write a brief essay on liberal feminism

Liberal Feminism: Definition, Theory & Examples

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

On This Page:

Liberal feminism asserts that equality for women can be achieved through legal means and social reform within current social systems, rather than an overhaul of the systems themselves. It focuses on individual rights, legal equality, and ending sex-based discrimination.

Key Takeaways

• Liberal feminism believes that equality should be brought about through education and policy changes. They try to change the system from within.
• Liberal feminism has been criticized for being too optimistic about the amount of progress that has been made. It has been accused of dealing with the effects of patriarchy and not the causes.
• Marxist and Radical feminists also argue that liberal feminists fail to challenge the underlying causes of women’s oppression and changing the law is not enough to bring about equality, there needs to be a fundamental change in social structures.

What Is Liberal Feminism?

Liberal feminism is a prominent branch of feminism that aims to advocate for women’s legal and political rights. It was born in western countries and emphasizes the value of freedom which can be achieved through political and legal reform.

The ideas of liberal feminism are rooted in liberalism, a political philosophy that encourages the development of freedom, particularly in the political and economic spheres. These key ideas of liberalism include individual freedom, democracy, equal opportunities, and equal rights.

Liberal feminists apply liberalism to gender equality and claim that the oppression of women lies in their lack of political and civil rights. Liberal feminism emphasizes the rights of the individual woman and aims to grant access to equal rights and representation through legislation.

Accordingly, women’s ‘liberation’ would be achieved by putting an end to discriminatory practices and by pushing for equal rights. Liberal feminists have fought for women’s right to vote, to work, to an education, and to have equal pay.

Many liberal feminists think that their fight for these rights is largely won, but others believe that there are still issues to work on such as the gender pay gap, representation in politics, and in the media.

What Are The Principles Of Liberal Feminism?

Gender equality.

While they may not deny there may be biological differences between men and women, liberal feminists do not see these differences as justification for inequalities between the sexes.

Thus, their main principle is for women to be treated as equals to men.

This can include having the same social and political rights, having equal pay for doing the same job as men, and being equals in marriage and partnership.

Equality in women’s representation

Liberal feminists believe that women have the right to be as active in society as men, and thus be equally represented in the workplace, politics, and in the media.

This may mean that they would want to be equally represented in higher career positions such as CEOs and directors. They would also want to be equally represented in political roles such as having more women world leaders.

Moreover, they would want to be better represented in film and television, by having more female leading actors and more female directors and producers.

Reforming the system

Liberal feminists do not necessarily question the system of society as a whole, but instead, believe in its capacity to reform.

They believe that gender justice is best achieved by modifying existing social institutions and political systems. They rely on the state to gain equality and support affirmative action and legislation which grants equal rights and opportunities to both men and women.

For instance, liberal feminists would generally be supportive of employers and educational institutions which make special attempts to include women as serious applicants.

Individualistic

Liberal feminism is individualistic rather than group based. This means that the rights are granted to individual women who are assumed to be equal and thus equally deserving, rather than granting rights to a whole group.

The concept of sexism

Liberal feminists are thought to have popularized the concept of ‘sexism’ to refer to ideas and social practices that keep women in a subordinate role.

They believe that sexism is rooted in the idea of biological determinism, which is the idea that certain behaviors or abilities are inherent to women or men and are derived from biological characteristics.

Sexism, liberal feminists believe, is the fundamental cause of discrimination against women.

What Are The Goals Of Liberal Feminism?

Equality in the public sphere.

The primary goal of liberal feminism is gender equality in the public sphere. This includes equal access to education, equal pay, ending job sex segregation, and better working conditions for women. All of these are believed to be achieved through legal change.

While early liberal feminists sought to gain the right to vote and access to education for women, modern liberal feminists aim to secure equal social, political, and economic opportunities, equal civil liberties, and sexual freedoms. If there is gender inequality in existing institutions, then liberal feminists seek to eradicate this to create a fair and just society.

Equality in the private sphere

Liberal feminists also suggest that gender equality should be present in the home as well as in public life. The family can be seen as a social institution and thus should be an equal structure according to liberal feminists.

They tend to support marriage as long as it is an equal partnership. In an equal partnership, men and women share the household chores, cooking, house management, and childcare as equally as possible.

Liberal feminists also generally support abortion and other reproductive rights that are related to the control of one’s life and autonomy. They also believe that ending domestic violence and sexual harassment removes obstacles to women achieving on an equal level with men.

Examples of Liberal Feminism Today

Since liberal feminism was traditionally focused on legal equality, it could be considered almost fully achieved in some Western countries.

In practice, however, gender equality in law and legislation does not necessarily mean that there is real and productive equality, which is why liberal feminism still exists.

In the family

Feminists are critical of the family as a social institutions. They believe that the family is a tool of female oppression and in particular the nuclear family serves the needs of men rather than women. This is through issues such as unequal division of domestic labor and domestic violence.

Liberal feminists argue that families are slowly becoming more equal through changes in law and social attitudes. They do not believe that full equality has been achieved but the process is well underway.

For example, they show how parents are now socializing their children in more gender-neutral ways, with similar aspirations for both sons and daughters and chores not being determined by gender.

In the workplace

While there may be more equality in the number of women in the workplace, liberal feminists argue that there are inequalities within.

Typically, women are over-represented in positions which are traditionally ‘feminine’ roles such as nursing, teaching, and social care. These are positions which are often underpaid compared to jobs which are typically male-dominated such as in science, law, and medicine.

Likewise, there is often still a gender wage gap in many countries where women still earn less on average than a man for the same job.

While there are more women represented in sectors that were once considered ‘male’, they are often confined to lower positions in the hierarchy and there are disproportionately less women CEOs, vice-presidents, and directors. Liberal feminists would like to see more women in these higher positions.

In politics

While there may now be more women involved in politics, there is still an under-representation in the number of women in political roles.

Particularly, men still dominate political leadership such as in the United States where there has never been a female president, or in the United Kingdom where there have only been two female prime ministers.

Men still make a lot of the decisions and laws in society meaning that less women’s voices are heard. Liberal feminists would suggest that having more women in positions of power would trigger positive changes to make their views understood.

In the media

In film and television, female characters are under-represented, with women less likely to play the protagonist character. Women in film and television often play the love interest to the main male character or play a smaller role with fewer speaking parts.

There is a test known as the Bechdel test which aims to examine the presence of women in film and highlights the sexism that persists.

To pass the Bechdel test, the film must contain two named, speaking female characters who have a conversation with each other where the topic of conversation is not related to a man. There are still many films released today that do not pass the Bechdel test.

There are also fewer female directors in films. Liberal feminists suggest that having more female directors would allow for more female actors and less female stereotyped characters.

The History Of Liberal Feminism

Liberal feminism is thought to have emerged in the 18th and 19th century with the rise of the political philosophy known as classical liberalism. This was a period of great social change in western countries alongside the rise of capitalism .

Mary Wollstonecraft

Early feminist scholars drew inspiration from Mary Wollstonecraft, especially from her notable writing of A Vindication of the Rights of Women , published in 1792. Wollstonecraft was a passionate advocate of educational and social equality for women.

In her writings, she makes the case that women need to be educated just as well as men so that they can grow up to be moral and autonomous human beings. She called for the improvement of women’s status through such political change as the reform of national educational systems.

John Stuart Mill

A century after Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill defended the civic and legal equality of women and their right to vote in his essay titled > On the Subjection of Women , published in 1869. He argued that women’s social and political equality was rooted in liberal principles.

Mill suggested that the central problem encountered by women is that they are denied a free and rational choice as to how they are to lead their lives – that they are denied the autonomy of the individual.

He claimed that the capacities of women cannot be known until they enjoy equal access to education and the vote.

First Wave Feminism

There was a gradual rise of the liberal feminist movement over time, but the first major advancements in gender equality did not happen until the first wave of feminism hit the 20th century in the west.

The women’s suffrage movement fought for the right for women to vote.

This struggle was mainly led by liberal feminists although more revolutionary feminists also took part in the movement. This movement is known as the first victory of liberal feminists toward having equal rights to men.

Second Wave Feminism

Second wave feminism took off in the 1960s, a period marked by the civil rights movement. Although women at the time had the right to vote, and more were entering the workplace, this did not automatically result in equal rights.

Liberal feminists now demanded the right to equal pay. Women of this time also faced employment discrimination, unequal pay, legal inequalities, and poor support services for working women.

Through this wave of feminism, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 was introduced. Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to prevent employers from discriminating on the basis of sex.

Strengths And Criticisms Of Liberal Feminism

A strength of liberal feminism is that it is a relatively popular branch of feminism, and the goals are ones that support a lot of public opinion.

For instance, it is easy for most people to support equal rights for both men and women to vote and work – it would be difficult to justify otherwise. Likewise, the major victories of liberal feminists are rarely questioned. For example, not many would suggest that the vote should be taken away from women.

Liberal feminists have helped to bring forward legislature which helps to protect more women. They cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their sex in the workplace, they have more rights, and they can own property. Also, liberal feminism extends its principles into the private sphere so as to protect more women from the forms of oppression specific to this sphere

Since liberal feminism is the oldest version of the feminist movement, it faces a lot of criticism, especially from other feminists.

It is argued that liberal feminists overlook how differences of race, class, and sexual orientation, among others, can intersect to create different levels of women’s oppression. Liberal feminists are accused of being ‘white feminists’ which means that they assume that the issues facing white, mostly western women are issues that all women face.

Much of the work of liberal feminism has been carried by white privileged women whose fight has mainly been for other white women.

They may question the number of women in politics, for instance, but may not argue for more women of color, or working-class women in this field. The suffrage movement saw the vote granted to women in the early 20th century as a win, despite many women of color not being granted the vote until decades later.

Many liberal feminists would celebrate a woman being promoted to a position of power without considering the values of the person.

They may overlook the fact that the woman in power has goals that are oppressive and immoral, because as long as she is in power, it is a win for the liberal feminists.

Liberal feminism does not really consider the root cause of gender inequality. Marxist feminists would argue that liberal feminists ignore the systemic discrimination – that women’s oppression coming from the patriarchy and capitalism. Instead, liberal feminists do not see the need to overthrow the system, and in fact, may even promote capitalism.

Liberal feminism often faces additional criticism for the notion of trying to make women ‘superheroes’, capable of successfully combining marriage, motherhood, and career.

While many women may desire this, it can be considered as more oppressive towards women as they are now expected to succeed in a male-dominated workplace while simultaneously managing their roles as housewife and mother.

Women who do not have the desire or time for a successful career may feel judged by liberal feminists for not living up to the male standards of success.

Cottais, C. (2020). Liberal feminism. Gender in Geopolitics Institute. Retrieved 2022, August 16 from: https://igg-geo.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/IGG_CCottais_Liberal_feminism2020.pdf

Donner, W. (1993). John Stuart Mill”s liberal feminism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 69(2/3), 155-166.

Friedan, B. (1963). The feminine mystique. WW Norton & Company.

Gerson, G. (2002). Liberal feminism: Individuality and oppositions in Wollstonecraft and Mill. Political Studies, 50(4), 794-810.

Mill, J. S. (2006). The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill.

Oxley, J. C. (2011). Liberal feminism. Just the Arguments, 100, 258262.

Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism Essay

Empowerment, individual feminism theory.

Liberal feminism is acknowledged to be the modern model of feminism, symbolized by the belief that women have innate influence to attain equality. That is why in liberal feminism, the aspects or concepts of civil society altering itself to adapt to feminine does not materialize (McElroy, 2002).

However, feminists are of the opinion that changing the existing law would help in eradicating those laws which are hostile to women. Thus exploring the movie-American violet which tells the story surrounding the life of Dee Roberts, we are allowed to delve into the nature and circumstances affecting her life.

Based on the development and deliberations of the popular civil rights legal proceedings regarding Regina Kelly v.John Paschall , which was filed against 15 defendants whose racial background, was African-American. The circumstances surrounding Dee Roberts do indicate that despite the challenges which included false accusations she opted to fight. Consider the fact that after being dragged to the women prison on drug charges she learns that she was charged as drug peddler.

Though, she has no previous drug record she is subjected to choose either to plead guilty and subsequently go home as a convicted criminal or equally remain in jail and opt to challenge the courts decision. This included endangering her custody including the option of having to stay in the prison for a long period due to the anticipated sentence.

As the story gains currency we do note that despite Dee Robert life as well as her freedom and children being at risk she opts to face the district attorney and subsequently challenge the courts rulings. the manner Dee Roberts is presented in the film can be explained by the way diverse liberal feminism argues in relation to gender equality. It ought to be noted that the circumstances surrounding her symbolizes the manner women are treated in the society.

However, her immediate challenge was to secure her freedom. This is demonstrated in the manner she opted to Remain in prison and fight to clear her name against the false accusations.

From such a situation it can thus be said the situation can be made better by employing the dynamics and principals of individual empowerment as is articulated under liberal feminism. This can be allied to the fact that liberal feminism have played a critical role in bridging the gap separated the two sexes.

In regard to Dee Roberts the situation could be corrected by establishing gender sensitive institutions. Consider the fact that lack of apposite legal procedures that guarantees woman equal rights as men played a central role in as far as the discusses individual is concerned.

Note that, by employing the aspects of social theories in regard to feminism Dee Roberts could not have found herself in such a situation. However, due to poor governance, racism and lack of proper procedures of dealing with crime hence she was wrongly charged. Examining the concepts of feminism the apposite way of rectifying the entire issue is for the women to stand against the oppressive legislations. In regard to what Dee Roberts encountered the remedy would be found if women accept to speak against the social evils.

Exploring the films plot it is apparent that the circumstances surrounding Roberts were recurring issues within the black community. She realized that more and more women were being subjected to suffering either through imprisonment or being shamed as drug dealer. It is from such a position she realized that she was not alone and made up her mind to stand firm not only for her problems but also for those helpless women outside.

By waging a war with intent to strike the very heart of the fraudulent Texas justice system she demonstrates that with determination nothing is impossible. Thus, in order to establish lasting solution to such a problem the suitable thing to do is to sensitize and empower women in regard to the rights surrounding their civil liberties. This can be achieved by developing articulate procedures of empowering women. The objectives of such measures would entail creating a common ground on which gender issues would be viewed adequately.

According to the individual feminism theory this situation can be reversed by allowing women as individuals to have unrestricted equality with men. It ought to be noted that Dee Roberts suffered because she was just a woman and more a black woman. Thus, if the stipulations of individual feminism theories could be employed as individual she could demand redress fro the government.

This can be allied to the fact that individual feminism theory as its core focus on individual rights, diversity, autonomy and liberty. The objectives of this theory are to protect the rights and privileges of individual woman. Thus, it can be employed in regard Dee Roberts’s case to fight the legal systems in order to enact changes that are not hostile to women.

In essence, this would help in getting rid of class privileges as well as gender privileges. What this asserts is that all genders would be treated with equal rights, including an equal claim to posses’ property. And this demonstrates why individual feminism would be the suitable tool to rectify the situation in Dee Roberts’s circumstance. The reason being it encourages women to have full control and responsibility for their own survival (Taylor,2000).

More so, the significance of this approach is that it can be employed to oppose any legal or political interference in regard to the choices women make concerning their bodies. Therefore, from such an approach the concepts of racism and hatred for woman as is witnessed in regard to Dee Roberts case can be fought and the women be given a fair treatment before the courts of law.

The situation in the film demonstrates how weak legal legislations can affect the individuals and equally deny them their liberties which are guaranteed by the law. It ought to be noted that no legal legislation ought to be employed to violate the individual liberties.

Hence, the individual feminism theory stands as a core vehicle that could be exploited to create a favorable condition in which women are treated equally as is men. Also it would be prudence to point that what had taken place in Texas was a raw violation of human rights, as a woman Dee Roberts was entitled to be protected and that is why individual feminism theory is essential in providing a suitable ground on which to establish measures of ascertaining women liberties are protected.

Thus, the remedy for the identified problem, which is abuse of human rights, can be remedied by establishing apposite legal mechanisms to guard the basic human rights. As is stipulated under individual feminism theory women do have a right to be treated equally as is with men (Sommers, 1995).

McElroy, Wendy (2002). Freedom and Feminism in the 21st century . NY:Ivan R. Dee.

Sommers, H (1995). Who stole feminism? New York: Simon & Schuster.

Taylor,K J. (2000) Individualist Feminism Rediscovered NY: Prometheus Books.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2023, December 24). Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism. https://ivypanda.com/essays/liberal-feminism/

"Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism." IvyPanda , 24 Dec. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/liberal-feminism/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism'. 24 December.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism." December 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/liberal-feminism/.

1. IvyPanda . "Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism." December 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/liberal-feminism/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Concept and History of the Liberal Feminism." December 24, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/liberal-feminism/.

• Roberts Court and Its Political Relations
• The "Killing the Black Body" Book by Dorothy Roberts
• The Purpose and Features of Marketing Channels
• Everyday Use by Alice Walker
• Give'Em the Pickle! Motivation in Business
• “Everyday Use” by Alice Walker and “The Story of an Hour” by Chopin
• Gender Roles in Cartoons
• Conflict in Everyday Use
• Relationship Between Mothers and Daughters
• "Everyday Use" by Alice Walker Critical Analysis
• Concepts of Feminism in the Present Societies
• Female Empowerment in Beyoncé's "Run the World"
• Metropolis' Women: Analysis of the Movie's Feminism & Examples
• Modern Gender Issues: Women in the Society
• Feminist Ethics Concept

Essay on Feminism

500 words essay on feminism.

Feminism is a social and political movement that advocates for the rights of women on the grounds of equality of sexes. It does not deny the biological differences between the sexes but demands equality in opportunities. It covers everything from social and political to economic arenas. In fact, feminist campaigns have been a crucial part of history in women empowerment. The feminist campaigns of the twentieth century made the right to vote, public property, work and education possible. Thus, an essay on feminism will discuss its importance and impact.

Importance of Feminism

Feminism is not just important for women but for every sex, gender, caste, creed and more. It empowers the people and society as a whole. A very common misconception is that only women can be feminists.

It is absolutely wrong but feminism does not just benefit women. It strives for equality of the sexes, not the superiority of women. Feminism takes the gender roles which have been around for many years and tries to deconstruct them.

This allows people to live freely and empower lives without getting tied down by traditional restrictions. In other words, it benefits women as well as men. For instance, while it advocates that women must be free to earn it also advocates that why should men be the sole breadwinner of the family? It tries to give freedom to all.

Most importantly, it is essential for young people to get involved in the feminist movement. This way, we can achieve faster results. It is no less than a dream to live in a world full of equality.

Thus, we must all look at our own cultures and communities for making this dream a reality. We have not yet reached the result but we are on the journey, so we must continue on this mission to achieve successful results.

Impact of Feminism

Feminism has had a life-changing impact on everyone, especially women. If we look at history, we see that it is what gave women the right to vote. It was no small feat but was achieved successfully by women.

Further, if we look at modern feminism, we see how feminism involves in life-altering campaigns. For instance, campaigns that support the abortion of unwanted pregnancy and reproductive rights allow women to have freedom of choice.

Moreover, feminism constantly questions patriarchy and strives to renounce gender roles. It allows men to be whoever they wish to be without getting judged. It is not taboo for men to cry anymore because they must be allowed to express themselves freely.

Similarly, it also helps the LGBTQ community greatly as it advocates for their right too. Feminism gives a place for everyone and it is best to practice intersectional feminism to understand everyone’s struggle.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Conclusion of the Essay on Feminism

The key message of feminism must be to highlight the choice in bringing personal meaning to feminism. It is to recognize other’s right for doing the same thing. The sad part is that despite feminism being a strong movement, there are still parts of the world where inequality and exploitation of women take places. Thus, we must all try to practice intersectional feminism.

FAQ of Essay on Feminism

Question 1: What are feminist beliefs?

Answer 1: Feminist beliefs are the desire for equality between the sexes. It is the belief that men and women must have equal rights and opportunities. Thus, it covers everything from social and political to economic equality.

Question 2: What started feminism?

Answer 2: The first wave of feminism occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It emerged out of an environment of urban industrialism and liberal, socialist politics. This wave aimed to open up new doors for women with a focus on suffrage.

Customize your course in 30 seconds

Which class are you in.

