what is creative problem solving in psychology

• Creative Problem-Solving
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• First Online: 01 January 2023
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• Gerard J. Puccio 2 ,
• Barry Klarman 2 &
• Pamela A. Szalay 2  

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Life and work in the beginning of the twenty-first century has been described as volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. In this fast changing, innovation-driven environment, Creative Problem-Solving has been identified as a fundamental skill for success. In contrast to routine problem-solving, with straightforward and repeatable solution paths, today’s problems are described as being complex and wicked. To generate the possibilities that can effectively address complex problems, individuals need to draw on the highest level of human thought – creativity. Creative Problem-Solving explicitly draws on, and promotes, effective creative thinking. The purpose of this entry is to describe and distinguish Creative Problem-Solving from other forms of problems-solving. Moreover, as Creative Problem-Solving is a deliberate creativity methodology, this chapter also provides a description of the more specific thinking skills that are embodied by the higher-order skill of creative thinking and are explicitly called on in Creative Problem-Solving. Complex problems require complex thinking, and Creative Problem-Solving provides a structured process that allows individuals to more easily and efficiently deploy their creative thinking skills.

• Complex problem-solving
• Creative thinking
• Solution path

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Puccio, G.J., Klarman, B., Szalay, P.A. (2022). Creative Problem-Solving. In: Glăveanu, V.P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_41

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What Is Creative Problem-Solving & Why Is It Important?

• 01 Feb 2022

One of the biggest hindrances to innovation is complacency—it can be more comfortable to do what you know than venture into the unknown. Business leaders can overcome this barrier by mobilizing creative team members and providing space to innovate.

There are several tools you can use to encourage creativity in the workplace. Creative problem-solving is one of them, which facilitates the development of innovative solutions to difficult problems.

Here’s an overview of creative problem-solving and why it’s important in business.

Access your free e-book today.

What Is Creative Problem-Solving?

Research is necessary when solving a problem. But there are situations where a problem’s specific cause is difficult to pinpoint. This can occur when there’s not enough time to narrow down the problem’s source or there are differing opinions about its root cause.

In such cases, you can use creative problem-solving , which allows you to explore potential solutions regardless of whether a problem has been defined.

Creative problem-solving is less structured than other innovation processes and encourages exploring open-ended solutions. It also focuses on developing new perspectives and fostering creativity in the workplace . Its benefits include:

• Finding creative solutions to complex problems : User research can insufficiently illustrate a situation’s complexity. While other innovation processes rely on this information, creative problem-solving can yield solutions without it.
• Adapting to change : Business is constantly changing, and business leaders need to adapt. Creative problem-solving helps overcome unforeseen challenges and find solutions to unconventional problems.
• Fueling innovation and growth : In addition to solutions, creative problem-solving can spark innovative ideas that drive company growth. These ideas can lead to new product lines, services, or a modified operations structure that improves efficiency.

Creative problem-solving is traditionally based on the following key principles :

1. Balance Divergent and Convergent Thinking

Creative problem-solving uses two primary tools to find solutions: divergence and convergence. Divergence generates ideas in response to a problem, while convergence narrows them down to a shortlist. It balances these two practices and turns ideas into concrete solutions.

2. Reframe Problems as Questions

By framing problems as questions, you shift from focusing on obstacles to solutions. This provides the freedom to brainstorm potential ideas.

3. Defer Judgment of Ideas

When brainstorming, it can be natural to reject or accept ideas right away. Yet, immediate judgments interfere with the idea generation process. Even ideas that seem implausible can turn into outstanding innovations upon further exploration and development.

4. Focus on "Yes, And" Instead of "No, But"

Using negative words like "no" discourages creative thinking. Instead, use positive language to build and maintain an environment that fosters the development of creative and innovative ideas.

Creative Problem-Solving and Design Thinking

Whereas creative problem-solving facilitates developing innovative ideas through a less structured workflow, design thinking takes a far more organized approach.

Design thinking is a human-centered, solutions-based process that fosters the ideation and development of solutions. In the online course Design Thinking and Innovation , Harvard Business School Dean Srikant Datar leverages a four-phase framework to explain design thinking.

The four stages are:

• Clarify: The clarification stage allows you to empathize with the user and identify problems. Observations and insights are informed by thorough research. Findings are then reframed as problem statements or questions.
• Ideate: Ideation is the process of coming up with innovative ideas. The divergence of ideas involved with creative problem-solving is a major focus.
• Develop: In the development stage, ideas evolve into experiments and tests. Ideas converge and are explored through prototyping and open critique.
• Implement: Implementation involves continuing to test and experiment to refine the solution and encourage its adoption.

Creative problem-solving primarily operates in the ideate phase of design thinking but can be applied to others. This is because design thinking is an iterative process that moves between the stages as ideas are generated and pursued. This is normal and encouraged, as innovation requires exploring multiple ideas.

Creative Problem-Solving Tools

While there are many useful tools in the creative problem-solving process, here are three you should know:

Creating a Problem Story

One way to innovate is by creating a story about a problem to understand how it affects users and what solutions best fit their needs. Here are the steps you need to take to use this tool properly.

1. Identify a UDP

Create a problem story to identify the undesired phenomena (UDP). For example, consider a company that produces printers that overheat. In this case, the UDP is "our printers overheat."

2. Move Forward in Time

To move forward in time, ask: “Why is this a problem?” For example, minor damage could be one result of the machines overheating. In more extreme cases, printers may catch fire. Don't be afraid to create multiple problem stories if you think of more than one UDP.

3. Move Backward in Time

To move backward in time, ask: “What caused this UDP?” If you can't identify the root problem, think about what typically causes the UDP to occur. For the overheating printers, overuse could be a cause.

Following the three-step framework above helps illustrate a clear problem story:

• The printer is overused.
• The printer overheats.
• The printer breaks down.

You can extend the problem story in either direction if you think of additional cause-and-effect relationships.

4. Break the Chains

By this point, you’ll have multiple UDP storylines. Take two that are similar and focus on breaking the chains connecting them. This can be accomplished through inversion or neutralization.

• Inversion: Inversion changes the relationship between two UDPs so the cause is the same but the effect is the opposite. For example, if the UDP is "the more X happens, the more likely Y is to happen," inversion changes the equation to "the more X happens, the less likely Y is to happen." Using the printer example, inversion would consider: "What if the more a printer is used, the less likely it’s going to overheat?" Innovation requires an open mind. Just because a solution initially seems unlikely doesn't mean it can't be pursued further or spark additional ideas.
• Neutralization: Neutralization completely eliminates the cause-and-effect relationship between X and Y. This changes the above equation to "the more or less X happens has no effect on Y." In the case of the printers, neutralization would rephrase the relationship to "the more or less a printer is used has no effect on whether it overheats."

Even if creating a problem story doesn't provide a solution, it can offer useful context to users’ problems and additional ideas to be explored. Given that divergence is one of the fundamental practices of creative problem-solving, it’s a good idea to incorporate it into each tool you use.

Brainstorming

Brainstorming is a tool that can be highly effective when guided by the iterative qualities of the design thinking process. It involves openly discussing and debating ideas and topics in a group setting. This facilitates idea generation and exploration as different team members consider the same concept from multiple perspectives.

Hosting brainstorming sessions can result in problems, such as groupthink or social loafing. To combat this, leverage a three-step brainstorming method involving divergence and convergence :

• Have each group member come up with as many ideas as possible and write them down to ensure the brainstorming session is productive.
• Continue the divergence of ideas by collectively sharing and exploring each idea as a group. The goal is to create a setting where new ideas are inspired by open discussion.
• Begin the convergence of ideas by narrowing them down to a few explorable options. There’s no "right number of ideas." Don't be afraid to consider exploring all of them, as long as you have the resources to do so.

Alternate Worlds

The alternate worlds tool is an empathetic approach to creative problem-solving. It encourages you to consider how someone in another world would approach your situation.

For example, if you’re concerned that the printers you produce overheat and catch fire, consider how a different industry would approach the problem. How would an automotive expert solve it? How would a firefighter?

Be creative as you consider and research alternate worlds. The purpose is not to nail down a solution right away but to continue the ideation process through diverging and exploring ideas.

Continue Developing Your Skills

Whether you’re an entrepreneur, marketer, or business leader, learning the ropes of design thinking can be an effective way to build your skills and foster creativity and innovation in any setting.

If you're ready to develop your design thinking and creative problem-solving skills, explore Design Thinking and Innovation , one of our online entrepreneurship and innovation courses. If you aren't sure which course is the right fit, download our free course flowchart to determine which best aligns with your goals.

About the Author

7.3 Problem-Solving

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Describe problem solving strategies
• Define algorithm and heuristic
• Explain some common roadblocks to effective problem solving

   People face problems every day—usually, multiple problems throughout the day. Sometimes these problems are straightforward: To double a recipe for pizza dough, for example, all that is required is that each ingredient in the recipe be doubled. Sometimes, however, the problems we encounter are more complex. For example, say you have a work deadline, and you must mail a printed copy of a report to your supervisor by the end of the business day. The report is time-sensitive and must be sent overnight. You finished the report last night, but your printer will not work today. What should you do? First, you need to identify the problem and then apply a strategy for solving the problem.

The study of human and animal problem solving processes has provided much insight toward the understanding of our conscious experience and led to advancements in computer science and artificial intelligence. Essentially much of cognitive science today represents studies of how we consciously and unconsciously make decisions and solve problems. For instance, when encountered with a large amount of information, how do we go about making decisions about the most efficient way of sorting and analyzing all the information in order to find what you are looking for as in visual search paradigms in cognitive psychology. Or in a situation where a piece of machinery is not working properly, how do we go about organizing how to address the issue and understand what the cause of the problem might be. How do we sort the procedures that will be needed and focus attention on what is important in order to solve problems efficiently. Within this section we will discuss some of these issues and examine processes related to human, animal and computer problem solving.

PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGIES

   When people are presented with a problem—whether it is a complex mathematical problem or a broken printer, how do you solve it? Before finding a solution to the problem, the problem must first be clearly identified. After that, one of many problem solving strategies can be applied, hopefully resulting in a solution.

Problems themselves can be classified into two different categories known as ill-defined and well-defined problems (Schacter, 2009). Ill-defined problems represent issues that do not have clear goals, solution paths, or expected solutions whereas well-defined problems have specific goals, clearly defined solutions, and clear expected solutions. Problem solving often incorporates pragmatics (logical reasoning) and semantics (interpretation of meanings behind the problem), and also in many cases require abstract thinking and creativity in order to find novel solutions. Within psychology, problem solving refers to a motivational drive for reading a definite “goal” from a present situation or condition that is either not moving toward that goal, is distant from it, or requires more complex logical analysis for finding a missing description of conditions or steps toward that goal. Processes relating to problem solving include problem finding also known as problem analysis, problem shaping where the organization of the problem occurs, generating alternative strategies, implementation of attempted solutions, and verification of the selected solution. Various methods of studying problem solving exist within the field of psychology including introspection, behavior analysis and behaviorism, simulation, computer modeling, and experimentation.

A problem-solving strategy is a plan of action used to find a solution. Different strategies have different action plans associated with them (table below). For example, a well-known strategy is trial and error. The old adage, “If at first you don’t succeed, try, try again” describes trial and error. In terms of your broken printer, you could try checking the ink levels, and if that doesn’t work, you could check to make sure the paper tray isn’t jammed. Or maybe the printer isn’t actually connected to your laptop. When using trial and error, you would continue to try different solutions until you solved your problem. Although trial and error is not typically one of the most time-efficient strategies, it is a commonly used one.

   Another type of strategy is an algorithm. An algorithm is a problem-solving formula that provides you with step-by-step instructions used to achieve a desired outcome (Kahneman, 2011). You can think of an algorithm as a recipe with highly detailed instructions that produce the same result every time they are performed. Algorithms are used frequently in our everyday lives, especially in computer science. When you run a search on the Internet, search engines like Google use algorithms to decide which entries will appear first in your list of results. Facebook also uses algorithms to decide which posts to display on your newsfeed. Can you identify other situations in which algorithms are used?

A heuristic is another type of problem solving strategy. While an algorithm must be followed exactly to produce a correct result, a heuristic is a general problem-solving framework (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). You can think of these as mental shortcuts that are used to solve problems. A “rule of thumb” is an example of a heuristic. Such a rule saves the person time and energy when making a decision, but despite its time-saving characteristics, it is not always the best method for making a rational decision. Different types of heuristics are used in different types of situations, but the impulse to use a heuristic occurs when one of five conditions is met (Pratkanis, 1989):

• When one is faced with too much information
• When the time to make a decision is limited
• When the decision to be made is unimportant
• When there is access to very little information to use in making the decision
• When an appropriate heuristic happens to come to mind in the same moment

Working backwards is a useful heuristic in which you begin solving the problem by focusing on the end result. Consider this example: You live in Washington, D.C. and have been invited to a wedding at 4 PM on Saturday in Philadelphia. Knowing that Interstate 95 tends to back up any day of the week, you need to plan your route and time your departure accordingly. If you want to be at the wedding service by 3:30 PM, and it takes 2.5 hours to get to Philadelphia without traffic, what time should you leave your house? You use the working backwards heuristic to plan the events of your day on a regular basis, probably without even thinking about it.

Another useful heuristic is the practice of accomplishing a large goal or task by breaking it into a series of smaller steps. Students often use this common method to complete a large research project or long essay for school. For example, students typically brainstorm, develop a thesis or main topic, research the chosen topic, organize their information into an outline, write a rough draft, revise and edit the rough draft, develop a final draft, organize the references list, and proofread their work before turning in the project. The large task becomes less overwhelming when it is broken down into a series of small steps.

Further problem solving strategies have been identified (listed below) that incorporate flexible and creative thinking in order to reach solutions efficiently.

Additional Problem Solving Strategies :

• Abstraction – refers to solving the problem within a model of the situation before applying it to reality.
• Analogy – is using a solution that solves a similar problem.
• Brainstorming – refers to collecting an analyzing a large amount of solutions, especially within a group of people, to combine the solutions and developing them until an optimal solution is reached.
• Divide and conquer – breaking down large complex problems into smaller more manageable problems.
• Hypothesis testing – method used in experimentation where an assumption about what would happen in response to manipulating an independent variable is made, and analysis of the affects of the manipulation are made and compared to the original hypothesis.
• Lateral thinking – approaching problems indirectly and creatively by viewing the problem in a new and unusual light.
• Means-ends analysis – choosing and analyzing an action at a series of smaller steps to move closer to the goal.
• Method of focal objects – putting seemingly non-matching characteristics of different procedures together to make something new that will get you closer to the goal.
• Morphological analysis – analyzing the outputs of and interactions of many pieces that together make up a whole system.
• Proof – trying to prove that a problem cannot be solved. Where the proof fails becomes the starting point or solving the problem.
• Reduction – adapting the problem to be as similar problems where a solution exists.
• Research – using existing knowledge or solutions to similar problems to solve the problem.
• Root cause analysis – trying to identify the cause of the problem.

The strategies listed above outline a short summary of methods we use in working toward solutions and also demonstrate how the mind works when being faced with barriers preventing goals to be reached.

One example of means-end analysis can be found by using the Tower of Hanoi paradigm . This paradigm can be modeled as a word problems as demonstrated by the Missionary-Cannibal Problem :

Missionary-Cannibal Problem

Three missionaries and three cannibals are on one side of a river and need to cross to the other side. The only means of crossing is a boat, and the boat can only hold two people at a time. Your goal is to devise a set of moves that will transport all six of the people across the river, being in mind the following constraint: The number of cannibals can never exceed the number of missionaries in any location. Remember that someone will have to also row that boat back across each time.

Hint : At one point in your solution, you will have to send more people back to the original side than you just sent to the destination.

The actual Tower of Hanoi problem consists of three rods sitting vertically on a base with a number of disks of different sizes that can slide onto any rod. The puzzle starts with the disks in a neat stack in ascending order of size on one rod, the smallest at the top making a conical shape. The objective of the puzzle is to move the entire stack to another rod obeying the following rules:

• 1. Only one disk can be moved at a time.
• 2. Each move consists of taking the upper disk from one of the stacks and placing it on top of another stack or on an empty rod.
• 3. No disc may be placed on top of a smaller disk.

