global problem solving without the globaloney

YaleGlobal Online

Global problem solving without the globaloney.

Click here for the article in the Stanford Social Innovation Review.

Pankaj Ghemawat is the Anselmo Rubiralta Chair of Global Strategy at IESE Business School and the Global Professor of Management and Strategy at New York University Stern School of Business . He is the author of numerous books, including Redefining Global Strategy and World 3.0.           

Globalization and Globaloney: Pankaj Ghemawat at TEDGlobal 2012

Pankaj Ghemawat  is the author of Global 3.0: Global Prosperity and How to Achieve It , and he takes the stage to ask an important question: Just how global are we really?

It’s not a new question, of course. It’s one that David Livingstone first floated back in the 1850s, and one that’s been popularized by writers such as Thomas Friedman. But Ghemawat, who notoriously wrote the article The World Is Not Flat , wants us to take a look at some data. He asks the audience: What percentage of all voice calling minutes do you think were international? The answer is 2% (as much as 7% with internet telephony). The audience coos, clearly not expecting the number to be that small.

How about the number of first-generation immigrants? 3%. More “huh”s. Or how much direct investment was foreign? Not quite 10%. The audience gets the gist now, and here’s one last stat. Exports as percent of GDP, according to official statistics around the world, average more than 30%. “But,” he says, “there’s a big problem with the official statistics. If a Japanese component supplier ships something to China to be slotted into an iPod and then it’s shipped to the U.S., it counts multiple times.” It helps to have friends in high places: Ghemawat asked his friend Pascal Lamy, director of the World Trade Organization , to estimate this figure excluding the double-counting and triple-counting. Lamy guessed the figure would be under 20%.

“Clearly, apocalyptically minded authors have overstated the case” for globalization, says Ghemawat. The thing is: many of us seem to agree that the world is flat. “Even though I’m an economist, I find this a pretty large error,” says Ghemawat drily. “This is globaloney.”

Ghemawat didn’t mean to become the evangelist for this way of thinking. He tells us a story of being interviewed for Indian television in Mumbai. “The first question the interviewer asked me was, ‘Professor Ghemawat, why do you believe the world is still round?’ I started laughing; I hadn’t come across that formulation before and I thought I really needed a more coherent response,” he says. “But what I can’t capture for you is the pity and disbelief with which the interviewer asked the question. It’s very cool to talk about the world being one. If you raise questions about that formulation, you are considered a bit of an antique.” This, he says, was a spur to action.

Given the dearth of thoughtful debate about the topic and the peer pressure to take a trendy position, Ghemawat was also inspired by what he calls “techno-trances.” He acknowledges this might be a touchy subject for a TED audience, but “this is nothing more than an analogy with a well-known finding that if you listen to techno music for a long time it does something to your brainwave activity.” That’s similar with the belief that technology will win out over all. Ghemawat clearly doesn’t agree. So he looked at Facebook. After all, Facebook lowers the barrier to friendship. We should all have friends everywhere now. Right?

Wrong. Typically, up to 15% of your friends are from another country than the one in which you live. “Not negligible,” he acknowledges. “We don’t live in an entirely local or national world, but that’s far from the 95% level you might expect.”

So does all this matter? “Is globaloney just a harmless way to get people to pay more attention to global issues?” he asks. “I’d suggest globaloney can be very harmful to your health.” He has two points to make:

First, recognizing that the glass is only 10-20% full helps us to see that there is plenty of room for additional gains. “If we thought we were already there, there’d be no point in pushing harder,” he says. “Being accurate about how limited globalization levels are is critical to noticing that there might be room for something more that would contribute further to global welfare.”

“Secondly, avoiding overstatement is very helpful, because it reduces and in some cases reverses some of the fears people have about globalization.” For example, where French people guess that immigrants make up 24% of France’s population, the figure is actually 8%. “Maybe realizing that the number is 8% might help cool some of the superheated rhetoric we see around the immigration issue,” he says.

Meanwhile, Americans guess that foreign aid accounts for more than 30% of the U.S. federal budget. The audience laughs. They know what’s coming … the reality is about 1%. Ghemawat suggests that when some people hear the real number, they’re encouraged to invest more. And this, Ghemawat says, is the critical point. By being accurate, by aiming for even small changes, we can have an enormous effect, quickly. “Given how closed we are,” he concludes, “even incremental openness could make things dramatically better.”

Photos: James Duncan Davidson

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August 1, 2011

Globaloney: Why the World Is Not Flat...Yet

By Michael Shermer

Fast-forward to the year 2100. Computers, writes physicist and futurist Michio Kaku in Physics of the Future (Doubleday, 2011), will have humanlike intelligence, the Internet will be accessible via contact lenses, nanobots will eliminate cancers, space tourism will be cheap and popular, and we’ll be colonizing Mars. We will be a planetary civilization capable of consuming the 1017 watts of solar energy falling on Earth to meet our energy needs, with the Internet as a worldwide telephone system; English and Chinese as the contenders for a planetary language; a unified culture of common foods, fashions and films; and a truly global economy with many more international trading blocs such as we see today in the European Union and NAFTA.

Kaku’s vision of how the exchange of science, technology and ideas among all peoples will create a global civilization with greatly weakened nation-states and almost no war is epic in its scope and heroic in its inspiration. Many have felt similar hope for a united, peaceful future through globalization. Indeed, I evoked a similar image in my book The Mind of the Market (Holt, 2009), and I was inspired in part by Thomas Friedman’s wildly popular The World Is Flat (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), in which he argues for “a global, Web-­enabled playing field that allows for multiple forms of collaboration on research and work in real time, without regard to geography, distance or, in the near future, even language.”

The problem for Kaku, Friedman, me and other globalization proponents (and even opponents) is that such a future may be unattainable because of our evolved tribal natures. In fact, this is all a bunch of “globaloney,” says Pankaj Ghemawat, professor of strategic management and Anselmo Rubiralta Chair of Global Strategy at IESE Business School at the University of Navarra in Barcelona, in his new book World 3.0: Global Prosperity and How to Achieve It (Harvard Business Review Press, 2011). According to Ghemawat, only 10 to 25 percent of economic activity is international (and most of that is regional rather than global). Consider the following percentages (of the total in each category): international mail: 1; international telephone calling minutes: less than 2; international Internet traffic: 17 to 18; foreign-owned patents: 15; exports as a percentage of GDP: 26; stock-market equity owned by foreign investors: 20; first-generation immigrants: 3. As Ghemawat starkly notes, 90 percent of the world’s people will never leave their birth country. Some flattened globe.

