to what extent do conservatives agree on human nature essay

Conservative Views On:

• Human nature: human beings seen as limited in capacity and flawed. No one person knows the absolute truth, so ideologies attempting to explain existence are to be distrusted. Human nature has both positive and negative aspects. Because of the negatives, there is the need for security and law and order to protect and guard. Society is a vulnerable place and strong legal frameworks are needed to protect humans from one another. Human nature leads people to familiar patterns of life and the tried and tested as opposed to the new and novel.
• State: there is a need for the state to provide law and order and defence. The state is a unifying force to promote national cohesion and unity. The neoliberal element of the New Right has favoured rolling back the state in the economy to become more laissez faire.
• Society: society is organic – a living thing which passes permanent and core values through the ages. As such, society is formed by the principles of tradition, authority and principled morality. Society is a comforting influence for family and group life. In contrast, neoliberals have favoured individual autonomy over the cherishing of society.
• Economy: support for free market and individual enterprise. If the economy prospers and wealth is created in terms of property, then property owners develop a stake in society and will not rebel. One Nation conservatives support intervention in the economy to avoid upheaval.

Traditional Conservatism

Conservatism arose as a reaction to political, social, economic change in the late 18 th century. Edmund Burke, and others, regretted the events of the French Revolution, and the (as he saw it) disorder and chaos that had followed it. Traditional conservatism is therefore a defence of the ideas of hierarchy and paternalism, and of the established order. Traditional conservatives support the concept of the organic society, and that humans should not therefore attempt to reform society as those involved in the French Revolution had attempted to do. Reform instead should be pragmatic, not principled or ideological. If it is not, the breakdown of society may follow. Traditional conservatives also support the idea that society is naturally hierarchical, and that people should therefore be rewarded differently (in pay and status) depending on what position they are in in the hierarchy.

Early traditional conservatives saw the aristocracy as the ‘natural’ leaders of society, due to the fact that they had been raised to be leaders and assume positions of authority. This led to the belief in noblesse oblige , that the aristocracy had a duty to care for the less fortunate in society, as they were the only ones who could. This is a form of ‘soft’ paternalism, where those below accept that the natural leaders of society are those best equipped to act in everyone’s best interests.

One Nation Conservatism

This aspect of conservatism is most closely associated with Benjamin Disraeli, a novelist and UK Prime Minster (1804-81). Disraeli was concerned about the effects of early industrialisation and laissez-faire capitalism, chiefly that Britain was at risk of becoming divided into ‘two nations’- the rich and the poor. Unrestrained capitalism could lead to selfish individualism, weakening the sense of responsibility people have to each other. He suggested that conservatism should renew its commitment to those in authority helping those better off. This was partly based on the moral idea of noblesse oblige , that the ‘price of privilege’ was shouldering responsibility for the least well-off in society. However, there were also practical reasons for this view, which were that, by caring for the least well-off and making sure they were provided for, the chance of the ruling elite being overthrown by the discontented masses in revolution was reduced. This therefore could be seen as another example of prudent ‘change in order to conserve’. Ultimately, preventing revolution is in the interests of the most well-off.

This form of conservatism was most influential in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, and was also dominant in the years following the Second World War. This was seen by Conservative Party government’s acceptance of welfarism and support for Keynesian economic intervention. Harold Macmillan further developed these ideas through the ‘middle way’, which tried to balance free-market individualist liberalism against socialist-style collectivism and state planning. One Nation views were largely side-lined during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership- she referred to those who opposed her New Right policies as ‘wets’ (whereas she and her supporters were ‘dries’). David Cameron’s call for ‘compassionate conservatism’ in his early days as Conservative Party leader was also seen as a potential return to One Nation values.

The New Right

This emerged in the 1970s as a rival tradition to One Nation conservatism. It was a response to the end of the long ‘boom’ in economic progress experienced by the western world partly as a result of Keynesian economics. By the 1970’s western economies were struggling with what became known as ‘stag-flation’, a combination of economic stagnation (lack of economic growth) and rising inflation (caused by large amounts of public spending). At the same time, many conservatives believed that liberal individualism had gone too far in the 1960s and 1970s and had created a permissive culture of low morality and instability. This period created a movement within conservatism based around a combination of traditional conservative ideals and classical liberal economics. The New Right has been seen as two ideological theories bound together- the liberal New Right (neo-liberalism) and the conservative New Right (Neo-conservatism).