  Figure 7.02. Steps for solving the Tower of Hanoi in the minimum number of moves when there are 3 disks.

Figure 7.03. Graphical representation of nodes (circles) and moves (lines) of Tower of Hanoi.

The Tower of Hanoi is a frequently used psychological technique to study problem solving and procedure analysis. A variation of the Tower of Hanoi known as the Tower of London has been developed which has been an important tool in the neuropsychological diagnosis of executive function disorders and their treatment.

GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY AND PROBLEM SOLVING

As you may recall from the sensation and perception chapter, Gestalt psychology describes whole patterns, forms and configurations of perception and cognition such as closure, good continuation, and figure-ground. In addition to patterns of perception, Wolfgang Kohler, a German Gestalt psychologist traveled to the Spanish island of Tenerife in order to study animals behavior and problem solving in the anthropoid ape.

As an interesting side note to Kohler’s studies of chimp problem solving, Dr. Ronald Ley, professor of psychology at State University of New York provides evidence in his book A Whisper of Espionage  (1990) suggesting that while collecting data for what would later be his book  The Mentality of Apes (1925) on Tenerife in the Canary Islands between 1914 and 1920, Kohler was additionally an active spy for the German government alerting Germany to ships that were sailing around the Canary Islands. Ley suggests his investigations in England, Germany and elsewhere in Europe confirm that Kohler had served in the German military by building, maintaining and operating a concealed radio that contributed to Germany’s war effort acting as a strategic outpost in the Canary Islands that could monitor naval military activity approaching the north African coast.

While trapped on the island over the course of World War 1, Kohler applied Gestalt principles to animal perception in order to understand how they solve problems. He recognized that the apes on the islands also perceive relations between stimuli and the environment in Gestalt patterns and understand these patterns as wholes as opposed to pieces that make up a whole. Kohler based his theories of animal intelligence on the ability to understand relations between stimuli, and spent much of his time while trapped on the island investigation what he described as  insight , the sudden perception of useful or proper relations. In order to study insight in animals, Kohler would present problems to chimpanzee’s by hanging some banana’s or some kind of food so it was suspended higher than the apes could reach. Within the room, Kohler would arrange a variety of boxes, sticks or other tools the chimpanzees could use by combining in patterns or organizing in a way that would allow them to obtain the food (Kohler & Winter, 1925).

While viewing the chimpanzee’s, Kohler noticed one chimp that was more efficient at solving problems than some of the others. The chimp, named Sultan, was able to use long poles to reach through bars and organize objects in specific patterns to obtain food or other desirables that were originally out of reach. In order to study insight within these chimps, Kohler would remove objects from the room to systematically make the food more difficult to obtain. As the story goes, after removing many of the objects Sultan was used to using to obtain the food, he sat down ad sulked for a while, and then suddenly got up going over to two poles lying on the ground. Without hesitation Sultan put one pole inside the end of the other creating a longer pole that he could use to obtain the food demonstrating an ideal example of what Kohler described as insight. In another situation, Sultan discovered how to stand on a box to reach a banana that was suspended from the rafters illustrating Sultan’s perception of relations and the importance of insight in problem solving.

Grande (another chimp in the group studied by Kohler) builds a three-box structure to reach the bananas, while Sultan watches from the ground.  Insight , sometimes referred to as an “Ah-ha” experience, was the term Kohler used for the sudden perception of useful relations among objects during problem solving (Kohler, 1927; Radvansky & Ashcraft, 2013).

Solving puzzles.

   Problem-solving abilities can improve with practice. Many people challenge themselves every day with puzzles and other mental exercises to sharpen their problem-solving skills. Sudoku puzzles appear daily in most newspapers. Typically, a sudoku puzzle is a 9×9 grid. The simple sudoku below (see figure) is a 4×4 grid. To solve the puzzle, fill in the empty boxes with a single digit: 1, 2, 3, or 4. Here are the rules: The numbers must total 10 in each bolded box, each row, and each column; however, each digit can only appear once in a bolded box, row, and column. Time yourself as you solve this puzzle and compare your time with a classmate.

How long did it take you to solve this sudoku puzzle? (You can see the answer at the end of this section.)

   Here is another popular type of puzzle (figure below) that challenges your spatial reasoning skills. Connect all nine dots with four connecting straight lines without lifting your pencil from the paper:

Did you figure it out? (The answer is at the end of this section.) Once you understand how to crack this puzzle, you won’t forget.

   Take a look at the “Puzzling Scales” logic puzzle below (figure below). Sam Loyd, a well-known puzzle master, created and refined countless puzzles throughout his lifetime (Cyclopedia of Puzzles, n.d.).

What steps did you take to solve this puzzle? You can read the solution at the end of this section.

Pitfalls to problem solving.

   Not all problems are successfully solved, however. What challenges stop us from successfully solving a problem? Albert Einstein once said, “Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result.” Imagine a person in a room that has four doorways. One doorway that has always been open in the past is now locked. The person, accustomed to exiting the room by that particular doorway, keeps trying to get out through the same doorway even though the other three doorways are open. The person is stuck—but she just needs to go to another doorway, instead of trying to get out through the locked doorway. A mental set is where you persist in approaching a problem in a way that has worked in the past but is clearly not working now.

Functional fixedness is a type of mental set where you cannot perceive an object being used for something other than what it was designed for. During the Apollo 13 mission to the moon, NASA engineers at Mission Control had to overcome functional fixedness to save the lives of the astronauts aboard the spacecraft. An explosion in a module of the spacecraft damaged multiple systems. The astronauts were in danger of being poisoned by rising levels of carbon dioxide because of problems with the carbon dioxide filters. The engineers found a way for the astronauts to use spare plastic bags, tape, and air hoses to create a makeshift air filter, which saved the lives of the astronauts.

   Researchers have investigated whether functional fixedness is affected by culture. In one experiment, individuals from the Shuar group in Ecuador were asked to use an object for a purpose other than that for which the object was originally intended. For example, the participants were told a story about a bear and a rabbit that were separated by a river and asked to select among various objects, including a spoon, a cup, erasers, and so on, to help the animals. The spoon was the only object long enough to span the imaginary river, but if the spoon was presented in a way that reflected its normal usage, it took participants longer to choose the spoon to solve the problem. (German & Barrett, 2005). The researchers wanted to know if exposure to highly specialized tools, as occurs with individuals in industrialized nations, affects their ability to transcend functional fixedness. It was determined that functional fixedness is experienced in both industrialized and nonindustrialized cultures (German & Barrett, 2005).

In order to make good decisions, we use our knowledge and our reasoning. Often, this knowledge and reasoning is sound and solid. Sometimes, however, we are swayed by biases or by others manipulating a situation. For example, let’s say you and three friends wanted to rent a house and had a combined target budget of $1,600. The realtor shows you only very run-down houses for $1,600 and then shows you a very nice house for $2,000. Might you ask each person to pay more in rent to get the $2,000 home? Why would the realtor show you the run-down houses and the nice house? The realtor may be challenging your anchoring bias. An anchoring bias occurs when you focus on one piece of information when making a decision or solving a problem. In this case, you’re so focused on the amount of money you are willing to spend that you may not recognize what kinds of houses are available at that price point.

The confirmation bias is the tendency to focus on information that confirms your existing beliefs. For example, if you think that your professor is not very nice, you notice all of the instances of rude behavior exhibited by the professor while ignoring the countless pleasant interactions he is involved in on a daily basis. Hindsight bias leads you to believe that the event you just experienced was predictable, even though it really wasn’t. In other words, you knew all along that things would turn out the way they did. Representative bias describes a faulty way of thinking, in which you unintentionally stereotype someone or something; for example, you may assume that your professors spend their free time reading books and engaging in intellectual conversation, because the idea of them spending their time playing volleyball or visiting an amusement park does not fit in with your stereotypes of professors.

Finally, the availability heuristic is a heuristic in which you make a decision based on an example, information, or recent experience that is that readily available to you, even though it may not be the best example to inform your decision . Biases tend to “preserve that which is already established—to maintain our preexisting knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and hypotheses” (Aronson, 1995; Kahneman, 2011). These biases are summarized in the table below.

Were you able to determine how many marbles are needed to balance the scales in the figure below? You need nine. Were you able to solve the problems in the figures above? Here are the answers.

   Many different strategies exist for solving problems. Typical strategies include trial and error, applying algorithms, and using heuristics. To solve a large, complicated problem, it often helps to break the problem into smaller steps that can be accomplished individually, leading to an overall solution. Roadblocks to problem solving include a mental set, functional fixedness, and various biases that can cloud decision making skills.

References:

Openstax Psychology text by Kathryn Dumper, William Jenkins, Arlene Lacombe, Marilyn Lovett and Marion Perlmutter licensed under CC BY v4.0. https://openstax.org/details/books/psychology

Review Questions:

1. A specific formula for solving a problem is called ________.

a. an algorithm

b. a heuristic

c. a mental set

d. trial and error

2. Solving the Tower of Hanoi problem tends to utilize a  ________ strategy of problem solving.

a. divide and conquer

b. means-end analysis

d. experiment

3. A mental shortcut in the form of a general problem-solving framework is called ________.

4. Which type of bias involves becoming fixated on a single trait of a problem?

a. anchoring bias

b. confirmation bias

c. representative bias

d. availability bias

5. Which type of bias involves relying on a false stereotype to make a decision?

6. Wolfgang Kohler analyzed behavior of chimpanzees by applying Gestalt principles to describe ________.

a. social adjustment

b. student load payment options

c. emotional learning

d. insight learning

7. ________ is a type of mental set where you cannot perceive an object being used for something other than what it was designed for.

a. functional fixedness

c. working memory

Critical Thinking Questions:

1. What is functional fixedness and how can overcoming it help you solve problems?

2. How does an algorithm save you time and energy when solving a problem?

Personal Application Question:

1. Which type of bias do you recognize in your own decision making processes? How has this bias affected how you’ve made decisions in the past and how can you use your awareness of it to improve your decisions making skills in the future?

anchoring bias

availability heuristic

confirmation bias

functional fixedness

hindsight bias

problem-solving strategy

representative bias

trial and error

working backwards

Answers to Exercises

algorithm:  problem-solving strategy characterized by a specific set of instructions

anchoring bias:  faulty heuristic in which you fixate on a single aspect of a problem to find a solution

availability heuristic:  faulty heuristic in which you make a decision based on information readily available to you

confirmation bias:  faulty heuristic in which you focus on information that confirms your beliefs

functional fixedness:  inability to see an object as useful for any other use other than the one for which it was intended

heuristic:  mental shortcut that saves time when solving a problem

hindsight bias:  belief that the event just experienced was predictable, even though it really wasn’t

mental set:  continually using an old solution to a problem without results

problem-solving strategy:  method for solving problems

representative bias:  faulty heuristic in which you stereotype someone or something without a valid basis for your judgment

trial and error:  problem-solving strategy in which multiple solutions are attempted until the correct one is found

working backwards:  heuristic in which you begin to solve a problem by focusing on the end result

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48 Problem Solving

Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, University of California, Santa Barbara

• Published: 03 June 2013
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Problem solving refers to cognitive processing directed at achieving a goal when the problem solver does not initially know a solution method. A problem exists when someone has a goal but does not know how to achieve it. Problems can be classified as routine or nonroutine, and as well defined or ill defined. The major cognitive processes in problem solving are representing, planning, executing, and monitoring. The major kinds of knowledge required for problem solving are facts, concepts, procedures, strategies, and beliefs. Classic theoretical approaches to the study of problem solving are associationism, Gestalt, and information processing. Current issues and suggested future issues include decision making, intelligence and creativity, teaching of thinking skills, expert problem solving, analogical reasoning, mathematical and scientific thinking, everyday thinking, and the cognitive neuroscience of problem solving. Common themes concern the domain specificity of problem solving and a focus on problem solving in authentic contexts.

The study of problem solving begins with defining problem solving, problem, and problem types. This introduction to problem solving is rounded out with an examination of cognitive processes in problem solving, the role of knowledge in problem solving, and historical approaches to the study of problem solving.

Definition of Problem Solving

Problem solving refers to cognitive processing directed at achieving a goal for which the problem solver does not initially know a solution method. This definition consists of four major elements (Mayer, 1992 ; Mayer & Wittrock, 2006 ):

Cognitive —Problem solving occurs within the problem solver’s cognitive system and can only be inferred indirectly from the problem solver’s behavior (including biological changes, introspections, and actions during problem solving). Process —Problem solving involves mental computations in which some operation is applied to a mental representation, sometimes resulting in the creation of a new mental representation. Directed —Problem solving is aimed at achieving a goal. Personal —Problem solving depends on the existing knowledge of the problem solver so that what is a problem for one problem solver may not be a problem for someone who already knows a solution method.

The definition is broad enough to include a wide array of cognitive activities such as deciding which apartment to rent, figuring out how to use a cell phone interface, playing a game of chess, making a medical diagnosis, finding the answer to an arithmetic word problem, or writing a chapter for a handbook. Problem solving is pervasive in human life and is crucial for human survival. Although this chapter focuses on problem solving in humans, problem solving also occurs in nonhuman animals and in intelligent machines.

How is problem solving related to other forms of high-level cognition processing, such as thinking and reasoning? Thinking refers to cognitive processing in individuals but includes both directed thinking (which corresponds to the definition of problem solving) and undirected thinking such as daydreaming (which does not correspond to the definition of problem solving). Thus, problem solving is a type of thinking (i.e., directed thinking).

Reasoning refers to problem solving within specific classes of problems, such as deductive reasoning or inductive reasoning. In deductive reasoning, the reasoner is given premises and must derive a conclusion by applying the rules of logic. For example, given that “A is greater than B” and “B is greater than C,” a reasoner can conclude that “A is greater than C.” In inductive reasoning, the reasoner is given (or has experienced) a collection of examples or instances and must infer a rule. For example, given that X, C, and V are in the “yes” group and x, c, and v are in the “no” group, the reasoning may conclude that B is in “yes” group because it is in uppercase format. Thus, reasoning is a type of problem solving.

Definition of Problem

A problem occurs when someone has a goal but does not know to achieve it. This definition is consistent with how the Gestalt psychologist Karl Duncker ( 1945 , p. 1) defined a problem in his classic monograph, On Problem Solving : “A problem arises when a living creature has a goal but does not know how this goal is to be reached.” However, today researchers recognize that the definition should be extended to include problem solving by intelligent machines. This definition can be clarified using an information processing approach by noting that a problem occurs when a situation is in the given state, the problem solver wants the situation to be in the goal state, and there is no obvious way to move from the given state to the goal state (Newell & Simon, 1972 ). Accordingly, the three main elements in describing a problem are the given state (i.e., the current state of the situation), the goal state (i.e., the desired state of the situation), and the set of allowable operators (i.e., the actions the problem solver is allowed to take). The definition of “problem” is broad enough to include the situation confronting a physician who wishes to make a diagnosis on the basis of preliminary tests and a patient examination, as well as a beginning physics student trying to solve a complex physics problem.

Types of Problems

It is customary in the problem-solving literature to make a distinction between routine and nonroutine problems. Routine problems are problems that are so familiar to the problem solver that the problem solver knows a solution method. For example, for most adults, “What is 365 divided by 12?” is a routine problem because they already know the procedure for long division. Nonroutine problems are so unfamiliar to the problem solver that the problem solver does not know a solution method. For example, figuring out the best way to set up a funding campaign for a nonprofit charity is a nonroutine problem for most volunteers. Technically, routine problems do not meet the definition of problem because the problem solver has a goal but knows how to achieve it. Much research on problem solving has focused on routine problems, although most interesting problems in life are nonroutine.

Another customary distinction is between well-defined and ill-defined problems. Well-defined problems have a clearly specified given state, goal state, and legal operators. Examples include arithmetic computation problems or games such as checkers or tic-tac-toe. Ill-defined problems have a poorly specified given state, goal state, or legal operators, or a combination of poorly defined features. Examples include solving the problem of global warming or finding a life partner. Although, ill-defined problems are more challenging, much research in problem solving has focused on well-defined problems.

Cognitive Processes in Problem Solving

The process of problem solving can be broken down into two main phases: problem representation , in which the problem solver builds a mental representation of the problem situation, and problem solution , in which the problem solver works to produce a solution. The major subprocess in problem representation is representing , which involves building a situation model —that is, a mental representation of the situation described in the problem. The major subprocesses in problem solution are planning , which involves devising a plan for how to solve the problem; executing , which involves carrying out the plan; and monitoring , which involves evaluating and adjusting one’s problem solving.