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The problem, Ghemawat says, is that globalization theories fail to account for the very real distance factors (geographic and cultural). He crunches these factors into a distance coefficient akin to Newton’s law of gravitation. For example, he computes, “a 1 percent increase in the geographic distance between two locations leads to about a 1 percent decrease in trade between them,” a distance sensitivity of –1. Or, he calculates, “U.S. trade with Chile is only 6 percent of what it would be if Chile were as close to the United States as Canada.” Likewise, “two countries with a common language trade 42 percent more on average than a similar pair of countries that lack that link. Countries sharing membership in a trade bloc (e.g., NAFTA) trade 47 percent more than otherwise similar countries that lack such shared membership. A common currency (like the euro) increases trade by 114 percent.”

That analysis actually sounds encouraging to me if we use Kaku’s projected time frame of 2100. But Ghemawat reminds us of our deeply ingrained tendencies to want to interact with our kin and kind and to retain our local customs and culture, which may forever balkanize any globalized scheme. Even as the E.U. expands, for instance, an average of “Eurobarometer” surveys of residents of 16 E.U. countries between 1970 and 1995 made in 2004 by researchers at the Center for Economic and Policy Research found that 48 percent trust their fellow nationals “a lot,” 22 percent trust citizens of other E.U.-16 countries a lot and only 12 percent trust people in certain other countries a lot.

Human nature’s constitution dictates the constitution of human society. In this sense, the world we make very much depends on the world we inherit. 

• Global Britain or globaloney

The government’s post-Brexit foreign policy of “global Britain” is incoherent

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THE idea of a global Britain has become the foundation stone of Britain’s post-Brexit foreign policy. Theresa May says Brexit “should make us think of global Britain, a country with the self-confidence and the freedom to look beyond the continent of Europe and to the economic and diplomatic opportunities of the wider world”. Boris Johnson, Britain’s foreign secretary, declares that “whether we like it or not we are not some bit part or spear carrier on the world stage. We are a protagonist—a global Britain running a truly global foreign policy”.

But what does the phrase mean? The Commons foreign affairs committee, newly energised under Tom Tugendhat, summoned the great and the good of the foreign-policy establishment to answer this question. The results were disappointing. Some confessed that they hadn’t a clue. The Foreign Office submitted a memorandum consisting of little more than a set of aspirations with no details about how to put them into practice. Mr Tugendhat’s committee worries that “global Britain” cannot be the basis of foreign policy because it is little more than an “advertising slogan”. This columnist thinks the problem goes deeper. Global Britain is three badly thought out ideas rolled into one.

The first is that, thanks to its long history as a trading nation and imperial power, Britain is an irreducibly global country. Britain has a first-class army and a Rolls-Royce diplomatic service, with 154 embassies around the world. It is one of five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Britons play an outsized role in the most global markets—not just finance but consulting, art and pop music. Britain is home to 91 Forbes 2000 companies, 52% more than France and 78% more than Germany. Even Britain’s national sport, football, is thoroughly globalised, with foreign owners and foreign players.

All this is true up to a point. But Britain’s diplomatic and military establishment is a bit like an aristocratic family that has inherited a crumbling pile in the country and insists on keeping up appearances. The defence budget has fallen by 20% in real terms since 2007. The Foreign Office’s budget has fallen by even more. Many embassies in Africa consist of one man (or woman) and a dog. Look beneath the surface of Britain’s global companies and you find a long tail of ill-managed firms that know nothing of global markets. Talk of “global Britain” fosters dangerous illusions. It encourages grandiloquent promises about intervening here and providing aid there. It also distracts attention from serious economic problems. A sensible government would try to do something about dismal companies that trap people in unproductive work, rather than dream of freeing Britain’s successful multinationals from the (often imaginary) shackles of Brussels.

The second idea is that being global means embracing emerging markets. Since 2000 these have accounted for more than 60% of the world’s economic growth. The European Union is the economic equivalent of a “legacy system”: locked in the past, overburdened by entitlements and regulations, terrified of the creative destruction at the heart of capitalism. The emerging world, by contrast, is a bubbling cauldron of new opportunities and new consumers. The world’s economic centre of gravity has moved from the Azores in 1980 to Iran today and is likely to reach Tibet by 2050. Britain needs to move with it.

Yet this idea rests on a false antithesis. There is nothing about EU membership that prevents Britain from taking advantage of these booming markets, as Germany does rather more successfully. Emerging countries can also be difficult places to do business with, sometimes because they are run by problematic regimes, sometimes because they are riddled with corruption. In recent years Britain has swallowed its principles to attract Russian business. Now it has little choice but to engage in a costly diplomatic row at a time when, thanks to Brexit, the false choice between Europe and the world is in danger of becoming real.

The Anglosphere delusion

The third idea is that “global Britain” means the Anglosphere. This embraces countries around the world that share a common culture because they were once part of the British empire. “Outside the EU, the world is our oyster”, a Brexiteer once put it poetically. “And the Commonwealth remains that precious pearl within.” Supporters of this idea argue that the Anglosphere has deep roots in British history: in “The History of the English-Speaking Peoples”, Winston Churchill argues that England is a global island, scattering its people around the world. But they also point out that it is attractively modern. It is global where the EU is regional, networked where the EU is bureaucratic, bottom-up where the EU is top-down. In short, it is a ready-made alliance linked by a common belief in free trade and by technologies that increasingly render distance obsolete.

Pankaj Ghemawat, of New York University, says there is some truth in this. All else equal, a common language boosts trade to 2.2 times what it would be without a common language, and colonial links can boost it to 2.5 times. But then the qualifications start. Excluding Britain, the Commonwealth’s GDP is only 55% as big as the EU’s. The effect of distance trumps the effect of culture by a significant margin. And colonial links cannot be relied on. Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, is less sentimental about British rule than his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, for example, and the American elite is less Anglophile than it was.

The phrase “global Britain” is well intentioned, designed to send a message that Britain is not withdrawing from the world by leaving the EU. It remains open for business, active on the world stage, bouncily cosmopolitan. But Britain needs to do more than remain open for business. It needs to work out ways of engaging without overstretching its abilities and of embracing globalisation without forgetting that it has downsides as well as upsides. Talking globaloney isn’t going to help.

This article appeared in the Britain section of the print edition under the headline “Globaloney”

Britain March 17th 2018

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From the March 17th 2018 edition

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Global Problem Solving Without the Globaloney

Posted by hkarner - 30. Oktober 2014

Many challenges, like climate change, are global in scale, but citizens often have an exaggerated sense of other global connections, including internet use and immigration. Pankaj Ghemawat refers to outsized estimates as globaloney: “It obscures the potential gains from additional globalization, swells fears about its adverse consequences, and causes companies to adopt strategies of ‘bigger and blander.’” Repeated failure of global initiatives stretch the limited capacity for true global problem solving, Ghemawat argues, pointing out that many goals can best be approached at the regional, national, or even local level. He proposes a system for analyzing problems: not every solution requires global coordination and organizations should consider that most interactions remain distance-sensitive. Before tackling global initiatives, organizations should assess not only priorities but their own competence at handling tasks and be prepared to build cross-border trust and reduce biases. To support and lead on global initiatives, people do need accurate assessments of the many connections. – YaleGlobal

Many organizations try to solve pressing problems on a global scale; too often, the problems can be better tackled at the regional, national or local level

Believing that the world is “flat,” many organizations attempt to solve pressing social and environmental problems on a global scale. All too often, these efforts flounder because the problems that seemed global in scope could have been more effectively solved at the regional, national, or even local level. 