Neoliberalism

The liberal new right can be seen as a meeting of the conservative and classical liberal ideologies. It developed as a response to what was argued as the failure of Keynesian economics in the 1970s. It is a restated case in support of the free market and therefore rejects the use of the state – it can be summed up in terms of ‘public bad, private good’. The state is regarded as a realm of coercion and of a lack of freedom. This form of libertarian economic thinking states that the free market will work for the good of all.

Liberal new right thinking, based on the ideas of Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, has built upon the free market ideas of economist Adam Smith. They argued that by the 1970s it was clear that the state could not effectively manage supply and demand efficiently and therefore provide general prosperity. As a result, the state should be minimalized and the economy dominated by free market thinking. This argues that the market acts as a central and organic nervous system that allows resources to be channelled where they are wanted and needed through the powers of supply and demand. This argument suggests that the state is the cause of economic problems due to its intervention in the market, creating inefficiency.

Friedman argued that Keynesian economics was causing problems with the economy. He claimed that by focusing on creating demand and therefore jobs and employment, Keynesianism had created a more dangerous economic problem- inflation.

The idea was that by creating employment and through rising demand prices had risen too sharply and quality had dropped, leading to inflation and economic failure. He argued that there was a natural rate of unemployment in a healthy economy. If the state tried to remove this, the action would create a price rise and lead to a drop in the value of money (inflation).

Therefore, the New Right neoliberal economic policies of the Thatcher and Reagan governments allowed unemployment to rise by cutting public spending and subsidies to businesses. Friedman claimed that inflation was the most dangerous result because if people lost faith in their ability to create wealth (make money) they would not take part in economic activity; this would lessen freedom and undermine society.

New Right liberal economic thinking also opposed the so called ‘mixed economy’ of some state owned industries and businesses. They claimed that if a business is state owned it reduces competition and the need to make profit (profit motive); this therefore makes it less efficient. This led to a policy of privatisation of state owned industries and businesses (for example, British Telecom, British Rail, British Steel).

New Right economic thinking argued that the supply side of the economy was important – this means that they wanted conditions that allowed producers to produce (not necessarily consumers to consume) leading to competition and natural demand levels. The way to achieve this was to lower levels of direct taxation, both personal and business.

The New Right was not opposed to state managed economics on purely economic grounds but also because of their support for classical individual freedom. They claimed to be defending individual freedom against ‘creeping collectivism’ (joint or communal ownership). The state is seen as the main enemy of personal freedom and therefore the only way to increase individual freedom is to ‘roll back the state’. Apart from economic management and ownership by the state this also means a return to ‘self-help’ or ‘social Darwinism’.

They make economic and moral arguments against welfare. Economically they argue that welfare causes greater taxation and public spending which leads to inflation and inefficiency. Morally they argue that welfare creates a culture of dependency, the idea that if there is a safety net there will be no desire to work to achieve and therefore it will create idleness. They claim that this robs people of their motivation and self-respect and they return to the classical liberal idea of the ‘undeserving poor’ who contribute nothing to society and therefore should not be entitled to anything in return.

Thatcher took this idea further when she claimed that ‘there is no such thing as society’. Murray agreed with Thatcher and claimed that welfare relieves a woman of the need to pair with a bread-winning man and therefore results in an underclass of single mothers and fatherless children who have no motivation to work. The final moral justification of the free market is put forward by Robert Nozick. He argues that taxation and redistribution through public spending is a violation of free property rights. He claimed that as long as a person had acquired their wealth legally any attempt to tax it and redistribute it amounted to ‘legalised theft’ against the individual.

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Human Imperfection (Conservatism)

Last updated 19 Jun 2020

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According to the conservative mindset, human nature is imperfect and unchangeable .

We are flawed creatures and we must simply recognise that. Any ideology that works against the grain of human nature in order to establish a utopia will inevitably end in dystopia. By recognising the limitations of human beings, one can avoid the unnecessary destruction and death that arises from attempts to perfect humanity.