For example, given an arithmetic word problem such as “Alice has three marbles. Sarah has two more marbles than Alice. How many marbles does Sarah have?” the process of representing involves building a situation model in which Alice has a set of marbles, there is set of marbles for the difference between the two girls, and Sarah has a set of marbles that consists of Alice’s marbles and the difference set. In the planning process, the problem solver sets a goal of adding 3 and 2. In the executing process, the problem solver carries out the computation, yielding an answer of 5. In the monitoring process, the problem solver looks over what was done and concludes that 5 is a reasonable answer. In most complex problem-solving episodes, the four cognitive processes may not occur in linear order, but rather may interact with one another. Although some research focuses mainly on the execution process, problem solvers may tend to have more difficulty with the processes of representing, planning, and monitoring.

Knowledge for Problem Solving

An important theme in problem-solving research is that problem-solving proficiency on any task depends on the learner’s knowledge (Anderson et al., 2001 ; Mayer, 1992 ). Five kinds of knowledge are as follows:

Facts —factual knowledge about the characteristics of elements in the world, such as “Sacramento is the capital of California” Concepts —conceptual knowledge, including categories, schemas, or models, such as knowing the difference between plants and animals or knowing how a battery works Procedures —procedural knowledge of step-by-step processes, such as how to carry out long-division computations Strategies —strategic knowledge of general methods such as breaking a problem into parts or thinking of a related problem Beliefs —attitudinal knowledge about how one’s cognitive processing works such as thinking, “I’m good at this”

Although some research focuses mainly on the role of facts and procedures in problem solving, complex problem solving also depends on the problem solver’s concepts, strategies, and beliefs (Mayer, 1992 ).

Historical Approaches to Problem Solving

Psychological research on problem solving began in the early 1900s, as an outgrowth of mental philosophy (Humphrey, 1963 ; Mandler & Mandler, 1964 ). Throughout the 20th century four theoretical approaches developed: early conceptions, associationism, Gestalt psychology, and information processing.

Early Conceptions

The start of psychology as a science can be set at 1879—the year Wilhelm Wundt opened the first world’s psychology laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, and sought to train the world’s first cohort of experimental psychologists. Instead of relying solely on philosophical speculations about how the human mind works, Wundt sought to apply the methods of experimental science to issues addressed in mental philosophy. His theoretical approach became structuralism —the analysis of consciousness into its basic elements.

Wundt’s main contribution to the study of problem solving, however, was to call for its banishment. According to Wundt, complex cognitive processing was too complicated to be studied by experimental methods, so “nothing can be discovered in such experiments” (Wundt, 1911/1973 ). Despite his admonishments, however, a group of his former students began studying thinking mainly in Wurzburg, Germany. Using the method of introspection, subjects were asked to describe their thought process as they solved word association problems, such as finding the superordinate of “newspaper” (e.g., an answer is “publication”). Although the Wurzburg group—as they came to be called—did not produce a new theoretical approach, they found empirical evidence that challenged some of the key assumptions of mental philosophy. For example, Aristotle had proclaimed that all thinking involves mental imagery, but the Wurzburg group was able to find empirical evidence for imageless thought .

Associationism

The first major theoretical approach to take hold in the scientific study of problem solving was associationism —the idea that the cognitive representations in the mind consist of ideas and links between them and that cognitive processing in the mind involves following a chain of associations from one idea to the next (Mandler & Mandler, 1964 ; Mayer, 1992 ). For example, in a classic study, E. L. Thorndike ( 1911 ) placed a hungry cat in what he called a puzzle box—a wooden crate in which pulling a loop of string that hung from overhead would open a trap door to allow the cat to escape to a bowl of food outside the crate. Thorndike placed the cat in the puzzle box once a day for several weeks. On the first day, the cat engaged in many extraneous behaviors such as pouncing against the wall, pushing its paws through the slats, and meowing, but on successive days the number of extraneous behaviors tended to decrease. Overall, the time required to get out of the puzzle box decreased over the course of the experiment, indicating the cat was learning how to escape.

Thorndike’s explanation for how the cat learned to solve the puzzle box problem is based on an associationist view: The cat begins with a habit family hierarchy —a set of potential responses (e.g., pouncing, thrusting, meowing, etc.) all associated with the same stimulus (i.e., being hungry and confined) and ordered in terms of strength of association. When placed in the puzzle box, the cat executes its strongest response (e.g., perhaps pouncing against the wall), but when it fails, the strength of the association is weakened, and so on for each unsuccessful action. Eventually, the cat gets down to what was initially a weak response—waving its paw in the air—but when that response leads to accidentally pulling the string and getting out, it is strengthened. Over the course of many trials, the ineffective responses become weak and the successful response becomes strong. Thorndike refers to this process as the law of effect : Responses that lead to dissatisfaction become less associated with the situation and responses that lead to satisfaction become more associated with the situation. According to Thorndike’s associationist view, solving a problem is simply a matter of trial and error and accidental success. A major challenge to assocationist theory concerns the nature of transfer—that is, where does a problem solver find a creative solution that has never been performed before? Associationist conceptions of cognition can be seen in current research, including neural networks, connectionist models, and parallel distributed processing models (Rogers & McClelland, 2004 ).

Gestalt Psychology

The Gestalt approach to problem solving developed in the 1930s and 1940s as a counterbalance to the associationist approach. According to the Gestalt approach, cognitive representations consist of coherent structures (rather than individual associations) and the cognitive process of problem solving involves building a coherent structure (rather than strengthening and weakening of associations). For example, in a classic study, Kohler ( 1925 ) placed a hungry ape in a play yard that contained several empty shipping crates and a banana attached overhead but out of reach. Based on observing the ape in this situation, Kohler noted that the ape did not randomly try responses until one worked—as suggested by Thorndike’s associationist view. Instead, the ape stood under the banana, looked up at it, looked at the crates, and then in a flash of insight stacked the crates under the bananas as a ladder, and walked up the steps in order to reach the banana.

According to Kohler, the ape experienced a sudden visual reorganization in which the elements in the situation fit together in a way to solve the problem; that is, the crates could become a ladder that reduces the distance to the banana. Kohler referred to the underlying mechanism as insight —literally seeing into the structure of the situation. A major challenge of Gestalt theory is its lack of precision; for example, naming a process (i.e., insight) is not the same as explaining how it works. Gestalt conceptions can be seen in modern research on mental models and schemas (Gentner & Stevens, 1983 ).

Information Processing

The information processing approach to problem solving developed in the 1960s and 1970s and was based on the influence of the computer metaphor—the idea that humans are processors of information (Mayer, 2009 ). According to the information processing approach, problem solving involves a series of mental computations—each of which consists of applying a process to a mental representation (such as comparing two elements to determine whether they differ).

In their classic book, Human Problem Solving , Newell and Simon ( 1972 ) proposed that problem solving involved a problem space and search heuristics . A problem space is a mental representation of the initial state of the problem, the goal state of the problem, and all possible intervening states (based on applying allowable operators). Search heuristics are strategies for moving through the problem space from the given to the goal state. Newell and Simon focused on means-ends analysis , in which the problem solver continually sets goals and finds moves to accomplish goals.

Newell and Simon used computer simulation as a research method to test their conception of human problem solving. First, they asked human problem solvers to think aloud as they solved various problems such as logic problems, chess, and cryptarithmetic problems. Then, based on an information processing analysis, Newell and Simon created computer programs that solved these problems. In comparing the solution behavior of humans and computers, they found high similarity, suggesting that the computer programs were solving problems using the same thought processes as humans.

An important advantage of the information processing approach is that problem solving can be described with great clarity—as a computer program. An important limitation of the information processing approach is that it is most useful for describing problem solving for well-defined problems rather than ill-defined problems. The information processing conception of cognition lives on as a keystone of today’s cognitive science (Mayer, 2009 ).

Classic Issues in Problem Solving

Three classic issues in research on problem solving concern the nature of transfer (suggested by the associationist approach), the nature of insight (suggested by the Gestalt approach), and the role of problem-solving heuristics (suggested by the information processing approach).

Transfer refers to the effects of prior learning on new learning (or new problem solving). Positive transfer occurs when learning A helps someone learn B. Negative transfer occurs when learning A hinders someone from learning B. Neutral transfer occurs when learning A has no effect on learning B. Positive transfer is a central goal of education, but research shows that people often do not transfer what they learned to solving problems in new contexts (Mayer, 1992 ; Singley & Anderson, 1989 ).

Three conceptions of the mechanisms underlying transfer are specific transfer , general transfer , and specific transfer of general principles . Specific transfer refers to the idea that learning A will help someone learn B only if A and B have specific elements in common. For example, learning Spanish may help someone learn Latin because some of the vocabulary words are similar and the verb conjugation rules are similar. General transfer refers to the idea that learning A can help someone learn B even they have nothing specifically in common but A helps improve the learner’s mind in general. For example, learning Latin may help people learn “proper habits of mind” so they are better able to learn completely unrelated subjects as well. Specific transfer of general principles is the idea that learning A will help someone learn B if the same general principle or solution method is required for both even if the specific elements are different.

In a classic study, Thorndike and Woodworth ( 1901 ) found that students who learned Latin did not subsequently learn bookkeeping any better than students who had not learned Latin. They interpreted this finding as evidence for specific transfer—learning A did not transfer to learning B because A and B did not have specific elements in common. Modern research on problem-solving transfer continues to show that people often do not demonstrate general transfer (Mayer, 1992 ). However, it is possible to teach people a general strategy for solving a problem, so that when they see a new problem in a different context they are able to apply the strategy to the new problem (Judd, 1908 ; Mayer, 2008 )—so there is also research support for the idea of specific transfer of general principles.

Insight refers to a change in a problem solver’s mind from not knowing how to solve a problem to knowing how to solve it (Mayer, 1995 ; Metcalfe & Wiebe, 1987 ). In short, where does the idea for a creative solution come from? A central goal of problem-solving research is to determine the mechanisms underlying insight.

The search for insight has led to five major (but not mutually exclusive) explanatory mechanisms—insight as completing a schema, insight as suddenly reorganizing visual information, insight as reformulation of a problem, insight as removing mental blocks, and insight as finding a problem analog (Mayer, 1995 ). Completing a schema is exemplified in a study by Selz (Fridja & de Groot, 1982 ), in which people were asked to think aloud as they solved word association problems such as “What is the superordinate for newspaper?” To solve the problem, people sometimes thought of a coordinate, such as “magazine,” and then searched for a superordinate category that subsumed both terms, such as “publication.” According to Selz, finding a solution involved building a schema that consisted of a superordinate and two subordinate categories.

Reorganizing visual information is reflected in Kohler’s ( 1925 ) study described in a previous section in which a hungry ape figured out how to stack boxes as a ladder to reach a banana hanging above. According to Kohler, the ape looked around the yard and found the solution in a flash of insight by mentally seeing how the parts could be rearranged to accomplish the goal.

Reformulating a problem is reflected in a classic study by Duncker ( 1945 ) in which people are asked to think aloud as they solve the tumor problem—how can you destroy a tumor in a patient without destroying surrounding healthy tissue by using rays that at sufficient intensity will destroy any tissue in their path? In analyzing the thinking-aloud protocols—that is, transcripts of what the problem solvers said—Duncker concluded that people reformulated the goal in various ways (e.g., avoid contact with healthy tissue, immunize healthy tissue, have ray be weak in healthy tissue) until they hit upon a productive formulation that led to the solution (i.e., concentrating many weak rays on the tumor).

Removing mental blocks is reflected in classic studies by Duncker ( 1945 ) in which solving a problem involved thinking of a novel use for an object, and by Luchins ( 1942 ) in which solving a problem involved not using a procedure that had worked well on previous problems. Finding a problem analog is reflected in classic research by Wertheimer ( 1959 ) in which learning to find the area of a parallelogram is supported by the insight that one could cut off the triangle on one side and place it on the other side to form a rectangle—so a parallelogram is really a rectangle in disguise. The search for insight along each of these five lines continues in current problem-solving research.

Heuristics are problem-solving strategies, that is, general approaches to how to solve problems. Newell and Simon ( 1972 ) suggested three general problem-solving heuristics for moving from a given state to a goal state: random trial and error , hill climbing , and means-ends analysis . Random trial and error involves randomly selecting a legal move and applying it to create a new problem state, and repeating that process until the goal state is reached. Random trial and error may work for simple problems but is not efficient for complex ones. Hill climbing involves selecting the legal move that moves the problem solver closer to the goal state. Hill climbing will not work for problems in which the problem solver must take a move that temporarily moves away from the goal as is required in many problems.

Means-ends analysis involves creating goals and seeking moves that can accomplish the goal. If a goal cannot be directly accomplished, a subgoal is created to remove one or more obstacles. Newell and Simon ( 1972 ) successfully used means-ends analysis as the search heuristic in a computer program aimed at general problem solving, that is, solving a diverse collection of problems. However, people may also use specific heuristics that are designed to work for specific problem-solving situations (Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999 ; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984 ).

Current and Future Issues in Problem Solving

Eight current issues in problem solving involve decision making, intelligence and creativity, teaching of thinking skills, expert problem solving, analogical reasoning, mathematical and scientific problem solving, everyday thinking, and the cognitive neuroscience of problem solving.

Decision Making

Decision making refers to the cognitive processing involved in choosing between two or more alternatives (Baron, 2000 ; Markman & Medin, 2002 ). For example, a decision-making task may involve choosing between getting $240 for sure or having a 25% change of getting $1000. According to economic theories such as expected value theory, people should chose the second option, which is worth $250 (i.e., .25 x $1000) rather than the first option, which is worth $240 (1.00 x $240), but psychological research shows that most people prefer the first option (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984 ).

Research on decision making has generated three classes of theories (Markman & Medin, 2002 ): descriptive theories, such as prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky), which are based on the ideas that people prefer to overweight the cost of a loss and tend to overestimate small probabilities; heuristic theories, which are based on the idea that people use a collection of short-cut strategies such as the availability heuristic (Gigerenzer et al., 1999 ; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000 ); and constructive theories, such as mental accounting (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000 ), in which people build a narrative to justify their choices to themselves. Future research is needed to examine decision making in more realistic settings.

Intelligence and Creativity

Although researchers do not have complete consensus on the definition of intelligence (Sternberg, 1990 ), it is reasonable to view intelligence as the ability to learn or adapt to new situations. Fluid intelligence refers to the potential to solve problems without any relevant knowledge, whereas crystallized intelligence refers to the potential to solve problems based on relevant prior knowledge (Sternberg & Gregorenko, 2003 ). As people gain more experience in a field, their problem-solving performance depends more on crystallized intelligence (i.e., domain knowledge) than on fluid intelligence (i.e., general ability) (Sternberg & Gregorenko, 2003 ). The ability to monitor and manage one’s cognitive processing during problem solving—which can be called metacognition —is an important aspect of intelligence (Sternberg, 1990 ). Research is needed to pinpoint the knowledge that is needed to support intelligent performance on problem-solving tasks.

Creativity refers to the ability to generate ideas that are original (i.e., other people do not think of the same idea) and functional (i.e., the idea works; Sternberg, 1999 ). Creativity is often measured using tests of divergent thinking —that is, generating as many solutions as possible for a problem (Guilford, 1967 ). For example, the uses test asks people to list as many uses as they can think of for a brick. Creativity is different from intelligence, and it is at the heart of creative problem solving—generating a novel solution to a problem that the problem solver has never seen before. An important research question concerns whether creative problem solving depends on specific knowledge or creativity ability in general.

Teaching of Thinking Skills

How can people learn to be better problem solvers? Mayer ( 2008 ) proposes four questions concerning teaching of thinking skills:

What to teach —Successful programs attempt to teach small component skills (such as how to generate and evaluate hypotheses) rather than improve the mind as a single monolithic skill (Covington, Crutchfield, Davies, & Olton, 1974 ). How to teach —Successful programs focus on modeling the process of problem solving rather than solely reinforcing the product of problem solving (Bloom & Broder, 1950 ). Where to teach —Successful programs teach problem-solving skills within the specific context they will be used rather than within a general course on how to solve problems (Nickerson, 1999 ). When to teach —Successful programs teaching higher order skills early rather than waiting until lower order skills are completely mastered (Tharp & Gallimore, 1988 ).