• Travelling Essay
• Picnic Essay
• Our Country Essay
• My Parents Essay
• Essay on Favourite Personality
• Essay on Memorable Day of My Life
• Essay on Knowledge is Power
• Essay on Gurpurab
• Essay on My Favourite Season
• Essay on Types of Sports

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Download the App

• Table of Contents
• New in this Archive
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Liberal Feminism

Liberals hold that freedom is a fundamental value, and that the just state ensures freedom for individuals. Liberal feminists share this view, and insist on freedom for women. There is disagreement among liberals about what freedom means, and thus liberal feminism takes more than one form. This entry discusses two basic kinds of liberal feminism. Part one discusses what, in the philosophical literature, is commonly called simply ‘liberal feminism.’ Liberal feminism conceives of freedom as personal autonomy—living a life of one's own choosing—and political autonomy—being co-author of the conditions under which one lives. Part two discusses what is commonly called ‘classical-liberal feminism,’ or sometimes ‘libertarian feminism’ (these terms will be used interchangeably here). [ 1 ] Classical-liberal or libertarian feminism conceives of freedom as freedom from coercive interference. While liberal feminism is established in academic philosophy, much of the classical-liberal or libertarian feminist literature is oriented towards a more popular audience. (Note that there is dispute over whether classical-liberal or libertarian feminism ought to be considered a version of liberal feminism (see section 2.7)).

1.1 Personal Autonomy

1.2 political autonomy, 1.3 justification, 1.4 historical sources, 1.5 criticism, 2.2 equity feminism, 2.3 cultural libertarian feminism, 2.4 sources, 2.5 anti-discrimination law and preferential treatment, 2.6 justification, 2.7 criticism, liberal feminism works, classical-liberal or libertarian feminist works, historical sources, selected feminist criticism, cited resources, classical-liberal or libertarian feminist internet resources, liberal feminist internet resources, other resources, related entries, 1. liberal feminism.

Liberal feminism conceives of freedom as personal autonomy—living a life of one's own choosing—and political autonomy—being co-author of the conditions under which one lives. Liberal feminists hold that the exercise of personal autonomy depends on certain enabling conditions that are insufficiently present in women's lives, or that social arrangements often fail to respect women's personal autonomy and other elements of women's flourishing. They hold also that women's needs and interests are insufficiently reflected in the basic conditions under which they live, and that those conditions lack legitimacy because women are inadequately represented in the processes of democratic self-determination. Liberal feminists hold that autonomy deficits like these are due to the “gender system” (Okin 1989, 89), or the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions, and that the women's movement should work to identify and remedy them. As the protection and promotion of citizens' autonomy is the appropriate role of the state on the liberal view, liberal feminists hold that the state can and should be the women's movement's ally in promoting women's autonomy. There is disagreement among liberal feminists, however, about the role of personal autonomy in the good life, the appropriate role of the state, and how liberal feminism is to be justified.

1.1.1 Procedural Accounts of Personal Autonomy

Liberal feminists hold that women should enjoy personal autonomy. That is, they hold that women should live lives of their own choosing. Some offer “procedural” accounts of personal autonomy (MacKenzie and Stoljar discuss these, 1999, 13–19). These accounts suggest that to say women should enjoy personal autonomy means they are entitled to a broad range of autonomy-enabling conditions. On this view, the women's movement should work to identify and promote these conditions. Identifying these enabling conditions requires careful attention to the particular ways in which autonomy deficits are produced in diverse women's lives. Procedural accounts avoid judging directly the substance of women's choices or the arrangements that ensue. The following list of enabling conditions is representative.

Being free of violence and the threat of violence : Violence and the threat of violence violate women's dignity; they make women do what others want or reduce women's sphere of activity to avoiding harm. In some cases violence fractures the self and takes from women their sense of self-respect (Brison 1997). The feminist literature on violence against women documents the particular role that violence and the threat of violence play in unfairly disempowering and limiting women (Cudd 2006, 85–118).

Being free of the limits set by patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws : Patriarchal paternalistic laws restrict women's options on the grounds that such limits are in women's interest. Think for example of laws that limit women's employment options on the grounds that taking certain jobs is not in women's interest (Smith 2004). Patriarchal moralistic laws restrict women's options on the grounds that certain options should not be available to women because morality forbids women's choosing them. Think for example of laws that prohibit or restrict prostitution or abortion, or laws that favor certain kinds of sexual expression or family forms (Cornell 1998; Brake 2004). Together, patriarchal paternalistic and moralistic laws steer women into socially preferred ways of life. These are unfair restrictions on women's choices, on the liberal feminist view, because women's choices should be guided by their own sense of their self-interest and by their own values. (But see Chambers (2008, 203–231) for liberal feminist uses of paternalism.)

Having access to options : On the liberal feminist view, women are entitled to access to options (Alstott 2004, 52). Women's access to options is frequently and unfairly restricted due to economic deprivation, in particular due to the “feminization of poverty” (Pearce 1978; see also Cudd 2006, 119–154). Other sources of unfairly reduced options for women are stereotyping and sex discrimination in education and employment (Smith 2004; Rhode 1997). Such stereotyping and discrimination affects some racial, ethnic and cultural groups in particularly pernicious ways. Liberal feminists also point to the way cultural homogeneity unfairly limits women's options (Cudd 2006, 234), for example when culture assigns identities and social roles according to sex (Okin 1989, 170ff; Alstott 2004; Meyers 2004; Cornell 1998, x; Chambers 2008).

Some emphasize the importance of internal, psychological enabling conditions as well, for example the ability to assess one's own preferences and imagine life otherwise (Meyers 2002, 168; Cudd 2006, 234–235; MacKenzie 1999). Without the ability to assess the preferences on the basis of which one makes choices, and the ability to imagine life otherwise, one can't meaningfully be said to have options other than affirming the status quo (see also Chambers 2008, 263–4). These internal enabling conditions are related to the external ones. Violence and the threat of violence, stereotyping and discrimination, material deprivation, and cultural homogeneity all can have the effect of closing down reflection and imagination.

On this view, the women's movement should work to identify and promote autonomy-enabling conditions. Identifying these conditions requires careful attention to the particular ways in which autonomy deficits are produced in women's lives. On the liberal feminist view, the state has an important role to play in promoting these conditions (see sections 1.1.4, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2). But there is much that cannot be done by the state (Cudd 2006, 223). For example, while the state can refrain from blocking such endeavors, women themselves must develop new “alternative emancipatory imagery” (Meyers 2002, 168), and fashion new ways of being a woman and new kinds of relationships through experiments in living (Cudd 2006, 234; Cornell 1998).

Some critics argue that freedom is of limited value because, even when enabling conditions like these are in place, women may choose limiting and disadvantaging social arrangements. Some point to the phenomenon of deformed preferences: when attractive options are limited or arrangements unfair, people may develop preferences for those limits or for less than their fair share (Nussbaum 1999a, 33, 50; Cudd 2006, 152). This phenomenon makes changing preferences through increased freedom problematic, and leads some feminists to reject theories that prioritize free choice (Yuracko 2003). Advocates of procedural accounts of autonomy concede that the enabling conditions do not rule out that a woman could choose, for example, to undergo clitorectomy (Meyers 2004, 213) or become a pornographic model (Cudd 2004, 58). As Ann Cudd explains, possibilities like these must be accepted because liberal feminism values freedom and thus cannot advocate direct “preference education” (Cudd 2004, 57). Liberal feminism must offer only a “… gradualist approach. Individuals and groups will make various experiments in living that we cannot now precisely imagine. They … will sometimes go on a mistaken path” (57). But they must be freed up to find their own way. As Diana Meyers explains, the moral imagination of feminist theorists and activists is limited (as is everyone's); they cannot know with certainty what substantive choices are compatible with personal autonomy (Meyers 2004, 213). Moreover, one should expect autonomous lives to take diverse forms in diverse cultural contexts. On this view, “a morally defensible and politically viable conception of autonomy for an era of global feminism” must be agnostic about the content of women's choices as long as they do not close off autonomy (205).

1.1.2 Fairness in Personal Relationships

Some liberal feminists hold that the social arrangements of personal life should not only be freely chosen, but should be characterized by fairness or justice. Jean Hampton draws on the contractualist tradition in moral and political philosophy to describe one way in which heterosexual intimate relationships often fail to be fair or just (Hampton 1993). (For extended discussion of Hampton's feminism, see Abbey 2011, 120–151. For more on feminist uses of contractualism, see section 1.2.1.)

On Hampton's view, a personal relationship is fair only if both parties to it could “reasonably accept the distribution of costs and benefits (that is, the costs and benefits that are not themselves side effects of any affective or duty-based tie between us) if it were the subject of an informed, unforced agreement in which we think of ourselves as motivated solely by self-interest” (Hampton 1993, 240). Of course, many women choose to enter or remain in relationships in part because of affective benefits; for example women often get satisfaction from satisfying others or fulfilling a duty. Why set aside these affective benefits, as Hampton recommends, when evaluating the fairness of a relationship? Hampton does not set them aside out of a conviction that a woman's affective nature is not part of her essential self. Nor does she set them aside out of a conviction that this aspect of a woman's nature is not valuable. (For criticism of Hampton, see Sample 2002.) Her test sets them aside because affective benefits of relationships are not received from the other; they are benefits that flow from one's own nature (Radzik 2005, 51). Thus while they may, and probably should, figure in a woman's overall decision about whether to enter or remain in a particular relationship, Hampton believes they should not figure in the evaluation of a relationship's fairness. As Linda Radzik explains in her defense of Hampton, a relationship is fair or just if the benefits that flow from each to the other are on par, that is, if each gives as much as she gets (51). When one party gets from the other significantly more than he gives, he is denying the other her legitimate entitlement to reciprocation.

This test formalizes an important insight of the women's movement: personal relationships, in particular traditional heterosexual relationships, are often unfair to women, indeed often exploit women's tendency to care about others. Injustice of this sort is not uncommon. Thus Hampton's test invites criticism of a wide swath of human social life (Sample 2002, 271). But Hampton does not call on women to cease valuing others' satisfaction or the fulfillment of duty (Hampton 1993, 227). Instead, she calls on the women's movement to cultivate in women and men a sensitivity and an aversion to this kind of injustice, and to develop remedies.

Procedural accounts of personal autonomy (see section 1.1.1) do not require that relationships be just in the way Hampton recommends. According to procedural accounts, it is possible that a choice to enter or remain in a personal relationship in which one gives more than she gets from the other can be autonomous. Therefore, according to procedural accounts, liberal feminists should focus on ensuring that women are not pressured into or unable to exit them.

To be sure, Hampton's account of justice in personal relationships can be a resource to women and men reflecting on their own preferences. It invites reflection on how one's own preferences affect the distribution of benefits and burdens within a relationship. Also, moral criticism of relationships that exploit women's preferences reminds us that relationships can be otherwise (because ought implies can). This reminder enhances personal autonomy by broadening the imagination. Thus procedural accounts of personal autonomy can include Hampton's test, not as definitive of the acceptability of social arrangements, but as a contribution to the kind of reflection about the good life on which the personal autonomy of individuals depends.

1.1.3 Personal Autonomy and Human Flourishing

Martha Nussbaum proposes an account of the good life that has “at its heart, a profoundly liberal idea … the idea of the citizen as a free and dignified human being, a maker of choices” (Nussbaum 1999a, 46). Echoing procedural accounts of personal autonomy (section 1.1.1), Nussbaum explains: “If one cares about people's powers to choose a conception of the good, then one must care about the rest of the form of life that supports those powers” (45). But for Nussbaum personal autonomy is merely one of the “major human functionings” (43) which define “a good human life” (42). These functionings include, among other things, bodily health and integrity, affiliation, and political participation (41–42). To be sure, personal autonomy, or in Nussbaum's words “practical reason,” is a good that “suffuses all the other functions” (44). But personal autonomy is not prioritized. A good life is one in which one is able to enjoy all of the major human functionings, that is, to flourish.

Nussbaum's approach takes on the problem of deformed preferences (see section 1.1.1) directly. To be sure, some may choose lives that do not include the actual exercise of some of the functionings—an ascetic may choose to compromise bodily health. But, Nussbaum explains, one must be able to function in each of these ways. Social arrangements are to be criticized if they render their participants unable to function in the valued ways regardless of their preferences (50). The women's movement should sensitize women and men to the injustice of denying women the ability to function in these valued ways, identify arrangements that are unjust to women by paying careful attention to diverse women's lives, and recommend remedies. Nussbaum holds that her account is compatible with global moral pluralism and thus may function as a foundation for a global feminism (Nussbaum 1999a, 40).

Nussbaum's “capabilities approach” may be compared with procedural accounts of autonomy (see section 1.1.1). Procedural accounts suggest that the women's movement should work to protect and promote women's ability to live lives of their own choosing by identifying particular autonomy deficits in women's lives and promoting the conditions that enable autonomy. These approaches avoid directly judging the substance of the choices women make or the arrangements that result. They leave it to individuals and groups to fashion new, diverse, non-oppressive ways of life. The list of enabling conditions for personal autonomy is not unlike Nussbaum's list of human functionings. But advocates of procedural approaches may worry that the goal of the women's movement, according to the capabilities approach, is to bring to women a particular way of life , namely one in which women can function in these ways, instead of freeing women up to find their own way (Cudd 2004, 50). As Drucilla Cornell, an advocate of a procedural approach explains, “social equality [should be] redefined so as to serve freedom” (Cornell 1998, xii) because “there is nothing more fundamental for a human being” (17; see also Cudd 2004, 51–52). Procedural accounts of autonomy can include Nussbaum's approach, not as definitive of the kinds of lives women should live, but as an important contribution to the kind of reflection on the good life on which personal autonomy depends. (There is a large literature on Nussbaum's liberal feminism; for liberal feminist discussion, see for example Abbey 2011 152–205; and Robeyns 2007.)

1.1.4 Personal Autonomy and the State

There is substantial agreement among liberal feminists that the gender system, or the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions, plays an important role in perpetuating morally objectionable deficits in personal autonomy in women's lives, and that the state can and should take action to remedy them. There is also substantial agreement among liberal feminists concerning what the state should do. There is disagreement about some hard cases, however, that pit liberal values against one another.

Liberal feminists hold that the state must effectively protect women from violence, regardless of where that violence takes place (Cudd 2006, 85–118, 209; Rhode 1997, 1193–95). They also hold that sexist paternalistic and moralistic laws are an unjust use of state power. Such laws place control over women's lives in the hands of others and steer women into preferred ways of life. Laws restricting access to abortion are of particular import in this context because they take an extremely momentous choice away from women, and together with the cultural assignment of caregiving duties to women, steer women into the social role of mother. Women must have a legal right to abortion and meaningful access to abortion services. In addition, liberal feminists hold that the state must not grant preferential treatment to particular family forms (Brake 2004, 293; Lloyd 1995, 1328; McClain 2006, 60). Some argue that this means giving gay and lesbian partnerships the same recognition currently available to heterosexuals (McClain 2006, 6; Hartley and Watson 2011). Others argue for removing marriage's privileged legal status altogether or treating it legally more like other associations (Case 2006; Metz 2010).

Liberals tend to reject laws prohibiting prostitution. They advocate instead the legal regulation of the sex trade prioritizing women's safety and women's control over their own working conditions (Cornell 1998, 57; Nussbaum 2002, 90). They support the right to collective bargaining to secure decent wages and working conditions (Cornell 1998, 57; Cudd 2006, 211), as well as a guaranteed minimum income (Cudd 2006, 154). They also support laws against sex discrimination in education, employment, and public accommodations. According to liberal feminists, the refusal to hire or promote a woman or do business with her because she is a woman is a morally objectionable limit on her options. So are workplaces that are hostile to women. Liberal feminists argue that laws prohibiting sexual harassment, and requiring affirmative action and comparable worth policies are often called for to remedy past and ongoing sex discrimination (Williams 2000, 253).

Liberal feminists hold also that a significant source of women's reduced options is the structure of the workplace, which assumes that workers are free of caregiving responsibilities (Okin 1989, 176; Williams 2000). Women, and increasingly men, do not fit this model. The effect of not fitting the model is dramatic. As Anne L. Alstott explains: “Caretakers at every income level have fewer options than noncaretakers at the same income level” (Alstott 2004, 97). She continues: “I am worried that child-rearing too dramatically contracts the options among which mothers can choose” (23). Alstott and others argue that the state must ensure that the socially essential work of providing care to dependents does not unreasonably interfere with the personal autonomy of caregivers. Policies proposed to ensure sufficient personal autonomy for caregivers include parental leave, state subsidized, high quality day care, and flexible work schedules (Cudd 2006, 228; Okin 1989, 175). Some recommend financial support for caregivers (Alstott 2004, 75ff), others suggest guaranteeing a non-wage-earning spouse one half of her wage-earning spouse's paycheck (Okin 1989, 181).

But workplaces fail to accommodate the socially essential caregiving work of their employees in various ways. Thus Joan Williams has argued for legal recognition of the right to not be discriminated against in employment on the basis of one's caregiving responsibilities. Williams recommends, if necessary, legal action alleging failure to recognize this right as an incentive to employers to accommodate caregivers (Williams 2000, 274).

There is disagreement among liberal feminists about some hard cases that pit liberal values against one another. Liberal feminists tend to reject legal limits on pornography (Cornell 1998, 57–58). But some hold that arguments for restricting violent pornography are not unreasonable (Laden 2003, 148–149; Watson 2007, 469; for what such a not unreasonable argument might look like, see Eaton 2007), and that the best arguments for freedom of expression fail to show that it should not be limited (Brison 1998). Indeed some argue that violent pornography can undermine the autonomy of viewers (Scoccia 1996) and the status of women as equal citizens (Spaulding 1988–89).

Other hard cases concern the role of the state in family life. Family life has dramatic effects on the personal autonomy of its adult members. Assuming the role of caregiver, for example, dramatically contracts women's options. On a liberal feminist view, the state has an interest in ensuring that family life does not undermine women's personal autonomy. Some hold that the state should promote justice in the family—for example, the sharing of paid and unpaid labor by its adult members (Okin 1989, 171). Others hold that the state may not be guided by a substantive ideal of family life (Alstott 2004, 114; see also Nussbaum 2000, 279–280; and Wolf-Devine 2004). (See section 1.2.1 for more discussion of this issue).

Girls' participation in families is, especially in the early years, nonvoluntary. The family affects the development of girls' sense of self-worth, as well as their preferences, and the capacities, like the capacity for reflection and imagination, on which their ability to live lives of their own choosing depends (Okin 1989, 97). Liberal feminists hold that the state must protect and promote the development of autonomy capacities in children, especially girls. For example they hold that child-marriage should be legally prohibited (McClain 2006, 79); girls should have access to abortion without parental consent or notification (Rhode 1994, 1204); girls must receive a formal education free of sexist stereotyping, including instruction in the legal equality of women (McClain 2006, 81; Lloyd 1995, 1332), including autonomy-promoting sex education (McClain 2006, 57–58), and ensuring that girls are prepared to be economically independent (Lloyd 1995, 1332). Beyond this some hold that girls' interest in developing autonomy capacities requires that families be internally just, that is, that there be an equal division of paid and unpaid labor between adults, so that families are not characterized by “dependence and domination” (Okin 1989, 99–100; see also Follesdal 2005). Others are not convinced that there is a necessary connection between this kind of justice in families and the development of girls' autonomy capacities (Lloyd 1995, 1335–1343), and hold that the state may not be guided by a substantive ideal of family life (Alstott 2004, 114; see also Nussbaum 2000a, 279–280; and Wolf-Devine 2004). (See section 1.2.1 for more discussion of this issue).

Some liberal feminists emphasize the importance of political autonomy, that is, being co-author of the conditions under which one lives. Some use contractualist political theory to argue that the state should ensure that the basic structure of society satisfies principles of justice that women, as well as men, could endorse. Others argue that the democratic legitimacy of the basic conditions under which citizens live depends on the inclusion of women in the processes of public deliberation and electoral politics.

1.2.1 Distributive Justice

Some liberal feminists, inspired by John Rawls' contractualist liberal theory of justice (Rawls 1971; 1993), argue that the state should ensure that the basic structure of society distributes the benefits and burdens of social cooperation fairly, that is, in a manner that women as well as men could endorse (Alstott 2004; Baehr 2004; Bojer 2002; Lloyd 1998; McClain 2006; Okin 1989; Thompson 1993; for an overview of feminist responses to Rawls, see Abbey 2013). They argue that the basic structure currently distributes benefits and burdens unfairly, in part due to the gender system, or the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions.

As Rawls puts it, the basic structure of society is: “The way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation. By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements…Competitive markets and the monogamous family [are] examples of major social institutions… The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that this structure contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the political system as well as by economic and social circumstances. In this way the institutions of society favor certain starting places over others” (Rawls 1971, 6–7).

Rawls argues that the fairness of the basic structure of society may be assessed by asking what principles representatives of citizens (parties) would choose to determine the distribution of primary goods in society if they were behind a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971, 12). The veil of ignorance blocks from the parties knowledge of their place in society: for example their socio-economic status, religion, and sex. (Rawls does not include sex in A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971), but adds it in “Fairness to Goodness” (Rawls 1975, 537).) Susan Okin proposes we “take seriously both the notion that those behind the veil of ignorance do not know what sex they are and the requirement that the family and the gender system, as basic social institutions, are to be subject to scrutiny” (Okin 1989, 101).

