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Henry VIII and Foreign Policy

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Henry VIII’s foreign policy primarily involved France and the Habsburg Empire. Traditionally, Tudor foreign policy tried to steer a path of neutrality with both these states and initially Henry VIII’s foreign policy was no different. Henry knew that England did not have the ability to take on either state but that as a nation she could profit from extending the hand of friendship to both. This plan fell apart when it became plain that Henry wanted to divorce Catherine of Aragon. Charles V would not contemplate any form of association with Henry VIII – as Catherine was his aunt. Charles believed that Henry VIII was depriving Catherine of all honour, something he was not willing to tolerate. However, Henry was astute enough to know that the position of Charles V in mainland Europe was such that he could not do anything about Catherine’s plight in England. Charles had far too much to think about with the Turks on the southeast of his empire to be able to help his aunt. However, he made clear his displeasure at the way Catherine had been treated.

Francis I of France tried to take advantage of this breakdown between Henry and Charles. He gave tacit support to Henry’s call for the Pope to nullify his marriage to Catherine. As a result both men met in great splendour at Calais in October 1532, where Francis greeted Anne Boleyn as if she was queen. Francis planned to help Henry further. In October 1533, Francis was due to sign a treaty with Pope Clement VII, which Francis hoped would include some settlement to Henry’s problem. Francis was not being altruistic – he simply wanted to create a powerful bloc against the Habsburgs. Henry ended this try by Francis when he made it plain that he planned to resolve the issue by himself.

Henry himself had to play a delicate diplomatic game. He knew with a degree of certainty that Francis was only ‘befriending’ him as part of an alliance against Charles V. The last thing Henry wanted was to become involved in a war between France and the Habsburgs – yet he did not want to antagonise Francis. The geographic distance between Vienna and England was sufficient to convince Henry that England was safe from Charles V. However, France was a different matter. When Francis made discreet overtures about marriage between his son and either Mary or Elizabeth, Henry failed to respond. He simply did not want to become embroiled in France politics.

Francis and Charles concentrated on one another after the death of Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, in 1535. Both concentrated their efforts on who should succeed him – thus leaving Henry with a degree of freedom with regards to his foreign policy. He pursued his desired for policy of neutrality. English diplomats in France were told to keep relations with Francis “cold”.

Henry could play this policy while Charles and Francis directed their foreign policies at one another. The one thing that Henry feared was an alliance between the two. Such an alliance seemed a distinct possibility by 1538. Charles and Francis met at Aigues Mortes in July 1538 in the presence of Pope Paul III. To Henry it appeared as if the major Catholic powers of Europe were pooling their power. On paper, Henry was in a weak position against such united powerful opponents and he tried to break up the Habsburg-Valois entente – he even offered himself for marriage to various French princesses but this came to nothing. In November 1538 Henry involved himself in negotiations for marriage to the niece of Charles V – but this too came to nothing. His position in a Catholic dominated Europe became even weaker when in December 1538 a papal order was dispatched supporting the deposing of Henry. The papal order called Henry “the most cruel and abominable tyrant”. This order made Henry fair game to any Catholic.

In response to this threat – a threat Henry took very seriously – Henry did a great deal to develop the navy. In 1539, Marillac, the French ambassador in England, wrote of 120 naval ships being based in the mouth of the Thames and 30 in Portsmouth – a considerable increase on the five ships he inherited from Henry VII. Henry ordered the modernisation of all coastal defences on the south coast – much of the material needed for repairs came from nearby monasteries.

One way that Henry countered this threat was to court the Lutheran princes of North Germany. On paper, they would not have been able to counter the military might of a combined French-Habsburg attack but they held a strategic position in Europe that could have inconvenienced the emperor. In January 1539, talks were held with the Schmalkaldic League but they got bogged down in theological arguments and came to nothing.

In July 1539, Henry received the agreement of William of Cleves for his sister, Anne, to marry Henry. William was a Catholic in the same mould as Henry and needed an ally of some standing as his position in Europe was threatened by Roman Catholics loyal to the Pope – men such as Francis I and Charles V. On January 6 th 1540, Henry married Anne at Greenwich. Francis had allowed Charles to march across his lands in December 1539 to facilitate the putting down of a rebellion in Ghent – the co-operation between the two was a clear worry to Henry. Charles put down the Ghent rebellion but it did not usher in an era of more co-operation between the two, much to the relief of Charles.

Henry’s ability to maintain a degree of separation from Europe relied, to a great extent, on the fact the Charles and Francis were to all intents, enemies. Any reconciliation was invariably followed by conflict – and this meant that their attention was concentrated on themselves. The 1539 agreement between Charles and Francis was followed in July 1541 by war between the two. Henry could only benefit from this. In February 1543, Henry allied with Charles. They agreed on upholding ancient trade agreements and guaranteeing the other against invasion. They also agreed that there would be a major attack on France within two years. In particular, Henry wanted to gain Boulogne. Henry committed 5,000 troops to an attack on France. On September 14 th 1544, Boulogne surrendered to the English and Henry seemed to be on the ascendancy with regards to his position with Francis. However, on September 18 th , Charles deserted Henry and made his own peace arrangements with Francis.

1545 was a year of crisis for Henry. Many expected a French attack and in July 1544 a French force landed at Bembridge on the Isle of Wight. The fleet also intended a landing at Seaford but disease put paid to this. The one saving grace for Henry was that Francis was not in a strong position and he sued for peace. He granted Henry Boulogne for eight years and agreed to pay Henry a pension of 95,000 crowns for the duration of Henry’s lifetime.

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New Episodes

Episode 067: Henry VII and his foreign policy

by Heather   -  February 4, 2017

This is the episode in which I unashamedly destroy the French language in three words. Sorry, French speakers. Incidentally, someone left me a negative comment on iTunes (yes, I read the reviews) saying that my accent was too foreign. Eh? Huh. Who knew. Cheers for that. If my accent bugs you, you can feel free to read the transcript below.

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Onwards …

A really good Prezi presentation on Henry VII’s foreign policy: https://prezi.com/i-t7wmxfeagf/henry-vii-foreign-policy/

Music from the episode (with Amazon affiliate links – buy through this link on Amazon, and pay the same price, but I get a small percentage, so you get to support the podcast at the same time. Woohoo!)

In this episode, I used a lot of music from Josquin Desprez – he was a French composer living during this time, and I wanted to feature his music.

Here are some albums to try:

Transcript of Episode 067: Henry VII’s Foreign Policy

Hello, and welcome to the Renaissance English History Podcast.  I’m your host, Heather Teysko, and I’m a storyteller who makes history accessible because I believe it’s a pathway to understanding who we are, our place in the universe, and being in touch with our own humanity. This is episode 67, and we’re going to talk about France. I have been wanting to do some episodes on France for a while. If you’re a longer time listener, you might remember that I did several episodes on Spain around this time last year, and so now I wanted to take a look at foreign policy with France.

But before I get started, a few reminders.  Firstly, please check out the Agora Podcast Network, of which this podcast is a proud member.  The Agora podcast of the month is

Remember you can get show notes for each episode along with the book recommendations, at Englandcast.com, where you can also sign up for the newsletter list and get extra minicasts, special book giveaways, and other fun stuff. Go to Englandcast.com to sign up.

So as I said, for right now I want to talk about foreign policy, specifically around France. I want to trace the relationships of all the different Tudor monarchs with France, starting with Henry VII and ending with Elizabeth. This episode is going to be on Henry VII. Next time we’ll do one on Henry VIII, then Edward and Mary in one episode, followed by Elizabeth in her own. So four episodes on Tudor Monarchs and France, and then we’ll cap it off with a supplemental on the Field of Cloth of Gold. It will be good, I promise. That will see us right the way through into March.

To get started, let’s talk about where England was on the European chessboard in 1485 when the Tudors came to power after Bosworth Field. England was a small backwater island, poor from having gone through decades of civil war. The Tudors were a brand new dynasty, and Henry Tudor, as we’ve talked about before, had a tenuous claim to the throne. His mothers line was through a bastard line dating to a relationship that John of Gaunt had with his mistress, Katherine Swynford. His father’s line was formed when Henry V’s Queen, Katherine of Valois, married her squire, Owen Tudor. So this was not a line that was old, or magnificent, or regal, or anything like that.

Henry’s primary aim in the early part of his reign was consolidating his power, and fighting off the many pretenders who tried to throw a wrench in his reign. If you know your Wars of the Roses history, you will remember that the Yorkist king, Edward IV, had two sons, who became the Princes in the Tower. Those two sons were murdered, or not – it’s a history mystery, and while I have my own thoughts on it, this isn’t the episode to go into that. The point is, Henry Tudor united the houses of Lancaster and York by marrying Elizabeth of York, who was also Edward IV’s daughter, so would have been a sister to those princes. Throughout Henry’s reign, he saw several men step forward saying that they were one of the Princes, claiming to have escaped. One of them, Perkin Warbeck, was supported by foreign governments (family members of Edward IV) and it created several crises for Henry throughout his reign. Foreign powers sought to create havoc and instability in England by supporting these pretenders.