Overall, research on teaching of thinking skills points to the domain specificity of problem solving; that is, successful problem solving depends on the problem solver having domain knowledge that is relevant to the problem-solving task.

Expert Problem Solving

Research on expertise is concerned with differences between how experts and novices solve problems (Ericsson, Feltovich, & Hoffman, 2006 ). Expertise can be defined in terms of time (e.g., 10 years of concentrated experience in a field), performance (e.g., earning a perfect score on an assessment), or recognition (e.g., receiving a Nobel Prize or becoming Grand Master in chess). For example, in classic research conducted in the 1940s, de Groot ( 1965 ) found that chess experts did not have better general memory than chess novices, but they did have better domain-specific memory for the arrangement of chess pieces on the board. Chase and Simon ( 1973 ) replicated this result in a better controlled experiment. An explanation is that experts have developed schemas that allow them to chunk collections of pieces into a single configuration.

In another landmark study, Larkin et al. ( 1980 ) compared how experts (e.g., physics professors) and novices (e.g., first-year physics students) solved textbook physics problems about motion. Experts tended to work forward from the given information to the goal, whereas novices tended to work backward from the goal to the givens using a means-ends analysis strategy. Experts tended to store their knowledge in an integrated way, whereas novices tended to store their knowledge in isolated fragments. In another study, Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser ( 1981 ) found that experts tended to focus on the underlying physics concepts (such as conservation of energy), whereas novices tended to focus on the surface features of the problem (such as inclined planes or springs). Overall, research on expertise is useful in pinpointing what experts know that is different from what novices know. An important theme is that experts rely on domain-specific knowledge rather than solely general cognitive ability.

Analogical Reasoning

Analogical reasoning occurs when people solve one problem by using their knowledge about another problem (Holyoak, 2005 ). For example, suppose a problem solver learns how to solve a problem in one context using one solution method and then is given a problem in another context that requires the same solution method. In this case, the problem solver must recognize that the new problem has structural similarity to the old problem (i.e., it may be solved by the same method), even though they do not have surface similarity (i.e., the cover stories are different). Three steps in analogical reasoning are recognizing —seeing that a new problem is similar to a previously solved problem; abstracting —finding the general method used to solve the old problem; and mapping —using that general method to solve the new problem.

Research on analogical reasoning shows that people often do not recognize that a new problem can be solved by the same method as a previously solved problem (Holyoak, 2005 ). However, research also shows that successful analogical transfer to a new problem is more likely when the problem solver has experience with two old problems that have the same underlying structural features (i.e., they are solved by the same principle) but different surface features (i.e., they have different cover stories) (Holyoak, 2005 ). This finding is consistent with the idea of specific transfer of general principles as described in the section on “Transfer.”

Mathematical and Scientific Problem Solving

Research on mathematical problem solving suggests that five kinds of knowledge are needed to solve arithmetic word problems (Mayer, 2008 ):

Factual knowledge —knowledge about the characteristics of problem elements, such as knowing that there are 100 cents in a dollar Schematic knowledge —knowledge of problem types, such as being able to recognize time-rate-distance problems Strategic knowledge —knowledge of general methods, such as how to break a problem into parts Procedural knowledge —knowledge of processes, such as how to carry our arithmetic operations Attitudinal knowledge —beliefs about one’s mathematical problem-solving ability, such as thinking, “I am good at this”

People generally possess adequate procedural knowledge but may have difficulty in solving mathematics problems because they lack factual, schematic, strategic, or attitudinal knowledge (Mayer, 2008 ). Research is needed to pinpoint the role of domain knowledge in mathematical problem solving.

Research on scientific problem solving shows that people harbor misconceptions, such as believing that a force is needed to keep an object in motion (McCloskey, 1983 ). Learning to solve science problems involves conceptual change, in which the problem solver comes to recognize that previous conceptions are wrong (Mayer, 2008 ). Students can be taught to engage in scientific reasoning such as hypothesis testing through direct instruction in how to control for variables (Chen & Klahr, 1999 ). A central theme of research on scientific problem solving concerns the role of domain knowledge.

Everyday Thinking

Everyday thinking refers to problem solving in the context of one’s life outside of school. For example, children who are street vendors tend to use different procedures for solving arithmetic problems when they are working on the streets than when they are in school (Nunes, Schlieman, & Carraher, 1993 ). This line of research highlights the role of situated cognition —the idea that thinking always is shaped by the physical and social context in which it occurs (Robbins & Aydede, 2009 ). Research is needed to determine how people solve problems in authentic contexts.

Cognitive Neuroscience of Problem Solving

The cognitive neuroscience of problem solving is concerned with the brain activity that occurs during problem solving. For example, using fMRI brain imaging methodology, Goel ( 2005 ) found that people used the language areas of the brain to solve logical reasoning problems presented in sentences (e.g., “All dogs are pets…”) and used the spatial areas of the brain to solve logical reasoning problems presented in abstract letters (e.g., “All D are P…”). Cognitive neuroscience holds the potential to make unique contributions to the study of problem solving.

Problem solving has always been a topic at the fringe of cognitive psychology—too complicated to study intensively but too important to completely ignore. Problem solving—especially in realistic environments—is messy in comparison to studying elementary processes in cognition. The field remains fragmented in the sense that topics such as decision making, reasoning, intelligence, expertise, mathematical problem solving, everyday thinking, and the like are considered to be separate topics, each with its own separate literature. Yet some recurring themes are the role of domain-specific knowledge in problem solving and the advantages of studying problem solving in authentic contexts.

Future Directions

Some important issues for future research include the three classic issues examined in this chapter—the nature of problem-solving transfer (i.e., How are people able to use what they know about previous problem solving to help them in new problem solving?), the nature of insight (e.g., What is the mechanism by which a creative solution is constructed?), and heuristics (e.g., What are some teachable strategies for problem solving?). In addition, future research in problem solving should continue to pinpoint the role of domain-specific knowledge in problem solving, the nature of cognitive ability in problem solving, how to help people develop proficiency in solving problems, and how to provide aids for problem solving.

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Sternberg, R. J. , & Ben-Zeev, T. ( 2001 ). Complex cognition: The psychology of human thought . New York: Oxford University Press.

Weisberg, R. W. ( 2006 ). Creativity . New York: Wiley.

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MINI REVIEW article

The creative brain under stress: considerations for performance in extreme environments.

• 1 Human Effectiveness Section, Toronto Research Centre, Defence Research and Development Canada, Toronto, ON, Canada
• 2 Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
• 3 Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
• 4 Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada

Over the last 2 decades, we have begun to gain traction on the neural systems that support creative cognition. Specifically, a converging body of evidence from various domains has demonstrated that creativity arises from the interaction of two large-scale systems in the brain: Whereas the default network (DN) is involved in internally-oriented generation of novel concepts, the executive control network (ECN) exerts top-down control over that generative process to select task-appropriate output. In addition, the salience network (SN) regulates switching between those networks in the course of creative cognition. In contrast, we know much less about the workings of these large-scale systems in support of creativity under extreme conditions, although that is beginning to change. Specifically, there is growing evidence from systems neuroscience to demonstrate that the functioning and connectivity of DN, ECN, and SN are influenced by stress – findings that can be used to improve our understanding of the behavioral effects of stress on creativity. Toward that end, we review findings from the neuroscience of creativity, behavioral research on the impact of stress on creativity, and the systems-level view of the brain under stress to suggest ways in which creativity might be affected under extreme conditions. Although our focus is largely on acute stress, we also touch on the possible impact of chronic stress on creative cognition.

Introduction

Human beings not only work under optimal conditions, but also under stressful conditions that require physical and psychological resilience for survival, performance, and growth ( Suedfeld and Steel, 2000 ). There is indeed a large scientific literature on the impact of stress on psychological and physiological functioning, but it is only recently that this work has begun to focus on the impact of stress on large-scale networks in the brain, including their functional connectivity ( Hermans et al., 2014 ; van Oort et al., 2017 ; see also Menon, 2011 ). The overarching aim of this manuscript is to review this nascent literature in an effort to improve our understanding of the impact of extreme environments – specifically those that cause stress – on creativity. This is made possible by virtue of the fact that the three large-scale networks in the brain that are impacted by stress are also precisely the ones that have begun to shape our understanding of the emergence of creative ideas in the neuroscience of creativity ( Beaty et al., 2016 ). Toward that end, we will begin by reviewing our current understanding of the neuroscience of creativity, before moving to a discussion of the impact of stress on the functioning and connectivity of large-scale networks in the brain. In the process, we will selectively review the behavioral literature on the impact of stress on creativity. We hope that this exercise will improve our understanding of the behavioral effects of stress on creativity, by revealing the key neural systems and their interactions that could mediate that link.

Neuroscience of Creativity: a Brief Historical Tour

Although electrophysiological studies of the neurological bases of creativity can be traced back to Martindale’s pioneering research five decades ago (e.g., Martindale and Hines, 1975 ), it was with the advent of modern neuroimaging techniques around the turn of the century that our understanding of the neuroscience of creativity has blossomed (for reviews, see Vartanian et al., 2013 ; Abraham, 2018 ; Jung and Vartanian, 2018 ). Much of the early exploratory work in this area was motivated by brain mapping approaches, and typically focused on discovering single, isolated brain regions that might underlie the generation of novel and useful thoughts. The tasks varied widely, including creative story generation, open-ended problem solving, drawing, divergent thinking, finding pragmatic links between incoherent sentences, and analogy and metaphor, to name a few. In addition, there was equal if not more variability in the neuroimaging methodologies used to study the brain, each of which was characterized by its own intricate analytic workflow, signal-to-noise ratio, and temporal and spatial resolution. As such, the early results were characterized by high levels of variability and inconsistency (for reviews, see Arden et al., 2010 ; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010 ).

Soon, however, a number of quantitative meta-analyses of this literature followed, which demonstrated an altogether different picture of the creative brain at work ( Vartanian, 2012 ; Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013 ; Boccia et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2015 ; see also Cogdell-Brooke et al., 2020 ). These meta-analyses illustrated two points: First, there is no single brain region that drives creativity. Rather, the entire brain contributes to creative cognition. Second, and critically, the neural correlates of creativity are process-specific and domain-specific. For example, there are dissociable neural regions that contribute to creativity in the verbal vs. non-verbal (spatial) vs. musical domains ( Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013 ; Boccia et al., 2015 ). Similarly, there are dissociable neural regions that contribute to processes related to creativity such as analogy vs. metaphor ( Vartanian, 2012 ), as well as creativity tasks that involve generation vs. combination of ideas ( Gonen-Yaacovi et al., 2013 ). As is the case with other higher-order constructs such as reasoning ( Goel, 2007 ; Prado et al., 2011 ), this early body of work demonstrated that creativity is hierarchical and componential, and emerges from the flexible and dynamic reconfiguration of brain regions that contribute to its various instantiations. This picture is consistent with componential models of creativity ( Amabile, 2012 ) and problem solving ( Sternberg, 1980 ), according to which higher-order cognitive abilities are decomposable into specific sub-processes (e.g., semantic memory, attention, etc.). As such, brain regions that exhibit a degree of functional specificity in relation to those sub-processes contribute to the types of creativity that draw on those functions.

Neuroscience of Creativity: From Regions to Networks

A significant shift in the neuroscience of creativity occurred when researchers began to focus on the contribution of large-scale networks rather than isolated brain regions to the emergence of creative thoughts. Those networks were initially discovered using the technique of resting-state connectivity, based on which one can identify brain regions that exhibit similar patterns of fMRI activity fluctuations, and can therefore be grouped into large-scale brain systems called “networks” ( Zabelina and Andrews-Hanna, 2016 ). In other words, at any given time, regions within the same network (e.g., visual, language, somatomotor, etc.) are likely to exhibit correlated activity when the individual is engaged in a task or at rest (i.e., not engaged in a task). It is important to note that the seven large-scale networks that have been identified to date also exhibit differing patterns of between-network connectivity ( Lee et al., 2012 ). These patterns of between-network connectivity can be conceptualized better when we consider that, despite their functional differences, some networks can work together to support the same type of cognition. For example, when the individual is engaged in externally-oriented cognition (i.e., responding to stimuli in the external world), the visual, somatomotor, and dorsal attention networks show high levels of between-network connectivity ( Yeo et al., 2011 ; Buckner et al., 2013 ). This makes sense, given that in many circumstances such externally-oriented cognition requires one to attend to and process sensory input.

Important for creativity researchers, a growing body of evidence has emerged to demonstrate that novel ideas emerge as a function of the dynamic interaction of the default network (DN) and the executive control network (ECN) in the brain ( Beaty et al., 2016 ). Regions within DN are more active during task-unrelated thought than during task-related thought, and frequently come online during episodes of mind wandering, daydreaming, and imagination ( Christoff et al., 2016 ; Raffaelli et al., 2020 ). In contrast, ECN is activated when the individual is engaged in tasks that require cognitive control. In most instances, DN and ECN activities are negatively correlated because individuals tend to be engaged in either task-related thought that necessitates cognitive control or task-unrelated thought that is not under top-down regulation. What is remarkable about creativity is that it represents a form of thinking that is supported by the dynamic interaction of these two modes of thought. Specifically, in the early phase of creative problem solving, when internally-oriented thoughts support idea generation, DN is relatively more active. In turn, in the later phases of creative problem solving, when the generated ideas are pruned to satisfy task demands, ECN is also engaged to exert top-down control to select appropriate output. Interestingly, aside from supporting goal-directed memory retrieval and inhibition of prepotent responses that represent some of its core functions, ECN may also facilitate internal orientation by shifting attention away from sensory input toward internally-generated thought processes carried out by DN ( Benedek et al., 2016 ; Beaty et al., 2019 ; Figure 1 ).

Figure 1 . Cognitive mechanisms of brain network interactions during creative cognition. DN, default-mode network; ECN, executive control network; VN, visual network. Adapted with permission from Beaty et al. (2019) .

An important early study that laid the groundwork for this interactive model was conducted by Ellamil et al. (2012) , who presented design students with short verbal descriptions of the contents of books while in the fMRI scanner, and then instructed them to design book covers to represent them. In the generation phase, the participants drew and/or wrote down their ideas using an MRI-compatible tablet, whereas in the evaluation phase, they assessed the quality of their ideas and productions. During generation there was greater activation in DN, specifically the hippocampus. This is consistent with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, according to which memory and imagination involve flexible recombination of episodic details (e.g., people, places, and events; Schacter and Addis, 2007 ; Beaty, 2020 ). In other words, as we generate new ideas using imagination, it is likely that we mine our episodic memory to locate and flexibly recombine episodic details to support novel ideation. In turn, during evaluation not only was there activation in DN, but also additional activation in ECN, most notably in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex that plays an important role in cognitive control. Additional analysis demonstrated that there was greater functional connectivity between DN and ECN during the evaluation phase, suggesting that there is close communication between those networks in the later stages of creative thinking when cognitive control is applied on the contents of generated ideas for their evaluation. Since then, data from several studies including musical improvisation ( Pinho et al., 2016 ) and poetry composition ( Liu et al., 2015 ) have also shown dynamic coupling between DN and ECN – interpreted to reflect the spontaneous generation of ideas derived from long-term memory and the evaluation of those ideas to meet specific task goals, respectively. Using dynamic causal modeling, Vartanian et al. (2018) have recently shown that ECN exerts unidirectional control over the activation of DN regions in the course of divergent thinking, supporting the causal model that underlies their interaction.

Beaty et al. (2015) used whole-brain functional connectivity analysis to highlight a network of brain regions associated with divergent thinking. This study was important because beyond DN and ECN, it also focused on the salience network (SN). SN has an important role to play in many types of higher-order cognition because it is involved in the detection and allocation of attention and neural resources to behaviorally relevant (i.e., salient) stimuli ( Bressler and Menon, 2010 ; Menon and Uddin, 2010 ; Uddin, 2015 ). In this role, it can trigger the engagement of other networks based on their relevance to the task at hand. Analyses of Beaty et al. (2015) revealed that the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) – a region that lies within the DN – exhibits increased functional coupling with ECN regions including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, as well as regions within SN such as the bilateral insula. Then, using dynamic functional connectivity analysis conducted in the course of engagement with the Alternate Uses Task, Beaty et al. (2015) demonstrated that the time-course of the coupling between the PCC and regions within SN and ECN varies as a function of the phase of the task. Specifically, the PCC showed early coupling with the insula and later coupling with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. There is evidence to show that one of the roles of SN is to facilitate switches between DN and ECN ( Cocchi et al., 2013 ). As such, its involvement in divergent thinking could be to facilitate later coupling between DN and ECN.