There is widespread belief not just that globalization is on the rise, but that it is already (close to) complete. Fed by books such as Thomas Friedman’s The World is Flat, and by heightened awareness of truly global problems such as climate change, large numbers of people believe that many, if not most, of today’s social and environmental problems are the result of global trends and that their solutions must also be global in nature. I refer to such overstatements about the extent of globalization as “globaloney.”

Consider a few examples of globaloney. The French guess that immigrants make up 24 percent of France’s population—three times the actual level. British air travelers guess that international air transport accounts for more than 20 percent of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions—10 times the actual level. And Americans guess that foreign aid accounts for more than 30 percent of the US federal budget—30 times the actual level!

Globaloney doesn’t plague just the general populace—it also infects leaders of nonprofit, business, government, and multilateral organizations. When I polled an assembly of the national envoys to the World Trade Organization, an overwhelming majority agreed with Friedman’s characterization of the world as flat—even though it raised existential questions about what they were doing in Geneva.

Globaloney has many negative consequences. It obscures the potential gains from additional globalization, swells fears about its adverse consequences, and causes companies to adopt strategies of “bigger and blander.”1 It also induces organizations and groups of organizations of all kinds to put undue emphasis on global solutions to social and environmental problems that should instead be tackled at a regional, national, or even local level. This misplaced emphasis matters because it overstretches our limited capacity for true “global problem solving” when it matters.

Consider, for instance, the Rio process orchestrated by the United Nations. It began amid much optimism with the 1992 Earth Summit, but has proven to be a colossal disappointment. Why has it largely failed? In addition to three treaties—on climate change, biodiversity, and desertification (which a review 20 years later in Nature graded with an “F”2)—the Earth Summit resulted in Agenda 21, an “action plan” that covered an astounding 27 program areas and 116 individual issues such as promoting sustainable development through trade, providing adequate financial resources to developing countries, meeting primary health care needs, and providing adequate shelter for all. Were they all appropriate subjects for a global conclave? By my reckoning, action primarily at the global level was invoked for only two of the 116 issues. Of the remaining, one-third resulted in calls for action primarily at the local level, another one-third for action at the local and global levels, and the remainder for action at the regional level as well. This classification, although subjective, is suggestive. It reminds us that not everything needs international coordination—and that even when international coordination is required, sub-global approaches (between only two nations, for example) may make more sense.

The other obvious problem with the Rio process was that the deliberations at the Earth Summit involved 172 governments and 2,400 representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—not to mention the 17,000 attendees at the parallel NGO Global Forum, which was accorded consultative status. And Rio+20 (the follow-on to the Earth Summit that took place in 2012) saw a further explosion in the number of NGOs participating. More than three times as many NGOs were officially involved, along with many more representatives from the business and investor communities.

There were some definite attractions to bringing civil society into the picture to supplement traditional government-to-government interactions, but the dismal results remind us that broad participation doesn’t guarantee that problems will actually be solved.

Global Designs To better understand how to differentiate between global and sub-global issues, and to pursue programs that are sized appropriately to the problem and the solution, I’ve devised five design principles, which I call the Five Ds: devolution, distance-sensitivity, distance-directedness, distinctive-competence, and de-biasing.

The first principle, devolution, emphasizes that not everything needs international coordination. It is based on the fact that most social and commercial interactions are only 10 to 20 percent globalized. Only a few interactions cross the 30 percent mark—and even that threshold still embodies a huge amount of “home bias.” The fact that most international flows occur between countries that are near each other geographically suggests the distance-sensitivity principle: Even if international coordination is required, high levels of distance-sensitivity typically favor sub-global approaches focusing on regions or sub-regions. Remapping the world in terms of multiple forms of distance (economic, cultural, and administrative, along with geographic) reveals the power of the distance-directedness principle in guiding choices about the locus of activity or operation (“where”), which activities to perform (“what”), and ways to organize to get them done effectively (“how”).

Realism about the general difficulties of cross-border operations and the management challenges confronting nonprofits, in particular, underlines the usefulness of the distinctive-competence principle: ask not only whether something is worth doing, but also if you, your organization, or your network are or can become capable of doing it well. And finally, remembering that most individuals are still quite distrustful of foreigners leads to the de-biasing principle: the importance of deliberately building cross-border trust by reducing home bias due to ignorance or prejudice.

Adhering to the Five Ds might not only have improved the outcomes of the Rio process, they also hold the potential to (re)direct and improve social initiatives. Consider a social innovation that has stirred up considerable interest recently: global solutions networks (GSNs), defined by author Don Tapscott as consisting of “diverse stakeholders, organized to address a global problem, making use of transnational networking, and with membership and governance that are self-organized.”3 The emergence of GSNs, which now number well into the hundreds if not thousands, is often extolled in glowing terms. (Examples of GSNs include knowledge and policy networks like the International Competition Network, advocacy and watchdog networks like Human Rights Watch, governance networks like the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and operational and delivery networks like the Red Cross.) And the potential for GSNs is indeed enhanced by the growing connectivity afforded by the Internet—the enabler emphasized by Tapscott—and the explosive growth of what Ashoka founder Bill Drayton calls the citizen sector.4

Before we get carried away with the prospects for GSNs, it is worth remembering that global conditions are in many respects more challenging today than they were when the Rio process was launched in 1992. Then, the world economy was growing rapidly, globalization was increasing, and the easing of Cold War tensions raised hopes of a real shift away from war and conflict and toward development and sustainability. Today, economic conditions are generally bleaker in advanced economies, and even faster-growing emerging economies (such as China, India, and Brazil) have experienced slumps in their growth rates. Globalization itself, after surging through 2007, faltered in the wake of the financial crisis.5 And ongoing threats to global stability and cooperation include regional economic crises such as those in the Eurozone; increases in income inequality in many countries and of xenophobia in some; continued trade imbalances; talk of currency wars and uncertainty about the dollar’s future as the world’s reserve currency; the growing obsolescence of multilateral institutions, many of which were set up in the aftermath of World War II; and geopolitical tensions in regions such as the South China Sea and Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, the notion of self-organizing GSNs spontaneously generating solutions to global problems of the sort wrestled with at Rio appears to be a triumph of hope over experience. At least some other scholars who have looked at GSNs have come to similar conclusions.6 Nevertheless, GSNs do exist, and organizations are tackling social and environmental problems at a global scale. The Five Ds are meant to provide guidance for these organizations that is grounded in what research has revealed about globalization and the responses to it.

