karachi and Islamabad. 75 Sectarian and extremist ASWJ played an active role in this campaign. 76 These street protests could lead to even more sectarianism, which has proved in the past to have empowered terrorists of all stripes in Pakistan besides widening the door for Saudi-versus-Iran games to be played in the country. 77 Islamic State-like organizations also thrive where sectarian tensions are high. An editorial of Pakistan’s leading newspaper Dawn captured the gist of this development well:

The embers of hate are once again being stoked. To prevent history from being repeated and innocent blood spilled in the name of religion, the government must act urgently and decisively. The state’s silence is indeed inexplicable. It appears to have willfully chosen to close its eyes to this sinister development. 78

Pakistan’s Shi`a Hazara, located mostly in Quetta, continue to pay a heavy price. 2021 began for them with the brutal murder of 11 Hazara coal miners who were kidnapped and their throats slit. Gruesome images of the victims were distributed through the Islamic State’s Amaq news service. 79 The Pakistani security analyst Amir Rana, in making security projections for Pakistan for 2021, aptly observes that “incidents of communal violence and religious and sectarian hatred have become a regular feature of Pakistan’s security and political landscape” and “sectarian discord and the groups promoting it continue to persist.” 80

Conclusion As this article has outlined, Pakistan’s counterterrorism challenges are evolving. While there is relative stability in the Pakistan-Afghanistan tribal belt and the overall violence levels have dropped since 2018, the TTP in particular are assertively trying to regroup and stage a comeback. While their infrastructure has been degraded earlier, nothing tangible was done to challenge the extremists’ ideology of hate. Countering violent extremism efforts have remained limited in focus and poorly resourced. 81 Economic failings and disparities in Pakistan have also offered opportunities for ISK terrorists to target vulnerable communities for recruitment, such as the Brahui in Baluchistan. ISK is a serious danger for South Asia, and its potential to grow further should not be underestimated. ISK’s creation of two subdivisions, namely Islamic State-Hind and Islamic State-Pakistan, in 2019 reflect its ambitions in the region. 82 Islamabad’s policy of looking for proxies to fight insurgents and extremists has backfired. 83 And the Kashmir-focused militants, though quieter and keeping a low profile since 2017, could also come out of their hibernation—on the state’s behalf or possibly on their own out of frustration—redirecting their energies toward India, which could lead to India-Pakistan military conflict. Heightened sectarianism also complicates Pakistan’s security scene. As Tariq Parvez, a seasoned Pakistani counterterrorism expert and former head of NACTA, argues:

The current resurgence of violent sectarianism in Pakistan is much more dangerous than the sectarianism in earlier decades, due to 3 factors, i.e. Barelvis joining them, Shia/Sunni returnees from Syria, and TTP/ISK/LeJ combo to attack each other. Government must react promptly and firmly. 84

The economic burden of dealing with COVID-19 is only going to make Pakistan’s counterterrorism challenges harder. While threats of suicide bombings in urban centers and terrorist attacks targeting progressive political leaders have receded relatively speaking, religious intolerance and threats to minority groups continue as serious problems. In the author’s assessment based on his field research, Pakistan’s criminal justice system, and especially its police, lacks the capacity and resources to serve as the first line of defense against terrorism. 85 The present government of Pakistan under Prime Minister Imran Khan, despite its promises, 86 has failed to introduce police reforms. Afzal Shigri, a former inspector general of the police and an advocate for rule of law, warns that this will have “horrendous impact on the future governance and politics of Pakistan.” 87 The five dimensions to the terrorist threat discussed in this article will only grow in magnitude and lethality if they remain untreated.

Pakistani officials appear to be more prone to dismissing these challenges as externally induced efforts g to disrupt the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). h While regional rivalries and tensions are a reality, the hard truth is that the state of Pakistan has invested very little in its countering violent extremism campaigns and deradicalization programs. One potentially beneficial initiative recently introduced pertains to intelligence coordination, bringing all civilian and military intelligence agencies under one umbrella. 88 However, equally crucial is coordination—and in some cases, mutual trust—between the country’s law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and that remains a weak link in Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. 89

Terrorists with a regional and global mission are constantly looking for opportunities to exploit, and Pakistan, having paid dearly in the past for its mistakes, needs to take these challenges very seriously. The infrastructure development projects under CPEC, as well as economic growth prospects, are at stake. Pakistan simply cannot afford to return to the old days when terrorism bogged it down almost completely, arresting its potential and progress. CTC

Hassan Abbas is Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. He is the author of the forthcoming The Prophet’s Heir: The Life of Ali ibn Abi Talib (Yale University Press, March 2021). Twitter: @watandost

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University or the Department of Defense.