Building on this work, Beaty et al. (2018) used connectome-based predictive modeling (CPM) – a machine learning algorithm for identifying functional connections in the brain that predict behavioral traits – to demonstrate that creative people are characterized by stronger functional connections between DN, ECN, and SN, and that this specific pattern of connectivity predicted their creativity scores. Interestingly, this dynamic interplay between DN and ECN has also been shown to be the case based on resting-state data, when people are not engaged in a task. Specifically, Beaty et al. (2014) reported that compared to less creative people, more creative people exhibit stronger DN-ECN coupling during rest, suggesting that at a fundamental neurological level more and less creative people may be distinguished by stable functional differences involving the coupling of key regions involved in creative cognition.

Stress and Creativity: Behavioral Effects

It is generally assumed that stress has a detrimental effect on creativity. This assumption is not unreasonable: given that in the immediate aftermath of stress, physiological, and cognitive resources are reallocated to promote vigilance and survival ( Hermans et al., 2014 ), it is likely that higher-order cognitive capacities that would otherwise support creative cognition would be shifted to meet those more urgent needs. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that stress has a negative impact on processes related to creativity, including task switching and cognitive flexibility ( Steinhauser et al., 2007 ; Plessow et al., 2011 , 2012 ). However, the impact of stress on creativity is not necessarily and universally negative, and depends in part on how stress-inducing the stressor is perceived to be, and the type of stress that is induced. For example, Byron et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis of 76 experimental studies that had examined the impact of stress on creativity demonstrated that uncontrollable stress leads to worse performance on creativity tasks, where uncontrollability was defined as the extent to which an individual believes that one’s actions can affect outcomes ( Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004 ). In addition, they found that whereas high social-evaluative threats decreased creative performance, low social-evaluative contexts increased creative performance, where social-evaluative threats were considered to “occur when an aspect of self is or [can] be negatively judged by others” ( Dickerson and Kemeny, 2004 , p. 361). Thus, it appears that stress impacts creativity, but not necessarily in negative ways. Importantly, the findings are broadly consistent with appraisal models of stress (e.g., Lazarus and Folkman, 1984 ), according to which one’s perception of the stress and individual differences that underlie vulnerabilities to those stressors are important factors that influence the stress-creativity relationship.

The Brain Under Stress: a Network View

At this point, we will consider how our knowledge of the workings of the brain can shed light on the impact of stress on creativity. Until recently this would have been difficult to do because with the exception of a few studies (e.g., Vartanian et al., 2014 ), we know very little about how the functioning of the creative brain is affected by various stressors. Fortuitously, however, we are now in a position to consider this question because a growing body of evidence from systems neuroscience has demonstrated that the three systems that support the emergence of creative thought under normal conditions are precisely the three systems whose functioning and connectivity is impacted by stress (for reviews, see Hermans et al., 2014 ; van Oort et al., 2017 ; see also Menon, 2011 ; Figure 2 ). As such, this offers one the opportunity to consider the ways in which the altered functioning and connectivity of SN, DN, and ECN can explain the impact of stress on creativity.

Figure 2 . Major functional connectivity networks in the acute stress response. This figure is a schematic representation of the major functional connectivity networks relevant for the brain’s stress response. The core regions of the salience network (SN) are the insular cortex (IC), dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dorsal ACC), temporal pole, and amygdala. The DN comprises the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PCu), and the inferior parietal lobule. The parahippocampal gyrus and hippocampus (HP) are strongly related to the DN. The ECN is centered on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and also includes part of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and frontal eyefields. Adapted with permission from van Oort et al. (2017) .

Following exposure to stress, a cascading series of physiological changes is triggered that ultimately impact neuronal function in temporally- and spatially-specific ways ( Joëls, 2018 ). At the neuroendocrine level, central levels of catecholamines in the brain (e.g., norepinephrine and dopamine) increase rapidly and normalize shortly thereafter, whereas corticosteroid levels in the brain rise more slowly and remain high for a longer period of time ( Hermans et al., 2014 ). The rapid rise in the level of catecholamines in the brain is associated with an increase in SN activity, and a decrease in ECN activity ( Hermans et al., 2014 ; van Oort et al., 2017 ). Hermans et al. (2014) have argued that this represents a reallocation of resources to SN, a network that underlies orienting attention toward salient information in the environment ( Menon, 2011 ). There is also a strengthening of the functional connectivity between SN and sensory cortices as the organism attends to sensory input ( Li et al., 2014 ). Psychologically, this represents a hypervigilant state geared toward maximizing the likelihood of survival in the immediate aftermath of stress. This reallocation of resources comes at the cost of ECN, where activation diminishes or remains the same. Interestingly, and perhaps counterintuitively, there is an increase in DN activity immediately following exposure to stress. One reason might be that stress can lead to increased negative self-referential processing, which is known to engage the DN. Indeed, high social-evaluative threats are known to decrease creative performance ( Byron et al., 2010 ). In addition, increased activity in the anterior sector of DN might be due to attempts to regulate emotion, another process that engages DN. Acute stress also brings about increased SN-DN functional connectivity, which may play an important role in memory consolidation given the association between SN and regions within DN that encode episodic memory such as the hippocampus ( van Oort et al., 2017 ). After the stress has subsided, the allocation of resources to SN and ECN reverses, thereby restoring higher-order cognitive functions that are necessary for linking stressful events to the specific context, and to encode this information for future retrieval ( Hermans et al., 2014 ; Joëls, 2018 ).

What does this mean for the creative brain under stress? Under normal circumstances, DN activity dominates in the early phase of creative problem solving. This is in stark contrast to what occurs in the acute response to stress where SN and sensory cortex activities increase ( van Marle et al., 2010 ), as does their functional connectivity ( Li et al., 2014 ). Furthermore, ECN activity decreases in the immediate aftermath of stress, and may not be prioritized in relation to SN activity until 1 h after the onset of stress ( Hermans et al., 2014 ). Because creative cognition necessitates a dynamic interaction between DN and ECN, the downregulation of the latter will in all likelihood adversely impact the emergence of creative output (see Vartanian et al., 2018 ). In summary, despite the fact that DN activity increases in the immediate aftermath of stress, the reallocation of resources away from ECN to SN, as well as the increased functional connectivity between SN and sensory cortices for prioritizing attention to salient stimuli may well hamper the neural dynamics that support the emergence of creative thought.

Acute Vs. Chronic Stress

In this paper, our focus has been on the impact of acute stress on the functioning of large-scale brain networks, with possible downstream impact on creative cognition. In other words, we have attempted to paint a picture of brain function in support of creative cognition in cases where a person encounters an extreme, stressful environment. However, quite aside from such acute forms of stress, one can also envision a host of chronic stressors that can negatively impact cognitive function, including creativity. Danese and McEwen (2012) reviewed the large literature on adverse childhood experiences, and demonstrated that such forms of chronic stress can have enduring impacts on the nervous, endocrine, and immune systems. Such long-lasting physiological changes (i.e., biological embedding) are perceived to represent the body’s allostatic response to chronic stress ( Sterling, 1988 ). For example, adults with a history of childhood trauma exhibit smaller prefrontal cortex and hippocampal volume, with associated deficits in declarative memory. Given the important role that the semantic system is known to play in divergent thinking (see Beaty and Schacter, 2018 ; Kenett, 2018 ), it is plausible that such chronic forms of stress that have a deleterious impact on the nervous system may also negatively impact creative cognition.

Indeed, the functioning of the three large-scale networks that have been the focus of our discussion here are known to be affected by a wide host of psychiatric and neurological disorders that have long-lasting effects on brain structure and function. Review by Menon (2011) of the network neuroscience literature demonstrated that functional disruptions in the ECN as well as abnormalities in the intrinsic functional connectivity within the DN and SN are associated with virtually every major psychiatric and neurological disorder, including anxiety disorders, mood disorders, and schizophrenia, among others. Synthesizing this literature in his Triple network model of psychopathology , Menon (2011) argued that deficits in access, engagement, and disengagement of large-scale neural networks are a defining feature of psychopathology. To the extent that various psychiatric and neurological disorders can be viewed as chronic forms of stress, this body of research suggests a close correspondence between the neurological markers of acute and chronic stress at the network level, and suggests that a complete representation of the impact of stress on higher cognition including creativity requires an understanding of both its acute and chronic effects.

Creative cognition has been shown to be supported by the dynamic interaction of DN, ECN, and SN. Furthermore, during divergent thinking, attention to sensory input is attenuated, and instead shifted to internally-generated thought. In contrast, in the acute response to stress (i.e., <1 h after the onset of stress) SN activity increases, whereas ECN activity decreases. There is also increased functional connectivity between SN and sensory cortices, as attention is directed to salient stimuli to maximize chances of survival. Although there is an increase in DN activity and DN-SN functional connectivity, this is likely related to self-referential cognition and emotion regulation rather than thought processes related to creativity. This pattern can help explain why under certain circumstances creativity is impacted negatively by stress, and points to network neuroscience as a useful avenue of research for studying the functioning of the creative brain under acute and chronic stress.

Author Contributions

OV and PS wrote the manuscript. SS and NH conducted literature searches and edited the manuscript. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

This work was supported by funding from Canada’s Department of National Defence (04KI04) under the direction of the first author.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

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Keywords: creativity, stress, performance, environmental psychology, brain networks

Citation: Vartanian O, Saint SA, Herz N and Suedfeld P (2020) The Creative Brain Under Stress: Considerations for Performance in Extreme Environments. Front. Psychol . 11:585969. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.585969

Received: 28 July 2020; Accepted: 29 September 2020; Published: 30 October 2020.

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Copyright © 2020 Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Oshin Vartanian, [email protected] ; [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

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Intelligence and Creativity in Problem Solving: The Importance of Test Features in Cognition Research

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This paper discusses the importance of three features of psychometric tests for cognition research: construct definition, problem space, and knowledge domain. Definition of constructs, e.g., intelligence or creativity, forms the theoretical basis for test construction. Problem space, being well or ill-defined, is determined by the cognitive abilities considered to belong to the constructs, e.g., convergent thinking to intelligence, divergent thinking to creativity. Knowledge domain and the possibilities it offers cognition are reflected in test results. We argue that (a) comparing results of tests with different problem spaces is more informative when cognition operates in both tests on an identical knowledge domain, and (b) intertwining of abilities related to both constructs can only be expected in tests developed to instigate such a process. Test features should guarantee that abilities can contribute to self-generated and goal-directed processes bringing forth solutions that are both new and applicable. We propose and discuss a test example that was developed to address these issues.

The definition of the construct a test is to measure is most important in test construction and application, because cognitive processes reflect the possibilities a task offers. For instance, a test constructed to assess intelligence will operationalize the definition of this construct, being, in short, finding the correct answer. Also, the definition of a construct becomes important when selecting tests for the confirmation of a specific hypothesis. One can only find confirmation for a hypothesis if the chosen task instigates the necessary cognitive operations. For instance, in trying to confirm the assumed intertwining of certain cognitive abilities (e.g., convergent thinking and divergent thinking), tasks should be applied that have shown to yield the necessary cognitive process.

The second test feature, problem space , determines the degrees of freedom cognition has to its disposal in solving a problem. For instance, cognition will go through a wider search path when problem constraints are less well defined and, consequently, data will differ accordingly.

The third test feature, knowledge domain , is important when comparing results from two different tests. When tests differ in problem space, it is not advisable they should differ in knowledge domain. For instance, when studying the differences in cognitive abilities between tests constructed to asses convergent thinking (mostly defined problem space) and divergent thinking (mostly ill-defined problem space), in general test practice, both tests also differ in knowledge domain. Hence, data will reflect cognition operating not only in different problem spaces, but also operating on different knowledge domains, which makes the interpretation of results ambiguous.

The proposed approach for test development and test application holds the promise of, firstly, studying cognitive abilities in different problem spaces while operating on an identical knowledge domain. Although cognitions’ operations have been studied extensively and superbly in both contexts separately, they have rarely been studied in test situations where one or the other test feature is controlled for. The proposed approach also presents a unique method for studying thinking processes in which cognitive abilities intertwine. On the basis of defined abilities, tasks can be developed that have a higher probability of yielding the hypothesized results.

The construct of intelligence is defined as the ability to produce the single best (or correct) answer to a clearly defined question, such as a proof to a theorem ( Simon, 1973 ). It may also be seen as a domain-general ability ( g -factor; Spearman, 1904 ; Cattell, 1967 ) that has much in common with meta cognitive functions, such as metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive monitoring, and metacognitive control ( Saraç et al., 2014 ).

The construct of creativity, in contrast, is defined as the ability to innovate and move beyond what is already known ( Wertheimer , 1945/1968 ; Ghiselin , 1952/1985 ; Vernon, 1970 ). In other words, it emphasizes the aspect of innovation. This involves the ability to consider things from an uncommon perspective, transcend the old order ( Ghiselin , 1952/1985 ; Chi, 1997 ; Ward, 2007 ), and explore loosely associated ideas ( Guilford, 1950 ; Mednick, 1962 ; Koestler, 1964 ; Gentner, 1983 ; Boden, 1990 ; Christensen, 2007 ). Creativity could also be defined as the ability to generate a solution to problems with ill-defined problem spaces ( Wertheimer , 1945/1968 ; Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi, 1976 ). In this sense it involves the ability to identify problematic aspects of a given situation ( Ghiselin , 1952/1985 ) and, in a wider sense, the ability to define completely new problems ( Getzels, 1975 , 1987 ).

Guilford (1956) introduced the constructs of convergent thinking and divergent thinking abilities. Both thinking abilities are important because they allow us insights in human problem solving. On the basis of their definitions convergent and divergent thinking help us to structurally study human cognitive operations in different situations and over different developmental stages. Convergent thinking is defined as the ability to apply conventional and logical search, recognition, and decision-making strategies to stored information in order to produce an already known answer ( Cropley, 2006 ). Divergent thinking, by contrast, is defined as the ability to produce new approaches and original ideas by forming unexpected combinations from available information and by applying such abilities as semantic flexibility, and fluency of association, ideation, and transformation ( Guilford, 1959 , as cited in Cropley, 2006 , p. 1). Divergent thinking brings forth answers that may never have existed before and are often novel, unusual, or surprising ( Cropley, 2006 ).

Guilford (1967) introduced convergent and divergent thinking as part of a set of five operations that apply in his Structure of Intellect model (SOI model) on six products and four kinds of content, to produce 120 different factors of cognitive abilities. With the SOI model Guilford wanted to give the construct of intelligence a comprehensive model. He wanted the model to include all aspects of intelligence, many of which had been seriously neglected in traditional intelligence testing because of a persistent adherence to the belief in Spearman’s g ( Guilford, 1967 , p. vii). Hence, Guilford envisaged cognition to embrace, among other abilities, both convergent and divergent thinking abilities. After these new constructs were introduced and defined, tests for convergent and divergent thinking emerged. Despite the fact that Guilford reported significant loadings of tests for divergent production on tests constructed to measure convergent production ( Guilford, 1967 , p. 155), over the years, both modes of thinking were considered as separate identities where convergent thinking tests associated with intelligence and divergent thinking tests with creativity ( Cropley, 2006 ; Shye and Yuhas, 2004 ). Even intelligence tests that assess aspects of intelligence that supposedly reflect creative abilities do not actually measure creativity ( Kaufman, 2015 ).

The idea that both convergent and divergent thinking are important for solving problems, and that intelligence helps in the creative process, is not really new. In literature we find models of the creative process that define certain stages to convergent and divergent thinking; the stages of purposeful preparation at the start and those of critical verification at the end of the process, respectively ( Wallas, 1926 ; Webb Young , 1939/2003 ). In this view, divergent thinking enables the generation of new ideas whereas the exploratory activities of convergent thinking enable the conversion of ideas into something new and appropriate ( Cropley and Cropley, 2008 ).