The Devolution Principle Not all the issues raised at Rio required the powers of global problem solving (as opposed to global exhortation). Many of them could be better handled at the regional, national, or local level. But there seems to be a tendency to attach the handle “global” to issues for no other reason than to give them extra emphasis. Given the limits on our capacity for global governance, cutting back on such globaloney is one way to concentrate that capacity where it really matters.

Let’s look at some relevant evidence—at data measuring the levels of internationalization of activities that can take place either domestically or across borders. (See “Internationalization Levels” at right.) It turns out that the international component of these activities represents a small fraction—typically less than 20 percent and often less than 10 percent—of the total. Only for a few—mostly financial7—variables do internationalization levels exceed 30 percent—and even that threshold still embodies a huge amount of home bias.

Actual levels of globalization are much lower than the levels one would expect to see if the world were flat (which would typically be 85 percent or more). They are also significantly lower than most people’s intuitions. In an online survey that Harvard Business Review conducted for me, respondents pegged international phone calls at 29 percent of the total, immigrants at 22 percent of the world’s population, and foreign direct investment at 32 percent of total capital formation—an average estimate of 27 percent, more than five times the actual average.9 (CEOs, interestingly enough, overestimated by a factor of nearly seven!)

Proponents of a flat world often point to the Internet and, more broadly, to the fact that in the last few decades the cost of communication has plummeted and the richness of what can be transmitted has exploded “in a way that changes everything.” But the portion of Internet traffic that crosses international borders is actually about 17 percent—five times as high as telephone calls, but far below the level one would expect in a flat world. Similarly, an estimated 16 percent of people’s friends on Facebook are foreign,10 as are 25 percent of the people that individuals follow on Twitter.11 Just because we are able to befriend anyone living anywhere on Facebook doesn’t mean that we will—there is an important distinction between potential connectivity and actual connectedness.

All of these data suggest that the agenda for global problem solving can be simplified by deemphasizing areas where the critical phenomena unfold mainly at a local or national level. The environmental externalities caused by pollution provide an interesting example. For distance-sensitive pollutants that stay more or less within national borders—most ground and water pollution—local solutions are generally appropriate. Pollutants that cross national borders to a significant extent—usually airborne ones—are the ones that require cross-border cooperation.

The growth and sustainability of cities provides another, somewhat different example. It may make sense to build a knowledge network to share information on, say, sustainable cities around the world, and even to build an advocacy network to engage in cross-border lobbying for more enlightened urbanism, but those are limited functions that don’t require much coordination across borders.

The broader point is that a problem needs to be more than globally widespread to be a candidate for global solutions that go beyond simple information-sharing. Requiring some coordination of responses across borders, rather than simply sharing information about different types of possible responses, is the acid test for global problem solving. Hence the devolution principle: Not every global problem needs coordination across national borders, and many issues are, in fact, tackled most effectively at the national or local level.

The Distance-Sensitivity Principle If the devolution principle was about determining which issues should be coordinated internationally and which should be addressed at the local or national level, the distance-sensitivity principle is about how best to structure what does make it onto the international agenda. This principle is predicated on the law of distance—the observation that the lion’s share of international interactions takes place between countries that are close to each other rather than far apart. What this implies is that many “international” issues are actually regional ones and not truly global.

The distance-sensitivity principle can be illustrated by extending the earlier discussion of pollution. Airborne pollutants can range across borders, but in very different ways. Acid rain, for example, tends to have a regional footprint, accounting for the success of intra-regional initiatives such as cooperation between the United States and Canada (most notably, their 1991 Air Quality Agreement), which has helped reduce North American acid rain by 65 percent since 1976. In contrast, carbon dioxide emissions that cause global warming have an unusually low distance-sensitivity and, therefore, warrant a fully global focus.

It is not just pollutants that obey the law of distance. Distance-sensitivity also applies to the voluntary international interactions that are more commonly studied in the context of globalization: trade in products and services, flows of capital, migrations of people, and flows of information. Instead of being randomly distributed, these flows often have a regional structure.

Germany, for example, is known for its manufacturing prowess and its ability to export its products around the world, but the bulk of its trade occurs within Europe, particularly with its immediate neighbors. About 60 percent of Germany’s exports go to other EU countries. Within Europe, there are also significant variations: Germany represents a particularly high share of Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary’s overall imports. (See “German Exports” below.) Those countries are close to Germany not only geographically and linguistically, but also historically: Apart from Switzerland, these countries, along with Germany, constituted the Holy Roman Empire circa 1500.

Similar patterns are evident for other kinds of international interactions. Sixty percent of German banks’ foreign lending is to the rest of Europe—which also accounts for 70 to 85 percent of Germany’s foreign direct investment, portfolio equity holdings, international phone calls, and international tourist arrivals. There are good reasons why the Eurozone crisis is, despite its potential global ramifications, mostly being handled in Europe.

Europe is more integrated than most continents, but similar patterns exist in other parts of the world. If we look at the world as a whole, 53 percent of merchandise trade, 52 percent of foreign direct investment, 51 percent of international telephone calls, and 49 percent of international migration all take place within rather than between roughly continent-sized regions12 The high average level of regionalization suggests that many issues that require international coordination might be best addressed at the regional rather than the global level. And geography isn’t the only possible basis for distinguishing between the near abroad and the far abroad. Others include cultural ties, political alignment, and degree of economic development.

The Distance-Directedness Principle

The distance-directedness principle also relies on the law of distance, but shifts the focus from devising the global problem-solving agenda to shedding light on what the actors involved in it should do. The most interesting research in this area are the studies that use “gravity” models to investigate the factors underlying the law of distance, particularly concerning trade. Gravity models in international economics link interactions between countries to the product of their economic masses, divided by some composite measure of distance. Gravity models not only help us understand why, for instance, the US-Canadian trading relationship is the largest in the world; they also explain, in a statistical sense, two-thirds or more of all the variation in bilateral trade intensities between all possible pairs of countries.

Distance, however, is not simply measured in miles. For example, the geographical distance between the United States and England may be substantial, but the two countries’ shared linguistic, cultural, and historical heritage supplies important bridges that narrow the gap. The CAGE Distance Framework posits that “distance” includes multiple dimensions—cultural, administrative (or political), geographic, and economic (CAGE). And whereas there are many differences between countries, the seven variables highlighted in red in the table explain 70 to 90 percent of the variation in country-to-country flows of trade, capital, people, and information.13 (See “CAGE Distance Framework” below.) To illustrate the usefulness of the CAGE Distance Framework, consider some of the questions that businesses have found it helpful in answering—many of which can be adapted to the social sector.