When Henry first became King, his first thoughts were to consolidating his power in England, rebuilding the economy, and having England catch up to the rest of Europe in terms of culture, and exploration, and all of that stuff. England had been at war for decades, most of the nobility was dead, and Henry couldn’t afford to start any foreign wars. He was inclined to seek peace, and he also wanted alliances that would build up his reputation.

But he did have potential problems, first with France. Of course, the relationship between France and England went way back. 1066 and all that. England had fought France for 100 years claiming the French throne, right up until 1453, so just a few decades before Henry was king. France had spent the 16th century building and consolidating power, so that many of the independent feudal territories we know like Aquitaine, etc., were now under the French throne. By the time of Bosworth, France was three times larger than England, both in manpower, and money. France provided a nearby staging ground as well, for all those who were opposed to the new Tudor regime. The first foreign policy action Henry took was to sign a truce with France that lasted until 1489.

The crisis in Brittany challenged his relationship with France, though. What, you may ask, is the crisis of Brittany? Brittany is now part of France, but at the time, it was its own independent area, and it’s the little bit that sticks out in the west, into the coast. Both France and Brittany had helped Henry when he was living in exile during the wars of the roses. Brittany had been his primary base during his period of wandering in the wilderness, while France had provided funds for his fight against Richard III.

Brittany was the last independent area within France and was governed by the ageing Duke Francis, who had been a good host to the exiled Henry. The regent of France, Anne of Beuajeau, had decided that the best way to resolve the issue of Brittany’s independence was to marry her eight-year old brother, Charles VIII , to Anne of Brittany – the twelve-year old daughter of Francis and heir to Brittany. Clearly, this was something that the Bretons would not accept as it would put them directly under the control of France and it would mean that France was basically eating up Brittany. Things became more complicated when the recently widowed Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian, said he intended to marry Anne of Brittany. Henry did not want to upset either France or Brittany but ended up sending 6,000 ‘volunteers’ to Brittany to defend the Bretons against the French.

However, the Bretons could not hold out against the French and in December 1491 they accepted defeat. Anne married Charles VIII and the marriage ended Brittany’s independence.

At this point Henry got a bit more assertive. This was during the time when he was dealing with pretenders to the throne, namely Lambert Simnel, and the early stages of Perkin Warbeck, both of whom claimed to be two different Yorkist princes with a better claim to the throne than Henry. Some foreign governments, like Burgundy, were supporting the pretenders, and Henry needed it to stop.

Henry likely knew that France was more interested in expanding her influence and power in northern Italy, and he decided to distract them. He announced his intention to assert his claim to the French throne. Parliament voted two subsidies that paid for 26,000 men. They crossed the Channel in October 1492 and besieged Boulogne. The advisors of Charles VIII wanted rid of Henry to leave them free to concentrate all resources in north Italy. The result was the Treaty of Étaples (November 3rd 1492). Henry received a promise from Charles that he would no longer give any assistance to any pretenders to the English throne. Henry also received a total of 745,000 crowns – the cost of the venture – to be paid at 50,000 crowns a year. This amounted to about 5% of Henry’s total annual income, and it was actually a paying of a pension due to Edward IV agreed in 1475.

Spain gave Henry a different set of problems. Aragon and Castille had united in 1479 under Ferdinand and Isabella, and was the dominant power in the Western Mediterranean, currently on a quest to reconquer the Iberian Peninsula from the last vestiges of Moors in southern Andalucia, where, coincidentally, I live now.

Henry wished to see greater English trade in the Mediterranean and Spain could have seen this as a threat to their status in the region. However, rather than antagonise Spain, Henry saw the country as a very useful potential ally on the southern border of France. The Treaty of Medina del Campo (1489) was signed to tie England and Spain closer together via the marriage between Prince Arthur and Catherine of Aragon. When the negotiations started, Arthur was barely three years old and six months younger than Catherine! This was a coup for Henry as the Tudors were still a brand new dynasty, and there was the fear in Spain that Henry was not as secure on the throne as they would wish – if he suffered a rebellion, Catherine would be at risk as well. The signing of the treaty was a success for Henry as it gave legitimacy to his rule from one of Europe’s most powerful nations. When Catherine finally arrived in England in 1501, she brought with her a dowry of 100,000 crowns.

Then in April 1502 Arthur died, changing all the plans. However, in June 1502, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain gave their blessing to the marriage between Prince Henry and Catherine – though this would have required a Papal dispensation as Catherine was Henry’s brother’s widow – too closely related to be married without a dispensation.

But relations with Spain took a major downturn in February 1503. Elizabeth of York died and aside from his own personal grief, Henry faced a very real problem. Two of his three sons had died and understandably, he was worried about Prince Henry – who was definitely active and participated in what might be seen as dangerous sports. To ensure that the Tudors had a surviving male heir, it seems that Henry wanted to find a new wife. This, ironically, led to a clash with Ferdinand whose wife, Isabella, had died in 1504. With two kings seeking a wife, and the options open to them being limited, the two former allies were on course to becoming major rivals.

Henry never remarried but he tried to develop closer ties with Burgundy. This pushed Ferdinand into the arms of the French and he married Germaine de Foix, the niece of Louis XII, in October 1505. With Spain and France now linked by marriage, Henry was in a vulnerable position.

Scotland was a potential source of trouble for Henry. While they had been favourable to Henry at Bosworth, he could not guarantee that this would always be the way. In July 1486, Henry signed a three-year truce with the Scots. In 1488, James III of Scotland was assassinated and James IV – a fifteen year old, succeeded him. With such a young king on the throne, Henry believed that the Scots had more domestic issues to deal with rather than become a thorn in the side of England.

Scotland’s support for Perkin Warbeck was directly aimed at Henry; Warbeck and married the cousin of James IV, and this was seen as a major threat to the king of England. The fact that the Warbeck rebellion petered out did not disguise the part played by Scotland and Henry, saw how fragile border was, and wanted a truce. In 1497, the Truce of Ayton was signed and after the execution of Warbeck it became a full peace treaty. This was the first peace agreement between England and Scotland since 1328, so it was a huge deal for Henry. In August 1503, Henry’s eldest daughter, Margaret, married James IV to bring both countries even closer together.

In January 1487, Henry renewed a treaty with the heir to the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian. In 1496, England also joined the Holy League formed to force France out of northern Italy. However, Henry only signed on the condition that England did not have to go to war with France and at the same time he signed a commercial treaty with France.

How successful was Henry’s foreign policy? From a position of extreme vulnerability in 1485, he had acquired a decent reputation abroad by the time of his death . Even though England was not part of the League of Cambrai (1508), the members of the League stated that they would not threaten England’s interest abroad. As well as being a wily diplomat, Henry also had luck on his side. For a number of years during his reign, France and other European powers were more concerned about events in northern Italy, an area where England had minimal interests. Therefore, Henry was given more of a freer hand than he might otherwise have expected. Polydore Vergil wrote that Henry was “fortunate” and in many areas of foreign policy he probably was. The book recommendation this week is Thomas Penn’s Winter King , which is a really great narrative biography of Henry VII – I’ll put a link up on the website. Remember there are show notes, everything like that, at englandcast.com. Thanks so much for listening, and I’ll be back in 2 weeks with more on France, now with Henry VIII in charge. In between there you will hear a joint episode I did with James Boulton of the Queens of England Podcast – a fantastic show that I highly recommend – where we talked about Katherine of Aragon. So that will be coming up next week, and then we’ll resume our regularly scheduled French programming. Thanks so much for listening!

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The Foreign Policy of Henry VIII

1995, The Reign of Henry VIII:Politics, Policy and Piety

This paper surveys the foreign policy of Henry VIII and his ministers in terms of the pressures on it, both internal and external, and geopolitical imperatives.

Related Papers

S. Doran and G. Richardson (eds.), Tudor England and its Neighbours, Macmillan, Themes in Focus (Basingstoke, 2005), p.106-38.

David Potter

This study explores the development of a consciousness of decisions on foreign policy as a national, as opposed to a purely monarchical, concern during the intense crises of the mid-Tudor period.