® 2021 Hassan Abbas

Substantive Notes [a] According to the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council, the attack was conducted by Tariq Gidar Group (TGG) in association with al-Qa`ida and in conjunction with or on behalf of JuA, TTP, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). See “Tariq Gidar Group (TGG),” United Nations Security Council.

[b] There is still some speculation that Shahab al-Muhajir is a Pakistani, Afghan, or even a Tajik per some sources and that the name (with the addition of al-Muhajir, meaning immigrant/refugee) is an attempt to hide his local roots. See “Andrabi claims new Daesh leader is a Haqqani member,” Ariana News, August 4, 2020.

[c] The author is grateful to Baluch-American journalist Siraj Akbar for helping him understand these nuances. The framing, however, is the author’s. Author interview, Siraj Akbar, December 2020.

[d] It is important to note, however, that many established and older extremist groups continue to recruit and expand their network through physical contact and through extremist religious gatherings and printed publications.

[e] The magazine Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind was earlier titled Nawai Afghan Jihad (The Voice of Afghan Jihad) and has been printed continuously for the last 14 years, as claimed on its contents page.

[f] The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. FATF added Pakistan to its grey list in June 2018, indicating “strategic weaknesses” in Pakistan’s countering money laundering and terror financing efforts. To avoid moving onto the FATF black list, Pakistan was asked to take a series of measures (27 actions to be specific). By October 2020, Pakistan was deemed to have taken action on 21 out of 27 specified areas, and its progress is still being reviewed by FATF. For details, see “Explained: FATF, Pakistan and the ‘Grey List,’” WIRE, October 24, 2020. For Pakistan’s progress, see “Mutual Evaluation of Pakistan,” Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, September 2020.

[g] In November 2020, Pakistan claimed it had “irrefutable evidence” that India was behind some terrorist activity in Pakistan. India has refuted this claim. Naveed Siddiqui, “Irrefutable evidence: Dossier on India’s sponsorship of state terrorism in Pakistan presented,” Dawn , November 14, 2020; Avinash Paliwal, “The strategic value of a dead dossier,” Observer Research Foundation, November 27, 2020.

[h] The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, benefiting from a multi-billion dollar Chinese investment, extends the land and maritime routes that connect the two countries through Gwadar port and a network of approximately 2,000 miles of railways, roads, and pipelines. For original plan details, see Khurram Husain, “Exclusive: CPEC master plan revealed,” Dawn , June 21, 2017; Andrew Small, “Returning to the Shadows: China. Pakistan and the Fate of CPEC,” German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 23, 2020.

Citations [1] “Global Terrorism Index 2020: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism,” Institute for Economics and Peace, Sydney, November 2020, p. 2.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

[4] “Number of Terrorism Related Incidents Year Wise, Datasheet – Pakistan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), accessed February 11, 2021.

[5] Amir Wasim, “Fazl among 20 politicians facing ‘serious threats to life’: minister,” Dawn , December 22, 2020.

[6] Amira Jadoon and Andrew Mines, Broken but Not defeated: An Examination of State-led Operations against Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan and Pakistan (2015-2018) (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2020), p. VI.

[7] For a discussion about the broader impact of the U.S. drone campaign, see Hassan Abbas, “Are Drone Strikes Killing Terrorists or Creating Them?” Atlantic , March 31, 2013.

[8] Asad Hashim “Exclusive: Pakistani Taliban down but not out, says ex-spokesman,” Al Jazeera, April 3, 2020. See also Umair Jamal, “Are US Forces Striking Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Members in Afghanistan for Islamabad?” Diplomat, February 14, 2020.

[9] For details, see Amira Jadoon, Allied and Lethal: Islamic State Khorasan’s Network and Organizational Capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2018), pp. 35-36, 54-58.

[10] See “Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA),” United Nations Security Council.

[11] Daud Khattak, “Whither the Pakistani Taliban: An Assessment of Recent Trends,” New America, August 31, 2020.

[12] Author interview, senior police officer in Peshawar, October 2020.

[13] Khattak.

[14] “Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities,” United Nations, January 20, 2020.

[15] “Shamali Waziristan se Taaluk rakhne wale do Taliban groupon ka TTP se Ittehad Ka Elaan,” Tribal News , November 28, 2020.

[16] “Allegiance of two popular North Waziristan’s Jihadi organizations’ leaders, Maulvi Aleem Khan and Commander Ghazi Omar Azzam, to TTP leader Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud,” Umar Media video, November 27, 2020. For a detailed assessment of this development, see Abdul Sayed, “Waziristan Militant Leader Aleem Khan Ustad Joins Tehreek-e-Taliban,” Militant Leadership Monitor 11:12 (2021).