Conservatives reject the view that is implicit within radical movements that human nature is somehow perfectible, because the conservative view is that humans are inevitably flawed and unchangeable. This applies to radicals from both sides of the political spectrum. Those on the left have sought to impose a communist system in which class conflict would end, the state would wither away and human nature would achieve perfectibility. Those on the far-right have adopted fascist ideology in order to create a new man shaped by romanticist notions. The same observation applies to religious fundamentalists, although it is harder to place them with accuracy along the political spectrum.

• Human imperfection

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A level politics: study note listing - core political ideas - conservatism, different tensions within conservatism, our subjects.

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A Level Politics Essay Plan - conservatism for ideologies

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28 April 2021

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Liberals and conservatives differ on climate change beliefs -- but are relatively united in taking action

Global experiment reveals surprising common ground in environmental activism.

The division between liberals and conservatives on both climate-change beliefs and related policy support is long-standing. However, the results of a newly released global experiment show that despite these differences, the two camps actually align when it comes to taking certain actions to combat climate change.

The study, led by researchers at New York University, finds that when given the opportunity, liberals and conservatives take action to address climate change at roughly the same levels -- and that this is due to conservatives choosing to take action despite their climate-change beliefs rather than liberals failing to act on theirs.

"Our work shows a disconnect between beliefs and behaviors among conservatives when it comes to environmental matters while, at the same time, revealing common ground with liberals when it comes to taking action," explains Madalina Vlasceanu, an assistant professor in NYU's Department of Psychology who led the study, which is published in the journal Nature Communications .

Additionally, the researchers identified which messages -- or interventions -- can be effective in boosting beliefs in climate change and policy support among both conservatives and liberals.

"These results paint an optimistic picture for policymakers and climate activists in their efforts to influence public opinion on climate change and related policies," says Michael Berkebile-Weinberg, an NYU doctoral student and the paper's first author. "Several interventions were effective in altering beliefs and policy support across the ideological divide, in liberals and conservatives alike."

However, the study's authors caution that the impact of interventions was not uniform. For instance, framing certain actions as a climate change solution can backfire and decrease conservatives' engagement. For example, informing conservatives that a majority of Americans are concerned about the climate crisis led to them planting fewer trees.

"This suggests that interventions aimed at increasing conservatives' pro-environmental behaviors should not involve their climate-change beliefs," explains Danielle Goldwert, the study's co-lead author and an NYU doctoral student. "Instead, framing climate-change actions as beneficial for ideologically consistent reasons might be more effective in spurring action."

The findings stem from an experiment involving 50,000 participants across 60 countries, including Algeria, China, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Peru, and the United States.

To capture the participants' views on climate change, the researchers asked a series of questions pertaining to beliefs in climate change (e.g., "Human activities are causing climate change.") and support for related policies (e.g., "I support increasing the number of charging stations for electric vehicles.").

In these measures, the participants around the globe showed significant political polarization, with liberals expressing belief in climate change and supporting climate-change policies to a far greater extent than conservatives -- a finding consistent with previous surveys.

The researchers then tested participants' engagement with actions aimed at addressing climate change. But prior to asking related questions, the researchers posed a series of messages, or interventions, to the participants in order to test their impact. These interventions included, among others, the following:

• Emphasizing scientific consensus on climate change (i.e., "Ninety-nine percent of expert climate change scientists agree that the Earth is warming, and climate change is happening, mainly because of human activity.").
• Touting the effectiveness of collective action in addressing climate change by providing examples of successful climate actions people took in the past.
• Asking participants to write a letter to a socially close child, as a member of the future generation.
• Asking participants to write a letter to a future generation member outlining what climate actions they are undertaking today to make the planet livable in 2055.

To gauge the effectiveness of these interventions, the paper's authors tested participants' support for several climate-related views, policies, and actions (e.g., "Climate change poses a serious threat to humanity," "I support raising carbon taxes on gas/fossil fuels/coal," participation in a tree-planting initiative). Finally, the paper's authors gauged the desire of participants to share climate-mitigation information on social media: "Did you know that removing meat and dairy for only two out of three meals per day could decrease food-related carbon emissions by 60%?" The data were collected between July 2022 and May 2023.