Björn Weiler

Paper, Henry III conference, 2007

Diarmaid MacCulloch

DARING DYNASTY: Custom, Conflict and Control in Early-Tudor England

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There have only been occasional scholarly toe-dipping into the complex and highly-speculative murkiness about Henry VII and his son, Henry VIII, regarding how much the former influenced the latter in ruling England. Pop psychology has been a favorite if at times facetious exercise when talking about Henry VIII. It ranged from his bevy of wives and a superego emerging in wars with France, to vengeful executions and playing ministers and supporters against each other on royal whim if not pathology. It was while reading about Henry VIII’s building and renovation of manors and castles that I came across the Whitehall Mural. As might be expected, much discourse about the mural had centered on Henry VIII’s overpowering image in this Holbein work that adorned the king’s privy chamber at Whitehall Palace until it burned down in 1698. It was the portrayal of a king that relegates the other three figures in it—his third wife, father and mother—almost to the shadows. This paper reviews certain actions of the son in full view of the accomplishments of his father, using the generally-ignored Whitehall inscription as a clue to the mind of the second Tudor king. It could be argued that the son competed with his dead father his entire life, a competition he could never win.

Shami Ghosh

History Compass

Glenn Richardson

This article summarises the main developments in Anglo-French relations in the context of Tudor foreign policy. It reviews the historiography of the subject, highlighting the main developments in twentieth century research. It argues that this research demonstrates that it was in the sixteenth century, under the later Valois monarchs and the first Bourbon king of France that Franco-English relations changed significantly. From being openly hostile they became more ambivalent in the true meaning of the word. Under Henry VIII and Elizabeth I the two nations began to create a still-difficult but sometimes more productive relationship with each other. This set the broad pattern for relations up to and beyond the Entente-Cordiale of 1904.

Jelle Haemers

Jana Chrenková

The thesis covers Henry's life, marriages, and medical explanation of his tyranny.

Jen Caddick

Dissertation submitted for the BA (Hons) in History at the University of York (2012 - 2015). Awarded 77.

Charles-Edouard LEVILLAIN FRHistS, MAE

The purpose of the article is to offer a new reading of Jean-Antoine d’Avaux’ correspondence for the year 1688 and a more refined interpretation of the reasons why William III of Orange’s fateful crossing of the Narrow Seas in November 1688 caught the French Crown by surprize. In particular, it will shift emphasis away from a French-centred towards a broader archival perspective on Louis XIVs’ European policy in late 1688. In doing so, it will at least partly resolve the question of why the French Crown did not intervene – either militarily or navally – in November 1688. Working within the tradition of source criticism, the essay uncovers for the first time some significant textual variations between d’Avaux’ manuscript and printed correspondence, thus calling into question the implicit assumption made by all historians that Abbé Mallet’s edition of 1752-1753 constitutes a reliable source for studying the French, Dutch or even English and German background to the events of 1688. The reader will learn the potential pitfalls of trusting a printed diplomatic correspondence without returning to the original manuscript source.

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Foreign Policy

Cite this chapter.

• David Potter  

Part of the book series: Problems in Focus Series ((PFS))

155 Accesses

1 Citations

For the sixteenth-century, as for the medieval, sovereign, the making of foreign policy was unquestionably part of the royal prerogative. It was not susceptible to routine political controls or to popular participation. The relations between states were, strictly speaking, the relations between dynastic rulers. On the other hand, like other domains of governance, it was subject to the loose convention that the ruler act by taking the good counsel of his advisers, although a ruler with sense was able to recognise the difference between the possible and the desirable. The conduct of diplomacy and the waging of war were inseparable, the risks taken in foreign relations high and the cost of war was a fact bound to involve interests wider than those of the court and the aristocracy. These basic propositions generate most of the debate that has developed about the nature of Henry VIII’s conduct of his relations with foreign powers, notably over the extent of the king’s actual control of his own policy. No ruler in Henry’s position could possibly manage his foreign relations alone; he was bound to take advice and it is in the nature of that advice and the extent to which the king could be manipulated that some of the main problems lie. Henry was particularly preoccupied by foreign policy and, judging by the periods of well-documented exchanges with ministers, took more interest in war and diplomacy than in most other areas.

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Bibliography

The most essential sources for Henrician foreign policy in the state papers at the PRO, BL and other collections are to be found variably summarised in LP , though these must sometimes be treated with caution over dating. Many, though not all, of the most important documents were published in extenso in a slightly earlier compilation, StP . In particular, some of the important exchanges between the king and his chief ministers, notably Cardinal Wolsey, are to be found in vol. I of StP and the correspondence with ambassadors in part V (vols VI-XII), foreign correspondence. LP also calendars a wide variety of correspondence between foreign ambassadors in England and their home governments from the early 1520s onwards. Much of this material was published separately as CSPSp (dealing with Habsburg documents from a number of different archives). French ambassadors’ reports are calendared for the most part in LP but three main French publications are important: Ambassades en Angleterre de Jean du Bellay , ed. V.L. Bourrilly and P. de Vaissi ère (Paris: Picard, 1905) followed by La correspondance du cardinal Jean du Bellay , ed. R. Scheurer, Soci ét é de l’Histoire de France, 2 vols so far (Paris: Klincksieck, 1969–74) and the Correspondance politique de MM. de Castillon et de Marillac , ed. J. Kaulek (Paris, 1885).

Google Scholar  

It was Sir John Seeley in The Growth of British Policy (2 vols, Cambridge UP, 1897) who emphasised the importance of what he called the ‘British problem’ in English diplomacy of the sixteenth century, the idea that England should ‘close the back door’ to foreign powers by assuring its dominance of Scotland. Both A.F. Pollard in Henry VIII (London: Longmans, 1902, 1925)

and R.B. Wernham in Before the Armada: The Growth of English Policy, 1485–1588 (London, 1961) pursued this idea that Henry VIII consciously, especially in his later years, sought in this policy the counterpart to internal consolidation. Wernham went on to argue that the reign of Henry VIII, in showing the final failure of English territorial ambitions in Europe, opened a new era of ‘oceanic strategies’ for England in the Elizabethan era. This was the same tradition in which P.S. Crowson produced the disappointing Tudor Foreign Policy (London: Black, 1973) a book too overshadowed by English experiences in the twentieth century and containing maps of a remarkable inexactitude. More recent historians of the Henrician period, led by Sir Geoffrey Elton in his incisive critique of Wernham’s book, have been increasingly reluctant to accept the reality of such grand strategies. Old nostrums, however, linger on.

Much recent interest has concentrated on the shaping of foreign policy by the king and his councillors. For foreign policy, the wider debate initiated in the different interpretations of the king’s role in G.R. Elton, Henry VIII (London: Routledge, 1962)

and J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (London: Eyre 8c Spottiswoode, 1968)

and reviewed by Elton in ‘King of Hearts’, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government (4 vols, Cambridge UP, 1974–92) pp. 100-8 is important. It is continued by D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics and Personalities (London: George Philip, 1985).

All these are of importance for the near-impossible task of assessing the degree to which Henry VIII shaped policy. A.F. Pollard, Cardinal Wolsey (London: Longmans, 1929)

advanced the theory that Wolsey’s personal ambition shackled English policy to the Papal See, a view effectively demolished in D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR , 28 (1965). More recently P. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal. The Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1990) has provided a sustained argument for the view that Wolsey’s chief preoccupation was to serve the king and maintain his honour. Ultimately, the strings lay in the king’s hands.

Gwyn’s views are largely shared by G. Bernard, War, Taxation and Rebellion in Early Tudor England: Henry VIII, Wolsey and the Amicable Grant of 1525 (Brighton: Harvester, 1986)

one of the best recent studies of English foreign policy in the early 1520s. The importance of the king’s honour in Wolsey’s calculations is also stressed by the work of S J. Gunn on the subject, notably his ‘Wolsey’s foreign policy and the Domestic Crisis of 1527–8’ in S.J. Gunn and P. Lindley (eds), Cardinal Wolsey, Church, State and Art (Cambridge: CUP, 1991) one of the most richly documented and incisive studies of policy in the late 1520s. In comparison, the 1530s and the policies of Thomas Cromwell in foreign affairs have not attracted much attention despite the great work of Sir Geoffrey Elton, although there is now R. McEntegart, ‘England and the League of Schmalkalden 1531–1547: faction, foreign policy and the English Reformation’, London School of Economics PhD thesis, 1992. On the 1540s, there is as yet only D. Potter, ‘Diplomacy in the Mid-Sixteenth Century: England and France 1536–1550’, Cambridge PhD thesis, 1973.

On warfare in the period, S.J. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’ in J. Black (ed.), The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987)

provides a useful overview and the campaigns of the early years are covered in G. Cruickshank, Army Royal. Henry VIII’s Invasion of France in 1513 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969)

and The English Occupation of Tournai, 1513–19 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). Military organisation is covered by two important theses: C.S.L. Davies, ‘Supply Services of the English Armed Forces, 1509–50’ (Oxford: OUP, 1963)

and J. Goring, ‘The Military Obligations of the English People, 1511–58’ (London, 1955). Some aspects of dealings with mercenaries are covered in J.G. Millar, Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, 1485–1547 (Charlottesville: Virginia UP, 1980).