We argue that studying the abilities of divergent and convergent thinking in isolation does not suffice to give us complete insight of all possible aspects of human problem solving, its constituent abilities and the structure of its processes. Processes that in a sequence of thoughts and actions lead to novel and adaptive productions ( Lubart, 2001 ) are more demanding of cognition for understanding the situation at hand and planning a path to a possible solution, than abilities involved in less complex situations ( Jaušovec, 1999 ). Processes that yield self-generated and goal-directed thought are the most complex cognitive processes that can be studied ( Beaty et al., 2016 ). Creative cognition literature is moving toward the view that especially in those processes that yield original and appropriate solutions within a specific context, convergent and divergent abilities intertwine ( Cropley, 2006 ; Ward, 2007 ; Gabora, 2010 ).

The approach of intertwining cognitive abilities is also developed within cognitive neuroscience by focusing on the intertwining of brain networks ( Beaty et al., 2016 ). In this approach divergent thinking relates to the default brain network. This network operates in defocused or associative mode of thought yielding spontaneous and self-generated cognition ( Beaty et al., 2015 ). Convergent thinking relates to the executive control network operating in focused or analytic modes of thought, yielding updating, shifting, and inhibition ( Benedek et al., 2014 ). Defocused attention theory ( Mendelssohn, 1976 ) states that less creative individuals operate with a more focused attention than do creative individuals. This theory argues that e.g., attending to two things at the same time, might result in one analogy, while attending to four things might yield six analogies ( Martindale, 1999 ).

In the process of shifting back and forth along the spectrum between associative and analytic modes of thinking, the fruits of associative thought become ingredients for analytic thought processes, and vice versa ( Gabora, 2010 ). In this process, mental imagery is involved as one sensory aspect of the human ability to gather and process information ( Jung and Haier, 2013 ). Mental imagery is fed by scenes in the environment that provide crucial visual clues for creative problem solving and actuates the need for sketching ( Verstijnen et al., 2001 ).

Creative problem solving processes often involve an interactive relationship between imagining, sketching, and evaluating the result of the sketch ( van Leeuwen et al., 1999 ). This interactive process evolves within a type of imagery called “visual reasoning” where forms and shapes are manipulated in order to specify the configurations and properties of the design entities ( Goldschmidt, 2013 ). The originality of inventions is predicted by the application of visualization, whereas their practicality is predicted by the vividness of imagery ( Palmiero et al., 2015 ). Imaginative thought processes emerge from our conceptual knowledge of the world that is represented in our semantic memory system. In constrained divergent thinking, the neural correlates of this semantic memory system partially overlap with those of the creative cognition system ( Abraham and Bubic, 2015 ).

Studies of convergent and divergent thinking abilities have yielded innumerable valuable insights on the cognitive and neurological aspects involved, e.g., reaction times, strategies, brain areas involved, mental representations, and short and long time memory components. Studies on the relationship between both constructs suggest that it is unlikely that individuals employ similar cognitive strategies when solving more convergent than more divergent thinking tasks ( Jaušovec, 2000 ). However, to arrive at a quality formulation the creative process cannot do without the application of both, convergent and divergent thinking abilities (e.g., Kaufmann, 2003 ; Runco, 2003 ; Sternberg, 2005 ; Dietrich, 2007 ; Cropley and Cropley, 2008 ; Silvia et al., 2013 ; Jung, 2014 ).

When it is our aim to study the networks addressed by the intertwining of convergent and divergent thinking processes that are considered to operate when new, original, and yet appropriate solutions are generated, then traditional thinking tests like intelligence tests and creativity tests are not appropriate; they yield processes related to the definition of one or the other type of construct.

Creative Reasoning Task

According to the new insights gained in cognition research, we need tasks that are developed with the aim to instigate precisely the kind of thinking processes we are looking for. Tasks should also provide a method of scoring independently the contribution of convergent and divergent thinking. As one possible solution for such tasks we present the Creative Reasoning Task (CRT; Jaarsveld, 2007 ; Jaarsveld et al., 2010 , 2012 , 2013 ).

The CRT presents participants with an empty 3 × 3 matrix and asks them to fill it out, as original and complex as possible, by creating components and the relationships that connect them. The created matrix can, in principle, be solved by another person. The creation of components is entirely free, as is the generation of the relationships that connects them into a completed pattern. Created matrices are scored with two sub scores; Relations , which scores the logical complexity of a matrix and is, therefore, considered a measure for convergent thinking, and Components and Specifications , which scores the originality, fluency, and flexibility and, therefore, is considered an indication for divergent thinking (for a more detailed description of the score method, see Appendix 1 in Supplementary Material).

Psychometric studies with the CRT showed, firstly, that convergent and divergent thinking abilities apply within this task and can be assessed independently. The CRT sub score Relations correlated with the Standard Progressive Matrices test (SPM) and the CRT sub score Components and Specifications correlated with a standard creativity test (TCT–DP, Test of Creative Thinking–Drawing Production; Urban and Jellen, 1995 ; Jaarsveld et al., 2010 , 2012 , 2013 ). Studies further showed that, although a correlation was observed for the intelligence and creativity test scores, no correlation was observed between the CRT sub scores relating to intelligent and creative performances ( Jaarsveld et al., 2012 , 2013 ; for further details about the CRT’s objectivity, validity, and reliability, see Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material).

Reasoning in creative thinking can be defined as the involvement of executive/convergent abilities in the inhibition of ideas and the updating of information ( Benedek et al., 2014 ). Jung (2014) describes a dichotomy for cognitive abilities with at one end the dedicated system that relies on explicit and conscious knowledge and at the other end the improvisational system that relies more upon implicit or unconscious knowledge systems. The link between explicit and implicit systems can actually be traced back to Kris’ psychoanalytic approach to creativity dating from the 1950s. The implicit system refers to Kris’ primary process of adaptive regression, where unmodulated thoughts intrude into consciousness; the explicit system refers to the secondary process, where the reworking and transformation of primary process material takes place through reality-oriented and ego-controlled thinking ( Sternberg and Lubart, 1999 ). The interaction between explicit and implicit systems can be seen to form the basis of creative reasoning, i.e., the cognitive ability to solve problems in an effective and adaptive way. This interaction evolved as a cognitive mechanism when human survival depended on finding effective solutions to both common and novel problem situations ( Gabora and Kaufman, 2010 ). Creative reasoning solves that minority of problems that are unforeseen and yet of high adaptability ( Jung, 2014 ).

Hence, common tests are insufficient when it comes to solving problems that are unforeseen and yet of high adaptability, because they present problems that are either unforeseen and measure certain abilities contained in the construct of creativity or they address adaptability and measure certain abilities contained in the construct of intelligence. The CRT presents participants with a problem that they could not have foreseen; the form is blank and offers no stimuli. All tests, even creativity tests, present participants with some kind of stimuli. The CRT addresses adaptability; to invent from scratch a coherent structure that can be solved by another person, like creating a crossword puzzle. Problems, that are unforeseen and of high adaptability, are solved by the application of abilities from both constructs.

Neuroscience of Creative Cognition

Studies in neuroscience showed that cognition operating in ill-defined problem space not only applies divergent thinking but also benefits from additional convergent operations ( Gabora, 2010 ; Jung, 2014 ). Understanding creative cognition may be advanced when we study the flow of information among brain areas ( Jung et al., 2010 ).

In a cognitive neuroscience study with the CRT we focused on the cognitive process evolving within this task. Participants performed the CRT while EEG alpha activity was registered. EEG alpha synchronization in frontal areas is understood as an indication of top-down control ( Cooper et al., 2003 ). When observed in frontal areas, for divergent and convergent thinking tasks, it may not reflect a brain state that is specific for creative cognition but could be attributed to the high processing demands typically involved in creative thinking ( Benedek et al., 2011 ). Top-down control, relates to volitionally focusing attention to task demands ( Buschman and Miller, 2007 ). That this control plays a role in tasks with an ill-defined problem space showed when electroencephalography (EEG) alpha synchronization was stronger for individuals engaged in creative ideation tasks compared to an intelligence related tasks ( Fink et al., 2007 , 2009 ; Fink and Benedek, 2014 ). This activation was also found for the CRT; task related alpha synchronization showed that convergent thinking was integrated in the divergent thinking processes. Analyzes of the stages in the CRT process showed that this alpha synchronization was especially visible at the start of the creative process at prefrontal and frontal sites when information processing was most demanding, i.e., due to multiplicity of ideas, and it was visible at the end of the process, due to narrowing down of alternatives ( Jaarsveld et al., 2015 ).

A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study ( Beaty et al., 2015 ) with a creativity task in which cognition had to meet specific constraints, showed the networks involved. The default mode network which drives toward abstraction and metaphorical thinking and the executive control network driving toward certainty ( Jung, 2014 ). Control involves not only maintenance of patterns of activity that represent goals and the means to achieve those ( Miller and Cohen, 2001 ), but also their voluntary suppression when no longer needed, as well as the flexible shift between different goals and mental sets ( Abraham and Windmann, 2007 ). Attention can be focused volitionally by top-down signals derived from task demands and automatically by bottom-up signals from salient stimuli ( Buschman and Miller, 2007 ). Intertwining between top-down and bottom-up attention processes in creative cognition ensures a broadening of attention in free associative thinking ( Abraham and Windmann, 2007 ).

These studies support and enhance the findings of creative cognition research in showing that the generation of original and applicable ideas involves an intertwining between different abilities, networks, and attention processes.

Problem Space

A problem space is an abstract representation, in the mind of the problem solver, of the encountered problem and of the asked for solution ( Simon and Newell, 1971 ; Simon, 1973 ; Hayes and Flowers, 1986 ; Kulkarni and Simon, 1988 ; Runco, 2007 ). The space that comes with a certain problem can, according to the constraints that are formulated for the solution, be labeled well-defined or ill-defined ( Simon and Newell, 1971 ). Consequently, the original problems are labeled closed and open problems, respectively ( Jaušovec, 2000 ).

A problem space contains all possible states that are accessible to the problem solver from the initial state , through iterative application of transformation rules , to the goal state ( Newell and Simon, 1972 ; Anderson, 1983 ). The initial state presents the problem solver with a task description that defines which requirements a solution has to answer. The goal state represents the solution. The proposed solution is a product of the application of transformation rules (algorithms and heuristics) on a series of successive intermediate solutions. The proposed solution is also a product of the iterative evaluations of preceding solutions and decisions based upon these evaluations ( Boden, 1990 ; Gabora, 2002 ; Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005 ; Goldschmidt, 2014 ). Whether all possible states need to be passed through depends on the problem space being well or ill-defined and this, in turn, depends on the character of the task descriptions.

When task descriptions clearly state which requirements a solution has to answer then the inferences made will show little idiosyncratic aspects and will adhere to the task constraints. As a result, fewer options for alternative paths are open to the problem solver and search for a solution evolves in a well-defined space. Vice versa, when task or problem descriptions are fuzzy and under specified, the problem solver’s inferences are more idiosyncratic; the resulting process will evolve within an ill-defined space and will contain more generative-evaluative cycles in which new goals are set, and the cycle is repeated ( Dennett, 1978 , as cited in Gabora, 2002 , p. 126).

Tasks that evolve in defined problem space are, e.g., traditional intelligence tests (e.g., Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS; and SPM, Raven , 1938/1998 ). The above tests consist of different types of questions, each testing a different component of intelligence. They are used in test practice to assess reasoning abilities in diverse domains, such as, abstract, logical, spatial, verbal, numerical, and mathematical domains. These tests have clearly stated task descriptions and each item has one and only one correct solution that has to be generated from memory or chosen from a set of alternatives, like in multiple choice formats. Tests can be constructed to assess crystallized or fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence represents abilities acquired through learning, practice, and exposure to education, while fluid intelligence represents a more basic capacity that is valuable to reasoning and problem solving in contexts not necessarily related to school education ( Carroll, 1982 ).

Tasks that evolve in ill-defined problem space are, e.g., standard creativity tests. These types of test ask for a multitude of ideas to be generated in association with a given item or situation (e.g., “think of as many titles for this story”). Therefore, they are also labeled as divergent thinking test. Although they assess originality, fluency, flexibility of responses, and elaboration, they are not constructed, however, to score appropriateness or applicability. Divergent thinking tests assess one limited aspect of what makes an individual creative. Creativity depends also on variables like affect and intuition; therefore, divergent thinking can only be considered an indication of an individual’s creative potential ( Runco, 2008 ). More precisely, divergent thinking explains just under half of the variance in adult creative potential, which is more than three times that of the contribution of intelligence ( Plucker, 1999 , p. 103). Creative achievement , by contrast, is commonly assessed by means of self-reports such as biographical questionnaires in which participants indicate their achievement across various domains (e.g., literature, music, or theater).

Studies with the CRT showed that problem space differently affects processing of and comprehension of relationships between components. Problem space did not affect the ability to process complex information. This ability showed equal performance in well and ill-defined problem spaces ( Jaarsveld et al., 2012 , 2013 ). However, problem space did affect the comprehension of relationships, which showed in the different frequencies of relationships solved and created ( Jaarsveld et al., 2010 , 2012 ). Problem space also affected the neurological activity as displayed when individuals solve open or closed problems ( Jaušovec, 2000 ).

Problem space further affected trends over grade levels of primary school children for relationships solved in well-defined and applied in ill-defined problem space. Only one of the 12 relationships defined in the CRT, namely Combination, showed an increase with grade for both types of problem spaces ( Jaarsveld et al., 2013 ). In the same study, cognitive development in the CRT showed in the shifts of preference for a certain relationship. These shifts seem to correspond to Piaget’s developmental stages ( Piaget et al., 1977 ; Siegler, 1998 ) which are in evidence in the CRT, but not in the SPM ( Jaarsveld et al., 2013 ).

Design Problems

A sub category of problems with an ill-defined problem space are represented by design problems. In contrast to divergent thinking tasks that ask for the generation of a multitude of ideas, in design tasks interim ideas are nurtured and incrementally developed until they are appropriate for the task. Ideas are rarely discarded and replaced with new ideas ( Goel and Pirolli, 1992 ). The CRT could be considered a design problem because it yields (a) one possible solution and (b) an iterative thinking process that involves the realization of a vague initial idea. In the CRT a created matrix, which is a closed problem, is created within an ill-defined problem space. Design problems can be found, e.g., in engineering, industrial design, advertising, software design, and architecture ( Sakar and Chakrabarti, 2013 ), however, they can also be found in the arts, e.g., poetry, sculpting, and dance geography.

These complex problems are partly determined by unalterable needs, requirements and intentions but the major part of the design problem is undetermined ( Dorst, 2004 ). This author points out that besides containing an original and a functional value, these types of problems contain an aesthetic value. He further states that the interpretation of the design problem and the creation and selection of possible suitable solutions can only be decided during the design process on the basis of proposals made by the designer.

In design problems the generation stage may be considered a divergent thinking process. However, not in the sense that it moves in multiple directions or generates multiple possibilities as in a divergent thinking tests, but in the sense that it unrolls by considering an initially vague idea from different perspectives until it comes into focus and requires further processing to become viable. These processes can be characterized by a set of invariant features ( Goel and Pirolli, 1992 ), e.g., structuring. iteration , and coherence .

Structuring of the initial situation is required in design processes before solving can commence. The problem contains little structured and clear information about its initial state and about the requirements of its solution. Therefore, design problems allow or even require re-interpretation of transformation rules; for instance, rearranging the location of furniture in a room according to a set of desirable outcomes. Here one uncovers implicit requirements that introduce a set of new transformations and/or eliminate existing ones ( Barsalou, 1992 ; Goel and Pirolli, 1992 ) or, when conflicting requirements arise, one creates alternatives and/or introduces new trade-offs between the conflicting constraints ( Yamamoto et al., 2000 ; Dorst, 2011 ).

A second aspect of design processes is their iterative character. After structuring and planning a vague idea emerges, which is the result of the merging of memory items. A vague idea is a cognitive structure that, halfway the creative process is still ill defined and, therefore, can be said to exist in a state of potentiality ( Gabora and Saab, 2011 ). Design processes unroll in an iterative way by the inspection and adjustment of the generated ideas ( Goldschmidt, 2014 ). New meanings are created and realized while the creative mind imposes its own order and meaning on the sensory data and through creative production furthers its own understanding of the world ( Arnheim , 1962/1974 , as cited in Grube and Davis, 1988 , pp. 263–264).