The researchers found that three interventions -- emphasizing effective collective actions, writing a letter to a future generation member, and writing a letter from the future self -- boosted the climate beliefs and policy support of both liberals and conservatives. Notably, emphasizing scientific consensus stimulated liberals' willingness to participate in a tree-planting initiative, but this message had no impact on conservatives.

"Different interventions are more effective at increasing liberals' and conservatives' climate awareness and action, so practitioners and policy makers can use our results to administer the most effective intervention for their target audience," explains Vlasceanu.

The study's other authors were Kimberly Doell, senior scientist at the University of Vienna, and Jay Van Bavel, an NYU professor of psychology.

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Story Source:

Materials provided by New York University . Original written by James Devitt. Note: Content may be edited for style and length.

Journal Reference :

• Michael Berkebile-Weinberg, Danielle Goldwert, Kimberly C. Doell, Jay J. Van Bavel, Madalina Vlasceanu. The differential impact of climate interventions along the political divide in 60 countries . Nature Communications , 2024; 15 (1) DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-48112-8

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The Politics Shed- A Free Text Book for all students of Politics.

Conservatism

Main ideas of Conservatism

Differences and conflict within Conservatism                                                                                

Important Conservative thinkers

Why, and to what extent, have conservatives supported tradition?

 Is conservatism a ‘disposition’ rather than a political ideology?

 Why has conservatism been described as a philosophy of imperfection? 

What are the implications of the belief that society is an organic entity? 

How does the conservative view of property differ from the liberal view?

 How far do conservatives go in endorsing authority? 

Is conservatism merely a ruling class ideology?

 To what extent do conservatives favour pragmatism over principle?

 In what ways is One Nation conservatism rooted in the assumptions of traditional conservatism?

 How and why have neoliberals criticised welfare? 

To what extent are neoliberalism and neoconservatism compatible? 

Why and how have conservatives sought to resist globalisation?  

Human Imperfection

Organic Society

Paternalism

Libertarianism

One Nation Conservatism

government, the free market, the individual  

Neo Liberalism

Neo conservatism

Laissez Faire

noblesse oblige

Social Conservatism

Thomas Hobbs

Edmund Burke

Michael Oakeshott 1901-1990

Mrs Whitehouse

Benjamin Disraeli

Robert Nozick

Friedrich Hayek

Aughey, A. et al., The Conservative Political Tradition in Britain and the United States (1992). A stimulating examination of similarities and difference between conservative thought in the USA and the UK. 

Honderich, T., Conservatism: Burke, Nozick, Bush, Blair? (2005). A distinctive and rigorously unsympathetic account of conservative thought; closely argued and interesting. 

O’Hara, K., Conservatism (2011). A defence of a small-c sceptical conservatism that draws heavily on the writings of Burke and Oakeshott.  

Scruton, R., The Meaning of Conservatism (2001). A stylish and openly sympathetic study that develops a distinctive view of the conservative tradition.  

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Guest Essay

The Happiness Gap Between Left and Right Isn’t Closing

By Thomas B. Edsall

Mr. Edsall contributes a weekly column from Washington, D.C., on politics, demographics and inequality.

Why is it that a substantial body of social science research finds that conservatives are happier than liberals?

A partial answer: Those on the right are less likely to be angered or upset by social and economic inequities, believing that the system rewards those who work hard, that hierarchies are part of the natural order of things and that market outcomes are fundamentally fair.

Those on the left stand in opposition to each of these assessments of the social order, prompting frustration and discontent with the world around them.

The happiness gap has been with us for at least 50 years, and most research seeking to explain it has focused on conservatives. More recently, however, psychologists and other social scientists have begun to dig deeper into the underpinnings of liberal discontent — not only unhappiness but also depression and other measures of dissatisfaction.

One of the findings emerging from this research is that the decline in happiness and in a sense of agency is concentrated among those on the left who stress matters of identity, social justice and the oppression of marginalized groups.

There is, in addition, a parallel phenomenon taking place on the right as Donald Trump and his MAGA loyalists angrily complain of oppression by liberals who engage in a relentless vendetta to keep Trump out of the White House.

There is a difference in the way the left and right react to frustration and grievance. Instead of despair, the contemporary right has responded with mounting anger, rejecting democratic institutions and norms.