The 1523 campaign is meticulously handled in SJ. Gunn, ‘The Duke of Suffolk’s March on Paris’, EHR , 101 (1986) 496–558

and the 1544 campaign newly discussed by L. Macmahon, ‘The English Invasion of France, 1544’, MA thesis, Warwick, 1992. Calais and its problems are examined in P. Morgan, ‘The Government of Calais, 1485–1558’, Oxford, DPhil thesis, 1966. On the navy, D. Loades, The Tudor Navy. An Administrative, Political and Military History (Aldershot: Scolar, 1992), while pointing out the continuities with Henry VII’s navy, brings out the remarkable expansion in the first half of the reign of Henry VIII.

Studies of a more specialist kind that throw light on particular periods may be found in J. Russell, The Field of the Cloth of Gold. Men and Manners in 1520 (London: Routledge, 1969)

and Russell, ‘The Search for Universal Peace: the Conferences of Calais and Bruges in 1521’, BIHR , 44 (1971); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: the Conferences of Calais and Bruges Reconsidered’, HJ , 23 (1980) 755–72.

Article   Google Scholar  

G. Jacqueton, La politique ext érieure de Louise de Savoie. Relations diplomatiques de la France et de VAngleterre pendant la captivit é de François 1er (1525–6) (Paris: Boullon, 1892) remains essential for the mid-1520s. R. Scheurer, ‘Les relations franco-anglaises pendant la n égociation de la paix des Dames (1528–9)’, in P.M. Smith and I.D. McFarlane (eds), Literature and the Arts in the Reign of Francis I (Lexington, 1985) exploits the du Bellay correspondence of which he is the editor. The role of Anglo-French relations in the divorce problems of Henry VIII was explored by V.-L. Bourrilly, ‘François 1er et Henry VIII: l’intervention de la France dans l’affaire du divorce’, Rev. d’hist. moderne et contemporaine , 1 (1889) 271–84. Involvement in the Baltic region has been explored by K.J.V. Jespersen, ‘Henry VIII of England, Lubeck and the Count’s War, 1533–35’, Scandinavian Journal of History , 8 (1981).

There are many. biographies of English courtiers and diplomats that shed light on the foreign policy of the period, including: S.J. Gunn, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988)

W.S. Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of Henry VIII (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State UP, 1953)

E.F. Rogers (ed.), The Letters of Sir John Hackett, 1526–34 (Morgantown, 1971); G. Redworth, In Defence of the Church Catholic. The Life of Stephen Gardiner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)

S.R. Gammon, Statesman and Schemer: William, first Lord Paget (London: David & Charles, 1973)

A.J. Slavin, Politics and Profit. A Study of Sir Ralph Sadler, 1507–47 (Cambridge: CUP, 1966); B. Ficaro, ‘Nicholas Wotton, Dean and Diplomat’, University of Kent, Canterbury, PhD thesis, 1981.

On the practice of diplomacy, the classic interpretation is G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (London: Cape, 1955)

J. Russell, Peacemaking in the Renaissance (London: Duckworth, 1976).

These need to be supplemented by C. Giry Deloison, ‘La naissance de la diplomatie moderne en France et en Angleterre au debut du XVIe si ècle (1475–1520)’, Nouvelle Revue du seizi ème si ècle (1987) and Deloison, ‘Le personnel diplomatique au d ébut du XVIe si ècle’, Journal des Savants (1987). See also, D. Potter, ‘Diplomacy in the Mid-sixteenth Century’ (above) ch. 6; C.B.A. Behrens, ‘The Origins of the Office of English Resident Ambassador at Rome’, EHR , 49 (1934) 640–58.

On England and Scotland there is an overview in D.M. Head, ‘Henry VIII’s Scottish Policy: a Reassessment’, Scottish Historical Review , 61 (1982) 1–24

on the earlier part of the reign, see R.G. Eaves, Henry VIII’s Scottish Diplomacy, 1513–24; English Relations with the Regency Government of James V (New York: Exposition, 1971)

Eaves, Henry VIII and James V’s Regency Government, 1524–28 (London, Lanham: UP of America, 1987).

On the 1540s, M. Merriman, ‘The Assured Scots’, Scottish Historical Review , 47 (1968) 10–34; Merriman, ‘War Propaganda during the Rough Wooing’, Scottish Tradition , IX-X (1979–80); E. Bonner, ‘The First Phase of the Politique of Henri II in Scotland, its Genesis and the Nature of the “Auld Alliance”, 1547–54’, University of Sydney PhD thesis, 1993.

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Potter, D. (1995). Foreign Policy. In: MacCulloch, D. (eds) The Reign of Henry VIII. Problems in Focus Series. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24214-6_6

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Henry VII: A Source-Based Question and Answer

Robert Hughes provides an Examiner's Commentary

The essay below is an example of a candidate’s response to a question set for the new Edexcel AS specification Unit 1, ‘The Reign of Henry VII, 1485-1509’, although the comments made here should be helpful to anyone sitting AS short essay questions. In this specification, candidates must write two essays in 80 minutes and are recommended to spend about 35 minutes per essay, thus allowing time for planning and preparation. 

An examiner for this specification works to five levels of response with the highest level being within the range of 25 to 30 marks. The assessment objective is ‘to present historical explanations and reach a judgement’, and it is vital that candidates have this objective at the centre of their thinking. To achieve a high mark there needs to be an analytical answer offering focus on the question and ‘explicit understanding’ of the key issues. ‘Explicit’ is a word examiners are fond of; it means that the material is clearly relevant. The alternative is ‘implicit’, when the examiner has to pause to ponder the relevance of a statement made. Another word to bear in mind is ‘developed’ – meaning that the candidate is doing something with the material and not simply regurgitating it. 

The essay below is not perfect, but there is sufficient explicit and developed material to warrant a high mark; it also has a clear focus on the assessment objective. Its material is limited for it has an imperfect notion of ‘pretenders’ and there might be more historical context, including more reference to the condition of monarchy at the beginning of the early modern period. Also, the conclusion might contain more integration of points – a bringing together of factors and an attempt to see how they fit together. But, bearing in mind the constraints of time (a maximum of 40 minutes), it is a lucid, relevant and cogent account which should be well-rewarded. 

To What Extent was Henry VII’s Reign under Threat from Pretenders to the Throne?  

In order to measure the extent of the threat posed to Henry VII by those keen to remove him from power it is necessary to consider a number of factors. First, was there a serious rival to Henry who was regarded by a substantial number of people as a more legitimate monarch? Second, was there at any point the chance of foreign invasion and conquest? Third, was Henry’s administration of the country seriously undermined through persistent fears of his being overthrown?   [This is a clear, pithy introduction suggesting a well-organised approach with clear parameters. If the essay keeps to the agenda laid out here it will be a relevant and focused study without descriptive padding.] 

In considering the first factor, a serious rival to Henry, the central weakness of the pretenders is exposed. The names of two pretenders stand out when considering this issue, Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck. The fact that the Yorkists needed to resort to such characters highlights their fundamental problem. There were contenders more legitimately aligned to the Yorkist cause, notably Clarence’s son, the Earl of Warwick, but incapacity or inadequacy rendered them unrealistic alternatives to Henry Tudor. On the other hand, while support for Simnel and Warbeck indicated Yorkist desperation, the fact that these two dubious characters posed such a threat to Henry does indicate that the first Tudor’s reign was far from stable. The biggest threat to Henry was undoubtedly Margaret, Dowager Duchess of Burgundy, sister of Edward IV and Richard III and widow of Charles the Bold. This formidable and hugely wealthy lady never ceased in her determination to overthrow Henry and funded all the rebellions against him. She was too grand and distant for Henry to do anything about directly and her danger only diminished when she ran out of people to fund. But there was really no serious rival to Henry and once the fraudulent nature of Simnel, the first pretender, was exposed then suspicion and doubt was thrown on all who succeeded him.  [This consideration of Henry’s rivals might be criticised for limiting the scope of the study to Simnel and Warbeck but it does make the effective point that the biggest threat was Margaret of Burgundy. It provides two good developed points – that the impact of Simnel and Warbeck worked both ways, indicating the strength and the weakness of Henry’s position, and that the revelation of Simnel’s fraudulence reduced the credibility of those who came later.] 