[17] “Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan,” United Nations Security Council, May 19, 2020, p. 20.

[18] “Twenty-fifth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring.”

[19] “Four tribal elders shot dead in North Waziristan,” The News , December 1, 2020. See also “Two More Tribal Elders Shot Dead In Northwestern Pakistan; Six Total Killed This Week,” Gandhara, December 2, 2020.

[20] Khattak.

[21] For background, see Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1:2 (2008) and Hassan Abbas, “From FATA to the NWFP,” CTC Sentinel 1:10 (2008).

[22] “Kya Qabaeli Azlaa main dahshatgard phir saar Utha rahee hain [Are terrorists again raising their heads in Tribal districts],” Urdu interview with Amir Rana, Rifatullah Orakzai YouTube Channel, December 15, 2020.

[23] For details about border fencing, see Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan says Afghan Border Fence Nearly Complete,” Voice of America, December 4, 2020.

[24] Rustam Shah Mohmand, “Why attacks surge in northwest Pakistan,” Arab News , September 24, 2020.

[25] For details, see “Shaping a New Peace in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” ICG Report No. 150 , August 20, 2018.

[26] Author interview, Imtiaz Ali, December 2020. For detail about change in FATA legal status in merger into KPK province, see Imtiaz Ali, “Mainstreaming Pakistan’s Federally Administrative Tribal Areas: Reform Initiatives and Roadblocks,” USIP Special Report 421 , March 2018, and Wajeeha Malik and Shakeeb Asrar, “Post-Merger Inaction in FATA: Expectations Vs. Reality,” South Asian Voices, July 10, 2019.

[27] For instance, see Abubakar Siddiqui, “Leader’s Arrest Galvanizes Pashtun Rights Movement in Pakistan,” Gandhara, January 30, 2020.

[28] See Madiha Afzal, “Why is Pakistan’s military repressing a huge, non-violent Pashtun protest movement?” Brookings, February 7, 2020.

[29] “Radio Pak claims MNAs Dawar, Wazir ‘fulfilling vested Indian agenda through Afghanistan,’” Dawn , March 10, 2020. See also Hasib Danish Alikozai, “Pakistani Activist Rejects Charges Foreign Spying Agencies Funding His Group,” Voice of America, May 7, 2019.

[30] Quoted in Ali Wazir, “What Does the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement Want?” Diplomat, April 27, 2018.

[31] Nadeem F. Paracha, “Smoker’s Corner: How Should the State Deal with PTM?” Dawn , February 3, 2020.

[32] Ibid. See also Mohsin Dawar, “Opinion: We are peacefully demanding change in Pakistan. The military says we’re ‘traitors,’” Washington Post , February 14, 2020.

[33] For instance, see “Peshawar police arrest MNA Ali Wazir,” The News , December 16, 2020. See also Mohsin Dawar, “Pashtuns’ struggle for rights cannot be silenced through violence,” Al Jazeera, June 20, 2020.

[34] For details, see Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, and Charmaine Willis, “Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,” CTC Sentinel 11:4 (2018).

[35] Abdul Sayed, “Who is the New Leader of Islamic State – Khorasan Province?” Lawfare, September 2, 2020.

[36] For details, see Animesh Roul, “Islamic State-Khorasan Remains Potent Force in Afghan Jihad,” Terrorism Monitor 8:11 (2020).

[37] Assessment based on multiple author interviews with security (counterterrorism) officials serving in Quetta and Karachi, October 2020.

[38] “Mastermind of several major terror attacks killed in encounter,” Dawn , March 1, 2019. See also Hafeez Tunio, “Two high-profile Daesh terrorists killed in encounter,” Express Tribune , March 1, 2019.

[39] Naeem Sahoutara, “Two ‘IS militants’ get death on 70 counts in Qalandar shrine suicide blast case,” Dawn , May 19, 2020.

[40] Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, “ISIS schemes with jihadist groups in Pakistan,” Asia Times , November 27, 2019.

[41] For background, see Farhan Zahid, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi al-Alami: A Pakistani partner for Islamic State,” Terrorism Monitor 15:2 (2017). See also Jadoon, Allied and Lethal , pp. 40-41, 50-51.

[42] Gul Yousafzai, “Minority Hazaras in Pakistan protest for third day after Quetta attack,” Reuters, April 14, 2019; See also Asad Hashim, “Quetta Hazaras despair as religious supremacists contest elections,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2018.