In a 2021 Vox article, “ Trump and the Republican Revolt Against Democracy ,” Zack Beauchamp described in detail the emergence of destructive and aggressive discontent among conservatives.

Citing a wide range of polling data and academic studies, Beauchamp found:

More than twice as many Republicans (39 percent) as Democrats (17 percent) believed that “if elected leaders won’t protect America, the people must act — even if that means violence.”

Fifty-seven percent of Republicans considered Democrats to be “enemies,” compared with 41 percent of Democrats who viewed Republicans as “enemies.”

Among Republicans, support for “the use of force to defend our way of life,” as well as for the belief that “strong leaders bend rules” and that “sometimes you have to take the law in your own hands,” grows stronger in direct correlation with racial and ethnic hostility.

Trump has repeatedly warned of the potential for political violence. In January he predicted bedlam if the criminal charges filed in federal and state courts against him damaged his presidential campaign:

I think they feel this is the way they’re going to try and win, and that’s not the way it goes. It’ll be bedlam in the country. It’s a very bad thing. It’s a very bad precedent. As we said, it’s the opening of a Pandora’s box.

Before he was indicted in New York, Trump claimed there would be “potential death and destruction” if he was charged.

At an Ohio campaign rally in March, Trump declared, “If I don’t get elected, it’s going to be a blood bath for the whole country.”

In other words, Trump and his allies respond to adversity and what they see as attacks from the left with threats and anger, while a segment of the left often but not always responds to adversity and social inequity with dejection and sorrow.

There are significant consequences for this internalization.

Jamin Halberstadt , a professor of psychology at the University of Otago in New Zealand and a co-author of “ Outgroup Threat and the Emergence of Cohesive Groups : A Cross-Cultural Examination,” argued in his emailed reply to my inquiry that because “a focus on injustice and victimhood is, by definition, disempowering (isn’t that why we talk of ‘survivors’ rather than ‘victims’?), loss of control is not good for self-esteem or happiness.”

But, he pointed out:

this focus, while no doubt a part of the most visible and influential side of progressive ideology, is still just a part. Liberalism is a big construct, and I’m reluctant to reduce it to a focus on social justice issues. Some liberals have this view, but I suspect their influence is outsized because (a) they have the social media megaphone and (b) we are in a climate in which freedom of expression and, in particular, challenges to the worldview you characterize have been curtailed.

Expanding on this line of argument, Halberstadt wrote:

I’m sure some self-described liberals have views that are counterproductive to their own happiness. One sub-ideology associated with liberalism is, as you describe, a sense of victimhood and grievance. But there is more than one way to respond to structural barriers. Within that group of the aggrieved, some probably see systemic problems that cannot be overcome, and that’s naturally demoralizing and depressing. But others see systemic problems as a challenge to overcome.

Taking Halberstadt’s assessment of the effects of grievance and victimhood a step farther, Timothy A. Judge , the chairman of the department of management and human resources at Notre Dame, wrote in a 2009 paper, “ Core Self-Evaluations and Work Success ”:

Core self-evaluations (C.S.E.) is a broad, integrative trait indicated by self-esteem, locus of control, generalized self-efficacy and (low) neuroticism (high emotional stability). Individuals with high levels of C.S.E. perform better on their jobs, are more successful in their careers, are more satisfied with their jobs and lives, report lower levels of stress and conflict, cope more effectively with setbacks and better capitalize on advantages and opportunities.

I asked Judge and other scholars a question: Have liberal pessimists fostered an outlook that spawns unhappiness as its adherents believe they face seemingly insurmountable structural barriers?

Judge replied by email:

I do share the perspective that a focus on status, hierarchies and institutions that reinforce privilege contributes to an external locus of control. And the reason is fairly straightforward. We can only change these things through collective and, often, policy initiatives — which tend to be complex, slow, often conflictual and outside our individual control. On the other hand, if I view “life’s chances” (Virginia Woolf’s term) to be mostly dependent on my own agency, this reflects an internal focus, which will often depend on enacting initiatives largely within my control.