The most serious attempt at foreign invasion came early on in Henry’s reign and concluded with the Battle of Stoke in 1487. This was a pitched battle fought in central England and as such must be regarded as a serious threat to Henry Tudor. But it also revealed the fragility of the Simnel cause for his was an army of poorly-equipped mercenaries who, having landed on the North Lancashire coast, could only offer credible opposition if it recruited support on the journey south; this it failed to do. Subsequent invasions in 1495, at Deal, and in 1497, in Cornwall, in the name of Perkin Warbeck had less impact. This might indicate that as Henry’s reign progressed so the threats diminished. But this would be inaccurate. Warbeck was a more serious and persistent threat than Simnel and at certain points in time attracted considerably more overseas support. It is significant that Henry could afford to be merciful to Simnel once he was captured but eventually was forced to execute Warbeck.  [The threat of foreign invasion is concisely handled; and this is a strength. A well-briefed candidate might be tempted into factual narrative here. The examiner will be more impressed with the observations that home-grown recruits never rallied to the Yorkist cause and that it was Warbeck who was the bigger threat, with Henry having to execute him while he could afford to be lenient with Simnel.] 

While Henry wanted to suggest that the pretenders were little more than irritating distractions, there is no doubt that at certain points in his reign they posed a serious threat and this was entirely due to the extent of the foreign support they attracted. Simnel’s cause was supported by the powerful Yorkist faction in Ireland and was funded by Margaret of Burgundy and encouraged by Charles VIII of France. Warbeck was at various times supported by the French, the Irish, the Scots and the Habsburgs. But this turned out to be both a strength and a weakness. It was a strength because Henry’s regime would never have survived the active hostility of powers greater than England, but it was a weakness because if these powers no longer saw that it was in their interest to give support to the pretenders then the cause was lost and the pretenders left isolated. The behaviour of Warbeck in 1497 as he travelled from Ireland to Scotland and then to Cornwall, desperately attempting to raise forces, showed the fate of a pretender whose moment had passed. So the closest Henry came to being overthrown on the battlefield was, ironically, when he was pitched against the weakest of the pretenders. The battle was hardfought but the inability to add to the mercenary force suggests that, had victory been achieved, it would not have been sustained.  [Again, the candidate rightly resists the temptation to describe the labyrinthine political and diplomatic manoeuvres of the time, preferring to mention the states who flirted with the idea of supporting the pretenders and then making the very effective point that foreign support was both a strength and a weakness.] 

There is no doubt that Henry’s running of the country was seriously pre-occupied with how to cope with the hostility of the pretenders. The King developed a highly efficient network of spies and informers who seriously undermined the impact of those with hostile intent – but also indicated how seriously Henry took the threat. Above all, Henry engaged in most effective diplomatic and dynastic policies to weaken and isolate those opposed to him. By the beginning of the sixteenth-century, some two-thirds through his reign, he had successfully dealt with the pretenders and their threat. This was achieved through skilled diplomatic deals with the French, the Spanish, the Scots and with Archduke Philip. Henry’s own marriage to Elizabeth, Edward IV’s daughter, was a huge dynastic triumph, made more so with the birth of a male heir in 1486. So Henry’s administration of the country was shaped by the need to guarantee his security, but it is too strong to state that the country was undermined by these concerns – indeed, in a sense it was probably strengthened.  [Henry’s diplomatic and dynastic policies – it is important to spell them out separately – are rightly regarded as immensely successful and a key factor in the undermining of opposition. The argument, though, that Henry was forced to run the country according to an agenda dictated by others is a subtle one and a good counter to the accounts of his triumphs.]  

In conclusion, Henry was threatened by the existence of pretenders at certain key periods in his reign. But the power of the pretenders depended upon the extent of the foreign support they were able to attract and this turned out to be unreliable and short-lived. Once Simnel was revealed as a fraud, and the Tudor king seen as a forceful and effective ruler whose regime took roots, then the cause of the pretenders lost its appeal to all but an extreme minority. But, given the violent and unstable condition of monarchy at the time, there is little doubt that, had the Tudors been led by a less-gifted figure than Henry Tudor, theirs would have been a very short-lived line of monarchs. [The brief conclusion emphasises the essential thrust of the essay and makes an effective final statement – always good to leave the examiner with a clear and ringing remark. It might have been stronger if the candidate had more obviously established an inter-linking of points – can all the factors be brought together around a central theme? But, given the constraints of time – always an issue at the end of an essay – this is an impressive end to a piece of work that would warrant a high mark]. 

Richard Hughes, until recently Head of History at St John's School in Leatherhead, is a senior history examiner with Edexcel.

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What Was King Henry VIII’s Foreign Policy?

King Henry VIII’s foreign policy can be seen as a series of moves designed to gain the upper hand over either Spain or France. During Henry’s reign, England was never strong enough to take on either country. As a result, throughout Henry’s reign there were numerous treaties and agreements with Spain against France or with France against Spain/Hapsburg Empire. The relationship with Scotland, traditionally allied with France, for the most part mirrored the relationship with France.

King Henry VIII’s Foreign Policy Contents

Pro Spain – 1509-14 Pro France – 1514-20 Peace-Keeping Policy – 1520-21 Pro Spain – 1521-25 Pro France – 1525-32 Neutral – 1532-39 Pro German – 1539-40 Pro Scotland – 1542-45 Pro Spain – 1543-45 Isolated – 1545-47 Success or Failure?

Pro Spanish Policy 1509 – 1514

When Henry VIII came to power he had little interest in politics, preferring to spend his time hunting and enjoying time with his friends. As a second son, he had not been prepared for the role of King and had virtually no experience in the running of the country.

Soon after succeeding to the throne, Henry married Catherine of Aragon, daughter of the Spanish monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain. Catherine had been betrothed to Henry’s elder brother, Arthur at a young age and had been educated and schooled for her future role as Queen of England. She was also trained to steer the Henry VIII’s foreign policy so that it favoured Spain.

Henry dreamed of following in the footsteps of Henry V and conquering France. In 1511 the Treaty of Westminster agreed that Henry and Ferdinand of Spain would attack France in the Spring of 1512. However, although Henry took Thouranne and Tournai in 1513, it soon became clear that Ferdinand had no intention of helping Henry achieve his aims but rather, used English forces for his own benefit.

While Henry was fighting the French in France, Catherine of Aragon dealt with a Scottish invasion. Following her orders, the English army were victorious at Flodden Field. King James IV of Scotland and a large number of nobles were killed during the fighting. The victory meant Scotland would pose no threat to England until the infant James V reached his majority.

Pro French Policy 1514 – 1520

Disillusioned by Ferdinand’s betrayal, Henry was less keen to take his wife’s advice, preferring to take advice from Thomas Wolsey, his chief minister. Wolsey advocated a pro-French foreign policy and Henry agreed.

In 1514 a peace treaty was agreed with France. It was to be sealed with the marriage of Henry’s younger sister, Mary, to the aging King Louis XII of France.

On 31st December 1514, King Louis XII died. The new King Francis I was happy to renew the peace between the two countries.

Negotiated by Wolsey, the Treaty of London was signed on 2nd October 1518. It agreed a perpetual peace between England and France that would be sealed by the marriage of the Dauphin of France and Henry’s infant daughter, Princess Mary . The treaty was extended and a total of 24 countries agreed to maintain peace in Europe.

Two years later, in June 1520 King Henry VIII and King Francis I met for a summit meeting. The eleven day summit was given the name Field of the Cloth of Gold because of the large number of cloth of gold tents that housed members of the nobility.

Peace-Keeping Policy 1520 – 1521

Three days before leaving for the Field of the Cloth of Gold summit meeting with Francis I, Henry VIII held a meeting with Charles V in Kent. Charles, had succeeded to the Spanish throne after the death of his grandfather, Ferdinand in 1516 and in 1519 he was elected Holy Roman Emperor.

A second meeting was held at Gravelines after the summit. It was agreed that neither Henry nor Charles would make a new alliance with France without the consent of the other for a period of two years. However, in 1521, after Francis defeated the Duke of Milan at Marignano, Charles and Pope Leo V agreed a treaty with Milan against France. English ambassadors were immediately sent to France to persuade Francis to make peace with Charles but they were unsuccessful and war broke out between France and the Hapsburg Empire.

Pro Spanish Policy 1521 – 1525

Henry VIII was reluctant to support Charles with troops on the ground and would only agree to the support if Charles became betrothed to Henry’s five year old daughter, Princess Mary. The Treaty of Bruges signed 25th August 1521 agreed that Henry would make sure that Charles had free access to the English Channel and that he and Charles would make a joint invasion of France before May 1523.

In retaliation for the Treaty of Bruges, the Duke of Albany, Regent of Scotland, who had been in France since 1517, returned to Scotland. Under the terms of a new agreement between France and Scotland, Albany would invade England if England invaded France.

In 1523 Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk invaded France with plans to lay siege to Boulogne. He met with the Spanish General Count Buren but they were unable to maintain the siege of Boulogne and abandoned it in favour of an attempt to take Paris. However, Francis had filled the capital with French troops making it an impossible task. Insanitary conditions led to the deaths of more than 100 English troops and Suffolk decided to retreat to Calais and then return to England.