Rawls argues that parties behind the veil of ignorance would choose two principles: a liberty principle providing for the “most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all;” and a principle of equality requiring equality of opportunity, and permitting inequalities only if they are to the benefit of the least well off (Rawls 1971, 302–303).

Okin argues that the “gender system” violates both the liberty and equality of opportunity principles because by effectively assigning roles to citizens according to sex it circumvents citizens' “free choice of occupation” (Okin 1989, 103). On Okin's view, this means that in a just society “gender could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure, whether inside or outside the family” (103). None of the institutions of the basic structure, including the family, could assign roles according to sex. [ 2 ] It is common to argue that the state, educational institutions, and workplaces should not assign roles according to sex. But Okin argues that this applies to the family as well. Gender blindness must play the same role in the family that it plays in these institutions. In Okin's words, there must be “congruence” between the principles that govern these institutions and those that govern family life (21). That is, families must be just.

Okin offers a second argument to support the claim that families must be just. Rawls explains that a society based on his two principles of justice can be stable because within it citizens develop a sense of justice (Rawls 1971, 453ff). For our purposes consider that citizens must develop the conviction that citizens generally are due the rights of equal citizenship. Okin argues that when children are raised within unjust families, families which lack “equality and reciprocity,” and are characterized by “dependence and domination,” they are not likely to develop the requisite sense of justice (Okin 1989, 99–100; see also McClain 2006, 73–84). Instead, girls and boys and may grow to believe that women are not entitled to equal citizenship. Therefore, if the society governed by Rawls' two principles of justice is to be stable, families must be just.

What can and should the state do to ensure that gender no longer forms a “part of the social structure, whether inside or outside the family” (Okin 1989, 103)? Okin endorses measures for the workplace, for example state subsidized daycare, parental leave, and flextime (176, 186). These accommodations make it possible for women and men to choose against traditional roles. She also recommends protecting from vulnerability those women who do choose traditional roles by making them entitled to half of their spouse's paycheck (181). But Okin does not think that the state should stop at increasing the voluntariness of women's choices and compensating for disadvantage. She argues instead that the state may and should promote a particular ideal of family life. She tells us that the state should “encourage and facilitate the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, or productive and reproductive labor” (171). Accommodations by employers may be understood, then, not only as a way of making options available to women, but as a way of encouraging the sharing of paid and unpaid work by spouses. Another way the state may encourage such egalitarianism is through autonomy-promoting education, especially for girls (177). To be sure, Okin argues that what is desired is a “future in which all will be likely to choose this mode of life” (171, my emphasis). But the fact that many people currently don't choose it does not mean, for Okin, that it is not an appropriate goal of state action (172). (There is a substantial literature on Okin's use of Rawls' theory of justice. See for example Reich and Satz 2009. See also Liberal Feminism Works.)

Other feminists apply contractualist political philosophy inspired by Rawls to the problem of justice for women but draw slightly different conclusions from Okin. S.A. Lloyd (1998), Anne L. Alstott (2004) and Linda C. McClain (2006) each argue that a basically Rawlsian contractualist argument supports the claim that the current disadvantages women suffer as a result of their shouldering a disproportionate share of the burdens of social reproduction must be remedied by state action. All three endorse many of Okin's policy proposals (Lloyd 1995, 1332; 1998, 218; Alstott 2004). But they reject Okin's claim that the state should promote a particular substantive ideal of family life (Lloyd 1995, 1340–1341; Lloyd 1998, 218; McClain 2006, 78). Alstott writes: “The egalitarian family is, even in principle, a troubling ideal. Strictly equal sharing seems unduly constraining, not merely because families today deviate from the idea, but because free people might want to organize their lives differently” (Alstott 2004, 113). Other liberal feminists have voiced similar concerns. Ann Cudd worries that state action intended to promote gender fairness and foster women's autonomy could impose a homogenizing conception of the good life, and stifle the very reinventions of self and experiments in living that women's liberation requires (Cudd 2006, 209, 223; see also Wolf-Devine 2004). Elizabeth Anderson writes: “The plurality of conceptions of the good that are likely to survive in a world in which the state has done all it can be reasonably and justly expected to do will include a host of unreasonable conceptions of the good, some of which may well be patriarchal. In the face of such injustices, liberals counsel feminists to redirect their claims from the state to those promulgating such unreasonable conceptions of the good, and to redirect their activism from a focus on state action to other domains, including civil society, churches, and the family. I think this counsel is wise, which is why I am a liberal feminist” (Anderson 2009, 131; see also 141–144).

A substantial liberal feminist literature engages this tension between associational liberty and possible state action aimed at remedying the way the current distribution of the burdens of reproduction disadvantages women. Much of this literature draws on both the liberal tradition within feminism and feminist work on caregiving (Barclay 2013; Bhandary 2010; Brighouse and Wright 2008; Engster 1995, 2010; Gheaus 2009, 2012; Gornick and Meyers 2008; Hartley and Watson 2012; Lloyd 1995, 1998; Robeyns 2007; Gheaus and Robeyns 2011; Wright 2008).

1.2.2 Public Deliberation and Electoral Politics

Some liberal feminists, who emphasize the importance of political autonomy—that women be co-authors of the conditions under which they live—focus in particular on participation in the processes of democratic self-determination. These processes include both political deliberation in the many arenas of public political discourse, and electoral politics. Liberal feminists hold that the conditions under which women live lack legitimacy because women are inadequately represented in these processes. They hold that this political autonomy deficit is, in large part, due to the “gender system” (Okin 1989, 89), or the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions, and that the women's movement should work to identify and remedy it.

Attempts to increase women's participation in public deliberation and electoral politics confront a vicious circle of women's exclusion. The gender system leads to women's being underrepresented in influential forums of public deliberation, including in elected law-making bodies. For example women have less free time to engage in public deliberation because of the double-burden they carry of paid and unpaid labor; sex stereotyping leads many to think that women (especially women from particular ethnic and cultural groups) are less capable of leadership than men; the behavior called for in agonistic public deliberation and electoral politics is understood to be masculine; issues of particular interest to women are seen as personal and not political issues; women lack power in the many institutions (like churches, universities, and think tanks) that influence political debate, etc. But when women are underrepresented in these forums and law-making bodies, it is unlikely that the justice of the gender system will become the subject of public conversation or its dismantling a target of legislative action.

Some liberal feminists explore ways to escape this vicious circle. Because women are excluded from important forums of public deliberation and electoral politics in complex ways, remedies must address a variety of problems. Justice in the distribution of benefits and burdens in society would go some way towards enabling women to access forums of public debate on equal terms with men (Okin 1989, 104). But cultural change is necessary as well if stereotypes about women's abilities are not to interfere with their participation, if women's needs and interests are to be understood as legitimate claims on democratic power, and if men's dominance in institutions of influence is to be overcome. Seyla Benhabib argues that the women's movement, along with other new social movements like the gay and lesbian liberation movement, has begun this work (Benhabib 1992). While much of this change is cultural and must come about through civic action, the state has a role to play. Linda McClain argues that all children must receive civic education—to equip them for democratic citizenship—including instruction in women's equality (McClain 2006, 81). She also argues that the state may use its persuasive power to put traditionally excluded issues, like violence against women or the dilemma of balancing work and family, on the agenda for public deliberation (78).

Others take on the vicious circle of women's exclusion by recommending legal mechanisms for the inclusion of women in electoral politics (see Rhode 1994, 1205–1208; Peters 2006; Phillips 1991). Some suggest that legal mechanisms for including those who have been systematically excluded may be justified as remedies for the unjust disproportionate political power enjoyed by others (Phillips 2004, 6–10). Suggested mechanisms include targets or quotas for women (and other underrepresented groups) on party slates, or proportional representation in elected bodies. Karen Green, for example, argues for “guaranteed equal representation of both sexes in parliament” (Green 2006). There is diversity of opinion, however, among liberal feminists about the justice and efficacy of such mechanisms (Peters 2006; see also Rhode 1994, 1205).

We can distinguish between comprehensive liberal feminisms and political liberal feminisms (or feminist political liberalisms). The distinction between political and comprehensive doctrines in political theory is due to Rawls (1993) but has been taken up by some liberal feminists in recent years. (For explicit discussion of the distinction in liberal feminism, see for example Abbey 2007; 2011, 72–82, 226–247; Baehr 2008; 2013; Chambers 2008, 159–201; Enslin 2003; Hartley and Watson 2010; Lloyd 1998; Neufeld 2009; Neufeld and Schoelandt 2013; Nussbaum 1999b, 108; 2000b, 76 fn38; Okin 1994; 1999, 129–130; and Watson 2007).

Comprehensive liberal feminisms are grounded in moral doctrines. Liberal feminisms typically give accounts of how state power should be used to feminist ends; so a comprehensive liberal feminism typically includes the claim that state power should be used to some particular feminist ends because some moral doctrine requires it. A comprehensive liberal feminism typically gives an account of how part of associational life—beyond what is traditionally understood as ‘the political’—should be arranged, for example that the family should foster women's and girls' personal autonomy, or that domestic associations should distribute benefits and burdens fairly. Some comprehensive liberal feminisms focus primarily on associational life and only peripherally on the role of the state. Comprehensive liberal feminist accounts of how associational life generally should be arranged may, but need not, include the claim that the state ought to enforce such arrangements. There is nothing about grounding in a moral doctrine that forces a comprehensive liberal feminism to include the claim that the state should enforce liberal feminist values outside of what is traditionally understood as ‘the political.’ To be sure, comprehensive liberal feminisms typically do this. The reason is that comprehensive liberal feminisms typically reject the traditional public/private distinction, and hold that the political justice liberalism promises for women can be realized only when associational life—the family, for example—does not undermine girls' and women's personal autonomy, or distribute benefits and burdens unfairly. (But note that to reject the traditional public/private distinction is not to reject any and all such distinctions.)

Political liberal feminisms (or feminist political liberalisms) are accounts of how state power should be used to feminist ends that are grounded in public political values. Public political values are not the particular values of any one moral doctrine; they are values that are shared by the many reasonable comprehensive moral doctrines citizens hold (Rawls 1993, 227–230). Advocates of political liberal feminism hold that state power is used justly when supported by values that are endorsable by all reasonable citizens. Like comprehensive liberal feminists, political liberal feminists typically reject the traditional public/private distinction. Thus they typically hold that public values can justify using state power to compensate for, or even to dismantle, patriarchal (and other disadvantaging) hierarchies that are pervasive in associational life. (Again, to reject the traditional public/private distinction is not to reject any and all such distinctions.)

Among comprehensive liberal feminists we may count Jean Hampton, Drucilla Cornell, Ann Cudd, Susan Okin, and Clare Chambers. Hampton's feminist contractualist account of justice in personal relationships (see section 2.2.1) is explicitly grounded in Kant's moral philosophy (Hampton 1993, 241; on Hampton, see Abbey 2011, 120–151). Cornell's psychoanalytically informed liberal feminism (Cornell 2003) focuses on the right to intimate and sexual self-determination and is also grounded in Kant's moral theory (Cornell 1998, 17–18; see also Thurschwell 1999, 771–772). Cudd explains that her liberal feminist account of oppression as harm is grounded in a “background moral theory,” namely “a liberal contractarian view of the sort developed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice , or the more libertarian version of David Gauthier in Morals by Agreement ” (Cudd 2006, 231). Okin's liberal feminism draws on Rawls' A Theory of Justice , which Rawls himself claims is a comprehensive liberalism (Okin 1999, 129; Rawls 1993, xvii). (But note that Okin claims hers is “in between” comprehensive and political liberalism (Okin 1999, 129–130).) Chambers' liberal feminism – which explores the relationship between social construction and choice—may also be counted among comprehensive liberal feminisms as it is grounded in personal autonomy as a moral value (Chambers 2008).

Among political liberal feminists we may count S.A. Lloyd, Linda McClain, Martha Nussbaum, Christie Hartley, Lori Watson, and Amy Baehr. Lloyd constructs an argument based on public political values to the conclusion that “women's disproportionate burden in social reproduction [must] be eliminated” (Lloyd 1998, 214). McClain argues that sex equality is a public and constitutional value (2006, 60; see also 22–23, 60–62, and 76) which requires state opposition to relations of subordination and domination in the family (62); state support for autonomy in intimate matters (22); and support for the development of autonomy capacities in children, especially girls (109). Nussbaum also presents her “capabilities approach” as a political, and not a comprehensive, liberalism (see section 1.1.3.). The capabilities list, she argues, can be shared by citizens holding a wide variety of comprehensive conceptions of the good life, and thus should be able to function as a foundation for a political liberalism (Nussbaum 2000b, 76 fn38). Hartley and Watson argue that public deliberation based on shared values is incompatible with “pervasive social hierarchies” (Hartley and Watson 2010, 8). As Watson puts it, “a central task of public reason arguments, in the context of social hierarchy and inequality, is to expose the ways in which background conditions (inequalities) undermine the necessary conditions for reasonable deliberations among citizens to occur” (Watson 2007, 470).

Political liberal feminists suggest some advantages of political liberal feminism over comprehensive liberal feminism. According to S.A. Lloyd, “it's true that confining the argument to talk of socially recognized values requires operating with one hand tied behind one's back, so to speak. Conclusions that would be quite easy to reach from stronger feminist principles, or other comprehensive principles, are much harder to reach using the sparse … toolbox [of public reason]” (Lloyd 1998, 210). But if we can reach feminist conclusions on these sparse grounds, they will be much more difficult to reject. Amy Baehr suggests that arguments to feminist ends from public political values can move the political community toward a more reasonable understanding of those values (Baehr 2013; see also Rawls 1993, 227). (For further examples of political liberal feminism, see Neufeld (2009) and Neufeld and Schoelandt (2013).)

Comprehensive liberal feminists argue that political liberalism (and thus political liberal feminism) will not be adequately feminist if it is grounded in the public values of a still-patriarchal society (Abbey 2007; Chambers 2008, 159–201; Enslin 2003; Okin 1993; see also Munoz-Darde 1998, 347).

Liberal feminism is part of, and thus finds its roots in, the larger tradition of liberal political philosophy; thus we see much liberal feminist work inspired by Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls (and other figures in this tradition). But liberal feminism shares with feminist political philosophy generally a concern with understanding the “gender system” (Okin 1989, 89), that is, the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions, so that it might recommend a remedy. To get a good picture of that system, liberal feminists draw broadly from the rich tradition of feminist theorizing. For example, some liberal feminists draw on radical feminist insights into the nature of violence against women (Nussbaum 1999a) and into the nature of gender identity (Chambers 2008m 43–80); some draw on psychoanalytic feminist theory (Meyers 2002; Cornell 2003); some on socialist feminist work on women's exploitation in the home (Anderson 2004; Gheaus 2008); and some on feminist theories of care (Alstott 2004; Bhandary 2010).

1.5.1 Liberal Criticism

Some argue that liberal feminisms run the risk of being insufficiently liberal. Measures intended to promote gender fairness and the autonomy of women could end up unreasonably hindering autonomy (Cudd 2006, 223). Some argue that Susan Okin's claim that the state should be guided by an egalitarian ideal of family life is an example of such a measure (see section 1.2.1). Other measures recommended by liberal feminists that some hold may be illiberal include quotas on party slates or in elected bodies (Peters 2006) (see section 1.2.2), and bans on violent pornography (see section 1.2.4).

Classical liberals or libertarians are critical of liberal feminisms because, on their view, liberalism cannot support the claim that the right of some against coercive interference may be violated in order to promote the autonomy capacities of others, such as we find in affirmative action programs, or in the substantial taxation that would be necessary to fund the social programs liberal feminists endorse (Epstein 2002; Tomasi 2009).

1.5.2 Multicultural Criticism

Multicultural critics of liberal feminism suggest that liberal feminism's emphasis on autonomy and fairness in personal and associational life runs the risk of elevating one particular comprehensive conception of the good life over the many others found in multicultural societies (Shachar 2009; for discussion, see Okin 1999).

1.5.3 Conservative Criticism

Conservatives hold that reformers can do more harm than good when they undermine the institutions and norms which, while surely offending in many ways, also serve as the foundation for many people's well-being (Muller 1997; see also Fox-Genovese 1996). Such conservatives worry about the radical implications of liberal feminism, its willingness to put women's autonomy ahead of institutions and norms on which many people rely for their well-being. Ann Cudd suggests that the expansion of opportunity and equality promised by liberal feminism “makes us all better off” (Cudd 2006, 237). Conservatives encourage us to consider also the loss that is in liberation.

1.5.4 Feminist Criticism

Some comprehensive liberal feminists (see section 2.3) argue that the public political values on which feminist political liberalism relies render the latter insufficiently critical of precisely those hierarchies and forms of disadvantage liberal feminism aims to criticize and undermine (Abbey 2007; Baehr 1996; Chambers 2008, 12, 159–201; Okin 1994).

Some nonliberal feminists argue that even comprehensive liberalism will be insufficiently critical. Several reasons are offered. Some argue that feminist political theory must rely on a much more robust feminist ideal of the good life than liberal feminism provides (Yuracko 2003). Some argue that liberal feminism's commitment to moral individualism and ideal theory renders it incapable of identifying and criticizing the oppression of women (Schwarzman 2010). Some argue that liberal feminism's focus on the distribution of benefits and burdens in society neglects power relations (Young 1990, 37) and the eroticization of domination and subordination that are the true linchpins of the gender system (MacKinnon 1987; 1989). Still others argue that liberal feminism inherits from liberalism a focus on the autonomous individual and is, for this reason, incapable of accounting sufficiently for the fact of human dependency, the value of being cared for, and the role that caregiving plays in a good society (Held 1987; Kittay 1999).

2. Classical-Liberal or Libertarian Feminism

Classical-liberal feminism or libertarian feminism (these terms will be used interchangeably here—see fn. 1 ) conceives of freedom as freedom from coercive interference. It holds that women, as well as men, have a right to such freedom due to their status as self-owners. It holds that coercive state power is justified only to the extent necessary to protect the right to freedom from coercive interference. Equity feminists are classical-liberal or libertarian feminists who hold that, in societies like the United States, the only morally significant source of oppression of women is the state. They hold that feminism's political role is to bring an end to laws that limit women's liberty in particular, but also to laws that grant special privileges to women. Some equity feminists see a nonpolitical role for feminism, helping women to benefit from their freedom by developing beneficial character traits or strategies for success, or navigating among their increasing options. Other equity feminists are socially conservative and argue that, while the state should not enforce them, traditional values function as bulwarks against state power and produce independent and self-restraining citizens. Cultural libertarian feminists are classical-liberal or libertarian feminists who hold that the culture of societies like the United States is patriarchal and a significant source of oppression of women. They hold that the patriarchal culture and the state are complementary systems of oppression. Cultural libertarian feminists hold that much of the oppression women suffer today is noncoercive, however, and thus should not be met with state remedies but with a nonviolent movement for feminist social change.

2.1 Self-Ownership and Women's Rights

Classical liberalism or libertarianism holds that women and men are self-owners capable of acquiring property rights over things. As such women and men, equally, have the right to freedom from coercive interference with their person and property. This right to freedom from coercive interference consists in, at least, rights to freedom of conscience and expression, freedom to control what happens to one's body, freedom of association, freedom to acquire, control and transfer property, freedom of contract, as well as the right to compensation when rights are violated. The state's role is, exclusively, to protect citizens from coercive interference by protecting their rights. Some reject even a limited state, however, holding that nongovernmental means of protecting rights are to be preferred.

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminists hold that the right to freedom from coercive interference has powerful implications for women's lives. It implies that women have the right to freedom in intimate, sexual and reproductive matters. This includes sexual autonomy (the right to engage in sexual activity of one's choosing including the buying and selling of sex (Almodovar 2002; Lehrman 1997, 23), and the right to defend oneself against sexual aggression, including the use of firearms (Stevens et al. 2002)); freedom of expression (the right to appear in, publish, and consume pornography free of censorship (McElroy 1995; Strossen 2000)); freedom of intimate association (the right to partner or enter into a private marriage contract (McElroy 1991a, 20)); and reproductive freedom (the right to use birth control, have an abortion (on the minority of pro-life libertarians see Tabarrok 2002, 157), and buy and sell bodily reproductive services, for example as in surrogate motherhood (Lehrman 1997, 22; McElroy 2002b; Paul 2002)). Freedom from interference with person and property also means that women have the right to engage in economic activity in a free market, entering contracts, and acquiring, controlling and transferring property free of sexist state limits (Epstein 1992; Kirp, Yudolf, and Franks 1986, 204).

One way to characterize the wrong involved when states fail to recognize these rights of women is as a failure to respect women's right to be treated as men's equal, or the right to equal treatment under the law. To be sure, classical-liberal feminists hold that the law should not treat women and men differently. But this is because they believe everyone has the same rights, not because they believe women have a right to be treated the same as men. This is clear when we note that, for classical-liberal or libertarian feminism, equal treatment under unjust law is not justice (McElroy 1991a, 3).