What? | Businesses also seem more inclined to recognize that their strategies in the countries in which they operate must respond in some way to international differences. That said, they often fail to consider the full range of strategy levers for dealing with the differences that matter the most in their industries: most broadly, using multiple levers and sub-levers of adaptation to adjust to differences; aggregating across countries to (partially) overcome differences; and arbitraging to exploit (selected) differences. Consider some analogues for social sector initiatives: Does a family-planning initiative targeting poor, strife-torn, traditional societies, which often have high gender inequality and fertility rates, make adequate allowance for effective approaches in male-dominated societies? Can the Grameen Foundation, the hugely successful pioneer of microlending in Bangladesh, identify important common social needs that cut across or aggregate segments in poor countries that it can effectively help meet? Some degree of confidence that it can do so should underpin its expansion into nearly three dozen additional countries. And arbitrage or targeting differences along selected dimensions raises important issues ranging from building low-cost but adequate delivery structures for very-low-income countries to questions about the focus of social-sector initiatives on extreme deprivation, as opposed to on some other area for improvement.

How? | Some businesses also understand that their ability to address cross-country differences depends not only on the objective distances to be traversed, but also on their internal capabilities for dealing with them. Businesses and social enterprises should consider the following questions before expanding: Do the critical people in your organization understand how global we actually are, or have they fallen prey to globaloney? Do they have a framework for understanding the underlying differences between countries—and differences in differences—that underlie limited levels of cross-border integration? Are they housed in one location or dominated by one nationality? Are they involved in cross-border projects and networks, and, ideally, have they ever been rotated abroad? Are they prepared to engage in the debate about the social consequences of globalization in general and your organization’s particular involvement in it?

The Distinctive-Competence Principle The distinctive-competence principle extends the where, what, and how questions, to ask whether a particular social enterprise is best positioned to pursue a particular global problem-solving opportunity—or would the cause be served better by joining up with an existing organization or network, or letting some other organization pursue it? The distinctive-competence principle emphasizes that individuals or organizations that are considering entering or expanding in the social sector need to ask themselves whether their involvement would lead to creating significantly more total value than would happen otherwise. The corollary is that organizations should ideally account for the opportunity costs of donors’ resources, even if those resources are contributed free.

Most social enterprises do not measure their performance by undertaking this sort of cost-benefit analysis. But the approach does merit more attention. Industrial organization economics indicates that at least in the absence of product differentiation, there is a tendency for an excessive number of companies to enter a market simply to take business away from existing companies without growing the market or providing any other particular benefit to society.14 These effects might be aggravated in the social sector by “messianic complexes” that could lead to even more entrants than in the for-profit benchmark.15 The good news is that in the social sector, it seems reasonable (or, at least, more reasonable than in the private sector) to ask players to internalize the social costs of their entry or expansion. Another implication of this line of reasoning is that initiatives that add to variety, whether in means or ends, are generally more deserving of grace than initiatives that simply pile additional resources onto established, relatively well-funded efforts.

To be a bit less stringent and a bit more practical, a social enterprise might not be the best in the world at what it does or aims to do, but it does have to be—or have plans to become—pretty good in the relevant respects. Without those plans, the adage by Kenneth Andrews, who wrote the classic text on business strategy, applies: “Opportunism without competence is a path to fairyland.”16

To better understand these ideas, consider again the example of Worldreader.org. Its two founders focused their nonprofit on education because they had backgrounds in the field, and on e-books because one had connections in high-tech. This knowledge and these connections increased the odds of being able to do something special within the zone of distinctive-competence rather than outside it. But they also set up a clear evaluation mechanism by hiring MIT Professor Esther Duflo to help design and analyze their first field trials. And because Worldreader.org was designed to be an operational and delivery network, it clearly did require the development of some significant organizational capabilities, as well as a structure to house them in, rather than an attempt to “organize without an organization.”

The De-Biasing Principle

The final principle—de-biasing—shifts the focus from governments, NGOs, and businesses to individuals. It recognizes that distrust of foreigners is rampant, reducing cross-border interactions and imposing constraints on global problem solving. To counter this bias it is important to build cross-border trust. To figure out what might be done in this regard, it is best to start with some data—in this case, concerning the extent to which citizens of various European countries reported trusting their co-citizens and others.

Close to 50 percent of respondents to the 1996 “Eurobarometer” survey reported trusting their fellow citizens “a lot,” but only 20 percent reported trusting citizens of the other 16 European Union countries “a lot,” and just over 10 percent reported trusting citizens of other countries “a lot.” There is some variation by country (Italians report trusting the Swiss more than they trust other Italians), but on average, nationals of EU countries express “a lot” of trust twice as often in co-nationals as in nationals of other “nearby” EU countries, and four times as often compared to nationals of countries that are farther away. These data from the EU are indicative of what researchers have found in other parts of the world. Scholars have concluded that trust falls as the populations of any two countries grow more different in their languages, religions, genes, body types, geographic distance, and incomes, and if they have a more extensive history of wars.17 This differential distrust of foreigners is estimated to have big effects. Statistical studies suggest that moving from lower to higher levels of bilateral trust can increase trade, direct investment, portfolio investment, and venture capital investment by 100 percent or more, even after controlling for other characteristics of the two countries.18

Fear of foreigners, particularly the ones who are most “foreign,” is compounded by the constraints that cross-cultural mistrust imposes on attempts to reduce other kinds of barriers to international flows. Consider some additional examples from Western Europe—a region where nationalism has recently been more or less held in check, where countries have pursued formal administrative integration to an extent unparalleled in other regions, and where education levels are generally high. Despite this context, cultural fears have loomed very large as economic pressures have mounted. Much of the surging protectionist and, especially, anti-immigrant sentiment has not just nationalistic but cultural roots. The economic case for large-scale immigration into Europe is clear; most of the fears around immigrants have to do with cultural fears more than ostensibly economic dimensions.

In figuring out how to build trust, it is also useful to note that much cross-cultural mistrust seems to be rooted in cultural insecurities. A survey of 47 countries around the world indicates a strong positive correlation between perceiving one’s own culture to be superior and perceiving it to need protection. The list is headed by India, where 93 percent of respondents agreed that their culture was superior and 92 percent agreed that it needed to be protected. India is followed by Indonesia, Tanzania, and Bangladesh. In contrast, the bottom of the list is occupied by Sweden, where only 21 percent of respondents agreed that their culture was superior and 29 percent that it needed protection. Interestingly, Swedes are highly trusted as well as trusting, illustrating a more general pattern across the countries included in both surveys: Countries that feel the least superior and defensive about their own cultures also tend to be the most trusting—and trusted.