Pro French Policy 1525 – 1532

In 1524 peace negotiations between England and France began. However, before they could be concluded the the French were defeated at the Battle of Pavia and Francis I was captured and taken prisoner. In 1526, Francis was freed by the terms of the Treaty of Madrid after exchanging his two eldest sons as hostage. Charles V no longer needed English support against France. He renounced his betrothal to Princess Mary and married Isabella of Portugal.

On 20th August 1525, the Treaty of the More agreed a peace between England and France. Two years later French ambassadors arrived in England to discuss a marriage between Princess Mary and the son of Francis I. However, when the Bishop of Tarbes expressed doubt over the validity of Henry’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon, the marriage negotiations broke down.

Nevertheless, the Treaty of Westminster, signed 30th April 1527, agreed that England would support France in negotiations to secure the release of the sons of Francis I held hostage by Charles.

On 6th May 1527, the Sack of Rome by Charles V meant that the Pope was now under Hapsburg control. Henry had hoped to petition the Pope to sanction a divorce from Catherine of Aragon but as Charles V was Catherine’s nephew this was now an impossible aim.

Wolsey hoped that with French support the divorce could still be achieved and he began negotiations. Unaware that Henry planned to marry Anne Boleyn, Wolsey suggested that Henry take a French bride.

The Treaty of Amiens, signed in August 1527 was a commercial treaty between England and France that put an embargo on goods from the Netherlands until the Pope was freed. The treaty also provided for the marriage of Princess Mary to Henri,  the second son of Francis I.

By 1528 the effects of the trade embargo with the Netherlands was having a devastating effect on the economy and causing financial hardship to those employed in the cloth industry. Henry had no choice but to agree terms with Charles V so that trading could resume. Attempts at a peace with Charles broke down.

In October 1532 Francis and Henry met at Calais. Francis was in negotiations with the Pope and believed he could get Henry his divorce as part of the settlement in return for Henry’s support against Charles. However, Henry had already decided to make himself Head of the Church in England and did not want to go to war against Charles.

Break with Rome – English neutrality 1532 – 1539

Between 1532 and 1534 a series of Acts of Parliament made the Break with Rome and established the Anglican religion with the monarch Head of the Church in England. The Break with Rome set England at odds with France and Spain, both Catholic countries. However, France and Spain were in conflict over Milan and with their efforts concentrated against each other England could remain neutral. However, English ambassadors were told to guard against any move towards an alliance between Francis and Charles.

Having failed to give Henry VIII the son he desired, Anne Boleyn was found guilty of adultery and plotting the King’s death and executed for treason. Her replacement, Jane Seymour, gave Henry the son he so desired but died shortly after the birth.

Pro German Policy 1539 – 1540

Thomas Cromwell, Henry’s chief minister was concerned about England being without allies in Europe and the threat of a possible attack by France or Spain. Despite Henry’s strengthening of fortifications along the south coast and the navy being increased significantly Cromwell believed an alliance with another country was essential.

He suggested an alliance with Protestant Germany sealed with a marriage. Negotiations began in 1539 and Henry VIII married Anne of Cleves on 6th January 1540 but he was not happy with his new bride and she agreed a divorce in July, three weeks before Henry married Kathryn Howard.

Pro Scottish Policy 1542 – 1545

In the autumn of 1542, peace negotiations between England and Scotland were proposed. However, they broke down when neither party could agree an acceptable place to meet. On 24th October 1542 Scottish troops that had invaded England were decisively beaten at Solway Moss. The Scottish King James V died two months later leaving his six-day old daughter Mary as Queen of Scotland.

Henry hoped to exploit the situation by securing a betrothal between his son, Edward and the infant Queen of Scotland. This would mean that when Edward became King he would unite England and Scotland. The Treaty of Greenwich, signed 1st July 1543, agreed the match and a peace between England and Scotland.

However, after Cardinal Beaton took power in Scotland he repudiated the Treaty of Greenwich and renewed the Auld Alliance with France. Mary of Guise placed the young Queen in hiding, fearing the English would invade and take her hostage.

Pro Spanish Policy 1543 – 1545

In February 1543, an agreement between Henry VIII and Charles V was reached. They made a series of demands on Francis I including reimbursing Charles for costs incurred by France’s alliance with Turkey and ceding Boulogne to England. Charles and Henry threatened to invade France if he did not comply.

Francis did not comply with the demands and Henry began planning an invasion of France. In 1544, Henry made the crossing to France at the head of an army of 40,000 men. The English army placed Boulogne under siege. Despite the fact that Charles failed to provide the promised support, Boulogne was captured.

In retaliation, the following year Francis sent troops to Scotland and placed Boulogne under siege. He also made a series of naval raids along the south coast of England. On 19th July an attack on the Solent saw the sinking of the Mary Rose with a huge loss of life.

England isolated – 1545 – 1547

In the autumn of 1545 peace negotiations between England and France broke down. An alliance was proposed between England and Spain but that too failed.

On 7th January 1546, the Battle of St Etienne saw the English defeated with a loss of 220 men. Peace talks with France were re-opened and terms were agreed.

Was Henry VIII’s Foreign Policy a Success or Failure?

In terms of achievements and gains, Henry VIII’s foreign policy achieved little. At the beginning of his reign Henry set out to emulate the achievements of Henry V and lay claim to the French throne. What he managed, was to take Tournai, Therouanne and Boulogne, all of which were later returned to France. In this respect his foreign policy was a failure. 

In economic terms, Henry VIII’s Foreign Policy can also be seen as a failure. When he became King in 1509 he inherited a very healthy treasury. When he died in 1547, it was nearly empty. The cost of his French campaigns had been huge but had brought nothing in reward.

Nevertheless, despite the failures outlined above, Henry did put on a great show of English power, majesty and wealth. Visiting ambassadors were always royally housed and entertained. The Field of the Cloth of Gold summit also put England on display as a great and wealthy nation. This aspect of Henry VIII’s Foreign Policy was successful in displaying England to foreign powers as a worthy player on the European stage.

The 1518 Treaty of London which brought about a peace in Europe was arguably Wolsey’s finest achievement and even though the peace was not lasting, its signing in London was a mark of prestige and a great achievement for English politics.

Henry VIII’s foreign policy can also be seen as highly successful in terms of maintaining English security. Despite being at odds with both France and Spain at various points during his reign, there was no direct attack on English soil. Henry avoided being drawn into the Spanish/French conflict in Italy and by anticipating a French attack on the south coast in 1545, put measures in place to make a French invasion virtually impossible.

Published Feb 25, 2022 @ 3:15 pm – Updated –  Oct 13, 2022 @ 9:23 am

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Henry VII achieved the aims of his foreign policy. Comment

enry VII thought an effective foreign policy was essential in the governing and security of the realm. Henry believed that a good foreign policy meant security, recognition and prosperity. Security: Henry thought it very important to prevent other powers from harbouring pretenders to the English throne. Recognition: the beginning of the new Tudor dynasty had to be accepted over seas. This gave Henry a secure position on his throne and the family marriages in Spain and Scotland were vital in his process to achieve international respectability. Prosperity: Henry knew that a rich king was better respected than a poor one. He was anxious to fill his pockets with foreign money and improve the trading of England’s merchants. A successful example of this being the treaty of Etaples in 1492 with France giving Henry a £5000 pension paid to him every year for the rest of his reign.

Henry VII had several areas that he needed to concentrate on in order to prevent any clashes with foreign powers: France, Spain, Burgundy, Scotland and Ireland. Each had its own problems, which Henry was quick to resolve, and in some cases, make money from.

rance had been a rival with England since William the Conqueror invaded and took control of England. Evidence for this long running feud is the Hundred Years War. Henry VII had a good start this time though, he had been exiled to France and had made some good friends there. In the same year that he came to the throne, Henry negotiated a truce with France that would last until 1487 and after that Henry hoped that he would not need a peace treaty with France in order for them not to attack him. However, in 1487, France was intending to take control of Brittany by marriage. Anne of Beaujeu was proposing the marriage of Charles VIII of France and Anne, daughter of Dike Francis of Brittany. Brittany called upon England for assistance in the matter. Henry agreed to send troops to Brittany, for a price though, while he acted as a mediator between France and Brittany. Brittany shunned Henry’s help as mediator so he therefore renewed his truce with France for another two years. In July 1888 France took Brittany and made sure that the heir to Brittany could not marry without French consent. Duke Francis died 3 weeks later putting his daughter Anne in the custody of France and free to marry Charles VIII, the total take over of Brittany and its incorporation into France seemed imminent. Despite this Henry still felt obliged to defend Brittany so he and Maximillian, Holy Roman Emperor, sent troops to defend the border with France. A downside to this plan however, was that Maximillian could not be trusted as he so often changed sides. Out of Henry’s control, Charles VIII marries Anne in 1891 and Brittany becomes part of France so Henry is left unsure about the future with France. In October the following year, 26000 men are sent to siege Boulogne on the French coast. This was a failed attempt to retaliate as October is not the month to be fighting and Charles was concentrating on Italy at the time. Later that year, Charles and Henry signed the treaty of Etaples, this contained two important sections, France could not harbour pretenders to the throne of England and they would pay Henry an annual pension of £5000 to keep him out of France’s affairs. Both of these sections were very helpful to Henry as he was gathering wealth to establish the Tudor dynasty, and to secure the throne. Henry knew how important it was to prevent pretenders to the throne from gaining support, as he was one himself.