Same treatment under the law does not guarantee same outcomes. Classical-liberal or libertarian feminists hold that women's rights are not violated when citizens exercise their rights in ways that create unequal outcomes (Epstein 2002, 30). A woman's rights are violated only when she is interfered with coercively, that is, when there is, or is a threat of, forced loss of freedom, property or life (which does not serve as just restraint or compensation).

Equity feminism is a form of classical-liberal or libertarian feminism that holds that feminism's political role is simply to ensure that everyone's, including women's, right against coercive interference is respected (Sommers 1994, 22). Wendy McElroy, an equity feminist writes: “I've always maintained that the only reason I call myself a feminist is because of [the] gov[ernment]. By which I mean, if the government (or an anarchist defense assoc[iation]) acknowledged the full equal rights of women without paternalistic protection or oppression, I would stop writing about women's issues” (McElroy 1998c).

Feminism's political role involves assuring that women's right against coercive interference by private individuals is recognized and protected by the state (for example women's right against groping on the street or rape within marriage (McElroy 1991a)), and that women's right against coercive interference by the state itself is respected. The latter means feminists should object to laws that restrict women's liberty in particular (for example laws that limit women's employment options (Taylor 1992, 228)), and laws that protect women in particular (for example laws granting preferential treatment to women (Paul 1989)). Equity feminists suggest that this has been largely accomplished in countries like the United States. Joan Kennedy Taylor explains: feminism's “goal of equal political liberty for women has been pretty much reached in the United States” (Taylor 2001; see also Sommers 1994, 274).

2.2.1 Equity Feminism on the Oppression of Women

On the equity feminist view, the feminist slogan “the personal is political” is accurate when the state fails to recognize women's right against coercive interference, especially in women's personal lives. So, for example, in some countries husbands have legal control over their wives' persons and property. (Some equity feminists argue that the women's movement in Western countries should not hesitate to criticize countries in which this occurs (Sommers 2007).) But in countries like the United States, where the right of women against this sort of coercive interference is recognized and protected by law, equity feminists hold that “the personal is no longer political” (Lehrman 1997, 5; see also 21).

If an individual or group of individuals suffers sustained and systematic denial of their rights, on the equity feminist view, we may call them oppressed. Women were oppressed in the United States during most of its first two centuries; people of African descent were oppressed before the dismantling of Jim Crow laws. While the culture of the United States supported this denial of rights, equity feminists hold that the oppressor was the state (McElroy 1998c), which refused to recognize and protect the right of women and people of African descent to treatment as self-owners. When the state recognizes and protects this right of women and Americans of African descent, they are no longer oppressed, even if the culture disadvantages them. So, for example, in a discussion of whether Muslim women are oppressed, Cathy Young focuses on whether women's conformity with a religious tradition that subordinates them is enforced by law. If it is, then women are oppressed (Young 2006).

If women are to be described as currently oppressed in societies like the United States, on the equity feminist view, one must show that the state fails to protect women, as a group, from sustained and systematic rights violations. Some feminists have argued that violence against women is pervasive in societies like the United States so that, even though the law recognizes women's right against it, that right is insufficiently protected, and thus women endure sustained and systematic denial of their right to bodily integrity (Dworkin 1991). Equity feminists endeavor to refute this claim by showing that the prevalence of violence against women has been exaggerated. For example Rita Simon contests the claim that as many as 154 out of 1,000 women have been raped. On her accounting, the number is closer to 19 per 1,000; and “rape is less common than other violent crimes”(Simon 2002, 235). In addition, she claims, “the criminal justice system does not ignore or make light of crimes against females”(Simon 2002, 236). Katie Roiphe argues that date rape is not a significant threat to women (Roiphe 1994). Concurring with Roiphe, Cathy Young writes: “women have sex after initial reluctance for a number of reasons … fear of being beaten up by their dates is rarely reported as one of them” (Young 1992).

Women have also been said to be oppressed because their right to be treated the same as men by employers, educational institutions, and associations has been violated in a sustained and systematic way. That is, some argue, women have been regularly denied the right to equal access to opportunities because they are women. Equity feminists generally hold that no rights are violated when employers, educational institutions, public accommodations or associations discriminate against women (see section 1.5). Nonetheless, equity feminists argue that discrimination against women is not a serious problem. Diana Furchtgott-Roth and Christine Stolba argue that “complaints about systematic economic discrimination against women simply do not square with the evidence” (Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 1999, xi; see also 2001). They argue that “women's wages and education levels are closing the gap with those of men” (xii). In addition, Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth claim that women have “surpassed men in education” (23; see also 23–43). Christina Hoff Sommers concurs, arguing that, rather than failing to provide girls with an education equal to that of boys, our current educational system disproportionately benefits girls (Sommers 2000, 20–23, 178).

Equity feminists argue that the differences in outcomes between women and men can be explained, not by violence against women and sex discrimination, but by differences in the preferences of women and men (Epstein 2002, 33; Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 1999, xii). “In many cases where women remain behind men, personal choices explain outcomes more readily than does overt discrimination” (Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 1999, xii). To be sure, classical-liberal or libertarian feminists hold that women and men are sufficiently the same that they have the “same political interests,” in particular the interest in being treated as a self-owner (McElroy 2002, 14–15). But, for some equity feminists, biological differences between the sexes largely explain the sex segregation in the workplace and in family roles still common in countries like the United States (Epstein 2002; Lehrman 1997, 5, 31).

Other equity feminists think biological sex differences alone do not explain this phenomenon (Young 2004). Women's preferences may reflect the effects of socialization or incentives: for example women may be socialized to prefer stereotypically female roles, or the rewards associated with such roles for women may provide motivation for women to take them up. But equity feminists hold that, because women are not legally required, or actually forced in some other way, to choose traditional roles, their choices are not coerced, and thus state remedies are inappropriate. On the equity feminist view, a law prohibiting women to become surgeons is coercive because it constitutes a threat of loss of liberty or property. But if one is socialized to prefer stay-at-home motherhood, or one discovers that one prefers to stay home with children given the other real options, one may still choose to become a surgeon without risking loss of liberty or property. As Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth put it (using the word“prevents” in a very strong sense): “Nothing prevents women from choosing the surgical specialty”(Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 1999, 60; my emphasis).

2.2.2 Feminism's Nonpolitical Role

While equity feminists hold that feminism's political task—securing for women the right to freedom from coercive interference—is nearly completed, some equity feminists believe that feminism has a nonpolitical role to play in women's personal lives. In its nonpolitical role, feminism can help women to develop character traits and strategies that will help them benefit from their freedom; and it can help women to navigate personally among their increasing options.

Karen Lehrman writes: “Men have typically held title to quite a few traits that women can now put to good use. In addition to ambition, assertiveness, and independence, there's also decisiveness” (Lehrman 1997, 33; see also 62). Other character traits emphasized by equity feminists include“self-confidence” (Stevens et al. 2002, 255), being able to think and argue independently (McElroy 1998a), and taking responsibility for oneself (Taylor 1992, 86). Some equity feminists suggest that feminism offers individual women and men the opportunity for freedom from conformity with sex roles (Lehrman 1997, 6; Taylor 1992, 23–24).

Equity feminists recommend strategies for success for women in education and employment as alternatives to state regulation. In male dominated fields, for example, equity feminists recommend that women mentor one another, or organize supportive associations, making use of the techniques of 1960's feminism like consciousness-raising (Taylor 1992, 100–101). In What You Can Do About Sexual Harassment When You Don't Want to Call the Cops , Joan Kennedy Taylor argues that women can avoid sexual harassment or lessen its impact if they learn to diffuse conflicts with men and understand the role of sexual banter in male culture (Taylor 1999). Equity feminists also recommend that women make full use of their right to contract by turning their preferences—for example the preference for being paid and/or promoted on the basis of one's job performance and not on the basis of sexual favors—into rights through contract (Epstein 2002, 40; Taylor 1992, 169).

Some equity feminists stress that women need not give up their gender difference to benefit from their freedom (Lehrman 1997, 198). As Karen Lehrman writes, “completing the feminist revolution… primarily involves [women] completing their own personal evolutions” (35). Lehrman quotes Elizabeth Cady Stanton:“the strongest reason for giving woman a complete emancipation from all forms of bondage of custom, dependence, superstition …is the solitude and personal responsibility of her own individual life” (Lehrman 1997, 201). An important part of this individual life, on Lehrman's view, is navigating among sexual difference and sameness in the personal construction of a satisfying life.

2.2.3 Socially Conservative Equity Feminism

Some equity feminists are socially conservative (Morse 2001; Sommers 2000). To be sure, equity feminism as described here is a form of classical-liberal or libertarian feminism. As such it involves the claim that traditional values should not be imposed on citizens by the state. For example, the state should not tax citizens to support institutions that promote traditional values, nor should the criminal or civil law create incentives for adherence to such values. But some equity feminists hold that it is best when citizens voluntarily adhere to traditional values. They hold that widespread voluntary adherence to traditional values is conducive to well-being in society because traditional values make possible the reproduction of independent and “self-restraining citizens” which are “the basis of free institutions, both economic and political” (Morse 2001, 161).

Socially conservative equity feminists do not take the classical liberal or libertarian theory of the limits of state power to imply endorsement of a libertine cultural ethos. So, for example, while socially conservative equity feminists hold that the state should not force citizens to accept traditional family forms (because individuals have a right against such coercive interference), they hold that society should strongly discourage disfavored ways of life and encourage favored ones through noncoercive, nonstate means. Socially conservative equity feminists hold that when feminism strays from its political role of assuring equal rights and ventures into women's personal lives it tends to discourage in women the kinds of delayed gratification and self-sacrifice on which vital social institutions, like the family, depend (Morse 2001, 133).

To be sure, there are political conservatives who take equity feminism's claim that women and men should be treated the same by the law as a rule of thumb. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese is an example of such a political conservative (Fox-Genovese 1991; 1996). The difference between political conservatives who embrace the equity feminist account of women's equality and socially conservative equity feminists is that the former endorse the use of state power to promote traditional values while the latter do not. Also, socially conservative equity feminists hold that individuals' political rights derive from their status as self-owners (Morse 2001, 57) while political conservatives hold that citizens' political rights derive from their status as members of communities (Fox-Genovese 1991, 9). In contemporary popular political discourse it is often hard to distinguish these two, as they are in political coalition. To appeal to both libertarian and socially conservative constituencies, on occasion theorists help themselves to a bit of both traditions. For example, Jennifer Roback Morse identifies herself as a libertarian: “When the topic is the proper relationship between the individual and the state, libertarianism is pretty much the right path” (Morse 2001, 4). She tells us that “the moral and ethical system underlying the polity must be secured outside the political process itself” (124). But she also makes the un-libertarian and politically conservative recommendation that the state should intervene in personal relationships by making it “costly to divorce” (164, see also 104, 111).

Cultural libertarianism is a form of classical liberalism or libertarianism that is “concerned about constraints on individual freedom from government as well as from traditionalist familial, religious, and community institutions-the same civil institutions that conservatives see as necessary for ordered liberty to thrive”(Young 2007). Cultural libertarian feminism holds that these institutions reflect the patriarchal nature of society and are oppressive of women. Thus cultural libertarian feminism recognizes sources of women's oppression other than the state (Presley 2000; Johnson and Long 2005—see Other Internet Resources). As Charles Johnson and Roderick Long put it, patriarchal culture and the state are “interlocking systems of oppression” (Johnson and Long 2005—see Other Internet Resources), both of which should be opposed by feminists. They explain: “There is nothing inconsistent or un-libertarian in holding that women's choices under patriarchal social structures can be sufficiently ‘voluntary,’ in the libertarian sense, to be entitled to immunity from coercive legislative interference, while at the same time being sufficiently ‘involuntary,’ in a broader sense, to be recognized as morally problematic and as a legitimate target of social activism” (Johnson and Long 2005—see Other Internet Resources).

Calling this view “anarchist feminism,” Sharon Presley writes: “What the anarchist feminists are calling for is a radical restructuring of society, both in its public and private institutions” (Presley 2000). Such feminists hold that much of the oppression women currently suffer is noncoercive, however. Laws against prostitution are coercive—the state can put a violator in jail or force her to pay a fine. But on the cultural libertarian feminist view, much of the pressure to conform to gender roles is not coercive. Noncoercive oppression can be resisted, although it is often not easy to do so. Cultural libertarian feminists hold that noncoercive oppression should not be remedied by the state (see also Tomasi 2009). As Presley and Kinsky explain, on the cultural libertarian view, to try to remedy the noncoercive oppression of women with coercive state action “just changes the sort of oppression, not the fact” (Presley and Kinsky 1991, 78). This oppression should be opposed by a nonviolent movement for feminist social change.

Cultural libertarian feminists target the patriarchal culture by, for example, developing in individuals (especially women) the ability to be independent. This involves enabling individuals to resist authority and think for themselves (Presley 2001). Cultural libertarian feminists also recommend the development of more deeply consensual relationships and institutions (Heckert 2004—see Other Internet Resources), relationships and institutions in which there is an equality of authority (Long 2001—see Other Internet Resources). While some equity feminists (see section 1.2) would applaud this work, they would call it “personal,” reserving the term “political” for the work of securing for women their right against coercive interference. Equity feminist Wendy McElroy writes: “I understand that there is a cultural form of feminism and many women would still fight for improved prestige or status, and I wouldn't criticis[e] them for doing so. It just wouldn't grip me. Guess I'm a political animal after all”(McElroy 1998c). But cultural libertarian feminists consider this work to be an integral part of a larger political struggle for women's freedom.

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminists understand themselves as heirs to the first generation of feminist political philosophers, for example Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor Mill, and John Stuart Mill (Taylor 1992, 25–39); the first generation of feminist political reformers in the United States, for example the abolitionist feminists Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Sarah Grimke (McElroy 2002, 6–7); and the tradition of 19 th century anarchist feminism, including figures such as Voltairine de Cleyre (McElroy 2002, 8; Presley 2000; Presley and Sartwell 2005). Equity feminists stress the extent to which these early thinkers and activists identify women's liberation with equal respect for women's right against coercive interference (Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 2001, 1–2). Cultural libertarian feminists emphasize the extent to which these thinkers and activists challenged both coercive state power and the patriarchal culture (Presley 2000; Johnson and Long 2005—see Other Internet Resources).

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminists hold that “the very arguments that rightly led to the legal reforms affecting the status of women during the 19 th century militate against the demands for reform from the late 20 th century women's movement” (Epstein 2002, 30). That is, they hold that the defense of equal rights and independence for women promulgated by these early feminists is incompatible with the tendency of the contemporary women's movement to call on the state to improve the lives of women.

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminism requires same treatment of women and men under just law. This means that sex discrimination by the state, for example when the state functions as an employer, is impermissible (Block 1991, 102; Epstein 2002, 34; Warnick 2003, 1608). But classical-liberal or libertarian feminists oppose laws that prohibit discrimination against women by nonstate actors, for example in employment, education, public accommodations, or associations (McElroy 1991a, 22–23; Epstein 1992). They hold that the interaction of citizens should be subject to state control only to the extent necessary to protect citizens' right against coercive interference. Businesses violate citizens' right against coercive interference if they steal from their customers or employees; associations violate it if they extort their members; colleges violate it if they kidnap students. But businesses do not violate this right if they refuse to do business with women, pay women less for the same work, or create a working environment that is hostile to them because of their sex. Private educational institutions do not violate this right if they refuse to educate girls or women, offer them an inferior education, or create a learning environment that is hostile to them because of their sex. Business and professional associations do not violate this right if they refuse to admit women as members or make them feel unwelcome because of their sex.

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminism, as described here, clearly implies rejection of legal prohibition of private discrimination in employment, education, public accommodations, and associations. But in the literature one finds a range of views. Some categorically reject any legal protection against private discrimination (Taylor 1992, 62). Others accept basic protections such as those afforded in U.S. law by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972; but reject more robust protections, such as non-remedial affirmative action or comparable worth (Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 2001, 179; see also 107–108).

Classical-liberal or libertarian feminism holds that private businesses, educational institutions, and associations are free to give or withhold preferential treatment to women. But the state may not treat women preferentially because the state must treat citizens the same regardless of sex. Nor may the state require that private businesses, educational institutions, or associations treat women preferentially. This is because, on the equity feminist view, failure to treat women preferentially is not a violation of anyone's right against coercive interference. Examples of preferential treatment under the law, which classical-liberal or libertarian feminists oppose, include affirmative action in employment and education (Lehrman 1997, 25), comparable worth (Paul 1989), and advantages for women in the legal treatment of custody and domestic violence (Simon 2002).

While equity feminists resist state remedies for private discrimination against women, they also hold that such discrimination is not currently a serious problem in countries like the United States (see section 1.2.1). In addition, they argue, “even where discrimination may exist, we find little, if any, evidence that expanded government intervention would serve any useful purpose”(Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 1999, xii), and speculate that freer markets would make whatever discrimination currently takes place even more rare (McElroy 2002a, 187).

Why should individuals be treated as self-owners? Much of the classical-liberal or libertarian feminist literature, especially the equity feminist literature, is written for public policy and popular audiences. Thus more attention is paid to implications and policy applications than to philosophical justification. Several justifications are mentioned in the literature. Kirp, Yudoff, and Franks, for example, refer to Kant's categorical imperative and claim that treating individuals as self-owners is what is meant by treating individuals as ends in themselves ((Kirp et al. 1986, 13–14). Wendy McElroy grounds her thought in the natural law tradition (McElroy 1998b). Some imply a perfectionist justification according to which the perfection of the human being requires being treated as a self-owner (Presley 2001).

By far the most common argument in the classical-liberal or libertarian feminist literature is consequentialist. The argument says that the political arrangements recommended by classical-liberalism or libertarianism, as compared with the alternatives, will provide women with more of what is good for them: for example safety, income and wealth, choices, and options. Liberalizing guns laws will make women safer (Stevens, et al. 2002); legalizing prostitution and porn will improve the lives of women in those trades (Almodovar 2002; Strossen 2000) and open opportunities for others; freer markets will root out discrimination against women and stimulate the proliferation of amenities essential to working women, like daycare centers (Epstein 2002, 33; Paul 2002, 208–209; Stolba and Furchtgott-Roth 2001, 124, 180; Conway 1998). Indeed, some argue that liberalizing the market will release such an “explosion of prosperity” that women will not need help from a welfare state (Long 1997—see Other Internet Resources).

Some critics take aim at the consequentialist argument offered in support of classical-liberal or libertarian feminism. The consequentialist argument says that the political arrangements recommended by classical-liberalism or libertarianism, as compared with the alternatives, will provide women with more of what is good for them. Following Ashlie Warnick, we can distinguish the claim that particular liberty-restricting policies are bad for women (and that some liberty-enhancing policies are good for women) from the claim that all liberty-restricting policies harm women, or that a minimal state (or no state) would be better for women overall (Warnick 2003). It is surely possible to cite liberty-restricting policies that are bad for women—laws limiting women's employment options—and thus to cite liberty-enhancing policies that are good for women—not having such laws. But it is also possible to cite liberty-restricting policies that are good for women—for example the legal prohibition against sex discrimination in employment, education, and public accommodations (which classical-liberal or libertarian feminists recommend dismantling (see section 2.5)). Of course, if sex discrimination is rare, as some classical-liberal or libertarian feminists contend (see section 2.2.1), laws prohibiting it will not produce much benefit. But, as liberal feminists Deborah Rhode and Ann Cudd argue sex discrimination is all too common (Rhode 1997, 156; Cudd 2006, 140–142). Think also of the classical-liberal or libertarian feminist recommendation that women and men be treated exactly the same by the state (see sections 2.1 and 2.5). While different treatment can stigmatize and entrench stereotypes, same treatment can disadvantage women if they are not similarly situated to men—which, arguably, is the case (Minow 1990). So the larger case—that all liberty-restricting policies harm women, or that a minimal state (or no state) would be better for women overall—has not been made convincingly (Warnick 2003). Another concern about the larger case is that much of the support offered is speculative, for example Roderick Long's assertion that “the explosion of prosperity that a libertarian society would see would go a long way toward providing women with an economic safety net more effective than any government welfare program” (Long 1997—see Other Internet Resources).

In addition to the consequentialist argument, classical-liberal or libertarian feminists offer an argument from principle. According to this argument, regardless of the consequences, women and men should be treated as self-owners with rights to property justly acquired and to freedom from coercive interference because this is what they deserve as ends in themselves, or because this is what moral insight teaches, or because this is what their perfection requires (see section 2.6). In short, the claim is that the dignity of women and men depends on their being treated as self-owners.