In keeping with the distance-directedness principle, the challenge of building cross-border trust is likely to be different in, say, the Netherlands and Nepal, not the least because the former is already more than one hundred times as connected with the rest of the world than is the latter. But both countries do present challenges. Think of the success in the Netherlands, traditionally a haven of tolerance, of Geert Wilders’s wildly misnamed Freedom Party, with its anti-immigrant and now Europhobic posturing.

Research on the determinants of cultural chauvinism and related fears does identify some apparent commonalities across countries— and some broad paths forward. Higher education levels in a country cause levels of nationalism and suspicion of outsiders to decrease. The extent to which an individual participates in the network of global economic, social, and cultural relations and of inclusive social identification with the world community seems important. Traveling and living abroad seems to broaden individuals’ perspectives. And scholars have found that security of property rights and the rule of law are prerequisites for trust to emerge, rather than what they often seem: vital substitutes for trust.

On the basis of these findings, several concrete steps for building trust and reducing excess cultural fear can be undertaken. These steps include more education; monitoring of negativism in the media and in political discourse; encouraging more interpersonal contacts across cultures and ensuring that they are as pleasant as possible; and building a cosmopolitan global social identity. One might also try to build cross-cultural understanding between countries in which economic potential exists, but political and cultural relationships are strained (such as India and Pakistan or Israel and Palestine); to prioritize support for the rule of law; and to encourage the private sector to become involved in building bridges between cultures.

Implications for Global Problem-Solving Leaders

Focus the agenda for global problem solving. | The devolution and distance-sensitivity principles offer systematic advice on how to set—and, in particular, limit—the agenda for global problem solving. Individuals and organizations should analyze the extent of globalization and the distance-sensitivity of the problems they wish to address. Calculate the percentage of the relevant activity that takes place domestically versus internationally and the percentage of the international component that crosses regional boundaries. Even if a similar problem appears in many countries, if it requires little coordination across borders, most of the effort expended toward solving it should be local, national, or regional, rather than global. Limiting truly global efforts to the problems that really demand them can help us make better use of our still very limited bandwidth for worldwide cooperation.

Select and structure initiatives so as to add value. | The distance-directedness and distinctive-competence principles look at some of the same observations about limited globalization and considerable distance-sensitivity from the perspective of the organizational actors involved in global problem solving. Distance-directedness supplies guidance about the where, what, and how of an organization’s pursuit of its mission across borders, and distinctive-competence about the more basic existential question of whether it is a good instrument for that pursuit. A starting point for operationalizing these two principles is to use the CAGE Distance Framework to understand that where you are coming from affects where you might want to try to contribute and what kinds of adaptation to cross-country differences might be required. Having applied the framework to get a more realistic sense of the border-crossing and distance-bridging challenges your effort faces, ask whether your organization or network is really the right one to pursue a particular opportunity—or whether it is better pursued through other means.

Work on improving people’s attitudes towards globalization. | The de-biasing principle goes even more micro, emphasizing that individuals’ attitudes toward globalization and foreigners in particular constrain both the global agenda and what organizational actors can hope to accomplish within it. Somewhere within global problem solving we must find room to consider educational initiatives that aim to shape people’s attitudes—by connecting them better with the systematic evidence about the extent, patterns, and consequences of globalization, as well as with each other.

Notes 1 For a detailed discussion of the consequences of globaloney and how to do better, see Pankaj Ghemawat, World 3.0: Global Prosperity and How to Achieve It, Harvard Business Review Press, 2011. 2 Jeff Tollefson and Natasha Gilbert, “Earth Summit: Rio Report Card,” Nature, no. 486 (7401):20–23. doi: 10.1038/486020a. Available at: http://www.nature.com/news/earth-summit-rio-report-card-1.10764 3 http://gsnetworks.org/ 4 Eli Malinsky, “Bill Drayton’s Five Trends for Social Entrepreneurs,” Forbes, Dec. 12, 2012. Accessed on June 18, 2014, at http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashoka/2012/12/12/bill-draytons-five-advice-for-social-entrepreneurs-what-the-future-holds-and-how-you-should-adjust/ 5 Pankaj Ghemawat and Steven A. Altman, Depth Index of Globalization 2013. Available at www.ghemawat.com/dig/ 6 Kenneth W. Abbott and Thomas Hale, “Orchestrating Global Solution Networks,” http://gsnetworks.org/research_posts/orchestrating-global-solution-networks/ . 7 Although nominal exports add up to 32 percent of global GDP, if you remove doublecounting, only about 23 percent of value added around the world gets exported. 8 Mail (international share of letter-post items, 2012) is based on data from Universal Postal Union; University students (students enrolled in degree programs outside their home countries as share of total tertiary education enrollment, 2011) is based on data from Euromonitor Passport, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, and Ministry of Education of the Republic of China (Taiwan); Immigrants (immigrants’ share of total world population, 2012) is based on data from United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin,” 2013 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/ Rev.2013) and World Development Indicators; Telephone calls (international share of total telephone call minutes, including calls placed over the Internet, 2013 estimate) is based on data from International Telecommunication Union and Telegeography (note that this estimate includes calls between telephones using voice over IP technology, calls between telephones and computers, and calls directly between computers via Skype but does not include calls directly between computers using other services); Co-invented patents (share of patents with at least one foreign coinventor in OECD member countries, 2009-2011) is based on data from OECD Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard 2013: Innovation for Growth; Direct investment (Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows as percentage of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 2012) comes from UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013; Private charity (share of grants from US foundations to non-US based charitable organizations, 2007) comes from Global Geneva; Tourists (international share of total international and domestic tourist arrivals, 2012) taken from United Nations World Tourism Organization, “UNWTO Tourism Highlights,” 2013 edition; Facebook friends (share of Facebook friends located in different countries, 2011) comes from Jason Ugander, Brian Karrer, Lars Backstrom, and Cameron Marlow, “The Anatomy of the Facebook Social Graph,” arXiv:1111.4503, [cs.SI], Nov. 2011; Internet traffic (international share of total Internet traffic, 2012) is an estimate based on data from Cisco Visual Networking Index and Telegeography; Twitter followers (share of Twitter followers located in different countries from the people they follow, 2012) comes from Yuri Takhteyev, Anatoliy Gruzd, and Barry Wellman, “Geography of Twitter Networks,” Social Networks, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan. 2012; Mergers (international share of total M&A transactions both in number of transactions and in value based on the 40 percent of transactions with values reported, excluding spinoffs, 2013) comes from Thomson Research; Public debt (foreign debt share of total public debt, 2012), based on data from Euromonitor; Exports/GDP (gross exports of goods and commercial services as percentage of world GDP, 2012) comes from World Trade Organization and World Development Indicators; Portfolio equity stocks (inward portfolio equity stock as percent of market capitalization of listed companies, weighted average across 88 countries, 2012) comes from IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics and Euromonitor. 9 Harvard Business Review online globalization survey launched on April 25, 2007. 10 Jason Ugander, Brian Karrer, Lars Backstrom, and Cameron Marlow, “The Anatomy of the Facebook Social Graph,” arXiv:1111.4503 [cs.SI], Nov. 2011. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1111.4503 11 Yuri Takhteyev, Anatoliy Gruzd, and Barry Wellman, “Geography of Twitter Networks,” Social Networks, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan. 2012: 73-81. Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378873311000359 12 Pankaj Ghemawat and Steven A. Altman, “DHL Global Connectedness Index 2012,” Report, Deutsche Post DHL, 2012. Available at: http://www.dhl.com/en/about_us/logistics_insights/studies_research/global_connectedness_index/global_connectedness_index_2012 13 Pankaj Ghemawat and Tamara de la Mata, “Globalization and Gravity,” unpublished working paper, IESE Business School, Sept. 2013. 14 N. Gregory Mankiw and Michael D. Whinston, “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,” The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 17, no. 1, Spring 1986: 48-58. Available at: http://www.jstor.org.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/stable/2555627 15 It has even been suggested that “While social entrepreneurs are driven by an ethical obligation and desire to improve their communities and societies, egoism can drive them to follow unethical practices. Egoism is especially relevant because the identity and passions of social entrepreneurs usually compel them to create and lead social ventures.” Shaker A. Zahra, Eric Gedajlovic, Donald O. Neubaum, and Joel M. Shulman, “A Typology of Social Entrepreneurs: Motives, Search Processes, and Ethical Challenges,” Journal of Business Venturing, 24, 2009: 528. Available at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0883902608000529 16 Kenneth Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy, Richard D. Irwin, 1971. 17 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange,” working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research, Dec. 2004. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11005 < 18 On the first three flows, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange.” On venture capital investment, see Laura Bottazzi, Marco Da Rin, and Thomas Hellmann, “The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital,” ECGI – Finance Working Paper No. 187/2007; EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper; CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-49 (Revision of No. 2009-43); TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2010-023. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997934