Judge elaborated on his argument:

If our predominant focus in how we view the world is social inequities, status hierarchies, societal unfairness conferred by privilege, then everyone would agree that these things are not easy to fix, which means, in a sense, we must accept some unhappy premises: Life isn’t fair; outcomes are outside my control, often at the hands of bad, powerful actors; social change depends on collective action that may be conflictual; an individual may have limited power to control their own destiny, etc. These are not happy thoughts because they cause me to view the world as inherently unfair, oppressive, conflictual, etc. It may or may not be right, but I would argue that these are in fact viewpoints of how we view the world, and our place in it, that would undermine our happiness.

Last year, George Yancey , a professor of sociology at Baylor University, published “ Identity Politics, Political Ideology, and Well-Being : Is Identity Politics Good for Our Well-Being?”

Yancey argued that recent events “suggest that identity politics may correlate to a decrease in well-being, particularly among young progressives, and offer an explanation tied to internal elements within political progressiveness.”

By focusing on “political progressives, rather than political conservatives,” Yancey wrote, “a nuanced approach to understanding the relationship between political ideology and well-being begins to emerge.”

Identity politics, he continued, focuses “on external institutional forces that one cannot immediately alleviate.” It results in what scholars call the externalization of one’s locus of control, or viewing the inequities of society as a result of powerful if not insurmountable outside forces, including structural racism, patriarchy and capitalism, as opposed to believing that individuals can overcome such obstacles through hard work and collective effort.

As a result, Yancey wrote, “identity politics may be an important mechanism by which progressive political ideology can lead to lower levels of well-being.”

Conversely, Yancey pointed out, “a class-based progressive cognitive emphasis may focus less on the group identity, generating less of a need to rely on emotional narratives and dichotomous thinking and may be less likely to be detrimental to the well-being of a political progressive.”

Yancey tested this theory using data collected in the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey of 1,232 respondents.

“Certain types of political progressive ideology can have contrasting effects on well-being,” Yancey wrote. “It is plausible that identity politics may explain the recent increase well-being gap between conservatives and progressives.”

Oskari Lahtinen , a senior researcher in psychology at the University of Turku in Finland, published a study in March, “ Construction and Validation of a Scale for Assessing Critical Social Justice Attitudes ,” that reinforces Yancey’s argument.

Lahtinen conducted two surveys of a total of 5,878 men and women to determine the share of Finnish citizens who held “critical social justice attitudes” and how those who held such views differed from those who did not.

Critical social justice proponents, on Lahtinen’s scale,

point out varieties of oppression that cause privileged people (e.g., male, white, heterosexual, cisgender) to benefit over marginalized people (e.g., woman, Black, gay, transgender). In critical race theory, some of the core tenets include that (1) white supremacy and racism are omnipresent and colorblind policies are not enough to tackle them, (2) people of color have their own unique standpoint and (3) races are social constructs.

What did Lahtinen find?

The critical social justice propositions encountered

strong rejection from men. Women expressed more than twice as much support for the propositions. In both studies, critical social justice was correlated modestly with depression, anxiety, and (lack of) happiness, but not more so than being on the political left was.

In an email responding to my inquiries about his paper, Lahtinen wrote that one of the key findings in his research was that “there were large differences between genders in critical social justice advocacy: Three out of five women but only one out of seven men expressed support for the critical social justice claims.”

In addition, he pointed out, “there was one variable in the study that closely corresponded to external locus of control: ‘Other people or structures are more responsible for my well-being than I myself am.’”

The correlation between agreement with this statement and unhappiness was among the strongest in the survey:

People on the left endorsed this item (around 2 on a scale of 0 to 4) far more than people on the right (around 0.5). Endorsing the belief was determined by political party preference much more than by gender, for instance.

Such measures as locus of control, self-esteem, a belief in personal agency and optimism all play major roles in daily life.

In a December 2022 paper, “ The Politics of Depression : Diverging Trends in Internalizing Symptoms Among U.S. Adolescents by Political Beliefs,” Catherine Gimbrone , Lisa M. Bates , Seth Prins and Katherine M. Keyes , all at Columbia’s Mailman School of Public Health, noted that “trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex and parental education over time, with female liberal adolescents experiencing the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially in the context of demographic risk factors, including parental education.”

“These findings,” they added, “indicate a growing mental health disparity between adolescents who identify with certain political beliefs. It is therefore possible that the ideological lenses through which adolescents view the political climate differentially affect their mental well-being.”