Towards the end of his reign, Henry attempted an alliance between France, the Netherlands and England, The League of Cambrai. This was not at all successful and it collapsed, Henry was left isolated from Europe. However, was this isolation beneficial to Henry as isolation could lead to nobody being interested in dealing with you so you gain no enemies.

All told, Henry’s dealings with France were somewhat dangerous at the start of his reign but turned out beneficial to him as he had gained an extra £5000 per annum to establish his dynasty.

This is a preview of the whole essay

pain had emerged as a superpower in Europe in the late 1400’s and its unification in 1479 with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile made it a country to make peace with and not war. Henry VII felt the same the treaty of Medina Del Campo settled a marriage of the young Prince Arthur of England to Catherine of Aragon creating a family bond between England and Spain. This treaty also banned Spain, like France, from harbouring rebels against Henry. Another treaty was signed between Spain and England against France. Spain had agreed to assist Henry in attempts to regain land in France as long as England would do the same.

When Isabella of Castile died in 1504 Spain was once again divided. Ferdinand and Henry were now rivals in the marriage market. Due to relations when it was unified, both Aragon and Castile were friendly with England and as Prince Arthur died, Catherine of Aragon was set to marry the new heir to England, Henry (would become Henry VIII). However, this was in question as Henry felt it against his conscience to marry, what was, his brother’s future wife.

Meanwhile, Ferdinand had married the niece of Louis XII of France thus forming a French-Spanish alliance. Ferdinand did this due to the relationship between Burgundy and England; Burgundy was supporting pretenders to the English throne so Spain wanted had made an alliance between France, Spain and England, a powerful combination. In 1506 a newly united Spain was in alliance with France and Henry was left isolated once more, advantageous or disadvantageous? In a revival of the League of Cambrai, the Pope, Louis XII of France, Emperor Maximillian, Charles of Burgundy and Ferdinand of Aragon had joined against Venice. Yet again England is left out and isolated, leaving Henry very safe indeed.

arly in the 15 th  Century, Burgundy had established itself as independent from France and in 1435 allied itself with Yorkist England. Edward IV had strengthened the alliance in the 1460’s. This alliance was useful to Edward as Burgundy helped him take control of England after hearing that France had sided with the Lancastrians and wanted to incorporate Burgundy back into France. Burgundy continued to support the house of York providing a safe place for Yorkist pretenders to seek refuge whilst gathering support to take the throne of England. Margaret of Burgundy was the key figure in these actions. A wealthy and powerful woman, she provided the financial backing for pretenders, two particular individuals who had substantial backing from her were Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck.

The Treaty of Windsor was signed between Philip of Burgundy and Henry VII. The treaty meant that Henry would recognise Philip and his wife Joanna King and Queen of Castile. In return, Henry would marry Philip and Joanna’s daughter solidifying the relationship between the two countries. In addition, Henry asked for the Duke of Suffolk to be handed over to him on the grounds of treason. The Duke of Suffolk had fled to Burgundy to seek the assistance of Margaret of Burgundy to help return the throne of England to the house of York. However, following the unexpected death of Philip in 1506, Ferdinand of Aragon proclaimed Joanna insane and her son Charles not only Charles of Burgundy but of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor, like his father. Henry could not complete the treaty as Philip was dead and with no daughter for Henry to marry. However, the Duke of Suffolk was returned preventing another possible pretender. As the treaty had collapsed, Henry was once again left isolated from Burgundy, isolated being peaceful.

n 1382 Scotland was recognised as being independent from England, despite this, English kings were still calling themselves King of Scotland. With it being independent, Scotland was regarded as the back door to England where people could invade through the fragile north. France was allied with Scotland at the time of Henry VII’s reign but Henry had seen to France with various treaties and truces. In 1485 Henry wanted to avoid an expensive war with Scotland and James III of Scotland was noted for trying to stir up revolts in the north and disrupt English security. In 1486, Henry negotiated a three-year truce with Scotland preventing them from entering England on a military basis. Before the truce had expired, James III was killed in fighting leaving his very young son James IV as king. As James was coming of age, Scotland was ruled by the lords and for the next few years the hostility continued. It was not until 1492 when James IV came of age that friendship could be established. However, James supported Perkin Warbeck in his attempt to take the throne of England putting him out of favour with Henry. James ultimately failed to cause unrest in the north and people were happy with the peace between the two sides. Henry tried to settle the matter by proposing the marriage of James IV to his daughter Margaret but James was far more interested in a Spanish princess. It was not until 1499 that James regarded Margaret as a serious marriage proposal and three years later they married. England and Scotland were once again joined.  The marriage secured the Treaty of Ayton signed in 1497. This treaty was largely one of peace and it lasted for many years and like most treaties drawn by Henry VII it included a section stating that Scotland could not harbour rebels.

All together Scotland was left happy and England was happy also. Rebels could no longer find refuge in Scotland and it could not be used as a back entrance to England. Despite this peace, Henry was still concerned about their alliance with France.

nother important area for Henry to make peace with was Ireland. The only part of Ireland under direct English control was a small area around Dublin called the Pale. Much of the eastern side of Ireland was in the hands of Anglo-Irish lords as opposed to the west, which was under the control of Gaelic clans. English Kings had relied upon the Desmond, Kildare and Ormund families to keep the peace in Ireland; the loyalty of these was to come into question in the early years of Henry VII’s rule. Henry was concerned with the possibility that Yorkist pretenders could hide in the vast countryside and when Perkin Warbeck landed in October 1491, his fears were confirmed. Things turned worse when Kildare did nothing to evict the rebel Warbeck so Henry removed him from his position. Poynings, as Lord Deputy replaced him, he immediately arrested Kildare and sent him to England for Henry to deal with. Poynings went on to establish his own law in Ireland, Poynings Law was harsh towards the Irish but meant Henry could rule it easier. The Irish no longer had any independent political power, parliament could not be called without the Kings permission therefore no laws could be passed without the Kings permission. The laws of England would now apply to Ireland as well but this was not negotiated with the Irish. Most important of all was that Ireland could not harbour rebels to England. This meant that Warbeck had lost his support in Ireland and had to leave in 1497. Things changed towards the end of Henry’s rule however with the pardoning of the Earl of Kildare in 1496 and power was returned to him. Later in 1509, complete control if Ireland was returned to the Irish.

o conclude, all of Henry’s frankly brilliant foreign policies were a success. In France he had prevented them from harbouring rebels and pretenders to the throne, he also got a £5000 pension from them each year with the Treaty of Etaples. Spain was a similar situation, a powerful country that would be dangerous if made an enemy. Peace by marriage between Catherine of Aragon and Henry VIII was successful and once more Spain could not provide refuge for pretenders to Henry’s throne. Yorkist Burgundy was kept away with the Treaty of Windsor and Scotland was kept at peace with the Treaty of Ayton, which included the section where they could not harbour pretenders or rebels. Ireland, a vast expanse of countryside ideal for Yorkists to hide in was not such a success as Henry was unable to establish control over it. However, he had insured the loyalty of the Desmond, Kildare and Ormund families by pardoning the Earl of Kildare after he ignored the arrival of Perkin Warbeck to his shores.

All told, Henry was at peace with Europe, Ireland and Scotland through various treaties, marriages and truces. He was also somewhat isolated from the rest of Europe, but was this advantageous? He was left alone to do his own business and did not concern the major powers on the continent.

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Q&A: The Tragedy of Haiti

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The Tragedy of Haiti

The world has let this caribbean country down for centuries. will anything change now.

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• Foreign & Public Diplomacy
• Ravi Agrawal

The ongoing crisis in Haiti represents the biggest security crisis in the Americas—and maybe even the Western Hemisphere—right now. And yet it gets little attention. Around 80 percent of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs, and it has driven tens of thousands of people to flee in the last few weeks. The airports and seaports are shut down. Food and aid are scarce. State institutions are largely in ruins.