Critics urge us to consider that all human beings are utterly dependent on the care of others for many years at the start of life; many come to need the care of others due to temporary or permanent disability later in life; and many require care as they become infirm at the end of life. Those who provide care for those who cannot care for themselves will also find themselves dependent on others for material support. These are enduring features of any human community. Thus all individuals have a high priority interest in receiving care when it is needed (Kittay 1999; Nussbaum 2000). As liberal feminist Susan Okin argues, a theory that ignores this interest must assume that there is a “realm of private life in which the reproductive and nurturant needs of human beings are taken care of” (Okin 1989, 75). This assumption hides the fact that it is women who typically satisfy this interest, and do so often without pay and at great sacrifice to themselves. This renders classical-liberalism or libertarianism, including its feminist versions, blind to the nature of obligations to, and entitlements of, children and others who require care. In addition, because caring labor is hidden from view, it becomes impossible to evaluate the justice of the arrangements under which the interest in receiving care is commonly satisfied. This suggests that freedom from coercive interference fails to capture what human dignity requires. At the very least, that dignity requires the right to care when one is unable to care for oneself and the right to a share of resources if one is charged with providing care for those who require it.

In a related criticism, Okin argues that classical-liberal or libertarian views are self-refuting. If individuals have a right to control their bodies and own the fruits of their labor, then women—who presumably make children from resources that have been given to them freely or were bought by them—own their children (Nozick 1974; Okin 1989, 80, 81; see also Jeske 1996; and Andersson 2007). But if women own their children, and everyone begins as a child, then no one owns herself (Okin 1989, 85).

Jennifer Roback Morse, herself a classical-liberal or libertarian feminist, concedes: “I think it is well to admit… that our inattention to family life and community responsibility has left libertarians open to the charge that we do not care very much about these matters” (Morse 2001, 28).

Liberal criticism of the argument from principle begins by noting that the liberties championed by classical-liberals and libertarians are valuable because of what they make it possible for individuals to be and do. But it is not liberties alone which facilitate our being and doing what we value. We require also, at least, adequate material resources, genuine opportunities, and standing as an equal in society (Rawls 1971; Rawls 1993). What is needed is a basic structure of society, including property rules, that secures these. Thus freedom from coercive interference fails to capture what human dignity requires.

Critics have also taken aim at the treatment of oppression in classical-liberal or libertarian feminism. Recall that equity feminism holds that women are oppressed when the state fails to protect them, as a group, from sustained and systematic rights violations. Recall also that for equity feminists the only rights that create coercible duties are the rights to justly acquired property and freedom from coercive interference. Equity feminists argue that, in western countries like the United States, women are not oppressed because the state protects these rights of women. It should be conceded that much violence against women which was, in the past, tolerated or condoned is now unambiguously prohibited. But, critics contend, violence against women remains all too common in western countries, and thus it is premature to suggest that women are not oppressed, that is, are not effectively protected against sustained and systematic rights violations (Rhode 1997, 120; see also Cudd 2006, 93ff).

As we have seen, cultural libertarian feminists criticize equity feminism for ignoring significant, though perhaps more subtle, constraints on women's individual freedom that stem “from traditionalist familial, religious, and community institutions” (Young 2007). Cultural libertarian feminists recommend social activism, not state power, as a remedy for this oppression. Liberal feminists disagree, arguing that state power is legitimately used to ensure the fair value of women's liberties and opportunities. Think here, for example, of the liberal feminist claim that workplaces should be structured by law so that care-givers are not disadvantaged, given the “traditionalist familial, religious and community” pressure on women to assume caregiving responsibilities for dependent family members (see section 1.1.4). Think also of the liberal feminist claim that the education of girls must ensure the development of their autonomy (see section 1.1.4).

As we have seen, while cultural libertarian feminists are culturally liberal, some classical-liberal feminists are culturally conservative. They content that classical-liberalism or libertarianism must call for voluntary adherence to traditional morality because that morality is necessary for the reproduction of citizens capable of independence and self-restraint. Critics respond that the traditional morality championed by cultural conservatives disadvantages women and girls in myriad ways. Think here, for example, of how the traditional nuclear family places on women a disproportionate and disadvantaging share of the burdens of reproduction (Okin 1989). Socially conservative equity feminists are untroubled by this disadvantage as long as it is voluntarily chosen. Some nonliberal feminists argue that the fact that a political philosophy grounded in the value of voluntary choice is compatible with traditions and institutions that disadvantage women shows that feminism should not be so grounded (Jaggar 1983, 194; Yuracko 2003, 25–26). Liberal feminists embrace the value of voluntary choice for feminism, but argue that women often cannot exercise it, because sexist socialization and a homogeneous culture render them incapable of critically assessing their preferences and imagining life otherwise (Meyers 2004; Cornell 1998; Cudd 2006). Indeed, if critical thinking is necessary for freedom but corrosive of tradition, cultural conservatives must be wary of freedom. Thus there is a tension within culturally conservative equity feminism between the emphasis on voluntariness and the value of tradition. (For related criticism, see Loudermilk 2004, 149–172).

To summarize, critics suggest that classical-liberal or libertarian feminism is not adequately supported by a consequentialist case; fails to recognize our obligations to those who cannot care for themselves; hides from view the way in which the work of care is distributed in society; denies that state power should be used to ensure equality of opportunity for women and women's equal standing in society; and (cultural libertarianism excepted) is uncritical of traditional social arrangements that limit and disadvantage women. For reasons such as these, some have argued that classical-liberal or libertarian feminism counts as neither feminist nor liberal (Minnich 1998; see also Freeman 1998).

Works Cited

• Abbey, Ruth (2013). ‘Biography of a Bibliography: Three Decades of Feminist Response to Rawls.‘ In Abbey (2013).
• ––– (2011). The Return of Feminist Liberalism . Montreal & Kingston: Mcgill-Queens University Press.
• ––– (2007). ‘Back Toward a Comprehensive Liberalism? Justice as Fairness, Gender and Families.‘ Political Theory 35: 5–28.
• Abbey, Ruth (ed.) (2013). Feminist Interpretations of Rawls . College Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Alstott, Linda (2004). No Exit: What Parents Owe Their Children and What Society Owes Parents . New York: Oxford University Press.
• Anderson, Elizabeth (2009). ‘Toward a Non-Ideal, Relational Methodology for Political Philosophy: Comments on Schwarzman's Challenging Liberalism.‘ Hypatia 24: 130–145.
• Antony, Louise and Charlotte Witt (eds.) (1993). A Mind of One's Own . Oxford: Westview.
• Baehr, Amy R. (2013). ‘Liberal Feminism: Comprehensive and Political.‘ In Abbey (2013).
• ––– (2008). ‘Perfectionism, Feminism, and Public Reason.’ Law and Philosophy 27: 193–222.
• ––– (2004). ‘Feminist Politics and Feminist Pluralism: Can We Do Feminist Political Theory without Theories of Gender?’ Journal of Political Philosophy 12: 411–436.
• ––– (1996). ‘Towards a New Feminist Liberalism: Okin, Rawls, and Habermas.’ Hypatia 11: 49–66. Reprinted in The Philosophy of Rawls: A Collection of Essays , vol. 3 Henry S. Richardson and Paul J. Weithman, eds. (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999): 295–312.
• Baehr, Amy R. (ed.) (2004). Varieties of Feminist Liberalism . Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Barclay, Linda (2013). ‘Liberal Daddy Quotas: Why Men Should Take Care of the Children, and How Liberals Can Get Them to Do It.’ Hypatia 28:163–178.
• Benhabib, Seyla (1992). Situating the Self . New York: Routledge.
• Bhandary, Asha (2010). ‘Dependency in Justice: Can Rawlsian Liberalism Accommodate Kittay's Dependency Critique? ’ Hypatia 25: 140–156.
• Bojer, Hilde (2002). ‘Women and the Rawlsian Social Contract.’ Social Justice Research 15: 393–407.
• Brake, Elizabeth (2004). ‘Rawls and Feminism: What Should Feminists Make of Liberal Neutrality?’ Journal of Moral Philosophy 1: 293–309.
• Brighouse, Harry and Erik Olin Wright (2008). ‘Strong Gender ism.’ Politics and Society 36: 360–372.
• Brison, Susan (2006). ‘Contentious Freedom: Sex Work and Social Construction.’ Hypatia 21: 192–200.
• ––– (1998). ‘The Autonomy Defense of Freedom of Speech.’ Ethics 108: 312–339.
• ––– (1997). ‘Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory and Personal Identity.’ In Meyers (1997): 12–39.
• Brown, Jude (ed). (2007). The Future of Gender . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Case, Mary Anne (2006). ‘Marriage Licenses.’ Minnesota Law Review 89: 1758–1796.
• Chambers, Clare (2008). Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice . University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Cornell, Drucilla (1998). At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• ––– (2003). ‘Autonomy Re-Imagined.’ Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 8: 144–149.
• Cudd, Ann (2006). Analysing Oppression . New York: Oxford University Press.
• ––– (2004). ‘The Paradox of Liberal Feminism: Preference Rationality, and Oppression.’ In Baehr (2004): 37–62.
• Eaton, A.W. (2007). ‘A Sensible Anti-Porn Feminism.’ Ethics 117: 674–715.
• Engster, Daniel (2010). ‘The Place of Parenting within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The Private Parenting Model, Parental Licenses, or Public Parenting Support?’ Social Theory and Practice 36: 233–262.
• ––– (1995). ‘Mary Wollstonecraft's Nurturing Liberalism: Between and Ethic of Justice and Care.’ American Political Science Review 95: 577–588.
• Enslin, Penny (2003). ‘Liberal Feminism, Diversity and Education.’ Theory and Research in Education 1: 73–87.
• Epstein, Richard (2002). ‘Liberty and Feminism.’In McElroy (2002): 30–42.
• Follesdal, Andreas (2005). ‘Exit, Choice, and Loyalty: Religious Liberty versus Gender Equality.’ Journal of Social Philosophy 36: 407–420.
• Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth (1996). Feminism is Not the Story of My Life: How Today's Feminist Elite Has Lost Touch With the Real Concerns of Women . London: Doubleday.
• ––– (1991). Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
• Freeman, Samuel (ed.) (2003). Cambridge Companion to Rawls . New York: Cambridge University Press.
• ––– (1999). John Rawls: Collected Papers . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Gheaus, Anca (2012). ‘Gender Justice.’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6: 1–24.
• ––– (2009). ‘The Challenge of Care to Idealizing Theories of Distributive Justice.’ In Tessman (2009).
• ––– (2008). ‘Basic Income, Gender Justice and the Costs of Gender-Symmetrical Lifestyles.’ Basic Income Studies 3: 1–8.
• Gheaus, Anca and Ingrid Robeyns (2011). ‘Equality-Promoting Parental Leave.’ The Journal of Social Philosophy 42: 173–191.
• Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers (2008). ‘Creating Gender Egalitarian Societies: An Agenda for Reform.’ Politics & Society 36: 313–349.
• Green, Karen (2006). ‘Parity and Procedural Justice.’ Essays in Philosophy , 7 (1) (January), URL = <available online in PDF>.
• Hampton, Jean (1993). ‘Feminist Contractarianism.’ In Antony and Witt (1993): 227–56.
• Hartley, Christie and Lori Watson (2012). ‘Political Liberalism, Marriage and the Family.’ Law and Philosophy 31: 185–212.
• ––– (2010). ‘Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?’ Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5: 1–21.
• Held, Virginia (1987). ‘Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View.’ In Hanen and Nielsen (1987).
• Kittay, Eva (1999). Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency . New York: Routledge.
• Laden, Anthony Simon (2003). ‘Radical Liberals, Reasonable Feminists: Reason, Power and Objectivity in MacKinnon and Rawls.’ Journal of Political Philosophy 11: 133–152.
• Lloyd, S.A. (1998). ‘Toward a Liberal Theory of Sexual Equality.’ Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 9: 203–224.
• ––– (1995). ‘Situating a Feminist Critique of John Rawls' Political Liberalism .’ Loyola Law Review 28: 1319–1344.
• MacKenzie, Catriona (1999). ‘Imagining Oneself Otherwise.’ In MacKenzie and Stoljar (1999): 124–150.
• MacKenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar (1999). ‘Autonomy Refigured.’ In MacKenzie and Stoljar (1999): 3–34.
• MacKenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar (eds.) (1999). Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self . New York: Oxford University Press.
• MacKinnon, Catharine (1989). Toward a Feminist Theory of the State . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• ––– (1987). Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Mansbridge, Jane (1997). ‘Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent “Yes”.’ The Journal of Politics 61: 628–657.
• McClain, Linda (2006). The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality and Responsibility . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Metz, Tamara (2010). Untying the Knot: Marriage, the State, and the Case for their Divorce . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Meyers, Diana (2004). Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life . Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• ––– (2002). Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Images and Women's Agency . New York: Oxford.
• Meyers, Diana T. (ed.) (1997). Feminists Rethink the Self . Boulder: Westview.
• Muller, Jerry Z. 1997. ‘What Is Conservative Social and Political Thought?’ In Muller (1997): 3–31.
• Muller, Jerry Z. (ed.) (1997). Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Munuz-Darde, Veronique (1998). ‘Rawls, Justice in the Family and Justice of the Family.’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 48: 335–353.
• Neufeld, Blain (2009). ‘Coercion, the Basic Structure, and the Family.’ Journal of Social Philosophy 40: 37–54.
• Neufeld, Blain and Chad Van Schoelandt (2013). ‘Political Liberalism, Ethos Justice, and Gender Equality.’ Law and Philosophy (January 2013) (online first).
• Nussbaum, Martha C. (2002). ‘Whether from Reason or Prejudice: Taking Money for Bodily Services.’ In Nussbaum (1999): 276–298.
• ––– (2000a). Women and Human Development . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• ––– (2000b). ‘The Future of Feminist Liberalism.’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74: 47–79.
• ––– (1999a). Sex and Social Justice . New York: Oxford.
• ––– (1999b). ‘A Plea for Difficulty.’ In Okin (ed.) (1999): 105–14.
• Okin, Susan (1999). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• ––– (1994). ‘ Political Liberalism , Justice and Gender.’ Ethics 105: 23–43.
• ––– (1989). Justice, Gender and the Family . Basic Books: New York.
• Pearce, Diana (1978). ‘The Feminization of Poverty.’ Urban and Social Change Review 1978: 28–36.
• Peters, Anne (2006). ‘Electoral Gender Quotas: Undemocratic, Unfair and Inefficient?’ Unpublished manuscript on file with the author.
• Phillips, Anne (2004). ‘Defending Equality of Outcome.’ Journal of Political Philosophy 12: 1–19.
• ––– 1991. Engendering Democracy . Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Radzik, Linda (2005). ‘Justice in the Family: A Defence of Feminist Contractarianism.’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 22: 45–54.
• Rawls, John (1997). ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited.’ In Freeman (1999): 573–615.
• ––– (1993). Political Liberalism . New York: Columbia University Press.
• ––– (1975). ‘Fairness to Goodness.’ In Freeman (1999): 267–285.
• ––– (1971). A Theory of Justice . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Rhode, Deborah (1997). Speaking of Sex: The Denial of Gender Inequality . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• ––– (1994). “Feminism and the State.” Harvard Law Review 107: 1181–1208.
• Reich, Robert, and Debra Satz (eds.) (2009). Toward a Humanist Justice: The Political Philosophy of Susan Moller Okin . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Robeyns, Ingrid (2007). ‘When Will Society Be Gender-Just?’ In Browne (2007): 54–74.
• Sample, Ruth (2002). ‘Why Feminist Contractarianism?’ Journal of Social Philosophy 33: 257–281.
• Schwartzman, Lisa (2010). Challenging Liberalism: Feminism as Political Critique . College Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Scoccia, Danny (1996). ‘Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?’ Ethics 106: 776–799.
• Smith, Patricia (2004). ‘Liberalism as an Antidote to Stereotyping.’ In Baehr (2004): 21–36.
• Spaulding, Christina (1988–89). ‘Anti-Pornography Laws as a Claim for Equal Respect: Feminism, Liberalism, and Community.’ Berkeley Women's Law Journal 4: 128–165.
• Tessman, Lisa (ed.) Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal . Springer.
• Thompson, Janna (1993). ‘What Do Women Want? Rewriting the Social Contract.’ International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 8: 257–272.
• Thurschwell, Adam (1999). ‘Radical Feminist Liberalism: At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality by Drucilla Cornell.’ Rutgers Law Review 51: 745–776.
• Tomasi, John (2009). ‘Can Feminism be Liberated from Governmentalism?’ In Reich and Satz (2009).
• Watson, Lori (2007). ‘Constituting Politics: Power, Reciprocity and Identity.’ Hypatia 22: 96–112.
• Williams, Joan (2000). Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It . New York: Oxford University Press.
• Wolf, Christopher (ed.) (2004). Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Its Critics (2nd Edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Wolf-Devine, Celia (2004). ‘The Hegemonic Liberalism of Susan Moller Okin.’ In Wolf (2004): 41–59.
• Wright, Erik Olin (2008). ‘Institutions Promoting Gender Families.’ Politics and Society 36: 311–312.
• Young, Iris (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference . Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Yuracko, Kimberly. (2003). Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values . Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.