[43] See Haris Gazdar, Sobia Ahmad Kaker, and Irfan Khan, “Buffer Zone, Colonial Enclave or Urban Hub? Quetta: Between Four Regions and Two Wars,” Working Paper no. 69, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics, February 2010.

[44] Author interview, Malik Siraj Akbar, December 2020.

[45] See “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al Alami,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University. For a detailed profile of LeJ, see “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University.

[46] See Syed Arfeen, “The Hunt for Hafeez Brohi,” Friday Times , February 24, 2017. See also Zia Ur Rehman, “Militant North of the Country’s South,” News on Sunday , December 9, 2018.

[47] Stephen Tankel, “Domestic Barriers to Dismantling the Militant Infrastructure in Pakistan,” United States Institute of Peace, September 2013.

[48] Zofeen T. Ebrahim, “Hazara Killers – supported from Punjab to the Middle East,” Dawn , February 13, 2013.

[50] For instance, see “Usman Kurd, the man who caused fall of Raisani govt,” The News , January 15, 2013.

[51] Saher Baloch, “Herald Exclusive: Mangled Facts,” Herald , March 20, 2014.

[52] Quoted in Maqbool Ahmed, “How death stalks policemen in Quetta,” Herald , April 25, 2018.

[53] Author interview, police officer in Quetta, January 2021. For Rafique Mengal’s LeJ connection, see Arif Rafiq, “How Pakistan Protects Itself from Regional Sectarian War,” National Interest , September 15, 2015. See also Mohammad Taqi, “Murder and Mayhem in Balochistan,” Daily Times , June 10, 2015.

[54] Author interviews, police officers in Karachi and Quetta, November 2020.

[55] See Shaikh Rahimullah Haqqani declaring ISIS/ISK followers as khawarij , meaning rejectionists, who left the fold of Islam, in “Who are Khawarij here: Full Details,” YouTube video, February 4, 2020. See also “IS ‘prime suspect’ for Peshawar seminary bombing,” Dawn , October 30, 2020.

[56] For details, see Riaz Khan, “Bomb at seminary in Pakistan kills 8 students, wounds 136,” Associated Press, October 27, 2020.

[57] See Tahir Khan, “Senior Afghan Taliban commander shot dead near Peshawar,” Daily Times , January 25, 2021.

[58] Abdul Basit, “Threat of Urban Jihadism in South Asia,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10:3 (2018): pp. 3-4. See also Huma Yusuf, “University Radicalization: Pakistan’s Next Counterterrorism Challenge,” CTC Sentinel 9:2 (2016).

[59] On a new generation of salafi-thinking radicals in Pakistan, see Jasmin Lorch, “Trajectories of Political Salafism: Insights from the Ahle Hadith Movement in Pakistan and Bangladesh,” Middle East Institute, October 30, 2018.

[60] Author interview, police officers in Karachi and Lahore, December 2019.

[61] For instance, see Zia Ur Rahman, “Recent attacks show resurgence of Sindhi separatists and TTP in Karachi: CRSS report,” The News , October 8, 2020.

[62] See Imtiaz Ali, “Police see new underground group behind recent targeted killings in Karachi,” Dawn , January 31, 2019.

[63] See Animesh Roul, “Pakistan Confronts Resurgent Baluch Ethno-Separatist Militancy,” Terrorism Monitor 18:15 (2020).

[64] See Syed Raza Hassan, “Coordinated blasts kill four in Pakistan, including soldiers,” Reuters, June 19, 2020.

[65] For background, see Owen Bennet-Jones, “Altaf Hussain, the notorious MQM leader who swapped Pakistan for London,” Guardian , July 29, 2013. See also S. Akbar Zaidi, “The rise and fall of Altaf Hussain,” The Hindu , September 8, 2016.

[66] See “Rangers arrest MQM-South Africa activists, recover ‘biggest ever cache of weapons,” The News , December 12, 2018. See also “Shehla Raza, Saeed Ghani receive life threats from MQM-South Africa,” ARY News, May 4, 2019.

[67] Author interviews, police officers in Lahore and Karachi, November 2020.

[68] Author interview, police officer in Karachi, November 2020. See also “Pakistanis pose a threat to Gulf communities, says Dubai security chief,” Dawn , January 2, 2020. UAE is also used as a transit point for human trafficking from Pakistan. For details, see “Recent trends of human trafficking and migrant smuggling to and from Pakistan,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2013. For sex trafficking in and through UAE, see “Trafficking in Persons Report 2019,” U.S. Department of State, June 2019.

[69] Aamir Latif, “Pakistan: ‘Mastermind’ of Chinese consulate attack held,” AA Agency News, July 3, 2019.