Gimbrone and her co-authors based their work on studies of 85,000 teenagers from 2005 to 2018. They found that

while internalizing symptom scores worsened over time for all adolescents, they deteriorated most quickly for female liberal adolescents. Beginning in approximately 2010 and continuing through 2018, female liberal adolescents reported the largest changes in depressive affect, self-esteem, self-derogation and loneliness.

In conclusion, the authors wrote, “socially underprivileged liberals reported the worst internalizing symptom scores over time, likely indicating that the experiences and beliefs that inform a liberal political identity are ultimately less protective against poor mental health than those that inform a conservative political identity.”

From another vantage point, Nick Haslam , a professor of psychology at the University of Melbourne, argued in his 2020 paper “ Harm Inflation: Making Sense of Concept Creep ” that recent years have seen “a rising sensitivity to harm within at least some Western cultures, such that previously innocuous or unremarked phenomena were increasingly identified as harmful and that this rising sensitivity reflected a politically liberal moral agenda.”

As examples, Haslam wrote that the definition of “trauma” has been

progressively broadened to include adverse life events of decreasing severity and those experienced vicariously rather than directly. “Mental disorder” came to include a wider range of conditions, so that new forms of psychopathology were added in each revision of diagnostic manuals and the threshold for diagnosing some existing forms was lowered. “Abuse” extended from physical acts to verbal and emotional slights and incorporated forms of passive neglect in addition to active aggression.

Haslam described this process as concept creep and argued that “some examples of concept creep are surely the work of deliberate actors who might be called expansion entrepreneurs.”

Concept expansion, Haslam wrote, “can be used as a tactic to amplify the perceived seriousness of a movement’s chosen social problem.” In addition, “such expansion can be effective means of enhancing the perceived seriousness of a social problem or threat by increasing the perceived prevalence of both ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators.’”

Haslam cited studies showing that strong “correlates of holding expansive concepts of harm were compassion-related trait values, left-liberal political attitudes and forms of morality associated with both.” Holding expansive concepts of harm was also “associated with affective and cognitive empathy orientation and most strongly of all with endorsement of harm- and fairness-based morality.” Many of these characteristics are associated with the political left.

“The expansion of harm-related concepts has implications for acceptable self-expression and free speech,” Haslam wrote. “Creeping concepts enlarge the range of expressions judged to be unacceptably harmful, thereby increasing calls for speech restrictions. Expansion of the harm-related concepts of hate and hate speech exemplifies this possibility.”

While much of the commentary on the progressive left has been critical, Haslam takes a more ambivalent position: “Sometimes concept creep is presented in an exclusively negative frame,” he wrote, but that fails to address the “positive implications. To that end, we offer three positive consequences of the phenomenon.”

The first is that expansionary definitions of harm “can be useful in drawing attention to harms previously overlooked. Consider the vertical expansion of abuse to include emotional abuse.”

Second, “concept creep can prevent harmful practices by modifying social norms.” For example, “changing definitions of bullying that include social exclusion and antagonistic acts expressed horizontally rather than only downward in organizational hierarchies may also entrench norms against the commission of destructive behavior.”

And finally:

The expansion of psychology’s negative concepts can motivate interventions aimed at preventing or reducing the harms associated with the newly categorized behaviors. For instance, the conceptual expansion of addiction to include behavioral addictions (e.g., gambling and internet addictions) has prompted a flurry of research into treatment options, which has found that a range of psychosocial treatments can be successfully used to treat gambling, internet and sexual addictions.

Judge suggested an approach to this line of inquiry that he believed might offer a way for liberalism to regain its footing:

I would like to think that there is a version of modern progressivism that accepts many of the premises of the problem and causes of inequality but does so in a way that also celebrates the power of individualism, of consensus and of common cause. I know this is perhaps naïve. But if we give in to cynicism (that consensus can’t be found), that’s self-reinforcing, isn’t it? I think about the progress on how society now views sexual orientation and the success stories. The change was too slow, painful for many, but was there any other way?

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Thomas B. Edsall has been a contributor to the Times Opinion section since 2011. His column on strategic and demographic trends in American politics appears every Wednesday. He previously covered politics for The Washington Post. @ edsall