Additional Sources

• Allen, Anita L. (2003). Why Privacy Isn't Everything: Feminist Reflections on Personal Accountability . Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Antony, Louise M. (1998). ‘Back to Androgyny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us About Equality.’ Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 9: 1–20.
• Baehr, Amy R. (2003). ‘A Feminist Liberal Approach to Hate Crime Legislation.’ The Journal of Social Philosophy 34: 134–152. Reprinted in Baehr (2004): 265–286.
• Bassham, Gregory (1992). ‘Feminist Legal Theory: A Liberal Response.’ Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 6: 293–319.
• Bjoer, Hilde (2000). ‘Children and Theories of Social Justice.’ Feminist Economics 6: 23–39.
• Brake, Elizabeth (2000). ‘A Liberal Response to Catharine MacKinnon.’ Southwest Philosophical Studies 22: 17–23.
• Brennan, Samantha (2004). ‘The Liberal Rights of Feminist Liberalism.’ In Baehr (2004): 85–102.
• Card, Robert F. (2001). ‘Gender, Justice Within the Family, and the Commitments of Rawlsian Liberalism.’ Public-Affairs-Quarterly 15: 155–171.
• Cohen, Joshua (1992). ‘Okin on Justice, Gender and Family.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22: 263–287.
• Cornell, Drucilla (1995). The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography, and Sexual Harassment . New York: Routledge.
• De Wijze, Stephen (2000). ‘The Family and Political Justice.’ The Journal of Ethics 4: 257–282.
• English, Jane (1977). ‘Justice Between Generations.’ Philosophical Studies 31: 91–104.
• Exdell, J. (1994). ‘Feminism, Fundamentalism and Liberal Legitimacy.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24: 441–463.
• Gill, Emily R. (2001). Becoming Free: Autonomy and Diversity in the Liberal Polity . Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
• Graham, Gordon (1994). ‘Liberal vs. Radical Feminism Revisited.’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 11: 155–170.
• Green, Karen (1994). ‘Freud, Wollstonecraft, and Ecofeminism: A Defense of Liberal Feminism.’ Environmental Ethics 16: 117–33.
• ––– (1986). ‘Rawls, Women and the Priority of Liberty.’ Australian Journal of Philosophy 64: 26–36.
• Groenhout, Ruth (2002). ‘Essentialist Challenges to Liberal Feminism.’ Social Theory and Practice 28: 51–75.
• Hager, Mark M. (1999). ‘Sex in the Original Position: A Restatement of Liberal Feminism.’ University of Wisconsin Women's Law Journal 14: 181–241.
• Heberle, Renee and Benhamin Pryor (2008). Imagining Law: On Drucilla Cornell . Albany: State University of New York Press.
• Jensen, Pamela Grande (ed.) (1996). Finding a New Feminism: Rethinking the Woman Question for Liberal Democracy . Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Johnson, Pauline (1994). Feminism as Radical Humanism . Boulder: Westview.
• Kearnes, Debrah (1983). ‘A Theory of Justice—and Love; Rawls on the Family.’ Politics 18 (Journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association): 36–42.
• Kensinger, Loretta (1997). ‘(In)Quest of Liberal Feminism.’ Hypatia 12: 178–197.
• Kymlicka, Will (1991). ‘Rethinking the Family.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 20: 77–97.
• Laden, Anthony Simon (2001). Reasonably Radical: Deliberative Liberalism and the Politics of Identity . Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
• Lloyd, S.A. (1994). “Family Justice and Social Justice.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 75: 353–371.
• McKeen, Catherine (2006). ‘Gender, Choice and Partiality: A Defense of Rawls on the Family.’ Essays in Philosophy , 7 (1), URL = <available online in PDF>.
• Mendus, Susan (1999). ‘The Importance of Love in Rawls' Theory of Justice ’. British Journal of Political Science 29: 57–75.
• Minow, Martha (1990). Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Nash, Kate (1998). Universal Difference: Feminism and the Undecidability of ‘Women.’ Basingstoke: Macmillan.
• Nussbaum, Martha C. (2003). ‘Rawls and Feminism.’ In Freeman (2003): 488–520.
• Okin, Susan (2005). ‘‘Forty Acres and a Mule’ for Women: Rawls and Feminism.’ Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4: 233–248.
• Phillips, Anne (2001). ‘Feminism and Liberalism Revisited: Has Martha Nussbaum Got it Right?’ Constellations 8: 249–266.
• Richardson, Janice (2007). “On Not Making Ourselves the Prey of Others.” Feminist Legal Studies 15: 33–55.
• Russell, J.S. (1995). ‘Okin's Rawlsian Feminism? Justice in the Family and Another Liberalism.’ Social Theory and Practice 21: 397–426.
• Schaeffer, Denise (2001). ‘Feminism and Liberalism Reconsidered: The Case of Catherine MacKinnon.’ American Political Science Review 95: 699–708.
• Schwartz, Justin (2001). ‘Rights of Inequality: Rawlsian Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Status of the Family.’ Legal Theory 7: 83–117.
• Smith, Andrew F. (2004). ‘Closer but Still No Cigar: On the Inadequacy of Rawls's Reply to Okin's “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender.”’ Social Theory and Practice 30: 59–71.
• Smith, Patricia (1998). ‘Autonomy, Aspiration and Accomplishment: Some Steps and Barriers to Equality for Women.’ Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 9: 257–278.
• Spinner-Halev, Jeff (2001). ‘Feminism, Multiculturalism, Oppression and the State.’ Ethics 112: 84–113.
• Thurschwell, Adam (2008). ‘Radical Feminist Liberalism.” In Heberle and Pryor (2008).
• Tong, Rosemarie (1998). ‘Liberal Feminism.’ In Tong (1998): 10–44.
• ––– (1998). Feminist Thought . Oxford: Westview.
• Walker, John D. (1995). ‘Liberalism, Consent, and the Problem of Adaptive Preferences.’ Social Theory and Practice 21: 457–471.
• Ward, Cynthia (1994). ‘A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian Literature.’ University of Chicago Law Review 61: 929–955.
• Ward, Cynthia (1999). ‘Introduction: Reconstructing Liberalism.’ William and Mary Law Review 40: 719–21.
• Wendell, Susan (1987). ‘A (Qualified) Defense of Liberalism.’ Hypatia 2: 65–93.
• Wijze, S.D. (2000). ‘The Family and Political Justice—The Case for Political Liberalisms.’ The Journal of Ethics 4: 257–282.
• Williams, Joan (2006). Opt Out or Forced Out? The Untold Story of Why Women Leave the Workforce . The Center for WorkLife Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.
• Wolf, Christopher (ed.) (2003). Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Its Critics (2nd Edition). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Almodovar, Norma Jean (2002). ‘For Their Own Good: The Results of the Prostitution Laws as Enforced by Cops, Politicians, and Judges.’ In McElroy (2002): 71–87.
• Andersson, Anna-Karin (2007). ‘An Alleged Contradiction in Nozick's Entitlement Theory.’ The Journal of Libertarian Studies 21:43–63.
• Block, Walter (1991). ‘Levin on Feminism and Freedom.’ Journal of Libertarian Studies X: 97–106.
• Boaz, David (1997). Libertarianism: A Primer . New York: Free Press.
• Conway, David (1998). Free-Market Feminism . London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
• Dworkin, Andrea (1991). ‘Terror, Torture, and Resistance.’ Canadian Women's Studies 12: 37–42
• Epstein, Richard (2002). ‘Liberty and Feminism.’ In McElroy (2002): 30–42.
• ––– (1992). Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws . Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth (1996). Feminism Is Not the Story of My Life: How Today's Feminist Elite Has Lost Touch with the Real Concerns of Women . London: Doubleday.
• ––– 1991. Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
• Freeman, Samuel (2001). ‘Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism Is Not a Liberal View.’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 30: 105–151.
• Jaggar, Alison (1983). Feminist Politics and Human Nature . Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Jeske, Diane (1996). ‘Libertarianism, Self-Ownership and Motherhood.’ Social Theory and Practice 22: 137–160.
• Kirp, David L., Mark G. Yudoff, and Marlene Strong Franks (1986). Gender Justice . Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Lehrman, Karen (1997). The Lipstick Proviso: Women, Sex & Power in the Real World . New York: Anchor/Doubleday.
• Loudermilk, Kim (2004). Fictional Feminism: How American Bestsellers Effect the Movement for Women's Equality . New York: Routledge.
• McElroy, Wendy (ed.) (2002). Liberty for Women: Freedom and Feminism in the Twenty-First Century . Chicago: Ivan R. D.
• McElroy, Wendy (2002). ‘Introduction: Foundation of Individualist Freedom.’ In McElroy (2002): 5–26.
• ––– (2002a). ‘What Does Affirmative Action Affirm?’ In McElroy (2002): 181–188.
• ––– (2002b). ‘Breeder Reactionaries: The‘Feminist’ War on New Reproductive Technologies.’ In McElroy (2002): 267–278.
• ––– (1998a). The Reasonable Woman: A Guide to Intellectual Survival . Prometheus Books.
• ––– (1998b). ‘The Non-Absurdity of Natural Law.’ The Freeman 48: 108–111.
• ––– (1998c). ‘An Exchange of E-Mail Letters on Gertrude B. Kelly.’ Association of Libertarian Feminists (ALF) News 68. [Available online].
• ––– (1995). XXX: A Woman's Right to Pornography . New York: St. Martin's Press.
• ––– (1991a). ‘The Roots of Individualist Feminist in 19 th Century America.’ In McElroy (1991): 3–28.
• ––– (1991). Freedom, Feminism and the State: An Overview of Individualist Feminism . Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
• Minnich, Elizabeth Kamarck (1998). ‘Feminist Attacks on Feminisms: Patriarchy's Prodigal Daughters.’ Feminist Studies 24: 159–176.
• Morse, Jennifer Roback (2001). Love and Economics: Why the Laissez-Faire Family Doesn't Work . Dallas: Spence Publishing.
• Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia . Basic Books.
• Nussbaum, Martha (2000). ‘The Future of Feminist Liberalism.’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 74: 47–79.
• Okin, Susan Moller (1989). Justice, Gender and the Family . Basic Books: New York.
• Paul, Ellen Frankel (2002). ‘Fetal Protection and Freedom of Contract.’ In McElroy (2002): 131–151.
• ––– (1989). Equity and Gender: The Comparable Worth Debate . New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
• Presley, Sharon (2001). Think For Yourself: Questioning Pressures to Conform . Ronin Publishing.
• ––– (2000). ‘No Authority But Oneself: The Anarchist Feminist Philosophy of Autonomy and Freedom.’ Social Anarchism 27 (Fall–Winter).
• Presley, Sharon and Lynn Kinsky (1991). ‘Government is Women's Enemy.’ In McElroy (1991): 77–86.
• Presley, Sharon and Chrispin Sartwell (eds.) (2005). Exquisite Rebel: Essays of Voltairine De Cleyre- Feminist, Anarchist, Genius . Albany: State University of New York.
• Roiphe, Katie (1994). The Morning After: Sex, Fear and Feminism . Boston: Back Bay Books.
• Simon, Rita (2002). ‘Women and Violent Crime.’ In McElroy (2002): 231–237.
• Sommers, Christina Hoff (2007). “The Subjection of Islamic Women.” Weekly Standard Vol. 12, No. 34. [Available online]
• Sommers, Christina Hoff (2002). ‘The Case against Ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).’ Government Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, published by American Enterprise Institute. [Available online]
• ––– (2000). The War Against Boys: How Misguided Feminism is Harming Our Young Men . New York: Simon and Schuster.
• ––– (1994). Who Stole Feminism? How Women Have Betrayed Women . New York: Simon and Schuster.
• Stevens, Richard W., Hugo Teufel III, and Matthew Y. Biscan (2002). ‘Disarming Women: Comparing ‘Gun Control’ to Self-Defense.’ In McElroy (2002): 238–263.
• Stolba, Christine and Diana Furchtgott-Roth (2001). The Feminist Dilemma: When Success Is Not Enough . Washington, DC: AIE Press.
• ––– (1999). Women's Figures: An Illustrated Guide to the Ecnomic Progress of Women in America . Washington, DC: AEI Press and Independent Women's Forum.
• Strossen, Nadine (2000). Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women's Rights . New York: New York University Press.
• Tabarrok, Alexander (2002). ‘Abortion and Liberty.’ In McElroy (2002): 152–177.
• Taylor, Joan Kennedy (2001). ‘A New View of the Libertarian Family: Review of Love and Economics.’ Association of Libertarian Feminists (ALF) News 80. [Available online].
• ––– (1999). What You Can Do About Sexual Harassment When You Don't Want to Call the Cops . New York: New York University Press.
• ––– (1992). Reclaiming the Mainstream: Individualist Feminism Rediscovered . Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
• Warnick, Ashlie (2003). ‘IFeminism. Review of Liberty for Women: Freedom and Feminism in the Twenty-First Century , Edited by Wendy McElroy.’ Michigan Law Review 101: 1602–1621.
• Williams, Joan C. (2000). Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to Do About It . New York: Oxford University Press.
• Young, Cathy (2007). ‘Enforcing Virtue.’ Reasononline . [Available online]
• ––– (2006). ‘Are Muslim Women Oppressed?: An Exploration of the Place of Women in Islam.’ Reasononline . [Available online]
• ––– (2004). ‘Taking Science Seriously: Conservative Dogma About Sex Roles Ignores Inconvenient Realities.’ Reasononline . [Available online]
• ––– (1992). Washington Post (National Weekly Edition) July 29, 1992, p. 25.
• Yuracko, Kimberly (2003). Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values . Bloomington: University of Indiana Press.
• Almeder, Robert F. (1994). ‘Liberal Feminism and Academic Feminism.’ Public-Affairs-Quarterly 8: 299–315.
• Case, Mary Anne (1995). ‘Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists.’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 18: 369–418.
• Elshtain, Jean Bethke (1991). ‘Antigone's Daughters.’ In McElroy (1991): 61–76.
• Epstein, Richard (1999). ‘Liberty, Patriarchy, and Feminism.’ University of Chicago Legal Forum 89: 106–111.
• Gladstein, Mimi and Chris Sciabarra (eds.) (1999). Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand . University Park: Penn State University Press.
• Jones, Bernie D. (2003). ‘Single Motherhood by Choice, Libertarian Feminism, and the Uniform Parentage Act.’ Texas Journal of Women and the Law 12: 419–449.
• Machan, Tibor (ed.) (2006). Liberty and Justice . Washington, D.C.: Hoover Institution Press.
• McElroy, Wendy (1998). The Reasonable Woman. A Guide to Intellectual Survival . Amherst: Prometheus Books.
• ––– (1991). ‘Abortion.’ In McElroy (1991): 145–156.
• ––– (1981). ‘Against the ERA.’ Libertarian Forum (June–July).
• McKitrick, Jennifer (2006). ‘Liberty, Gender, and the Family.’ In Machan (2006).
• Morse, Jennifer Roback (1999). ‘No Families, No Freedom: Human Flourishing in a Free Society.’ Social Philosophy and Policy 16: 290–314.
• ––– (1986). A Matter of Choice: A Critique of Comparable Worth by a Skeptical Feminist . New York: Priority Press.
• Posner, Richard A. (1989). ‘Conservative Feminism.’ University of Chicago Legal Forum 191: 209–217.
• Presley, Sharon (1999). ‘Ayn Rand's Philosophy of Individualism: A Feminist Psychologist's Perspective.’ In Gladstein and Schiabarra (1999).
• Strossen, Nadine (1993). ‘Fighting Big Sister for Liberty and Equality.’ New York Law School Law Review 38: 1–8.
• ––– (1991). ‘The American Civil Liberties Union and Women's Rights.’ New York University Law Review 66: 1940–1961.
• ––– (1993). Women's Issues: Feminism, Classical Liberalism, and the Future . Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.
• ––– (1991). ‘Protective Labor Legislation.’ In McElroy (1991): 187–192.
• Tong, Rosemarie (1998). ‘Radical Feminism: Libertarian and Cultural Perspectives.’ In Tong (1998): 45–93.
• Vaughn, Karen I. (1993). ‘Who Owns the Children? Libertarianism, Feminism, and Property.’ Reason Papers 18: 189–200.
• Young, Cathy (1999). Ceasefire: Why Women and Men Must Join Forces to Achieve True Equality . New York: The Free Press.
• Young, Cathy and Michael Weiss (1996). ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Equal Rights or Neo-Paternalism?’ Policy Analysis 256 (Cato Institute).
• Abbey, Ruth (1999). ‘Back to the Future: Marriage as Friendship in the Thoughts of Mary Wollstonecraft.’ Hypatia 14: 78–95.
• Anderson, Elizabeth (1991). “John Stuart Mill and Experiments in Living.” Ethics 102: 4–26.
• Baum, Bruce (1997). ‘Feminism, Liberalism and Cultural Pluralism: J. S. Mill on Mormon Polygyny.’ Journal of Political Philosophy 5: 230–253.
• Boucher, J. (2003). ‘Betty Friedan and the Radical Past of Liberal Feminism.’ New Politics 9: 23–32.
• Burgess-Jackson, Keith (1995). ‘John Stuart Mill, Radical Feminist.’ Social Theory and Practice 21: 369–396
• Donner, Wendy (1993). ‘John Stuart Mill's Liberal Feminism.’ Philosophical Studies 69: 155–166.
• Engster, Daniel (1995). ‘Mary Wollstonecraft's Nurturing Liberalism: Between and Ethic of Justice and Care.’ American Political Science Review 95: 577–588.
• Friedan, Betty (1974) (1963). The Feminine Mystique . New York: Norton.
• Gerson, Gal (2004). ‘Gender in the Liberal Tradition: Hobhouse on the Family.’ History of Political Thought 25: 700–725.
• ––– (2002). ‘Liberal Feminism: Individuality and Oppositions in Wollstonecraft and Mill.’ Political Studies 50: 794–810.
• Hekman, Susan (1992). ‘John Stuart Mill's “The Subjection of Women”: The Foundations of Liberal Feminism.’ History of European Ideas 15: 681–686.
• Makus, Ingrid (1996). Women, Politics and Reproduction: The Liberal Legacy . Tonawanda: University of Toronto Press.
• Mill, John Stuart (1989) (1869). The Subjection of Women . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• ––– (1989) (1859). On Liberty . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Smith, G.W. (2000). ‘J.S. Mill on What We Don't Know about Women.’ Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 12: 41–61.
• Stafford, W. (2004). ‘Is Mill's Liberal Feminism Masculinist?’ Journal of Political Ideologies 9: 159–79.
• Tulloch, Gail (1989). ‘Mill's Epistemology in Practice in his Liberal Feminism.’ Educational Philosophy and Theory 21: 32–39.
• Wollstonecraft, Mary (1998) (1792). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman . New York: Norton.
• Fox-Genovese, Elizabeth (1990). Feminism Without Illusions: A Critique of Individualism . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
• Held, Virginia (1987). ‘Non-contractual Society: A Feminist View.’ In Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen (eds.) Science, Morality and Feminist Theory . Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary 13: 111–37.
• Pateman, Carole (1988). The Sexual Contract . Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Young, Iris (2006). ‘Taking the Basic Structure Seriously.’ Perspectives on Politics 4: 91–97.
• ––– (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

Other Internet Resources

• Feser, Edward (2001). ‘ What Libertarianism Isn't .’
• Heckert, Jamie (2004). ‘ Towards Consenting Relations: Anarchism and Sexuality .’
• Long, Roderick (1997). ‘ Beyond Patriarchy: A Libertarian Model of the Family .’
• Long, Roderick (2001). ‘ Equality: The Unknown Ideal .’
• Long, Roderick and Charles Johnson (2005). ‘ Libertarian Feminism: Can This Marriage Be Saved? ’
• McElroy, Wendy (2001). ‘ Individualism: A New View of Feminism .’
• Libertarians for Life
• Center for WorkLife Law (UC Hastings College of the Law)
• NARAL Pro-Choice America
• National Organization for Women (NOW)
• The Society for Women in Philosophy

democracy | feminist philosophy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on autonomy | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on power | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on reproduction and the family | justice: distributive | liberalism | libertarianism | liberty: positive and negative | pornography: and censorship | rights

Copyright © 2013 by Amy R. Baehr < amy . baehr @ hofstra . edu >

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2016 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous
• Next chapter >

Introduction: A Feminist Liberalism

Professor of Political Philosophy

• Published: February 2024
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

This chapter sets out the concept of feminist liberalism and distinguishes it from liberal feminism. Liberal feminism is a type of feminism that is sometimes described as ‘just about equality’; in addition, it understands freedom primarily in terms of choice. Feminist liberalism, in contrast, argues that a deeper conception of feminism is necessary for liberalism to secure the freedom and equality that are its core values. Feminism is necessary to counteract liberalism’s over-reliance on choice as a normative transformer: something that changes the normative character of a situation or inequality from unjust to just. The chapter also summarises the work to come.

Signed in as

Institutional accounts.

• Google Scholar Indexing
• GoogleCrawler [DO NOT DELETE]

Personal account

• Sign in with email/username & password
• Get email alerts
• Save searches
• Purchase content
• Activate your purchase/trial code

Institutional access

• Sign in with a library card Sign in with username/password Recommend to your librarian
• Institutional account management
• Get help with access

Access to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways:

IP based access

Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. This authentication occurs automatically, and it is not possible to sign out of an IP authenticated account.

Sign in through your institution

Choose this option to get remote access when outside your institution. Shibboleth/Open Athens technology is used to provide single sign-on between your institution’s website and Oxford Academic.

• Click Sign in through your institution.
• Select your institution from the list provided, which will take you to your institution's website to sign in.
• When on the institution site, please use the credentials provided by your institution. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.
• Following successful sign in, you will be returned to Oxford Academic.

If your institution is not listed or you cannot sign in to your institution’s website, please contact your librarian or administrator.

Sign in with a library card

Enter your library card number to sign in. If you cannot sign in, please contact your librarian.

Society Members

Society member access to a journal is achieved in one of the following ways:

Sign in through society site

Many societies offer single sign-on between the society website and Oxford Academic. If you see ‘Sign in through society site’ in the sign in pane within a journal:

• Click Sign in through society site.
• When on the society site, please use the credentials provided by that society. Do not use an Oxford Academic personal account.

If you do not have a society account or have forgotten your username or password, please contact your society.

Sign in using a personal account

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members. See below.

A personal account can be used to get email alerts, save searches, purchase content, and activate subscriptions.

Some societies use Oxford Academic personal accounts to provide access to their members.

Viewing your signed in accounts

Click the account icon in the top right to:

• View your signed in personal account and access account management features.
• View the institutional accounts that are providing access.

Signed in but can't access content

Oxford Academic is home to a wide variety of products. The institutional subscription may not cover the content that you are trying to access. If you believe you should have access to that content, please contact your librarian.

For librarians and administrators, your personal account also provides access to institutional account management. Here you will find options to view and activate subscriptions, manage institutional settings and access options, access usage statistics, and more.

Our books are available by subscription or purchase to libraries and institutions.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Rights and permissions
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Liberal Feminism, its critics and some thinkers

Related Papers

Julinna Oxley

Tulsa Law Review

Lori Watson

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks

Bipasha Baruah

bethany stafford

Maimuna B. Hussain

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)

aarti suhag

Kayreen T . H . Stephenson

Development

Joan French

RELATED PAPERS

Jezreel Baculna

Fabien Sixdenier

Bioelectromagnetics

Katalin Paksy

The Journal of clinical endocrinology and metabolism

Ilpo Huhtaniemi

Maciej Michalik

Emre Toprak

Respiratory Research

Li Erran Li

Austral Ecology

bedrich moldan

Asmaul Hasanah

Zidni rohmah

Zidni Rohmah

Profetik: Jurnal Komunikasi

Aryo Subarkah Eddyono

The Sustainable City VI

M. Sotoudeh

Japanese Journal of Applied Physics

Raku Shirasawa

American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine

Matthew Naughton

Ryszard Smolenski

Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences

Brian Wandell

Actas Urológicas Españolas

Juan Manosa Cruz

International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance

Mohsen Bahmani-oskooee

Wojciech Dobicki

Acta Neurochirurgica

Ciencia e Interculturalidad

Aura Palacios

IJMRAP Editor

Uttam Kumar

留学生买文凭加拿大TUA毕业证书制作 办理阿尔伯塔大学毕业证书成绩单修改

TMS 2019 148th Annual Meeting & Exhibition Supplemental Proceedings

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

Literary Theory and Criticism

Home › Feminism: An Essay

Feminism: An Essay

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on April 27, 2016 • ( 6 )

Feminism as a movement gained potential in the twentieth century, marking the culmination of two centuries’ struggle for cultural roles and socio-political rights — a struggle which first found its expression in Mary Wollstonecraft ‘s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792). The movement gained increasing prominence across three phases/waves — the first wave (political), the second wave (cultural) and the third wave (academic). Incidentally Toril Moi also classifies the feminist movement into three phases — the female (biological), the feminist (political) and the feminine (cultural).