Pankaj Ghemawat is the Anselmo Rubiralta Chair of Global Strategy at IESE Business School and the Global Professor of Management and Strategy at New York University Stern School of Business. He is the author of numerous books, including Redefining Global Strategy and World 3.0.

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This entry was posted on 30. Oktober 2014 um 08:20 and is filed under Artikel . Verschlagwortet mit: Germany , Ghemawat , Globaloney , Trade , Yale . You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response , oder trackback from your own site.

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word histories

“ad fontes!”

‘globaloney’: meaning and origin

Of American-English origin, the noun globaloney denotes nonsensical or absurd talk or ideas concerning global issues .

For example, the following is from After Salisbury 1 , Britain must realise its true friends are in Europe , by Martin Kettle, published in The Guardian (London and Manchester, England) of Wednesday 21 st March 2018:

Of all the vacuous slogans generated by the entire Brexit campaign and process, “Global Britain” is the most vacuous of all. Not before time, the phrase is being called out for what it really is. Last week the Commons foreign affairs select committee dismissed it as meaningless, the former head of the Foreign Office trashed it as “mushy thinking”, while the Economist scorned it as “globaloney”.

1 This refers to the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the British intelligence agencies, and of his daughter, Yulia Skripal, on Sunday 4 th March 2018 in the city of Salisbury, England.

A blend of the adjective global and of the noun baloney , denoting nonsense , globaloney was coined by the U.S. playwright, diplomat and journalist Clare Boothe Luce (1903-1987) in her maiden speech to the House of Representatives on Tuesday 9 th February 1943 (she had, in 1942, won a Republican seat representing Fairfield County, Connecticut); newspapers nationwide reported on that speech the following day—for example, The Burlington Free Press (Burlington, Vermont):

Clare Boothe Luce Calls Some Of Wallace’s 2 Views ‘Globaloney’ Washington, Feb. 9. (AP)—Rep. Clare Boothe Luce, in her first speech to congress, today urged creation of a full-fledged house committee to deal with present and post-war civilian aviation, and described as “globaloney” some of Vice-President Wallace’s views. “If out of indifference or lack of foresight, this administration, and this congress, espouse the wrong air policy for this nation, we shall have most efficiently laid the ground-work for America’s certain defeat in world war III,” said Mrs. Luce (R.-Conn.) The blonde playwright declared the international aviation score stands thus: “We have been insensibly but steadily losing, not gaining our commercial air supremacy abroad. Our pride in the extraordinary job they (the army and navy) have so gallantly done in the face of great obstacles is boundless, but we beg them to be most careful not to fritter away our best chance of winning the peace—which is post-war civilian, as well as military, control of the air.” Mrs. Luce expressed agreement with some of Vice-President Wallace’s ideals, but asserted he did “a great deal of global thinking” in a recent magazine article. “Much of what Mr. Wallace calls his global thinking is, no matter how you slice it , still globaloney,” she said. “Mr. Wallace’s warp of sense and his woof of nonsense is very thickly cloth out of which to cut the pattern of a post-war world.” While planning for post-war aviation could be undertaken now, she said, the same was not true of other peace aims—“there is a vast area of specific war and peace aims which can never be clarified, stated or proposed, and certainly not enjoined upon the world, until we know what goes on in the mind of Josef Stalin.”

2 Henry Agard Wallace (1888-1965) served as the 33 rd Vice President of the USA (1941-45) under Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882-1945), 32 nd President of the USA (1933-45).

The word globaloney gained such currency in 1943 that Marcia Winn 3 listed it—without mentioning its coiner—in the following from her column Front Views & Profiles , published in the Chicago Daily Tribune ( Chicago , Illinois) of Friday 31 st December:

The Year Behind Us […] It was the year nail brushes, Kleenex, and butter began to vanish from the American scene and words such as seep [sea going jeep], globaloney, and televise crept into the American tongue.

3 Katherine Marcia Winn (1911-1961) was a U.S. journalist.

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Vào giữa năm 2021, khi tình hình dịch bệnh diễn ra phức tạp, ubnd tphcm ra quyết định trưng dụng khu nhà tái định cư bình khánh (khu đô thị mới thủ thiêm, tp thủ Đức) và khu tái định cư vĩnh lộc b (huyện bình chánh, tphcm) làm bệnh viện dã chiến điều trị cho bệnh nhân covid-19, hiện, hàng chục nghìn căn hộ tại 2 khu này tiếp tục bị rơi vào trạng thái hoang vắng, thưa thớt người

Tại sao bệnh viện chợ rẫy Đóng cửa, Ớn lạnh tòa nhà thuận kiều

Giám đốc bệnh viện chợ rẫy khẳng định giá gói thầu đang là vấn đề khó khăn nhất của bệnh viện, nếu tiếp tục chờ đợi 3 báo giá, chắc chắn bệnh viện sẽ tạm ngưng hoạt động vì không đủ hóa chất

Tại sao bệnh viện thiếu thuốc, vật tư, trang thiết bị y tế?