A third aspect of design processes is coherence. Coherence theories characterize coherence in, for instance, philosophical problems and psychological processes, in terms of maximal satisfaction of multiple constraints and compute coherence by using, a.o., connectionist algorithms ( Thagard and Verbeurgt, 1998 ). Another measure of coherence is characterized as continuity in design processes. This measure was developed for a design task ( Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005 ) and calculated by the occurrence of a given pair of objects in a sketch, expressed as a percentage of all the sketches of a series. In a series of sketches participants designed a logo for a new soft drink. Design series strong in coherence also received a high score for their final design, as assessed by professionals in various domains. Indicating that participants with a high score for the creative quality of their final sketch seemed better in assessing their design activity in relation to the continuity in the process and, thereby, seemed better in navigating the ill-defined space of a design problem ( Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005 ). In design problems the quality of cognitive production depends, in part, on the abilities to reflect on one’s own creative behavior ( Boden, 1996 ) and to monitor how far along in the process one is in solving it ( Gabora, 2002 ). Hence, design problems are especially suited to study more complex problem solving processes.

Knowledge Domain

Knowledge domain represents disciplines or fields of study organized by general principles, e.g., domains of various arts and sciences. It contains accumulated knowledge that can be divided in diverse content domains, and the relevant algorithms and heuristics. We also speak of knowledge domains when referring to, e.g., visuo-spatial and verbal domains. This latter differentiation may refer to the method by which performance in a certain knowledge domain is assessed, e.g., a visuo-spatial physics task that assesses the content domain of the workings of mass and weights of objects.

In comparing tests results, we should keep in mind that apart from reflecting cognitive processes evolving in different problem spaces, the results also arise from cognition operating on different knowledge domains. We argue that, the still contradictory and inconclusive discussion about the relationship between intelligence and creativity ( Silvia, 2008 ), should involve the issue of knowledge domain.

Intelligence tests contain items that pertain to, e.g., verbal, abstract, mechanical and spatial reasoning abilities, while their content mostly operates on knowledge domains that are related to contents contained in school curricula. Items of creativity tests, by contrast, pertain to more idiosyncratic knowledge domains, their contents relating to associations between stored personal experiences ( Karmiloff-Smith, 1992 ). The influence of knowledge domain on the relationships between different test scores was already mentioned by Guilford (1956 , p. 169). This author expected a higher correlation between scores from a typical intelligence test and a divergent thinking test than between scores from two divergent thinking tests because the former pair operated on identical information and the latter pair on different information.

Studies with the CRT showed that when knowledge domain is controlled for, the development of intelligence operating in ill-defined problem space does not compare to that of traditional intelligence but develops more similarly to the development of creativity ( Welter et al., in press ).

Relationship Intelligence and Creativity

The Threshold theory ( Guilford, 1967 ) predicts a relationship between intelligence and creativity up to approximately an intelligence quotient (IQ) level of 120 but not beyond ( Lubart, 2003 ; Runco, 2007 ). Threshold theory was corroborated when creative potential was found to be related to intelligence up to certain IQ levels; however, the theory was refuted, when focusing on achievement in creative domains; it showed that creative achievement benefited from higher intelligence even at fairly high levels of intellectual ability ( Jauk et al., 2013 ).

Distinguishing between subtypes of general intelligence known as fluent and crystallized intelligence ( Cattell, 1967 ), Sligh et al. (2005) observed an inverse threshold effect with fluid IQ: a correlation with creativity test scores in the high IQ group but not in the average IQ group. Also creative achievement showed to be affected by fluid intelligence ( Beaty et al., 2014 ). Intelligence, defined as fluid IQ, verbal fluency, and strategic abilities, showed a higher correlation with creativity scores ( Silvia, 2008 ) than when defined as crystallized intelligence. Creativity tests, which involved convergent thinking (e.g., Remote Association Test; Mednick, 1962 ) showed higher correlations with intelligence than ones that involved only divergent thinking (e.g., the Alternate Uses Test; Guilford et al., 1978 ).

That the Remote Association test also involves convergent thinking follows from the instructions; one is asked, when presented with a stimulus word (e.g., table) to produce the first word one thinks of (e.g., chair). The word pair table–chair is a common association, more remote is the pair table–plate, and quite remote is table–shark. According to Mednick’s theory (a) all cognitive work is done essentially by combining or associating ideas and (b) individuals with more commonplace associations have an advantage in well-defined problem spaces, because the class of relevant associations is already implicit in the statement of the problem ( Eysenck, 2003 ).

To circumvent the problem of tests differing in knowledge domain, one can develop out of one task a more divergent and a more convergent thinking task by asking, on the one hand, for the generation of original responses, and by asking, on the other hand, for more common responses ( Jauk et al., 2012 ). By changing the instruction of a task, from convergent to divergent, one changes the constraints the solution has to answer and, thereby, one changes for cognition its freedom of operation ( Razumnikova et al., 2009 ; Limb, 2010 ; Jauk et al., 2012 ). However, asking for more common responses is still a divergent thinking task because it instigates a generative and ideational process.

Indeed, studying the relationship between intelligence and creativity with knowledge domain controlled for yielded different results as defined in the Threshold theory. A study in which knowledge domain was controlled for showed, firstly, that intelligence is no predictor for the development of creativity ( Welter et al., 2016 ). Secondly, that the relationship between scores of intelligence and creativity tests as defined under the Threshold theory was only observed in a small subset of primary school children, namely, female children in Grade 4 ( Welter et al., 2016 ). We state that relating results of operations yielded by cognitive abilities performing in defined and in ill-defined problem spaces can only be informative when it is ensured that cognitive processes also operate on an identical knowledge domain.

Intertwining of Cognitive Abilities

Eysenck (2003) observed that there is little justification for considering the constructs of divergent and convergent thinking in categorical terms in which one construct excludes the other. In processes that yield original and appropriate solutions convergent and divergent thinking both operate on the same large knowledge base and the underlying cognitive processes are not entirely dissimilar ( Eysenck, 2003 , p. 110–111).

Divergent thinking is especially effective when it is coupled with convergent thinking ( Runco, 2003 ; Gabora and Ranjan, 2013 ). A design problem study ( Jaarsveld and van Leeuwen, 2005 ) showed that divergent production was active throughout the design, as new meanings are continuously added to the evolving structure ( Akin, 1986 ), and that convergent production was increasingly important toward the end of the process, as earlier productions are wrapped up and integrated in the final design. These findings are in line with the assumptions of Wertheimer (1945/1968) who stated that thinking within ill-defined problem space is characterized by two points of focus; one is to work on the parts, the other to make the central idea clearer.

Parallel to the discussion about the intertwining of convergent and divergent thinking abilities in processes that evolve in ill-defined problem space we find the discussion about how intelligence may facilitate creative thought. This showed when top-down cognitive control advanced divergent processing in the generation of original ideas and a certain measure of cognitive inhibition advanced the fluency of idea generation ( Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011 ). Fluid intelligence and broad retrieval considered as intelligence factors in a structural equation study contributed both to the production of creative ideas in a metaphor generation task ( Beaty and Silvia, 2013 ). The notion that creative thought involves top-down, executive processes showed in a latent variable analysis where inhibition primarily promoted the fluency of ideas, and intelligence promoted their originality ( Benedek et al., 2012 ).

Definitions of the Constructs Intelligence and Creativity

The various definitions of the constructs of intelligence and creativity show a problematic overlap. This overlap stems from the enormous endeavor to unanimously agree on valid descriptions for each construct. Spearman (1927) , after having attended many symposia that aimed at defining intelligence, stated that “in truth, ‘intelligence’ has become a mere vocal sound, a word with so many meanings that finally it has none” (p. 14).

Intelligence is expressed in terms of adaptive, goal-directed behavior; and the subset of such behavior that is labeled “intelligent” seems to be determined in large part by cultural or societal norms ( Sternberg and Salter, 1982 ). The development of the IQ measure is discussed by Carroll (1982) : “Binet (around 1905) realized that intelligent behavior or mental ability can be ranged along a scale. Not much later, Stern (around 1912) noticed that, as chronological age increased, variation in mental age changes proportionally. He developed the IQ ratio, whose standard deviation would be approximately constant over chronological age if mental age was divided by chronological age. With the development of multiple-factor-analyses (Thurstone, around 1935) it could be shown that intelligence is not a simple unitary trait because at least seven somewhat independent factors of mental ability were identified.”

Creativity is defined as a combined manifestation of novelty and usefulness ( Jung et al., 2010 ). Although it is identified with divergent thinking, and performance on divergent thinking tasks predicts, e.g., quantity of creative achievements ( Torrance, 1988 , as cited in Beaty et al., 2014 ) and quality of creative performance ( Beaty et al., 2013 ), it cannot be identified uniquely with divergent thinking.

Divergent thinking often leads to highly original ideas that are honed to appropriate ideas by evaluative processes of critical thinking, and valuative and appreciative considerations ( Runco, 2008 ). Divergent thinking tests should be more considered as estimates of creative problem solving potential rather than of actual creativity ( Runco, 1991 ). Divergent thinking is not specific enough to help us understand what, exactly, are the mental processes—or the cognitive abilities—that yield creative thoughts ( Dietrich, 2007 ).

Although current definitions of intelligence and creativity try to determine for each separate construct a unique set of cognitive abilities, analyses show that definitions vary in the degree to which each includes abilities that are generally considered to belong to the other construct ( Runco, 2003 ; Jaarsveld et al., 2012 ). Abilities considered belonging to the construct of intelligence such as hypothesis testing, inhibition of alternative responses, and creating mental images of new actions or plans are also considered to be involved in creative thinking ( Fuster, 1997 , as cited in Colom et al., 2009 , p. 215). The ability, for instance, to evaluate , which is considered to belong to the construct of intelligence and assesses the match between a proposed solution and task constraints, has long been considered to play a role in creative processes that goes beyond the mere generation of a series of ideas as in creativity tasks ( Wallas, 1926 , as cited in Gabora, 2002 , p. 1; Boden, 1990 ).

The Geneplore model ( Finke et al., 1992 ) explicitly models this idea; after stages in which objects are merely generated, follow phases in which an object’s utility is explored and estimated. The generation phase brings forth pre inventive objects, imaginary objects that are generated without any constraints in mind. In exploration, these objects are evaluated for their possible functionalities. In anticipating the functional characteristics of generated ideas, convergent thinking is needed to apprehend the situation, make evaluations ( Kozbelt, 2008 ), and consider the consequences of a chosen solution ( Goel and Pirolli, 1992 ). Convergent reasoning in creativity tasks invokes criteria of functionality and appropriateness ( Halpern, 2003 ; Kaufmann, 2003 ), goal directedness and adaptive behavior ( Sternberg, 1982 ), as well as the abilities of planning and attention. Convergent thinking stages may even require divergent thinking sub processes to identify restrictions on proposed new ideas and suggest requisite revision strategies ( Mumford et al., 2007 ). Hence, evaluation, which is considered to belong to the construct of intelligence, is also functional in creative processes.

In contrast, the ability of flexibility , which is considered to belong to the construct of creativity and denotes an openness of mind that ensures the generation of ideas from different domains, showed, as a factor component for latent divergent thinking, a relationship with intelligence ( Silvia, 2008 ). Flexibility was also found to play an important role in intelligent behavior where it enables us to do novel things smartly in new situations ( Colunga and Smith, 2008 ). These authors studied children’s generalizations of novel nouns and concluded that if we are to understand human intelligence, we must understand the processes that make inventiveness. They propose to include the construct of flexibility within that of intelligence. Therefore, definitions of the constructs we are to measure affect test construction and the resulting data. However, an overlap between definitions, as discussed, yields a test diversity that makes it impossible to interpret the different findings across studies with any confidence ( Arden et al., 2010 ). Also Kim (2005) concluded that because of differences in tests and administration methods, the observed correlation between intelligence and creativity was negligible. As the various definitions of the constructs of intelligence and creativity show problematic overlap, we propose to circumvent the discussion about which cognitive abilities are assessed by which construct, and to consider both constructs as being involved in one design process. This approach allows us to study the contribution to this process of the various defined abilities, without one construct excluding the other.

Reasoning Abilities

The CRT is a psychometrical tool constructed on the basis of an alternative construct of human cognitive functioning that considers creative reasoning as a thinking process understood as the cooperation between cognitive abilities related to intelligent and creative thinking.

In generating relationships for a matrix, reasoning and more specifically the ability of rule invention is applied. The ability of rule invention could be considered as an extension of the sequence of abilities of rule learning, rule inference, and rule application, implying that creativity is an extension of intelligence ( Shye and Goldzweig, 1999 ). According to this model, we could expect different results between a task assessing abilities of rule learning and rule inference, and a task assessing abilities of rule application. In two studies rule learning and rule inference was assessed with the RPM and rule application was assessed with the CRT. Results showed that from Grades 1 to 4, the frequencies of relationships applied did not correlate with those solved ( Jaarsveld et al., 2010 , 2012 ). Results showed that performance in the CRT allows an insight of cognitive abilities operating on relationships among components that differs from the insight based on performance within the same knowledge domain in a matrix solving task. Hence, reasoning abilities lead to different performances when applied in solving closed as to open problems.

We assume that reasoning abilities are more clearly reflected when one formulates a matrix from scratch; in the process of thinking and drawing one has, so to speak, to solve one’s own matrix. In doing so one explains to oneself the relationship(s) realized so far and what one would like to attain. Drawing is thinking aloud a problem and aids the designer’s thinking processes in providing some “talk-back” ( Cross and Clayburn Cross, 1996 ). Explanatory activity enhances learning through increased depth of processing ( Siegler, 2005 ). Analyzing explanations of examples given with physics problems showed that they clarify and specify the conditions and consequences of actions, and that they explicate tacit knowledge; thereby enhancing and completing an individual’s understanding of principles relevant to the task ( Chi and VanLehn, 1991 ). Constraint of the CRT is that the matrix, in principle, can be solved by another person. Therefore, in a kind of inner explanatory discussion, the designer makes observations of progress, and uses evaluations and decisions to answer this constraint. Because of this, open problems where certain constraints have to be met, constitute a powerful mechanism for promoting understanding and conceptual advancement ( Chi and VanLehn, 1991 ; Mestre, 2002 ; Siegler, 2005 ).

Convergent and divergent thinking processes have been studied with a variety of intelligence and creativity tests, respectively. Relationships between performances on these tests have been demonstrated and a large number of research questions have been addressed. However, the fact that intelligence and creativity tests vary in the definition of their construct, in their problem space, and in their knowledge domain, poses methodological problems regarding the validity of comparisons of test results. When we want to focus on one cognitive process, e.g., intelligent thinking, and on its different performances in well or ill-defined problem situations, we need pairs of tasks that are constructed along identical definitions of the construct to be assessed, that differ, however, in the description of their constraints but are identical regarding their knowledge domain.

One such possible pair, the Progressive Matrices Test and the CRT was suggested here. The CRT was developed on the basis of creative reasoning , a construct that assumes the intertwining of intelligent and creativity related abilities when looking for original and applicable solutions. Matched with the Matrices test, results indicated that, besides similarities, intelligent thinking also yielded considerable differences for both problem spaces. Hence, with knowledge domain controlled, and only differences in problem space remaining, comparison of data yielded new results on intelligence’s operations. Data gathered from intelligence and creativity tests, whether they are performance scores or physiological measurements on the basis of, e.g., EEG, and fMRI methods, are reflections of cognitive processes performing on a certain test that was constructed on the basis of a certain definition of the construct it was meant to measure. Data are also reflections of the processes evolving within a certain problem space and of cognitive abilities operating on a certain knowledge domain.

Data can unhide brain networks that are involved in the performance of certain tasks, e.g., traditional intelligence and creativity tests, but data will always be related to the characteristics of the task. The characteristics of the task, such as problem space and knowledge domain originated at the construction of the task, and the construction, on its turn, is affected by the definition of the construct the task is meant to measure.