The first wave of feminism, in the 19th and 20th centuries, began in the US and the UK as a struggle for equality and property rights for women, by suffrage groups and activist organisations. These feminists fought against chattel marriages and for polit ical and economic equality. An important text of the first wave is Virginia Woolf ‘s A Room of One’s Own (1929), which asserted the importance of woman’s independence, and through the character Judith (Shakespeare’s fictional sister), explicated how the patriarchal society prevented women from realising their creative potential. Woolf also inaugurated the debate of language being gendered — an issue which was later dealt by Dale Spender who wrote Man Made Language (1981), Helene Cixous , who introduced ecriture feminine (in The Laugh of the Medusa ) and Julia Kristeva , who distinguished between the symbolic and the semiotic language.

The second wave of feminism in the 1960s and ’70s, was characterized by a critique of patriarchy in constructing the cultural identity of woman. Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1949) famously stated, “One is not born, but rather becomes a woman” – a statement that highlights the fact that women have always been defined as the “Other”, the lacking, the negative, on whom Freud attributed “ penis-envy .” A prominent motto of this phase, “The Personal is the political” was the result of the awareness .of the false distinction between women’s domestic and men’s public spheres. Transcending their domestic and personal spaces, women began to venture into the hitherto male dominated terrains of career and public life. Marking its entry into the academic realm, the presence of feminism was reflected in journals, publishing houses and academic disciplines.

Mary Ellmann ‘s Thinking about Women (1968), Kate Millett ‘s Sexual Politics (1969), Betty Friedan ‘s The Feminine Mystique (1963) and so on mark the major works of the phase. Millett’s work specifically depicts how western social institutions work as covert ways of manipulating power, and how this permeates into literature, philosophy etc. She undertakes a thorough critical understanding of the portrayal of women in the works of male authors like DH Lawrence, Norman Mailer, Henry Miller and Jean Genet.

In the third wave (post 1980), Feminism has been actively involved in academics with its interdisciplinary associations with Marxism , Psychoanalysis and Poststructuralism , dealing with issues such as language, writing, sexuality, representation etc. It also has associations with alternate sexualities, postcolonialism ( Linda Hutcheon and Spivak ) and Ecological Studies ( Vandana Shiva )

Elaine Showalter , in her “ Towards a Feminist Poetics ” introduces the concept of gynocriticism , a criticism of gynotexts, by women who are not passive consumers but active producers of meaning. The gynocritics construct a female framework for the analysis of women’s literature, and focus on female subjectivity, language and literary career. Patricia Spacks ‘ The Female Imagination , Showalter’s A Literature of their Own , Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar ‘s The Mad Woman in the Attic are major gynocritical texts.

The present day feminism in its diverse and various forms, such as liberal feminism, cultural/ radical feminism, black feminism/womanism, materialist/neo-marxist feminism, continues its struggle for a better world for women. Beyond literature and literary theory, Feminism also found radical expression in arts, painting ( Kiki Smith , Barbara Kruger ), architecture( Sophia Hayden the architect of Woman’s Building ) and sculpture (Kate Mllett’s Naked Lady).

Share this:

Categories: Uncategorized

Tags: A Literature of their Own , A Room of One's Own , Barbara Kruger , Betty Friedan , Dale Spender , ecriture feminine , Elaine Showalter , Feminism , Gynocriticism , Helene Cixous , http://bookzz.org/s/?q=Kate+Millett&yearFrom=&yearTo=&language=&extension=&t=0 , Judith Shakespeare , Julia Kristeva , Kate Millett , Kiki Smith , Literary Criticism , Literary Theory , Man Made Language , Mary Ellmann , Mary Wollstonecraft , Patricia Spacks , Sandra Gilbert , Simone de Beauvoir , Sophia Hayden , Susan Gubar , The Female Imagination , The Feminine Mystique , The Laugh of the Medusa , The Mad Woman in the Attic , The Second Sex , Toril Moi , Towards a Feminist Poetics , Vandana Shiva , Vindication of the Rights of Woman

Related Articles

• Mary Wollstonecraft’s Contribution to Feminism – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes
• Kate Millett’s Sexual Politics – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes
• The Influence of Poststructuralism on Feminism – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes
• Sigmund Freud and the Trauma Theory – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes
• Gender and Transgender Criticism – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes
• Second Wave Feminism – Literary Theory and Criticism Notes

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Feminism & Gender Equality: An Ongoing Debate

• First Online: 27 October 2021

Cite this chapter

• Kavita S. Jerath 4  

504 Accesses

This chapter will discuss the types of feminism and its traditional views, changing of gender relations, waves of feminism, #MeToo movement and the nature of Stockholm syndrome. The goal of this discussion is to convey an understanding of women’s progression from what was to what is today.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

McKelvey, A., & Gal, S. It’s International Women's Day—Here are 35 quotes from the strongest feminist voices around the world . Business Insider. https://www.businessinsider.com/international-womens-day-quotes-from-feminist-voices-around-the-world-2017-3

Lewis, J. J. What is radical feminism? ThoughtCo. thoughtco.com/what-is-radical-feminism-3528997

Sheivari, R. Marxist feminism, encyclopedia of critical psychology . New York: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5583-7_682 .

Wikipedia contributors. Materialist feminism , Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Materialist_feminism&oldid=964583931

Feminism . History Chanel. https://www.history.com/topics/womens-history/feminism-womens-history

Krolokke, C. (2005, June 10). Three waves of feminism: From suffragettes to grrls. Sage.

Google Scholar  

Carlsen, A., Salam, M., Miller, C. C., Lu, D., Ngu, A., Patel, J. K., & Wichter, Z. #MeToo brought down 201 powerful men. Nearly half of their replacements are women. The New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html?searchResultPosition=2

Bower, T. The #MeToo backlash. Harvard Business Review . https://hbr.org/2019/09/the-metoo-backlash

Westcott, K. What is Stockholm syndrome? BBC News Magazine . https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-22447726

Roan, S. Abused women may be ‘hostages’: Health: A new study says victims exhibit a behavior common in hostage situations. It may explain why they often remain in harmful relationships. Los Angeles Times . https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-20-vw-1268-story.html

Ullrich, J. Corporate Stockholm syndrome. Psychology Today . https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-modern-time-crunch/201403/corporate-stockholm-syndrome

Sweeney, G. 6 chilling cases of Stockholm syndrome. The Lineup . https://the-line-up.com/stockholm-syndrome

Andrea, M. (June 2004). Gender in Asian history: “Eternal flames”: Suicide, sinfulness and insanity in “Western” constructions of sati 1500–1830. International Journal of Asian Studies, 1 (02), 247–278.

Rajalashmi, T. K. (2009, February 18). Sati and the verdict. Frontline 2004 ; http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2105/stories/20040312002504600.htm

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Associate Professor, Department of General Science, Birla Institute of Technology & Science, Pilani - Dubai Campus, Dubai, United Arab Emirates

Kavita S. Jerath

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Jerath, K.S. (2021). Feminism & Gender Equality: An Ongoing Debate. In: Science, Technology and Modernity . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80465-7_10

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80465-7_10

Published : 27 October 2021

Publisher Name : Springer, Cham

Print ISBN : 978-3-030-80464-0

Online ISBN : 978-3-030-80465-7

eBook Packages : Social Sciences Social Sciences (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

Liberal Feminism: Understanding the Concept and Its Key Principles

Liberal Feminism (Relevant for UPSC Sociology Syllabus – Topic : Major Theoretical Strands of Research Methodology)

Liberal feminism is a political and philosophical movement that emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as an offshoot of feminism. It emphasizes the importance of individual freedom, equality, and legal rights for women. Liberal feminists believe that women should have the same legal and political rights as men, and that the state has a responsibility to ensure that these rights are protected.

Liberal feminism focuses on achieving gender equality through legal and institutional reforms. Liberal feminists argue that women should be free to pursue their own goals and interests, and that they should have the same opportunities as men to succeed in their chosen fields.

One of the key principles of liberal feminism is the idea that gender inequality is primarily the result of social and cultural attitudes and beliefs. Liberal feminists argue that gender roles are learned, and that these roles can be changed through education and socialization.

Liberal feminists also emphasize the importance of economic equality. They argue that women should have access to the same economic opportunities as men, and that this requires policies that promote equal pay for equal work, as well as policies that support work-life balance, such as parental leave and flexible working arrangements.

In terms of specific policy proposals, liberal feminists advocate for a range of measures aimed at promoting gender equality. These may include equal pay laws, anti-discrimination legislation, and affirmative action programs.

Liberal feminists also often focus on issues related to reproductive rights and sexual autonomy. They argue that women should have the right to control their own bodies and make decisions about their reproductive health, and that access to contraception and abortion is essential for women’s equality.

Critics of liberal feminism often argue that it is too focused on individualism and too quick to dismiss the role of structural factors, such as social and economic inequality, in shaping women’s experiences of oppression. Some argue that liberal feminism ignores the role that other forms of oppression, such as racism and homophobia, can play in shaping women’s experiences of inequality.

Overall, liberal feminism represents an important strand of feminist thought that emphasizes the importance of legal and institutional reforms in promoting gender equality. By focusing on individual freedom, equality, and legal rights, liberal feminism offers a powerful framework for understanding and addressing the challenges facing women in the 21st century.

Follow us :

🔎 https://www.instagram.com/triumphias

🔎 www.triumphias.com

🔎https://www.youtube.com/c/TriumphIAS

https://t.me/VikashRanjanSociology

Find More Blogs

UPSC Sociology Syllabus, theoretical strands of research methodology, feminism, gender equality, legal reforms, individualism, social and economic inequality, discrimination, affirmative action, reproductive health, racism, homophobia

#Sociologyforupsc #sociologyforupscinhindi #sociologyforupscgs1 #sociologyforupscprelims #sociologyforupscinenglish #sociologyforupscmainsinhindi #sociologyforupscoptionalinhindi #sociologyforupscmains #sociologyforupscplaylist #sociologyforupsclecture1 #sociologyforupsccse #sociologyforupscoptional #syllabusofsociologyforupscoptional #bestbookforsociologyforupsc #sociologyoptionalforupscanswerwriting #sociologyoptionalforupscanukumari #sociologyoptionalforupscabhijeet #sociologyoptionalforupscanalysis #sociologyoptionalforupscalllectures #sociologysyllabusforupscanalysis

One comment

• Pingback: Feminism - Themes & Theories: Exploring the Historical Roots to Contemporary Expressions | UPSC Sociology Paper 1

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

5 Essays About Feminism

On the surface, the definition of feminism is simple. It’s the belief that women should be politically, socially, and economically equal to men. Over the years, the movement expanded from a focus on voting rights to worker rights, reproductive rights, gender roles, and beyond. Modern feminism is moving to a more inclusive and intersectional place. Here are five essays about feminism that tackle topics like trans activism, progress, and privilege:

“Trickle-Down Feminism” – Sarah Jaffe

Feminists celebrate successful women who have seemingly smashed through the glass ceiling, but the reality is that most women are still under it. Even in fast-growing fields where women dominate (retail sales, food service, etc), women make less money than men. In this essay from Dissent Magazine, author Sarah Jaffe argues that when the fastest-growing fields are low-wage, it isn’t a victory for women. At the same time, it does present an opportunity to change the way we value service work. It isn’t enough to focus only on “equal pay for equal work” as that argument mostly focuses on jobs where someone can negotiate their salary. This essay explores how feminism can’t succeed if only the concerns of the wealthiest, most privileged women are prioritized.

Sarah Jaffe writes about organizing, social movements, and the economy with publications like Dissent, the Nation, Jacobin, and others. She is the former labor editor at Alternet.

“What No One Else Will Tell You About Feminism” – Lindy West

Written in Lindy West’s distinct voice, this essay provides a clear, condensed history of feminism’s different “waves.” The first wave focused on the right to vote, which established women as equal citizens. In the second wave, after WWII, women began taking on issues that couldn’t be legally-challenged, like gender roles. As the third wave began, the scope of feminism began to encompass others besides middle-class white women. Women should be allowed to define their womanhood for themselves. West also points out that “waves” may not even exist since history is a continuum. She concludes the essay by declaring if you believe all people are equal, you are a feminist.

Jezebel reprinted this essay with permission from How To Be A Person, The Stranger’s Guide to College by Lindy West, Dan Savage, Christopher Frizelle, and Bethany Jean Clement. Lindy West is an activist, comedian, and writer who focuses on topics like feminism, pop culture, and fat acceptance.

“Toward a Trans* Feminism” – Jack Halberstam

The history of transactivsm and feminism is messy. This essay begins with the author’s personal experience with gender and terms like trans*, which Halberstam prefers. The asterisk serves to “open the meaning,” allowing people to choose their categorization as they see fit. The main body of the essay focuses on the less-known history of feminists and trans* folks. He references essays from the 1970s and other literature that help paint a more complete picture. In current times, the tension between radical feminism and trans* feminism remains, but changes that are good for trans* women are good for everyone.

This essay was adapted from Trans*: A Quick and Quirky Account of Gender Variability by Jack Halberstam. Halberstam is the Professor of American Studies and Ethnicity, Gender Studies and Comparative Literature at the University of Southern California. He is also the author of several books.

“Rebecca Solnit: How Change Happens” – Rebecca Solnit

The world is changing. Rebecca Solnit describes this transformation as an assembly of ideas, visions, values, essays, books, protests, and more. It has many layers involving race, class, gender, power, climate, justice, etc, as well as many voices. This has led to more clarity about injustice. Solnit describes watching the transformation and how progress and “ wokeness ” are part of a historical process. Progress is hard work. Not exclusively about feminism, this essay takes a more intersectional look at how progress as a whole occurs.

“How Change Happens” was adapted from the introduction to Whose Story Is it? Rebecca Solnit is a writer, activist, and historian. She’s the author of over 20 books on art, politics, feminism, and more.

“Bad Feminist” extract – Roxane Gay

People are complicated and imperfect. In this excerpt from her book Bad Feminist: Essays , Roxane Gay explores her contradictions. The opening sentence is, “I am failing as a woman.” She goes on to describe how she wants to be independent, but also to be taken care of. She wants to be strong and in charge, but she also wants to surrender sometimes. For a long time, she denied that she was human and flawed. However, the work it took to deny her humanness is harder than accepting who she is. While Gay might be a “bad feminist,” she is also deeply committed to issues that are important to feminism. This is a must-read essay for any feminists who worry that they aren’t perfect.

Roxane Gay is a professor, speaker, editor, writer, and social commentator. She is the author of Bad Feminist , a New York Times bestseller, Hunger (a memoir), and works of fiction.

You may also like

15 Great Charities to Donate to in 2024

15 Quotes Exposing Injustice in Society

14 Trusted Charities Helping Civilians in Palestine

The Great Migration: History, Causes and Facts

Social Change 101: Meaning, Examples, Learning Opportunities

Rosa Parks: Biography, Quotes, Impact

Top 20 Issues Women Are Facing Today

Top 20 Issues Children Are Facing Today

15 Root Causes of Climate Change

15 Facts about Rosa Parks

Abolitionist Movement: History, Main Ideas, and Activism Today

The Biggest 15 NGOs in the UK

About the author, emmaline soken-huberty.

Emmaline Soken-Huberty is a freelance writer based in Portland, Oregon. She started to become interested in human rights while attending college, eventually getting a concentration in human rights and humanitarianism. LGBTQ+ rights, women’s rights, and climate change are of special concern to her. In her spare time, she can be found reading or enjoying Oregon’s natural beauty with her husband and dog.

Want to create or adapt books like this? Learn more about how Pressbooks supports open publishing practices.

44 Student Essay Example: Feminist Criticism

The following student essay example of femnist criticism is taken from Beginnings and Endings: A Critical Edition . This is the publication created by students in English 211. This essay discusses Ray Bradbury’s short story ”There Will Come Soft Rains.”

Burning Stereotypes in Ray Bradbury’s “There Will Come Soft Rains”

By Karley McCarthy

Ray Bradbury’s short story “There Will Come Soft Rains” takes place in the fallout of a nuclear war. The author chooses to tell the story though a technologically advanced house and its animatronic inhabitants instead of a traditional protagonist. The house goes about its day-to-day as if no war had struck. It functions as though its deceased family is still residing in its walls, taking care of the maintenance, happiness, and safety of itself and the long dead family. On the surface, Bradbury’s story seems like a clear-cut warning about technology and humanity’s permissiveness. Given that the short story was written in the 1940s, it’s easy to analyze the themes present and how they related to women of the time. Bradbury’s apt precautionary tale can be used as a metaphor for women’s expectations and role in society after World War II and how some women may have dealt with the fallout of their husbands coming back home with psychological trauma.

To experience “There Will Come Soft Rains” from a feminist perspective, readers must be aware of the societal norms that would have shaped Bradbury’s writing. “Soft Rains” takes place in the year 2026. Yet the house and norms found throughout were, “modeled after concept homes that showed society’s expectations of technological advancement” (Mambrol). This can be seen in the stereotypical nuclear family that once inhabited the house as well as their cliché white home and the hobbies present. According to writer Elaine Tyler May’s book Homeward Bound, America’s view of women’s role in society undertook a massive pendulum swing during the World War II era as the country transitioned through pre-war to post-war life. For example, in a matter of decades support for women joining the workforce shifted from 80% in opposition to only 13% (May 59). Despite this shift, the men coming back from the war still expected women to position themselves as the happy housewife they had left behind, not the newfound career woman architype. Prominent figures of the 40s, such as actress Joan Crawford, portrayed a caricature of womanhood that is subservient to patriarchal gender roles, attempting to abandon the modern idea of a self-sufficient working-class woman (May 62-63). Keeping this in mind, how can this image of the 1940s woman be seen in Bradbury’s work?

Throughout Bradbury’s life he worked towards dismantling clichés in his own writing. A biography titled simply “Ray Bradbury” mentions that even in his earlier work, he was always attempting to “escape the constrictions of stereotypes” found in early science fiction (Seed 13). An example of him breaking constrictions could be his use of a nonhuman protagonist. Instead, Bradbury relies on the personification of the house and its robotic counterparts. Bradbury describes the house as having “electric eyes” and emotions such as a, “preoccupation with self-protection which bordered on a mechanical paranoia,” something that would make the house quiver at the sounds of the outside world (2-3). While these descriptions are interesting, Bradbury’s use of personification here is a thought-provoking choice when one breaks down what exactly the house is meant to personify.

One analysis of this story notes that the house’s personification, “replaces the most human aspects of life,” for its inhabitants (Mambrol). Throughout the story, the house acts as a caretaker, records a schedule, cooks, cleans, and even attempts to extinguish an all-consuming fire. While firefighting is not a traditionally feminine career or expectation from the 1940s (more on that later), most of the house’s daily tasks are replacing jobs that were traditionally held by a household’s matriarch. Expanding further on this dichotomy of male/woman tasks, a chore mentioned in the story that is ‘traditionally’ accepted as a masculine household duty—mowing the law—is still assigned as a male task. This is feels intentional to the house’s design as Bradbury is, “a social critic, and his work is pertinent to real problems on earth” (Dominianni 49). Bradbury’s story is not meant to commentate on just an apocalypse, but society at large.  Bradbury describes the west face of the house as, “black, save for five places” (Bradbury 1-2). These “five places” are the silhouettes of the family who had been incinerated by a nuclear bomb. The family’s two children are included playing with a ball, but the mother and father’s descriptions are most important. The mother is seen in a passive role, picking flowers, while the father mows the lawn. The subtext here is that the man is not replaceable in his mundane and tedious task. Only the woman is replaced. While this is a small flash into the owners’ lives, what “human aspect” or autonomy of the father’s life has been replaced by the house’s actions if the house is mainly personifying only the traditional 1940s female-held positions? The message here is that a man’s position in society is irreplaceable while a woman’s is one of mere support.

While this dynamic of husband vs subordinate is harmful, wives supporting their partners is nothing new. Homeward Bound explains that life after World War II for many women meant a return to their previous position as a housewife while many men came home irreparably damaged by years of warfare. PTSD, known then as shellshock, affected countless men returning from the war. Women were often expected to mend the psychological damage as part of their domestic responsibilities, even if they were unprepared for the realities of the severe trauma their husbands had faced (May 64-65). The psychological effects of the war came crashing into women’s lives the same way that the tree fell into the autonomous house in “Soft Rains”. As mentioned earlier, firefighting is not a task someone from the 40s would expect of women, but the house’s combustion and its scramble to save itself can be seen as a metaphor for women attempting to reverse the cold reality that the war had left them with. The picturesque family they had dreamed of would forever be scarred by the casualties that took place overseas. While Bradbury may not have meant for women to be invoked specifically from this precautionary tale, it’s obvious that him wanting his science fiction to act as, “a cumulative early warning system against unforeseen consequences,” would have impacted women of the time as much as men (Seed 22). The unforeseen consequences here is the trauma the war inflicted on families.