[70] For a profile of Masood Azhar, see Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, “The Terrorist Who Got Away,” New York Times , March 19, 2020.

[71] See Rezaul H Laskar and Aadil Mir, “Al-Qaeda’s India affiliate hints at shifting focus to Kashmir,” Hindustan Times , March 22, 2020.

[72] Shahid Hamid, “PM Imran warns against crossing LoC for Kashmir Jihad,” Express Tribune , September 19, 2019.

[73] “Pakistan: Surge in Targeted Killings of Ahmedis,” Human Rights Watch, November 26, 2020.

[74] For background, see Mohammad Taqi, “What Does the Death of Barelvi Firebrand Khadim Rizvi Mean for Sectarian Politics,” WIRE, November 28, 2020.

[75] For details, see Shah Meer Baloch and Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Pakistani Shias live in terror as sectarian violence increases,” Guardian , October 21, 2020.

[76] Jaffer A. Mirza, “The Changing Landscape of Anti-Shia Politics in Pakistan,” Diplomat, September 28, 2020.

[77] For background and details, see Hassan Abbas, Shiism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence and Tit-for-Tat Violence, Occasional Paper Series (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2010).

[78] “Sectarian Tensions,” Dawn Editorial , September 21, 2020.

[79] See Asad Hashim and Saadullah Akhter, “Pakistani Hazara families refuse to bury dead after attack,” Al Jazeera, January 4, 2021.

[80] Muhammad Amir Rana, “Security projections for 2021,” Dawn , January 24, 2021.

[81] For details, see Rashad Bukhari and Qamar-ul Huda, “A Critique of Countering Violent Extremism Programs in Pakistan,” Center for Global Policy, July 2020.

[82] For details, see Ayaz Gul, “Islamic State Announces ‘Pakistan Province,’” Voice of America, May 15, 2019.

[83] For comparable examples, see Hassan Abbas and Nadia Gerspacher, “The Irregulars,” Foreign Policy , March 30, 2015.

[84] See Tariq Parvez, “TTP militancy was by one sunni sub sect ie deobandies and was anti state as …,” Twitter, September 19, 2020. Parvez reiterated what he stated in his tweet in a phone communication with the author in December 2020.

[85] For details, see Hassan Abbas ed., Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reforms (New York: Asia Society, 2012). See also Robert Perito and Tariq Pervez, “A Counterterrorism Role for Pakistan’s Police Stations,” USIP Special Report 351 , August 2014.

[86] See Ansar Abbasi, “Police reforms – the govt’s forgotten agenda,” The News , July 17, 2019.

[87] Afzal Shigri, “Politics of Police Reform,” Dawn , December 19, 2020.

[88] Baqir Sajjad Syed, “PM okays creation of liaison body for spy agencies,” Dawn , November 24, 2020.

[89] Author interview, Tariq Khosa, former Inspector General of Police in Baluchistan, Dubai, UAE, December 2019.

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BJPsych Int
v.15(1); 2018 Feb

Terrorism in Pakistan: the psychosocial context and why it matters

Asad tamizuddin nizami.

1 Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychiatry, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan; email moc.liamg@imazindasard

Tariq Mahmood Hassan

2 Assistant Professor, Providence Care Mental Health Services, Kingston, Canada

Sadia Yasir

3 Consultant Psychiatrist, Shifa International Hospital, Shifa College of Medicine, Islamabad, Pakistan

Mowaddat Hussain Rana

4 Director General, Centre for Trauma Research and Psychosocial Interventions, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan

Fareed Aslam Minhas

5 Head Institute of Psychiatry, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Terrorism is often construed as a well-thought-out, extreme form of violence to perceived injustices. The after effects of terrorism are usually reported without understanding the underlying psychological and social determinants of the terrorist act. Since ‘9/11’ Pakistan has been at the epicentre of both terrorism and the war against it. This special paper helps to explain the psychosocial perspective of terrorism in Pakistan that leads to violent radicalisation. It identifies the terrorist acts in the background of Pakistan's history, current geopolitical and social scenario. The findings may also act as a guide on addressing this core issue.

Most nations are unable to reach a consensus on a legally binding definition of ‘terrorism.’ The term seems emotionally charged and, as such, governments have been devising their own definitions. So far the United Nations has been unable to devise an internationally agreed-upon definition of terrorism. Terrorism is suggested to be ‘the use of intimidation or fear for advancement of political objectives’ (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006 ). Since the ‘9/11’ incident, Muslim countries in particular feel emotionally threatened with the word terrorism and perceive it as synonymous with the acts of terror carried out by so-called Muslim extremist groups. This is further complemented in the media by the unjust linking of such horrendous terror attacks to Islamic Jihad.