Here we present the CRT as one possible solution for the described problems in cognition research. However, for research on relationships among test scores other pairs of tests are imaginable, e.g., pairs of tasks operating on the same domain where one task has a defined problem space and the other one an ill-defined space. It is conceivable that pairs of test could operate, besides on the domain of mathematics, on content of e.g., visuo-spatial, verbal, and musical domains. Pairs of test have been constructed by changing the instruction of a task; instructions instigated a more convergent or a more a divergent mode of response ( Razumnikova et al., 2009 ; Limb, 2010 ; Jauk et al., 2012 ; Beaty et al., 2013 ).

The CRT involves the creation of components and their relationships for a 3 × 3 matrix. Hence, matrices created in the CRT are original in the sense that they all bear individual markers and they are applicable in the sense, that they can, in principle, be solved by another person. We showed that the CRT instigates a real design process; creators’ cognitive abilities are wrapped up in a process that should produce a closed problem within an ill-defined problem space.

For research on the relationship among convergent and divergent thinking, we need pairs of test that differ in the problem spaces related to each test but are identical in the knowledge domain on which cognition operates. The test pair of RPM and CRT provides such a pair. For research on the intertwining of convergent and divergent thinking, we need tasks that measure more than tests assessing each construct alone. We need tasks that are developed on the definition of intertwining cognitive abilities; the CRT is one such test.

Hence, we hope to have sufficiently discussed and demonstrated the importance of the three test features, construct definition, problem space, and knowledge domain, for research questions in creative cognition research.

Author Contributions

All authors listed, have made substantial, direct and intellectual contribution to the work, and approved it for publication.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Supplementary Material

The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00134/full#supplementary-material

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What Is Problem-Solving Therapy?

Arlin Cuncic, MA, is the author of "Therapy in Focus: What to Expect from CBT for Social Anxiety Disorder" and "7 Weeks to Reduce Anxiety." She has a Master's degree in psychology.

Daniel B. Block, MD, is an award-winning, board-certified psychiatrist who operates a private practice in Pennsylvania.

Verywell / Madelyn Goodnight

Problem-Solving Therapy Techniques

How effective is problem-solving therapy, things to consider, how to get started.

Problem-solving therapy is a brief intervention that provides people with the tools they need to identify and solve problems that arise from big and small life stressors. It aims to improve your overall quality of life and reduce the negative impact of psychological and physical illness.

Problem-solving therapy can be used to treat depression , among other conditions. It can be administered by a doctor or mental health professional and may be combined with other treatment approaches.

At a Glance

Problem-solving therapy is a short-term treatment used to help people who are experiencing depression, stress, PTSD, self-harm, suicidal ideation, and other mental health problems develop the tools they need to deal with challenges. This approach teaches people to identify problems, generate solutions, and implement those solutions. Let's take a closer look at how problem-solving therapy can help people be more resilient and adaptive in the face of stress.

Problem-solving therapy is based on a model that takes into account the importance of real-life problem-solving. In other words, the key to managing the impact of stressful life events is to know how to address issues as they arise. Problem-solving therapy is very practical in its approach and is only concerned with the present, rather than delving into your past.

This form of therapy can take place one-on-one or in a group format and may be offered in person or online via telehealth . Sessions can be anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours long. 

Key Components

There are two major components that make up the problem-solving therapy framework:

• Applying a positive problem-solving orientation to your life
• Using problem-solving skills

A positive problem-solving orientation means viewing things in an optimistic light, embracing self-efficacy , and accepting the idea that problems are a normal part of life. Problem-solving skills are behaviors that you can rely on to help you navigate conflict, even during times of stress. This includes skills like:

• Knowing how to identify a problem
• Defining the problem in a helpful way
• Trying to understand the problem more deeply
• Setting goals related to the problem
• Generating alternative, creative solutions to the problem
• Choosing the best course of action
• Implementing the choice you have made
• Evaluating the outcome to determine next steps

Problem-solving therapy is all about training you to become adaptive in your life so that you will start to see problems as challenges to be solved instead of insurmountable obstacles. It also means that you will recognize the action that is required to engage in effective problem-solving techniques.

Planful Problem-Solving

One problem-solving technique, called planful problem-solving, involves following a series of steps to fix issues in a healthy, constructive way:

• Problem definition and formulation : This step involves identifying the real-life problem that needs to be solved and formulating it in a way that allows you to generate potential solutions.
• Generation of alternative solutions : This stage involves coming up with various potential solutions to the problem at hand. The goal in this step is to brainstorm options to creatively address the life stressor in ways that you may not have previously considered.
• Decision-making strategies : This stage involves discussing different strategies for making decisions as well as identifying obstacles that may get in the way of solving the problem at hand.
• Solution implementation and verification : This stage involves implementing a chosen solution and then verifying whether it was effective in addressing the problem.

Other Techniques

Other techniques your therapist may go over include:

• Problem-solving multitasking , which helps you learn to think clearly and solve problems effectively even during times of stress
• Stop, slow down, think, and act (SSTA) , which is meant to encourage you to become more emotionally mindful when faced with conflict
• Healthy thinking and imagery , which teaches you how to embrace more positive self-talk while problem-solving

What Problem-Solving Therapy Can Help With

Problem-solving therapy addresses life stress issues and focuses on helping you find solutions to concrete issues. This approach can be applied to problems associated with various psychological and physiological symptoms.

Mental Health Issues

Problem-solving therapy may help address mental health issues, like:

• Chronic stress due to accumulating minor issues
• Complications associated with traumatic brain injury (TBI)
• Emotional distress
• Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
• Problems associated with a chronic disease like cancer, heart disease, or diabetes
• Self-harm and feelings of hopelessness
• Substance use
• Suicidal ideation

Specific Life Challenges

This form of therapy is also helpful for dealing with specific life problems, such as:

• Death of a loved one
• Dissatisfaction at work
• Everyday life stressors
• Family problems
• Financial difficulties
• Relationship conflicts

Your doctor or mental healthcare professional will be able to advise whether problem-solving therapy could be helpful for your particular issue. In general, if you are struggling with specific, concrete problems that you are having trouble finding solutions for, problem-solving therapy could be helpful for you.

Benefits of Problem-Solving Therapy

The skills learned in problem-solving therapy can be helpful for managing all areas of your life. These can include:

• Being able to identify which stressors trigger your negative emotions (e.g., sadness, anger)
• Confidence that you can handle problems that you face
• Having a systematic approach on how to deal with life's problems
• Having a toolbox of strategies to solve the issues you face
• Increased confidence to find creative solutions
• Knowing how to identify which barriers will impede your progress
• Knowing how to manage emotions when they arise
• Reduced avoidance and increased action-taking
• The ability to accept life problems that can't be solved
• The ability to make effective decisions
• The development of patience (realizing that not all problems have a "quick fix")

Problem-solving therapy can help people feel more empowered to deal with the problems they face in their lives. Rather than feeling overwhelmed when stressors begin to take a toll, this therapy introduces new coping skills that can boost self-efficacy and resilience .

Other Types of Therapy

Other similar types of therapy include cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) and solution-focused brief therapy (SFBT) . While these therapies work to change thinking and behaviors, they work a bit differently. Both CBT and SFBT are less structured than problem-solving therapy and may focus on broader issues. CBT focuses on identifying and changing maladaptive thoughts, and SFBT works to help people look for solutions and build self-efficacy based on strengths.

This form of therapy was initially developed to help people combat stress through effective problem-solving, and it was later adapted to address clinical depression specifically. Today, much of the research on problem-solving therapy deals with its effectiveness in treating depression.

Problem-solving therapy has been shown to help depression in: 

• Older adults
• People coping with serious illnesses like cancer

Problem-solving therapy also appears to be effective as a brief treatment for depression, offering benefits in as little as six to eight sessions with a therapist or another healthcare professional. This may make it a good option for someone unable to commit to a lengthier treatment for depression.

Problem-solving therapy is not a good fit for everyone. It may not be effective at addressing issues that don't have clear solutions, like seeking meaning or purpose in life. Problem-solving therapy is also intended to treat specific problems, not general habits or thought patterns .

In general, it's also important to remember that problem-solving therapy is not a primary treatment for mental disorders. If you are living with the symptoms of a serious mental illness such as bipolar disorder or schizophrenia , you may need additional treatment with evidence-based approaches for your particular concern.

Problem-solving therapy is best aimed at someone who has a mental or physical issue that is being treated separately, but who also has life issues that go along with that problem that has yet to be addressed.

For example, it could help if you can't clean your house or pay your bills because of your depression, or if a cancer diagnosis is interfering with your quality of life.

Your doctor may be able to recommend therapists in your area who utilize this approach, or they may offer it themselves as part of their practice. You can also search for a problem-solving therapist with help from the American Psychological Association’s (APA) Society of Clinical Psychology .

If receiving problem-solving therapy from a doctor or mental healthcare professional is not an option for you, you could also consider implementing it as a self-help strategy using a workbook designed to help you learn problem-solving skills on your own.

During your first session, your therapist may spend some time explaining their process and approach. They may ask you to identify the problem you’re currently facing, and they’ll likely discuss your goals for therapy .

Keep In Mind

Problem-solving therapy may be a short-term intervention that's focused on solving a specific issue in your life. If you need further help with something more pervasive, it can also become a longer-term treatment option.

Get Help Now

We've tried, tested, and written unbiased reviews of the best online therapy programs including Talkspace, BetterHelp, and ReGain. Find out which option is the best for you.

Shang P, Cao X, You S, Feng X, Li N, Jia Y. Problem-solving therapy for major depressive disorders in older adults: an updated systematic review and meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials .  Aging Clin Exp Res . 2021;33(6):1465-1475. doi:10.1007/s40520-020-01672-3

Cuijpers P, Wit L de, Kleiboer A, Karyotaki E, Ebert DD. Problem-solving therapy for adult depression: An updated meta-analysis . Eur Psychiatry . 2018;48(1):27-37. doi:10.1016/j.eurpsy.2017.11.006

Nezu AM, Nezu CM, D'Zurilla TJ. Problem-Solving Therapy: A Treatment Manual . New York; 2013. doi:10.1891/9780826109415.0001

Owens D, Wright-Hughes A, Graham L, et al. Problem-solving therapy rather than treatment as usual for adults after self-harm: a pragmatic, feasibility, randomised controlled trial (the MIDSHIPS trial) .  Pilot Feasibility Stud . 2020;6:119. doi:10.1186/s40814-020-00668-0

Sorsdahl K, Stein DJ, Corrigall J, et al. The efficacy of a blended motivational interviewing and problem solving therapy intervention to reduce substance use among patients presenting for emergency services in South Africa: A randomized controlled trial . Subst Abuse Treat Prev Policy . 2015;10(1):46. doi:doi.org/10.1186/s13011-015-0042-1

Margolis SA, Osborne P, Gonzalez JS. Problem solving . In: Gellman MD, ed. Encyclopedia of Behavioral Medicine . Springer International Publishing; 2020:1745-1747. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-39903-0_208

Kirkham JG, Choi N, Seitz DP. Meta-analysis of problem solving therapy for the treatment of major depressive disorder in older adults . Int J Geriatr Psychiatry . 2016;31(5):526-535. doi:10.1002/gps.4358

Garand L, Rinaldo DE, Alberth MM, et al. Effects of problem solving therapy on mental health outcomes in family caregivers of persons with a new diagnosis of mild cognitive impairment or early dementia: A randomized controlled trial . Am J Geriatr Psychiatry . 2014;22(8):771-781. doi:10.1016/j.jagp.2013.07.007

Noyes K, Zapf AL, Depner RM, et al. Problem-solving skills training in adult cancer survivors: Bright IDEAS-AC pilot study .  Cancer Treat Res Commun . 2022;31:100552. doi:10.1016/j.ctarc.2022.100552

Albert SM, King J, Anderson S, et al. Depression agency-based collaborative: effect of problem-solving therapy on risk of common mental disorders in older adults with home care needs . The American Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry . 2019;27(6):619-624. doi:10.1016/j.jagp.2019.01.002

By Arlin Cuncic, MA Arlin Cuncic, MA, is the author of "Therapy in Focus: What to Expect from CBT for Social Anxiety Disorder" and "7 Weeks to Reduce Anxiety." She has a Master's degree in psychology.

How Managers Can Improve Team Problem-Solving

Teaching good problem-solving means learning from previous solutions..

Posted March 28, 2024 | Reviewed by Ray Parker

• What Is a Career
• Find a career counselor near me
• We can access vast information online, but critical thinking skills are still essential.
• The key to improving team problem-solving is providing reliable resources you trust.
• Build a library of problem-solving resources, including creating step-by-step instructions and checklists.

By now, it is a hackneyed truth about today’s world that we all have endless amounts of information at our fingertips, available instantly, all the time. We have multiple competing answers to any question on any subject—more answers than an entire team, let alone an individual, could possibly master in a lifetime. The not quite as obvious punchline is this: There has been a radical change in how much information a person needs to keep inside their head versus accessible through their fingertips.

Nobody should be so short-sighted or so old-fashioned as to write off the power of being able to fill knowledge gaps on demand. Yet this phenomenon is often attributed to a growing critical thinking skills gap experienced in many organizations today.

Many people today are simply not in the habit of really thinking on their feet. Without a lot of experience puzzling through problems, it should be no surprise that so many people are often puzzled when they encounter unanticipated problems.

Here’s the thing: Nine out of ten times, you don’t need to make important decisions on the basis of your own judgment at the moment. You are much better off if you can rely on the accumulated experience of the organization in which you are working, much like we rely on the accumulated information available online.

The key is ensuring that your direct reports are pulling from sources of information and experience they and the organization can trust.

The first step to teaching anybody the basics of problem-solving is to anticipate the most common recurring problems and prepare with ready-made solutions. It may seem counterintuitive, but problem-solving skills aren’t built by reinventing the wheel: From learning and implementing ready-made solutions, employees will learn a lot about the anatomy of a good solution. This will put them in a much better position to improvise when they encounter a truly unanticipated problem.

The trick is to capture best practices, turn them into standard operating procedures, and deploy them to your team for use as job aids. This can be as simple as an “if, then” checklist:

• If A happens, then do B.
• If C happens, then do D.
• If E happens, then do F.

Here are seven tips to help you build a library of problem-solving resources for your team:

1. Break things down and write them out. Start with what you know. Break down the task or project into a list of step-by-step instructions, incorporating any resources or job aids you currently use. Then, take each step further by breaking it down into a series of concrete actions. Get as granular as you possibly can—maybe even go overboard a little. It will always be easier to remove unnecessary steps from your checklist than to add in necessary steps later.

2. Follow your instructions as if you were a newbie. Once you have a detailed, step-by-step outline, try using it as though you were totally new to the task or project. Follow the instructions exactly as you have written them: Avoid subconsciously filling in any gaps with your own expertise. Don't assume that anything goes without saying, especially if the task or project is especially technical or complex. As you follow your instructions, make corrections and additions as you go. Don't make the mistake of assuming you will remember to make necessary corrections or additions later.

3. Make final edits. Follow your updated and improved instructions one final time. Make any further corrections or additions as necessary. Include as many details as possible for and between each step.

4. Turn it into a checklist. Now, it's time to translate your instructions into a checklist format. Checklists are primarily tools of mindfulness : They slow us down and focus us on the present actions under our control. Consider whether the checklist will be more helpful if it is phrased in past or present tense. Who will be using the checklist? What information do they need to know? How much of the checklist can be understood at a glance?

5. Get outside input. Ask someone to try and use your checklist to see if it works for them. Get their feedback about what was clear, what was unclear, and why it was clear or unclear. Ask about any questions they had that weren't answered by the checklist. Solicit other suggestions, thoughts, or improvements you may not have considered. Incorporate their input and then repeat the process with another tester.

6. Use your checklist. Don't simply create your checklist for others and then abandon it. Use it in your own work going forward, and treat it as a living document. Make clarifying notes, additions, and improvements as the work naturally changes over time. Remember, checklists are tools of mindfulness. Use them to tune in to the work you already do and identify opportunities for growth and improvement.

7. Establish a system for saving drafts, templates, and examples of work that can be shared with others . Of course, checklists are just one type of shareable job aid. Sharing examples of your previous work or another team member is another useful way to help someone jumpstart a new task or project. This can be anything from final products to drafts, sketches, templates, or even videos.

Bruce Tulgan, JD, is the founder and CEO of RainmakerThinking and the author of The Art of Being Indispensable at Work.

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