While men were fighting on the front lines, women back home and in noncombat positions would still feel the war’s ripples. In “Soft Rains” the nuclear tragedy had left, “a radioactive glow which could be seen for miles” (Bradbury 1). Despite the destruction, the house continues its routine as though nothing had happened. This can be seen as a metaphor for how women responded to the trauma their husbands brought back from the war. Women were urged to, “preserve for him the essence of the girl he fell in love with, the girl he longs to come back to. . .The least we can do as women is to try to live up to some of those expectations” (May 64). Following this, many could have put their desires and personal growth to the side to act as a secondary character in their husband’s lives.

The final line can be read as the culmination of similarities between post-war women and Bradbury’s house. The violence and destruction that fell upon the house in its final moments leaves little standing. What’s remarkable is how the house still attempts to continue despite its destruction. The final lines of the short story exemplify this: “Within the wall, a last voice said, over and over again and again, even as the sun rose to shine upon the heaped rubble and steam: ‘Today is August 5, 2026, today is August 5, 2026, today is…’” (Bradbury 5). The house is acting just like the women from the 40s, clinging to their past in an attempt to preserve something that had already been lost, society’s innocence. One analysis points out that, “The house is depicted in this way because it represents both humanity and humanity’s failure to save itself” (Mambrol). While it might be wrong to say that women were unable to save themselves in this situation, this quote does touch on an idea present in the feminist metaphor for “Soft Rains”. The preservation of “the essence of the girl he fell in love with, the girl he longs to come back to” was a failure (May 64). The same way that the house cannot preserve itself from destruction, women cannot preserve an image of themselves that had already dissolved. As mentioned earlier, women had already entered the workforce, a huge step towards removing sexist stereotypes around women’s worth. After garnering work-based independence, it seems impossible that the idea of women solely as men’s support would not immolate.

While Bradbury’s “Soft Rains” can be viewed as an apt precautionary tale with real modern world issues at hand, in many ways it is a period piece. As a writer in the 1940s, it’s hard to imagine that Bradbury’s story would not have been influenced by the framework of a nuclear family and the stereotypical expectations of this time. Bradbury’s use of personification opens dialogue about gender roles in the 1940s and how war had complicated patriarchal expectations. Despite his attempt to bypass science fiction stereotypes, his story is full of metaphor for gender stereotypes. Using a feminist lens to analyze the story allows it to be read as a metaphor for war and its effects on married women. The standard analysis appears to say that, “machine no longer served humanity in “There Will Come Soft Rains”; there humanity is subservient to machinery” (Dominianni 49). From a feminist perspective, instead of machine, the house represents patriarchy and gender norms. While men suffered greatly during World War II, women often put their wants and futures on hold to support their husbands. This is a selfless act that shows the resilience of women despite their society’s wish to downplay their potential and turn them into mere support.

Works Cited

Bradbury, Ray. “August 2026: There Will Come Soft Rains.” Broome-Tioga BOCES, 1950, pp. 1-5. btboces.org/Downloads/7_There%20Will%20Come%20Soft%20Rains%20by%20Ray%20Bradbury.pdf.

Dominianni, Robert. “Ray Bradbury’s 2026: A Year with Current Value.” The English Journal , vol. 73, no. 7, 1984, pp. 49–51. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/817806

Mambrol, Nasrullah. “Analysis of Ray Bradbury’s There Will Come Soft Rains.” Literary Theory and Criticism , 17 Jan. 2022.

May, Elaine Tyler. “War and Peace: Fanning the Home Fires.”  Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era.  20th ed., Basic Books, 2008, pp. 58-88.

Seed, David. “Out of the Science Fiction Ghetto.”  Ray Bradbury (Modern Masters of Science Fiction).  University of Illinois, 2015, pp. 1-45.

Critical Worlds Copyright © 2024 by Liza Long is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Share This Book

Liberal Feminism: Emphasizing Individualism and Equal Rights in Meena Kandasamy’s When I Hit You

• J. Sangeetha Kalasalingam Academy of Research and Education
• S. Mohan Kalasalingam Academy of Research and Education
• R. Kannan Hindustan Institute of Technology and Science

Liberal feminism is the emerging mainstream feminism that spotlights gender inequality and women’s liberation within the context of liberal democracy. The aim of the study focuses on the perspectives of liberal feminism using prominent ideas of liberal thinkers in Meena Kandasamy’s award-winning novel When I Hit You: Or, A Portrait of the Writer as a Young Wife (2017). The methodology of the study includes concepts of liberal feminism in the text, and it is substantiated and explored using the ideologies of notable liberal thinkers such as Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women , Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and The Subjection of Women .  The protagonist’s transition from a submissive to a self-liberated persona strengthens the novel’s credibility as a liberal feminist text. The paper also attempts to show that the concepts of liberal feminism very well appear in the selected text.

Author Biographies

S. mohan, kalasalingam academy of research and education.

Faculty of English

R. Kannan, Hindustan Institute of Technology and Science

Department of Langauges

Arifatin, Fais Wahidatul. (2019). “Gender Stereotype in Joyce Lebra’s The Scent of Sake.” NOTION: Journal of Linguistics, Literature, and Culture 1 (2): 76. Retrieved August 24, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.12928/notion.v1i2.976 .

Asri, Yasnur. (2018). “Women’s Rejection toward Patriarchy Culture: A Feminism Study in Selected Indonesian Novels” 148 (Icla 2017): 200–205. Retrieved September 1, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.2991/icla-17.2018.35 .

Delukman. (2018). “Existing Feminism in Helen Garner's Monkey Grip.” Journal of Advanced English Studies 1 (2): 50–55. Retrieved August 19, 2021 from http://sastra.unifa.ac.id/journal/index.php/jes/article/view/33 .

Farzaneh. (2012). “Thomas Hardy, John Stuart Mill and Feminism.” Thesis. University of Wollongong.

Foley, A. (2007). “Fay Weldon, Liberal Feminism and the Praxis of Praxis.” Literator 28 (3): 27–54. Retrieved August 30, 2021from https://doi.org/10.4102/lit.v28i3.167 .

Friedan, Betty. (1964). The Feminine Mystique. New York: DELL PUBL. CO.

Hariharasudan, A., and Gnanamony, S. (2017). “Feministic Analysis of Manju Kapur’s A Married Woman.” International Journal of Scientific Research and Education 5 (1): 6135–41. Retrieved August 24, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.18535/ijsre/v5i01.01 .

Jones, Carole.( 2015). “‘Femininity in Crisis’: The Troubled Trajectory of Feminism in Laura Hird’s Born Free and Jenni Fagan’s the Panopticon.” Contemporary Women’s Writing 9 (3): 385–400. Retrieved August 18, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.1093/cww/vpv007 .

Jose, Jim. (2004). “No More like Pallas Athena: Displacing Patrilineal Accounts of Modern Feminist Political Theory.” Hypatia 19 (4): 1–22. Retrieved August 22, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2004.tb00146.x .

Kandasamy, Meena. (2017). When I Hit You: Or, A Portrait of the Writer as a Young Wife. India: Juggernaut Books.

Kaplan, Cora. (1986). Sea Changes: Essays on Culture and Feminism. London: Verso.

Krolokke, Charlotte, and Anne Scott Sorensen. (2005). “Gender Communication Theories and Analyses: From Silence to Performance.” 1st ed., SAGE Publications, Inc

Lasa ÁlvarezBegoña. (2018). “Mary Hays, an Eighteenth-Century Woman Lexicographer at the Service of ‘the Female World’”. ELOPE: English Language Overseas Perspectives and Enquiries 15 (2), 81-94. Retrieved August 1, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.4312/elope.15.2.81-94 .

Mayabadi, Farzaneh. (2012). Thomas Hardy, John Stuart Mill and Feminism. School of English Literatures and Philosophy, University of Wollongong. Retrieved August 19, 2021, from https://ro.uow.edu.au/

Michael, Magali Cornier. (1987). “Who Is Sarah?: A Critique of The French Lieutenant’s Woman’s Feminism.” Critique - Studies in Contemporary Fiction 28 (4): 225–36. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.1080/00111619.1987.9936460 .

Mill, John Stuart. (1869). The Basic Writings of John Stuart Mill: on Liberty, the Subjection of Women and Utilitarianism. New York: Classic Books.

Mitra, Indrani, and Madhu Mitra. (2013). “Of Liberal The Discourse Feminism and Third World Women’ s Texts : Some Issues of Pedagogy” 18 (3): 55–63.

Myers, Mitzi. (1986). “Impeccable Governesses, Rational Dames, and Moral Mothers: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Female Tradition in Georgian Children’s Books.” Children’s Literature 14 (1): 31–59. Retrieved September 1, 2021 from https://doi.org/10.1353/chl.0.0638 .

Nur, Azizah and Nurul Fitri. (2019). “The Representation of Liberal Feminism through the Main Character in ‘The Post’ Movie.” Journal of English Language Teaching 3 (2): 84–94. Retrieved February 14, 2021, from http://jelt.unbari.ac.id/index.php/jelt/article/view/41/49 .

Rini, Rahayu, Pepi Siti Paturohmah, and Ujang Suyatman. (2020). “The Roles Of Sophie Neveu As Reflection Of Women’s Equality In Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code Novel.” Call 1 (1): 1–8. Retrieved April 30, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.15575/call.v1i1.8802 .

Rotskoff, Lori E. (2000). “Home-Grown Radical or Home-Bound Housewife? Rethinking the Origins of 1960s Feminism through the Life and Work of Betty Friedan.” Reviews in American History 28 (1): 120–27. Retrieved September 2, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.1353/rah.2000.0014 .

Sayekti Ningsih Lasahi. (2018). “Critic Of Liberal Feminism Towards The Role Of Women (In Catholic and Protestant Churches).” Thesis. University Of Darussalam Gontor.

Snow, Nancy E. (2002). “Virtue and the Oppression of Women.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 28 (January 2015): 33–61. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2002.10717582 .

Suaidi, Rusfandi, and Trisno Tunggal Rahayu Wilujeng. (2016). “Feminism Reflected In Pride And Prejudice Novel By Jane Austen 1813.” Jurnal Ilmiah Bahasa Dan Sastra 3 (1): 85–99. Retrieved September 1, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.21067/jibs.v3i1.1157 .

Turan, Ishak and Hale, Kryci. (2018). “Liberal Feminism and the current conditions of Syrian Refugee Women and Children.” The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies 72: 487-502.

Ukić KoštaVesna. (2014). “Irish Women’s Fiction of the Twentieth Century: The Importance of Being Catholic”. ELOPE: English Language Overseas Perspectives and Enquiries 11 (2), 51-63. Retrieved February 1, 2021, from https://doi.org/10.4312/elope.11.2.51-63 .

Widiatmi, Yasinta Deka. (2013). “The Portrayal of Feminism in the Main Characters of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre.” Journal of English Language and Culture 3 (1): 61–73.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. (1792). A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. With Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. London: Printed for J. Johnson.

Wulandari Mega, Dwi, Supiastutik, and Hat Pujiati. (2019). “The Representation Of Liberal Feminism In A Woman Is No Man By Etaf Rum.” LENTERA: Jurnal Ilmiah Kependidikan. Retrieved August 9, 2021, from http://jurnal.stkippgribl.ac.id/index.php/lentera .

Copyright © 2015-2024 ACADEMY PUBLICATION — All Rights Reserved

April 9, 2024

Liberal feminism is antithetical to fostering healthy relationships.

• Liberal feminism is intensely interested in smashing the social norms that it views as restrictive. It has little use for family, community, tradition, place, belonging, or biology. Tweet This
• We have traded the communal for the individual, the we for the me. And it’s not making us happy. Tweet This
• Caring for others gives meaning and purpose. Caring only for ourselves makes us miserable.  Tweet This

Some years ago, a friend of mine made an observation that I have thought about ever since. “We, as women, can do absolutely anything,” she said, “except for the one thing that our grandmothers took for granted—get married and have kids.” 

In the months leading up to my 40th birthday, contemplating this statement, I found myself overwhelmed by despair. I was single and childless, and couldn’t figure out how it had happened. I had scrupulously followed the life path set out for women of my generation. I had gone to university and excelled; I had spent time “finding myself” in foreign countries; I had launched a professional career and worked gruelling hours to achieve success; I had paid off colossal student loans; I had moved to bigger, more cosmopolitan cities to pursue better opportunities; I had “worked on” myself. All the while, believing that the rest—marriage, children, a home life—would fall into place when the timing was right. When none of that materialized, I felt utterly adrift. 

My life was devoid of the milestones of adulthood. And, since many friends were now busy raising children, it was also devoid of daily, close contact with others. 

In my distress, I made  a radio documentary . But at the time, my only solution was to more aggressively pursue the more-freedom-is-always-better mantra that I’d been raised with. So I downsized my possessions, uprooted my life, and moved across the country yet again, chasing down some vague idea of adventure. 

It should come as no surprise that this approach did not yield the results I was looking for. I was not able to course correct until, during research for my book  Lean Out: A Meditation on the Madness of Modern Life , I visited extended family in Ireland, an older, more communal society, and observed how the women there lived. While some worked and others didn’t, their lives centred on family and community. Spouses stayed together, and men and women cooperated more. The families I knew all had at least three children. Extended kin networks, who lived close by, provided everything from meals and childcare to emotional support. Nobody was making a go of life alone. 

My depression lifted the day I arrived and, for the most part, save some dark months during Toronto’s endless lockdowns, has not returned. 

I had misunderstood what I need in life, what we all need. And in the wake of that realization, I began to adopt different values, and make different choices, and build a life anchored in connection instead of autonomy.

To do so, I had to reject liberal feminism.

In Louise Perry’s game-changing book   The Case Against the Sexual Revolution , she defines liberal feminism as an iteration of feminism that’s hyper-focused on maximizing individual freedom and self-actualization, often at the cost of all else. 

Spend just a few minutes online and you’ll find plenty of exaggerated examples of this ethos—a “boss girl” feminism that fetishizes career, a cult of self-care that rationalizes self-centred behaviour, disdainful jokes that mock men, diatribes against domesticity, memes that portray motherhood as an albatross around one’s neck, posts that champion single living and solo travel, and endless essays about severing long-held ties, from marriages to friendships, in order to pursue one’s own happiness.

This worldview interprets women’s well-being in the narrowest of terms, focusing on the issues that matter most to economically elite women (think: professional success). And, much like the rest of social liberalism, liberal feminism is intensely interested in smashing the social norms that it views as restrictive. It has little use for family, community, tradition, place, or belonging. Or, indeed, biology.

As a result, the old order, with all its social and sexual mores, is rejected out-of-hand, without consideration for unintended consequences . Which, as we’re seeing now, include widespread loneliness for women (and  men ). 

We have allowed liberal feminism to convince us to trade close, committed human relationships—in all their messy glory—for theoretical, frictionless freedom.

The liberal feminist ethos, I believe, is a good explanation for the  much-puzzled-over reality that women’s happiness has actually  declined since the 1970s , when the liberal feminist revolution took root. If you believe your highest goal in life is to make yourself happy, you set yourself up for dysfunctional relationships, and rob yourself of the benefits of interdependence. 

To unpack this trend, we can turn to a growing genre of memoirs written by distressed, middle-aged women who find themselves single, childless and lost in life. But instead of questioning the ideology that’s landed so many of us in such dire straits, these authors double down on liberal feminism, and personal freedom, channeling all of their energy into ever-more extreme sexual quests. 

It does not seem to occur to them that the frame itself is the problem. 

A pioneer in this genre is Emily Witt’s  Future Sex: A New Kind of Free Love . In the book, faced with a disorienting lack of social norms, and the new, extreme sexual freedom that’s imposed on everyone in the culture—even “people who never wanted to shake off the old institutions, except to the extent of showing solidarity with friends who did”—Witt elects, bizarrely, to smash more societal norms. 

She sets out on a reluctant quest, stamping out her own instinctual discomfort, as well as her longing for a more traditional life, to experiment with orgasmic meditation, kink, sex parties, Burning Man, and polyamory. 

Witt’s profoundly depressing long-form 2022 essay for The New Yorker, about the dating app Feeld , gives us an idea of where all of this leads. “For single people, casual sex is not a glib lifestyle choice but a serious attempt to be happy within a specific reality,” she writes, underlining the profound ambivalence lurking just below the surface. 

At another point, referring to the more mainstream dating apps, Witt observes:

I kept experiencing a suffocating gender dynamic: Regardless of the kind of person I am, I was somehow forced into the role of a desperate pursuer trying to win the affection of the elusive and “emotionally unavailable” male, a dynamic that was confusing to see revived in a moment when I was experiencing as much sexual agency as I’d ever had in my life.

This same baseline dissatisfaction at the state of modern mating — and the same attempt to rationalize this unhappiness away—also surfaces in titles like Aimée Lutkin’s  The Lonely Hunter: How Our Search for Love is Broken . Lutkin’s own solution to isolation is to move across America, get out of her comfort zone, and embark on experimental sexual liaisons with men and women. And then to further embrace the politics of liberal feminism. But by the book’s end, none of this seems to have moved the needle on Lutkin’s own loneliness in any meaningful way. 

Still, perhaps the most striking iteration of convoluted cheerleading for liberal feminism comes from none other than Nona Willis Aronowitz, daughter of the late sex-positivity feminist Ellen Willis, and a sex columnist at Teen Vogue. 

Her 2022 memoir,  Bad Sex: Truth ,  Pleasure, and an Unfinished Revolution,  proves to be a profoundly self-absorbed outing, in which she chronicles leaving a companionable, mutually supportive marriage to self-actualize through transgressive sex. Such straightforward narcissism is then somehow cast as a political act. (“Second Wave feminists were well aware that heterosexual romance presented a major roadblock to political clarity,” she reflects at one point.)

But  Bad Sex’ s “revolution” amounts to Willis Aronowitz engaging in risky sex with detached strangers — and then ruminating endlessly on these encounters. “My phone’s photo library was littered with screenshots of ambiguous texts, dispatched to friends so they could offer their insight,” Willis Aronowitz observes.

Having failed to achieve any real satisfaction through casual sex, the book concludes with Willis Aronowitz in a new long-term relationship, albeit a non-monogamous one, performing the mental gymnastics required to double down yet again on liberal feminism. 

We should ask ourselves: Who are books like  Bad Sex  written for? What agenda do they serve? Who are these feminist politics for?

What exactly is liberating about working 60-hour weeks on Zoom—alone in tiny condos we can barely afford in big, impersonal cities—and then logging off to eat takeout and tend to dating apps that place actual companionship far out of reach? What kind of life is that? 

We have traded the communal for the individual, the  we  for the  me . And it’s not making us happy. For many women, what it often means is isolation, overwork, economic precarity, and alienating casual sex. We have allowed liberal feminism to convince us to trade close, committed human relationships—in all their messy glory—for theoretical, frictionless freedom.

The simple fact of the matter is that, as Louise Perry argues, there is such a thing as too much freedom. Giving up some autonomy for the greater good—whether in a friendship, a partnership, an extended family, or a community—is both personally rewarding and collectively uplifting. 

As human beings with a tribal past, we are hardwired for interdependence. Even our body chemistry operates best under such conditions. Caring for others gives meaning and purpose. Caring only for ourselves makes us miserable. We humans need people. And needing people means they need us too. Which means that all intimate relationships require some level of sacrifice. 

But liberal feminism has cast these basic truths about humanity — so obvious as to be unremarkable in previous generations — as somehow oppressive to women. It has encouraged women to view communal life as inherently draining, thereby sowing the seeds of our own isolation, and thus, our own misery. 

It’s no wonder that women are unhappy. Anyone who views relationships this way sets themselves up for disaster.

Tara Henley is a writer and podcaster based in Toronto, and the author of the bestselling book Lean Out.

Editor's Note : This essay appeared first on the author's Substack and has been reprinted here with permission.

Related Posts

Eight reasons women stay in abusive relationships, male sexlessness is rising but not for the reasons incels claim, does sexual history affect marital happiness, how dads affect their daughters into adulthood, the porn gap: gender differences in pornography use in couple relationships, how moving in together makes it harder to know if he’s the one, join the ifs mailing list.

Sign up for our mailing list to receive ongoing updates from IFS.

© 2024 Institute for Family Studies

• Our Mission
• Books & Articles
• Get Married
• Success Sequence
• Public Education

Interested in learning more about the work of the Institute for Family Studies? Please feel free to contact us by using your preferred method detailed below.  

Mailing Address:

P.O. Box 1502 Charlottesville, VA 22902 (434) 253-5011

[email protected]

Media Inquiries

For media inquiries, contact Chris Bullivant ( [email protected] ).

We encourage members of the media interested in learning more about the people and projects behind the work of the Institute for Family Studies to get started by perusing our "Media Kit" materials.