Terrorism has brought an enormous burden on South Asian countries through the adverse impacts on their social, economic, political and physical infrastructure. Pakistan has suffered particularly excessively from the social, economic and human costs due to terrorism (Daraz et al , 2012 ). Surprisingly, Pakistan is portrayed as being on the front line in the international war against terrorism and at the same time has been wrongly labelled as a sponsor of international terrorism. Terrorism in Pakistan is a multidimensional phenomenon and, among many precipitating factors, the psychosocial factors play an important role. This paper attempts to address what we believe are significant psychosocial determinants to terrorism in Pakistan.

Historical developments

Pakistan is a Muslim majority nation in South East Asia with India to its east, Iran and Afghanistan to its west, China and the landlocked Asian countries to its north and the Arabian Sea to its south. Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons – a nuclear device was detonated in 1998 – and is thus part of the informally named ‘nuclear club.’ Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan), a capital territory (Islamabad) and a group of federally administered tribal areas in the north west, along with the disputed area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan is the world's sixth most populous country with an average population density of 229 people per km 2 (World Bank indicators; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/urban-population-growth-annual-percent-wb-data.html ). Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been challenged not only by the trauma inflicted by its colonial occupiers but also by the mass murder of people migrating to the ‘new’ country. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, looted, raped or burnt alive. At the same time, the stability of this fledgling country was significantly hampered by the lack of resources. Just a few years later, due to political instability and separatist movements and terrorism, the east wing of the country was separated from Pakistan; this paved the way to the creation of a new country, Bangladesh, in 1971 (Wadhwani, 2011 ).

The Soviet–Afghan war, which began in 1979, provided a breeding ground for terrorism in the region. A fundamental change was witnessed that altered the very character of the existing Pakistani society. Withdrawal of the Soviets revealed a Pakistani society that had been forced into one of violence and weaponisation, plaguing Pakistan with so-called ‘Kalashnikov culture’ and ‘Talibanisation’ (Wadhwani, 2011 ).

Pakistan's social landscape has for the most part been plagued with illiteracy, disease, insecurity and injustice. Since the 9/11 incident, Pakistan has been intricately linked with the many facets of the ‘war on terrorism.’ Some argue that Pakistan is a breeding ground for terrorist outfits, but it is certain that all of this havoc has resulted in the significant loss of innocent lives as well as loss of economic revenue. These fragile conditions provide a fertile ground for terrorism to grow.

Psychological influence

The act of carrying out terrorist activity does not come from a single moment of inspiration but rather from a complex process of cognitive accommodation and assimilation over accumulating steps. It is wrongly reductionist to label the terrorists as mad or psychopaths (Atran, 2003 ; Horgan, 2008 ). Terrorists’ motivation may involve a deep, underlying quest for personal meaning and significance. Several analyses of such motives have appeared in recent years. There are differences in these analyses regarding the type and variety of motivational factors identified as critical to terrorism. Some authors identified a singular motivation as crucial; others listed a ‘cocktail’ of motives (Sageman, 2004 ; Bloom, 2005 ).

The socioeconomic adversity combined with political challenges were bound to have a detrimental impact on the psyche of the average Pakistani. A terrorist adopts a dichotomous way of identifying their victims, the black-and-white thought that ‘I am good’ and ‘you are evil,’ with no intermediary shades of grey. This thinking leaves no doubt in their minds and they find it easier to kill their opponents with little or no sense of remorse or guilt.

The unmanned army drone strikes killed and maimed thousands of innocent civilians in poor and difficult to access regions of Pakistan. This infuriated people, leading them to take up arms against the perceived aggressors. This triggering of the relatives of the deceased to engage in such activity is the culture of revenge in Pakistan, which unfortunately can last for generations.

Self-sacrifice and martyrdom has been explicitly used in almost all religions and is aggressively exploited by terrorist outfits who groom suicide bombers using the ideology of Islamist martyrdom (Atran, 2003 ). Some have argued that suicide bombers may actually be clinically suicidal and attempting to escape personal impasse (Lankford, 2013 ). In grooming young impressionable adolescents, extremist organisations brainwash these adolescents into believing that the ultimate self-sacrifice by suicide bombing will elevate their stature in the eyes of God and send them straight to heaven. This is associated with massive financial compensations to the deceased family. Terrorist organisations in Pakistan, through this process of brainwashing, have been able to convert young impressionable Muslim adolescents into a ‘suicide bomber in six weeks’ (Nizami et al , 2014 ). In the current scenario of the existing war on terror, this complex process of recruiting young adolescents as suicide bombers seems irreversible.