Mặc dù chính phủ, quốc hội, bộ y tế đã ban hành nhiều văn bản nhằm tháo gỡ tình trạng thiếu thuốc, vật tư y tế tại các bệnh viện, thực tế bệnh viện vẫn thiếu thuốc, vật tư, người bệnh phải đi mua từ băng gạc đến kim tiêm, bệnh nhân truyền máu tại viện huyết học và truyền máu trung ương - Ảnh minh họa: dƯƠng liỄutại buổi cung cấp thông tin cho báo chí chiều 15-12, bộ y tế cho hay việc thiếu thuốc không phải do văn bản hướng dẫn của bộ y tế, cũng không do ảnh hưởng kết quả đấu thầu tập trung cấp

Tại sao bệnh viện lại cần quản trị bệnh viện, quản trị bệnh viện

Tại sao lại có bệnh ung thư lại gọi là k ung thư là gì, uống thuốc không đúng bệnh có sao không, bạn có mắc những lỗi này khi uống thuốc không, vì sao bệnh ung thư tử cung, nguyên nhân gây ra bệnh ung thư cổ tử cung là gì, vì sao bệnh ung thư vòm họng giai đoạn đầu: hình ảnh, dấu hiệu và điều trị.

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Building a Canadian Social Finance Fund

Government and its partners can achieve transformative change by taking a big leap.

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By Stephen Huddart & Tim Draimin Winter 2018

On a hope-filled day in September 2015, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau joined 150 world leaders in New York for the proclamation of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals—the global action plan to reach a sustainable and equitable future by 2030.

Canadian Innovation in an Age of Acceleration

This special supplement highlights innovative social programs, collaborations, and movements underway among Canada’s diverse communities—150 years after the country’s founding—and shares ideas for others involved in similar efforts around the world.

The Critical Role of Traditional Knowledge in Social Innovation | 3

A new model for csr | 1, the digital future of canadian philanthropy | 1, a path to community driven food innovation, fighting social exclusion, one encounter at a time | 1, supporting women’s rights in troubled times | 1, an invitation to explore indigenous innovation, out of the lab and into the frontline, crowdsourcing refugee resettlement | 2, canada and the sustainable development goals | 1.

Today, the world is different. Just when we most need concerted action on issues such as climate change, income inequality, and international migration, the sad reality is that populism, cynicism, and insularity have taken over the political agendas of some of our closest allies. Meanwhile, Canada is facing its own challenges, such as the transition to a low-carbon economy, and economic reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples.

Against this challenging global backdrop, however, Canada still has a unique opportunity to grow and share its capacity for social innovation by advancing its social financing capabilities.

Canadian social innovation and social finance have coevolved over the last decade. For example, from its inception in 2007, the collaborative partnership Social Innovation Generation (SiG) has fostered a culture of continuous social innovation in Canada, including a focus on impact investing. In 2010, the partnership initiated the Canadian Task Force on Social Finance to identify opportunities to mobilize private capital for public good. Among its recommendations: Philanthropic foundations should allocate at least 10 percent of their assets to impact investments by 2020. The Task Force also catalyzed the founding of the MaRS Centre for Impact Investing in Toronto, one of a growing number of intermediaries serving the financing needs of purpose-driven organizations.

Governments at the local, provincial, and federal levels also have taken noteworthy action. Following framework legislation and financial support, the Quebec social economy has come to represent nearly 10 percent of the province’s GDP. The Chantier de l’économie sociale, a civil society organization created by social movements, nonprofits, and cooperative enterprises, was an instrumental partner in this effort with global links.

Reflecting this level of activity, Canada ranked third in the Economist ’s 2016 global Social Innovation Index , after the United States and the United Kingdom. Building on what has been accomplished to date, the federal government is now working with practitioners and experts from across government, the private sector, civil society, and academia to cocreate a bold new social innovation and social finance strategy for Canada.

Designing a Social Finance Solution

Several countries have recognized that injecting capital into the social finance market is a natural next step for enabling its success. Using unclaimed assets and investments from leading banks, the United Kingdom established Big Society Capital in 2012 to capitalize the world’s first social finance wholesaler. Inspired by the British model, Japan will soon launch its own version of a social impact fund. Portugal used European Union Structural Funds to create Portugal Inovação Social , a financing wholesaler that will also support capacity building, match philanthropic and private investments, and support outcomes budgeting. Meanwhile, Impact Investing Australia and key stakeholders are developing Impact Capital Australia to use public funds to leverage capital from retail banks into the social sector.

A July 2017 meeting at the Global Steering Group on Impact Investing conference in Chicago brought together individuals from around the world to discuss plans to set up government-anchored impact funds. Canada is among the countries exploring options for structuring a fund, or funds, to address crosscutting national challenges on the one hand, and locally determined priorities on the other.

A Canadian version of such a fund could forge multisector partnerships, structure blended finance instruments, and—in association with existing intermediaries—provide complementary services. It could create impact investment opportunities, collaborate with innovation teams, and deploy tools to fit specific challenges—thematically, regionally, and nationally. It could also structure outcomes funds, incentivizing long-term results over short-term “outputs,” as documented and discussed in the recent book What Matters: Investing in Results to Build Strong, Vibrant Communities . 1

Additionally, a Canadian social innovation grant fund, complemented by an open data strategy and enhanced capacity for outcomes measurement, would complement the work of a social finance fund by increasing deal flow and ensuring that solutions could scale bottom-up, top-down, and horizontally. It could align and expand on the current ecosystem of social purpose organizations, investors, intermediaries, social innovation labs, research institutes, and data centers, among other actors.

Beyond innovative financing, the fund could operate challenge platforms to find open-source solutions to social challenges, as the new Smart Cities Challenge proposes. Additional social infrastructure—social innovation labs, What Works Centres that support evidence-based decision making, research and development, open-source technology platforms, and other complementary capacities—would further contribute to a pipeline of investable solutions with transformative impacts.

A social finance fund in Canada would stimulate innovation in the public service and bring new dynamism to the social sector, renewing the relationship between government, philanthropy, and the private sector at a time when meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals demands an all-out effort. Transformative change will require not only collaboration within government and across sectors, but also new sources of capital, new approaches to managing risk, and new uses of data.

In Canada and around the world, social finance and social innovation are evolving rapidly and becoming increasingly networked. We have arrived at a threshold moment when we must take the work to another level of scale. Building on Canada’s existing strengths, and learning from the experiences of others, affords us an opportunity to transform our challenges into opportunities for inclusive growth.

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Read more stories by Stephen Huddart & Tim Draimin .

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