How did we get here? There are many moments in history one could point to as causes for the current strife. You could go as far back as the Haitian revolution that began in the 1790s—a slave rebellion that somehow ended up with Haiti paying France reparations instead of the other way round. Or you could pick the 2010 earthquake that leveled the capital and killed anywhere from 100,000 to 300,000 people, and after which Haiti has struggled to recover. But the most proximate cause of the current crisis seems to be from last month, when armed gangs took over the state while acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry was out of the country. Now, a new transitional council is being formed, and it will look to restore order while paving a path to elections in 2026.

What is the situation on the ground like, and what might happen next? I spoke with two experts on FP Live: Jacqueline Charles , a correspondent for the Miami Herald who has spent more than a decade covering Haiti; and Jake Johnston , a senior research associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, and the author of Aid State: Elite Panic, Disaster Capitalism, and the Battle to Control Haiti . What follows is a condensed and lightly edited transcript.

Ravi Agrawal: Jacqueline, can you describe what life is like for people on the ground right now?

Jacqueline Charles: If there is one word I can think about, it’s panic. You don’t know what every day is going to bring. You wake up and you hear the gunshots. People are telling me that when they don’t hear the gunfire, that’s when they start to panic and wonder what’s wrong, because it’s become such a constant for them now.

Unfortunately, with the vandalism, the burning, and the looting of hospitals, it’s very difficult to get health care. But people still get sick. Just last week, I interviewed a young lady who was literally watching her mother die. Her mother had not had dialysis in six weeks because the only place that she could get it, the general hospital, was not functioning because gangs had taken over that entire road.

You can’t go anywhere. If you take that risk, you don’t know whether you’re going to be the next victim. There’s no medication. The store shelves are starting to run bare. In about two weeks or less, we’re going to really start to see a humanitarian crisis. It’s not just the people in the camps, but also the people who are not in the camps, who are not going to be able to find food because the airport and the seaport have been shut down for over a month now.

RA: Jake, where do you rank this in terms of other crises Haiti has had in the past?

Jake Johnston: I think in almost every way this is unprecedented. We need to understand that this didn’t just happen a month ago. This has been a long time coming. There have been warnings about it reaching this stage for many years.

Now, nobody is speaking. The authorities that are currently in power and Henry, who is out of the country, are totally silent. The presidential council that’s being formed with the backing of international powers is also totally silent. In that absence, who is speaking are the leaders of armed groups or politicians on the ground who are advocating for very different things. Everyone’s sort of in the dark.

RA: Jacqueline, with gangs controlling so much of the movement in and out of the country, what kind of access do aid groups have right now?

JC: The U.N. recently released a report that noted 114 interruptions last month in trying to bring aid to individuals primarily in camps. Some of the private ports have managed to still get some produce in. But those individuals who have managed to get a container or two out are paying enormous prices. The price of basic food items has gone up by over 40 percent. It’s very difficult.

The reality is that the U.N. is asking for $674 million, and they have only received $45 million so far. The world is not opening its checkbooks, not even for humanitarian requests when people are dying and need food, medicine, and water. There are displacement camps where there is no aid because there just isn’t enough to go around. That, I think, is a real tragedy. We’re having to decide whose lives we attempt to save.

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RA: Jake, we hear a lot about the gangs who’ve taken control of Port-au-Prince. What do they want?

JJ: I think we need to understand a few things. One is we have this ostensible coalition that came together to force Henry out. But these are very disparate actors with disparate interests. I think the reality is there’s not one goal. There are multiple goals and a lot of different interests at play here, and that’s part of why this is so confusing.

The history of armed groups in Haiti is closely linked with political and economic interests in Haiti. I think it remains so today, though, obviously, the sort of levels of coordination and control perhaps have changed in recent times.

These armed groups are exercising sort of de facto territorial control but are not actually replacing the state or taking over state control. And so, there is a real question of whether that’s their goal or if they are intending to increase bargaining power or support the political aspirations of other actors outside of these armed groups themselves.

Prefer to listen?   Follow the FP Live  podcast for the entire conversation, plus other in-depth discussions, wherever you get your podcasts.

RA: Jacqueline, it looks like a transitional council has been finalized. What do they hope to achieve?

JC: The members of this council have to figure out what their role is. The criticism coming out of Haiti is that they’ve given themselves an enormous amount of power that, constitutionally, the president would normally have. For instance, they’ve said they will hire the next prime minister, which is usually the purview of a parliament. Another concern is who should be in charge.

With this council, you have seven voting members and two observers. But you look at civil society, which has played a very active role in these years, and they’ve only been given this observer status. There are a couple of individuals who have served in government before, who are not necessarily reflecting the demographics or what you’re hearing on the streets. We’re wishing them success, but this does not look like a clear path. It looks very murky, very uncertain.

RA: Talk to us a bit more about the strength of civil society. One criticism of the way in which the world has handled various crises in Haiti over the years is that it hasn’t really empowered civil society. And, after all, for democracy to flourish, you need it to grow roots from within.

JC: One of the biggest issues with Haiti is the fact that we don’t have strong institutions—and in some cases, no institutions. When I think of Haitian civil society, I think of the human rights sector. They have literally been the watchdog on this crisis, telling us about the various massacres and attacks. In a country where everything has been crumbling for years, they have managed to stay and to be the eyes and ears.

But it’s under tremendous pressure, including threats to their own lives, for the work that they do.

RA: Jake, it’s been almost three years since [President] Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his home. We still don’t know exactly who was responsible for that. But if you look back at Haiti’s history, how did we get here?

JJ: At the root of so much of this is the inability of Haiti to actually have a sovereign democracy. It’s been interfered with for so long, whether that be coups or overturned election results. That’s where I would start with the present situation: the overturning of the 2010-2011 election results after the earthquake. This really changed the trajectory of Haiti, both in terms of its democracy, but also accompanied by billions of dollars in foreign assistance. These two dynamics of money that largely bypassed the government, bypassed local institutions, and undermined grassroots organizing, combined with a really heavy hand on the political side of things like choosing Haiti’s leaders. We’ve seen this over the last 15 years—steadily declining participation, erosion of any faith in democracy, and the inability of Haitians to chart their own path forward. In this decimation of democracy, you’ve had this turn to paramilitary violence and settling political scores through violence rather than through other means.

That’s not just a story about Haiti. That’s a story also about the role of international actors in Haiti and foreign-policy decisions from the U.S., from the United Nations, and from other countries that have helped destabilize the situation and cause the present situation.

RA: So, Jake, let me ask you about some possible solutions. If you were to put power in the hands of Haitians and give them the ability to rebuild their state, where does that begin?

JJ: It begins with dialogue. It sounds sort of simplistic to say, but I think it’s the only path. For a year and a half, we’ve been talking about external security intervention as imminent or the only solution to Haiti’s security crisis. I think regardless of what we think about that, it’s not happening tomorrow, and Haitians can’t just sit around and wait for that.

It needs to be about what can happen now. That process needs to start with a dialogue, and not just a dialogue among seven people with CARICOM to form this council but a dialogue across the country. This is not just Port-au-Prince. This is a big country with interests all over the provinces. So how can you bridge these long-standing gaps? Between urban and rural, between Petion-Ville and Upper Port-au-Prince? There are huge divisions here, and the effort to overcome them has to be through dialogue for me.

There’s a lot of pushback on this, saying we can’t give armed groups a seat at the table. I’m not suggesting giving amnesty or things like this. But I do think we need to be honest that this is not something that can be attacked only with force, that this is a bigger issue about a broken social contract, about a state that has left big parts of the country behind. If we’re trying to bridge those gaps, if we’re trying to get at the root causes of what generates this instability and empowering the Haitian people to actually take charge of their state, they need to be a part of that discussion in some meaningful way.

RA: But aren’t there many steps before you can get to that stage? With gangs running amok across Port-au-Prince, what kind of international intervention is needed? And how would such an intervention be legitimized?

JC: I think the first thing today is security. The average Haitian wants security. They want to be able to wake up in the morning and not panic. Last year, I visited a school and when I was watching these kids, I realized that these are kids that can be at any classroom in America or elsewhere in the world. With everything I’ve seen, you develop sort of an iron heart. But I literally started crying because in that moment I started thinking about what it took every morning for those kids to come to school, and the fact that while they are there, their parents cannot depend on them being safe. Schools are no longer off limits; they are also being attacked. So I think that what we need is to figure out how to put security back.

I see the divisions that exist, and they go back centuries. But we need to start to build institutions. When you put institutions in place and provide them with support, then they can start to do the grassroots work in various communities and figure out how in this country of many realities, we find a way to move forward, even if we don’t agree. But trying to get past these divisions is not going to get us to where we need to get right away. We need to deal with security and institution-building.

Ravi Agrawal is the editor in chief of Foreign Policy . Twitter:  @RaviReports

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