The contribution of the religious schools

In the West, Madrassas (Islamic religious schools) have gained a reputation of being a sinister influence on young impressionable Muslims. These institutions are not completely regulated and can vary from a single room to large institutions offering schooling and boarding to hundreds of students at a time. A survey of just over 50 000 households in Pakistan found that children in Urdu-medium government schools and madrassas were from poorer households than those in English-medium private schools. The primary reason for parents to send their children to madrassas as opposed to mainstream schools was that these institutions provided a good Islamic education. The second most common reason was that the madrassa provided education that is low in cost along with the provision of food and clothing (Cockcroft et al , 2009 ).

Another survey indicated that in Pakistan only a minority of the religious schools promoted an extremist view of Islam (Bano, 2007 ). An interrogation of 79 terrorists involved in anti-Western attacks found that very few had attended a madrassa. This suggests that terrorist groups may selectively recruit better qualified people for technically demanding tasks (Bergen & Pandey, 2006 ). However, the religious seminaries have been implicated as playing the role of recruitment centres for the suicide bombers (Nizami et al , 2014 ).

In an effort to break this incorrect perception the Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in the world, hosted an anti-terrorist conference in 2008. This was attended by 6000 Imams declaring that ‘Islam is a religion of mercy for all humanity. Islam sternly condemns all kinds of oppression, violence and terrorism. It has regarded oppression, mischief, rioting and murder among sins and crimes’ (Press Trust of India, 2008 ). However, it is yet to be ascertained how many religious schools in Pakistan adopted this school of thought. With the revolution in the world of information technology, experts agree that the internet played an important role in the radicalisation and self-recruitment process into terrorist groups. Messages and videos on jihadi websites target the ‘soft spots’ of potential recruits and inflame their imagination (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009 ).

The link between terrorism and mental disorder

With both mental disorder and terrorism in Pakistan being highly prevalent, it would be a fair assumption that the two may have a causal relationship. Walter Laqueur wrote that ‘all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and persecution mania… The element of… madness plays an important role in terrorism’ (Silke, 2003 ).

However, apart from certain pathological cases, a causal connection between an individual's mental disorder and engagement in terrorist activity could not be established (Daraz et al , 2012 ). However, there can be a connection between an individual engaging in terrorist activity and developing a mental disorder as mental disorders worsen in stress, anxiety and depression.

The adverse impacts of terrorism lead the masses towards anomie and create the tendency towards suicide and mental illnesses (Daraz et al , 2012 ). Poor health, depressive symptoms, risky behaviours in young adults, personality variables, social inequalities, criminality, social networks and international foreign policy have all been proposed to be influential drivers for grievances that lead to radicalisation and terrorism (La Free & Ackerman, 2009 ).

It may well be that individuals with mild depression would be a better target for gradual psychological moulding. Female suicide bombers who are predominantly motivated by revenge as opposed to their male counterparts may have some degree of clinical depression (Jacques & Taylor, 2008 ). Personality traits are useless as predictors for understanding why people become terrorists. However, personality traits and environmental conditions are the contributing factors for terrorism (Horgan, 2008 ). There are protective and modifiable risk factors early on the path towards radicalisation. The benefits of early intervention have far reaching implications for preventing significant depressive symptoms, promoting wellbeing and perhaps social capital (Bhui et al , 2014 ).

By understanding, appreciating and addressing the psychosocial factors contributing to terrorism in Pakistan, one may find long-lasting solutions to the fall out on Pakistan's war against terror. This war has led to a loss of innocent human lives, compounded by the deep psychological scars for survivors which will undoubtedly persist for generations to come. An ongoing, concerted effort to gain peace and security in the region is essential and is the only way to counteract the revenge attacks and further brainwashing of young impressionable youths. These psychological determinants, however, are markedly different than terrorist activities in Western countries, where it seems that a different set of psychological rules apply.

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Education and Extremism in Pakistan (Essay for CSS)

Extremism in the name of Islam has greatly affected the structural stability and functionality of Pakistani society and the state in recent years. Extremism could be effectively prevented and countered through viable educational infrastructure in the country. The case of Pakistan in this context is unique. In our country, educational institutions and academia have become a key factor in extremism and terrorism. Although regarding the connection between education and extremism in Pakistan much attention has remained focused on the role of madrassas, the main issue is the failure of successive governments and regimes to provide adequate education infrastructure and curricula.

On the contrary, social scientists and educationists are concerned about the curriculum taught in public schools and think it is fixated on religion and ideology and that it needs to be reformed. Many studies on the syllabi in Pakistan corroborate their view.

At the same time, a segment of Pakistan’s secular elite opposes campaigns for the equal right to education for all citizens. They have a set of reservations which reflects a pessimist mindset. Their major objection is also related to the curriculum. They argue that it is producing generations that will push the country further into extremism. They also argue that the economy cannot afford the burden of more literates and the market has already absorbed more than its capacity.

Interestingly, both the madressah establishment and secular segments of society oppose the formal education system for divergent ideological reasons. Though these anti-public education segments do not represent the majority of their class, they do contribute to the state’s attitudes towards education. Despite the Constitution’s Article 25A, which ensures an equal and compulsory right to education for every citizen, the federal and provincial governments are not prioritising education in their development discourse.

Both segments are the beneficiaries of their own educational systems. Both madressahs and elite educational institutions target the public-sector formal education system and demand reforms. At the same time, they contest demands for reforms in their own education system. Both have active alliances and unions to resist any attempt at the reform of their respective educational systems. These alliances also enable them to safeguard their so-called class interest through resisting educational reforms.

The formal education sector in Pakistan is believed to be catering to the needs of 75pc of the population, while less than 4pc of students go to religious seminaries. Elite schools enroll an even lesser percentage. Both the public and private services sectors heavily depend on the formal education sector. The increasing number of technical training institutions in the public and private sectors not only fulfils the internal demand for skilled labour but also for labour abroad. Increases in foreign remittances are linked to skilled Pakistani labour abroad.

The pessimist mindset is not ready to realise that education is a social instrument for developing human resources and for human capital formation. Pessimist elites in India and Bangladesh had similar fears until a few decades ago. But both countries gradually saw that literacy leads to education and results in empowerment, which enables one to contribute to community development.

As far as the question of extremism is concerned, it has its own dynamics which are linked largely to state policies as well as to the ideological and political ambiguities created by the establishment and its beneficiaries. Foreign and local scholars have done extensive research on the subject and are still exploring the changing dynamics of extremism and thinking patterns but nobody has proved education to be the sole factor in extremism. If this was indeed the case, then all social classes and educational institutions would not be facing extremism of equal levels within their respective spheres.

Interestingly, radical and militant groups also follow class distinctions and are quite aware of their constituencies and areas of support among different classes in Pakistan. For instance, sectarian and local Taliban factions function mainly in the lower middle classes and consider these an important support base.

Urban-based militants including Lashkar-e-Taiba and factions of the Punjabi Taliban (affiliates of Al Qaeda) depend on the middle class and have encroached into formal and private educational institutes. Radical groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Al Huda are active in indoctrinating elite classes and have established their networks in their institutions. Al Qaeda is also a beneficiary of radical tendencies found among the elite as it is continuously producing terrorists like Omer Saeed Sheikh, Khalid Sheikh and Faisal Shazad.

Extremism is a complex phenomenon and cannot be understood in general terms. There is a need to evolve a consensus approach at both the state and society level to tackle it. Linking education to ideological, social and economic challenges is not the right approach. Such an approach cannot provide any solution and is nothing but an attempt to draw a curtain over the wrongdoings of the state and influential classes in the field of education. Blaming the education system alone will not help resolve the problem.

No doubt, the current education systems including the formal, the elitist and the religious education institutions need massive reforms, but on the baseless fears of extremism, a small job market and economic burden, the nation cannot be kept illiterate and ignorant.

There is a dire need to combine all energies to promote and reform the education sector. Instead of blaming the education system for the common man, there is a need to focus more on literacy and educational reforms.

However, the problems with madrassas are multifaceted and not just limited to militancy. The students of thousands of madrassas are imparted religious theory, largely based on selective lessons from the Islamic scripture and their de-contextualised exegesis, and are prepared to take up jobs in the religious sector. The main problem of madrassas is that their extremely narrow worldview that they cultivate among their students along with the curricula that is bereft of modern civic education interacts with the poverty of the students and cause large-scale radicalisation of society.

Importantly, well before madrassas in Pakistan became hubs of militant training and extremism, many universities and colleges had already been dens of arms, ammunition and violence, if not of militant training per se. The example of the Punjab University is a case in point where a student group, the Islami Jamiat-e-Talaba, associated with Jamaat-e-Islami, since long has made the institute into its virtual forte and preaching of its radical agenda. According to an American expert on Pakistan, Christine Fair, who was informed by some Pakistani official respondents, as much as 40 per cent of militant manpower actually comes from Pakistan’s public schools and higher educational institutions.

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